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THE

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PŪRVA-MIMĀMSĀ-SŪTRAS OF JAIMINI

WITH
AN ORIGINAL COMMENTARY IN ENGLISH

BY
MAHĀMAHOPĀDHYĀYA GANGANATHA JHA, D. LITT.

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THE PŪRVA-MĪMĀMSĀ-SŪTRAS OF JAIMINI

WITH AN ORIGINAL COMMENTARY IN ENGLISH.

FIRST ADHYĀYA.

MEANS OF ACQUIRING RIGHT KNOWLEDGE OF DUTY.

FIRST PĀDA.

THE TARKA-POLEMICAL—PĀDA.

Adhikaraṇa I.—Necessity of the Inquiry embodied in the Sūtras.

SŪTRA 1.

अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा ॥ १ । १ । १ ॥

अथ Atha, now. अतः Atah, therefore. धर्म Dharma, duty—जिज्ञासा Jijñāsā, desire to know, enquiry.

1. Now, therefore, (there must be) an inquiry into (the nature of) Duty.—1.

COMMENTARY.

When the student recalls to his mind the injunctive text 'Svādhyāyo-
'dhyetavyah,' 'the Veda should be studied,'—there arises a doubt in his
mind as to the scope and method of this study: should he only get up
the words of the Vedic texts? or, should he, after having got up the texts,
proceed to learn the meaning of the texts and further developments there-
from? The former naturally is the course that suggests itself to him as
the one to be adopted; he argues that the study of the Veda has been laid
down in the Veda;—this study, therefore, must lead to some desirable
result;—as the text itself does not speak of any particular result, we must
assume the 'attainment of heaven' to be that result;—as this result can,
by virtue of the text itself, be obtained by the mere learning of the texts,
the 'study' enjoined must end with this;—and there can be no need or
justification for prolonging the study after that.

The above *prima facie* statement has been called the 'Pûrvapakṣa'; and in answer to this we have the following final conclusion, which is called the 'Siddhānta' or 'accepted view'; it is this latter view that is embodied in the first aphorism.

'Now'—after the text of the Veda has been learnt during residence with the teacher,—'therefore'—because the real fruit of the learning of the text lies in the acquiring of the knowledge of its real meaning and import,—there must arise 'the desire to know duty,' which desire must be the motive for the enquiry into the nature of duty. It is a universally accepted law that, so long as we can trace out a visible result of an act, we shall not be justified in postulating an invisible or 'super-physical' result; and hence in the case in question it follows that, inasmuch as we actually find 'the knowledge of the meaning of the texts' following from the knowledge of the texts themselves, there can be no justification for assuming 'that the learning of the Veda' leads to 'attainment of heaven'; and thus there remains nothing for the above Pûrvapakṣa to stand upon.

The above is the statement of the 'topic' of the Sûtra in accordance with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's interpretation of the Bhāṣya—called the 'Bhāṭṭa-mata'. The Guru-mata or Prabhākara's Interpretation is somewhat different. It may be briefly stated as follows:—

As a matter of fact we do not find any such Vedic text as 'the V should be studied'; and it is on this presumed text that the above explanation of the 'topic' proceeds. We shall take for our basic text, the well-known texts 'aṣṭavarṣam brāhmaṇam upanayīta, tam adhyāpayīta,' 'He should initiate the eight-year-old Brāhmaṇa boy and should teach him.' This text, we find, lays down the initiating and teaching as a duty,—for whom?—for the Brāhmaṇa who is desirous of acquiring for himself the title of 'Āchārya,' 'Professor.' Thus then the teaching by the Professor being directly laid down, this same injunction also implies the injunction of studying the Veda; because until the student studies, there is no teaching in the proper sense of the word. Now the question arises—'Does this studying include the learning of the meaning, &c., also, or the mere reading of the verbal text?' The Pûrvapakṣa standpoint is as follows:—"The enjoined teaching by the Professor cannot imply the learning, by the student, of the meaning also; because even though the student may not learn the meaning, if the Professor has succeeded in making him learn the verbal text, his work of teaching is thereby accomplished and the coveted title of professorship acquired." The final conclusion, however, is that the learning of the meaning is also included in the injunction. It



may be that the teaching that is enjoined does not directly denote the learning of the meaning ; but it has to be borne in mind that in 'studying the Veda,' it will be necessary for the student to learn the subsidiary sciences of grammar, prosody, lexicography and the like ; and when he will have learnt all this, the knowledge thereby attained will naturally by itself enable him to understand much of the meaning of the Vedic texts also ; and when he has acquired this faculty, there would be many instances, where he would be in doubt as to the true meaning ; such, for instance, would be all those thousand and odd cases that form the subject matter of the adhikarāṇas of the Mīmāṃsā Śāstras, Pūrva and Uttara alike ; and in order to settle his doubts upon these points, it would be necessary for him to carry on, with the help of his Professor, a systematic enquiry ; and thus this enquiry necessarily becomes a part and parcel of that 'study' and 'teaching' which is enjoined by the text quoted at the outset.

It will be noted that between the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara presentment of the Adhikarāṇa, there is no difference as regards the basic topic or doubt ; as in both the investigation into the meaning of the Vedic texts forms the topic, and the doubt also is the same in both cases—'is this investigation covered by the injunction of study.' The only difference that there is lies in the choice of the basic text, and the consequent shape given to the reasonings of the Pūrvaapakṣa and the Siddhānta.

Adhikarāṇa II.—Definition of 'Dharma.'

SŪTRA 2.

चोदनालक्षणो ऽर्थो धर्मः ॥ २ ॥

चोदना Chodanā, injunction (Vedic).—**लक्षणः** Lakṣaṇaḥ, source of knowledge. That whereof the Vedic injunction is the only source of knowledge. **अर्थः** Arthaḥ, something desirable. **धर्मः** Dharmaḥ, (is) Duty.

2. Dharma or Duty is that which, being desirable, is indicated (or taught) by Vedic injunction.

COMMENTARY.

In the preceding adhikarāṇa the conclusion was arrived at that it is necessary to carry on an investigation into the nature of Dharma. The next question that arises is—Is there possible a definition of Dharma ? or is there any valid means of knowing what this Dharma is ? The Pūrvaapakṣa argument is that there can be no 'definition' of Dharma ; as we can define only such things of the ordinary world of which we have some knowledge, while Dharma is something beyond the world, and as such not

having its distinctive features known, it cannot be defined. As regards the means of knowing Dharma, no such means is possible; because it cannot be perceived by the senses; and what is absolutely beyond the senses cannot be amenable to Inference; for a similar reason it must be beyond all words and phrases. Thus it must be admitted that (1) there can be no definition of Dharma, and (2) there can be no trustworthy means of knowing what Dharma is; and under the circumstances Dharma must be rejected as a nonentity; thus the whole inquiry becomes aimless and futile. In answer to this the final conclusion is that—(1) Dharma can be defined as that desirable thing which is mentioned or laid down by Vedic Injunctions; that is to say, that which the Vedic injunction lays down as leading to a desirable end is Dharma; and from this it also follows that the Vedic Injunction is the sole means of knowing Dharma. Thus the three ideas conveyed by the sūtra are—(1) that Dharma is that which, etc., etc., (2) that the Vedic Injunction is the only means of knowing Dharma, and (3) that Vedic injunctions are absolutely trustworthy. Thus then Dharma having been duly defined, and a valid and trustworthy means of knowing it being found available, it cannot be rejected as a nonentity.

The Prābhākara interpretation is as follows:—

In sūtra (1), the word 'aṭha' has been interpreted as denoting the sequence to the study of the entire Veda, and the word 'aṭha' as providing the reason for the proposed enquiry—because the entire Veda is intended to express some meaning; and on the basis of these true facts it has been hinted that the word 'dharma' as contained in that first sūtra indicates the whole Veda; and it was in view of this that the 'enquiry into Dharma' was interpreted to mean 'enquiring into the meaning of the Veda.' At this point the following question arises:—What is meant by the phrase 'the meaning of the Veda' or 'what the Veda expresses?' Does it mean anything and everything spoken of in any sentence of the Veda—including even mere descriptions and mention of things of the world? or is it intended to apply to only that which the Veda speaks of, or lays down, as to be done? On this point, the *prima facie* argument is that as the Veda certainly speaks of the ordinary things also,—specially in the case of mantras and arthavādas which are chiefly merely descriptive of the past and present state of things,—there can be no doubt as to these things also being included in the term 'what the Veda expresses.' That the mere statement of facts brings about desirable results is proved by the well-known instance of the conveyance of the news of the birth of a son being the cause of pleasure. And the inner motive of this reasoning is that when

all such ordinary things become included under the object of enquiry, it could not be rightly asserted that the Veda is the only means of knowing them; for in regard to the ordinary things before our eyes, for instance, Visual Perception would certainly be a surer guide than any number of Vedic injunctions. The final conclusion is that the object of enquiry as expressed by the term 'what is expressed by the Veda' must be that alone which the Veda lays down as to be done; and this is done only by the Injunctions, and not by mantras and arthavādas; and on the point of a certain act, which is yet to be done, leading to a certain result in the future, there can be no guide save a trustworthy source of information; and such a one *par excellence* is the Vedic Injunction. As regards the instance cited above, of desirable results proceeding from the mere statement of facts, there is nothing to prove beyond doubt that the pleasurable feeling has been produced by the conveying of the news. In the case of the injunction, however, there can be not the slightest doubt in the mind of the observant young man that the action of the fetching of the cow has been the direct result of the injunction 'fetch the cow.'

Adhikarāṇa III.—Propounding of the Enquiry into the valid means of knowing Dharma.

SŪTRA 3.

तस्य निमित्तपरीष्टिः ॥ २ ॥

तस्य Tasya, thereof, of the true knowledge of Dharma. निमित्त Nimitta, cause, source, means. परीष्टिः Parīṣṭiḥ, examination, investigation.

3. An enquiry into the means of the true knowledge of Dharma (becomes necessary).—3.

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted above that the Vedic Injunction is the means of knowing Dharma. Now the question arises—Is it necessary to discuss the question as to whether or not a true knowledge of Dharma can be acquired by the help of the other well-recognised means of knowledge?

The conclusion is that such a discussion is absolutely necessary; as without it we could not be sure of the declaration embodied, as a corollary, in the preceding aphorism that Vedic Injunction is the only means of knowing dharma.

By Prabhākara's interpretation the present aphorism answers the question—should we at once proceed to discuss the meaning of Vedic

sentences, or should we, before doing that, discuss the validity of Vedic Injunction as the means of knowing dharma? The Pūrvapakṣa being that, inasmuch as the ascertaining of the real meaning of the Veda is the avowed purpose of the Śāstra, we should proceed with that at once,—the final conclusion is that we have hitherto only proved the fact that the Veda is the means of knowing dharma; it becomes necessary, therefore, to ascertain beforehand, the validity of the Vedic Injunction; specially as this validity is, as a matter of fact, (to be proved later on), self-sufficient, and does not depend upon anything else. On the other hand, any sustained effort towards ascertaining the meaning of the Veda on the part of an intelligent student, would be possible only after he had become convinced of the fact that the Veda is the only valid means of knowing dharma. Before we proceed to consider what is made known by a certain means of knowledge, it is only natural that we should examine the character of the means of knowledge itself.

Adhikaraṇa IV.—Dharma is not amenable to Sense-perception and the other means of knowledge.

SŪTRA 4.

सत्सम्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणाम्बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षमनिमित्तम् विद्यमानोपलम्भनत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

सत् Sat, that which exists, an existing thing—सम्प्रयोगे Samprayoge, on contact (of). पुरुषस्य Puruṣasya, of man. इन्द्रियाणाम् Indriyāṇām, of the sense-organs. बुद्धि Buddha, (of) cognition—जन्म Janma, production, appearance. तत् Tat, that (is) प्रत्यक्षम् Pratyakṣām, sense perception. अनिमित्तम् Animittam, not the means. विद्यमान Vidyamāna, that which exists at the present time—उपलम्भनात् Upalambhanāt, on account of apprehending.

4. That cognition of men which proceeds upon the contact of the sense-organs with existing objects, is *Sense-perception*; and this is not the means (of knowing dharma); because it apprehends only objects existing at the present time—4.

COMMENTARY.

The question propounded in the preceding aphorism was—Can dharma be known by means of the Veda alone, or by the other means of knowledge also? The *prima facie* argument is that being an 'object of knowledge' dharma must be amenable, to all 'means of knowledge.'

The final conclusion is that even though dharma is an object of knowledge, it is not amenable to sense-perception, because Sense-perception can apprehend only such objects as are in existence at the time of perception, and are in direct contact with one or more of the organs of perception. Neither of those conditions is fulfilled by dharma: it is not an object existing at the time of the perception, but has to be brought into existence by certain acts of the agent; nor is it ever possible for it to be in direct contact with any organ of perception; for the simple reason that it has no external and tangible form. Then again, Inference, Presumptive Reasoning, and Negation are all more or less directly, dependent upon Sense-perception: as each of them has its foundation in some fact of sensuous perception; consequently, what is never amenable to Sense-perception cannot be apprehended either by Inference or Presumption or Negation. It follows, then, that Verbal Authority is the only one of the recognised 'means of knowledge' which can afford any knowledge of dharma. Of Verbal Authority also, it is the Veda alone whose validity is beyond all dispute, and which alone can provide an absolutely *valid* knowledge. It will be shown later on that of the Veda also, it is only the purely injunctive passages that can be regarded as intrinsically valid. It, therefore, follows that a really valid knowledge of dharma can be obtained only by means of the Vedic Injunctions. The unquestionable authority of these Injunctions forms the 'topic' of the next adhikarāṇa.

Adhikarāṇa V.—The unquestionable validity of 'Vedic Injunction' as the only means of knowing Dharma.

SŪTRA 5.

औत्पत्तिकस्तु शब्दस्यार्थेन सम्बन्धः । तस्य ज्ञानमुपदेशः ;
अव्यतिरेकश्चार्थेऽनुपलब्धे । तत्प्रमाणम्बादरायणस्यानपेक्ष-
त्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

औत्पत्तिकः Autpattikah, inborn, natural, eternal. तु Tu, on the other hand शब्दस्य Śabdasya, of the word. अर्थेन Arthēna, with the meaning or object denoted. सम्बन्धः Sambandhah, relation. तस्य Tasya, of that, of dharma. ज्ञानम् Jñānam, means of knowing. उपदेशः Upadeśah, injunction. अव्यतिरेकः Avyatiirekah, un-failing. च Cha, and. अर्थे Arthe, in regard to the object. अनुपलब्धे Anupalab-dhe, unperceived. तत् Tat, that (injunction). प्रमाणम् Pramāṇam, valid, trust-worthy. बादरायणस्य Bādarāyaṇasya, according to Bādarāyaṇa. अनपेक्षत्वात् Anapekṣatvāt, because of independence or self-sufficiency.

5. On the other hand, the relation of the word with its meaning is inborn (and eternal); consequently injunction (which is a form of *word*) is the means of knowing dharma; and it is unfailing in regard to objects not perceived (by other means of knowledge); it is authoritative, according to Bâdarâyana, specially as it is independent or self sufficient in its authority—5.

COMMENTARY.

The question that arises after the conclusion has been arrived that no valid knowledge of Dharma can be derived from Sense-perception, Inference, &c., is:—Is the valid knowledge of dharma obtainable from Vedic injunction? The *prima facie* argument is that no trustworthiness can belong to Vedic injunctions; because in the case of the assertions of trustworthy persons, it is found that we can know what they assert only after we have comprehended the meaning of the words contained in the assertion; and it is a well-known fact that the meaning of words is comprehended only with reference to such things of the ordinary world as the cow and the like; while Dharma is something beyond the world; and hence the fact of its being expressed by means of any word cannot be ascertained by any means at our disposal; it must be admitted therefore that, inasmuch as Dharma cannot be expressed to us by means of any *word*, Vedic injunction cannot afford any reliable information with regard to it. Then again, in all cases of verbal cognition, we find that it is only after the thing and the word have come into existence independently of one another, that people of the world fix by convention a certain relationship between the two, by virtue of which one comes to be expressed or denoted by the other; and this convention fixing the relationship, originating from human sources, is liable to error, like everything human; consequently, all such relationship between words and meanings, being of human origin, is untrustworthy; and as all verbal cognition is dependent upon those relationships, the cognition or knowledge, derived from injunctions, which after all only consist of words, could never be possessed of that reliability which ought to belong to all things relating to dharma.

In answer to the above, we have the following final conclusion:—As a matter of fact, the relationship between the word and its meaning is not the product of human convention; it is something inborn, natural to the members related. Thus being free from all possibility of error, the word—or injunction, which is Word *par excellence*—can very well be the

means of knowing of *dharmā*; specially because *dharmā* being something not cognisable by Sense-perception and the other ordinary means of cognition, all its knowledge must be obtained from injunctions which, independent of all external corroboration, is absolutely self-sufficient in its reliability or trustworthy character. Doubts are cast upon the trustworthiness of the means of knowledge only when they afford cognitions that are found contrary to the real state of things; in themselves the means of knowledge are all trustworthy always. In the case of Vedic injunction, it has never been found to give rise to cognitions that turn out wrong; consequently its inherent trustworthy character remains unsullied.

Adhikarāṇa VI—Eternity of Words.

SŪTRAS 6-23.

“कर्मैके तत्र दर्शनात्” ॥ ६ ॥

कर्म Karma, [word is] something produced or brought into existence or caused, non-eternal. एके Eke, some people, the Naiyāyikas (assert.) तत्र Tatra, in that (in the uttering of the word). दर्शनात् Darśanāt, because [an effort] is always perceived.

6. “Some people hold that the word is caused (non-eternal), (a) because we find it is perceptible only after an effort”—6.

COMMENTARY.

In the preceding adhikarāṇa it has been proved that the relationship between the *word* and its meaning is eternal. As this conclusion necessarily presupposes the eternality of the word itself, the present adhikarāṇa seeks to establish this eternality. The question then being—is the word eternal?—we have the *prima facie* arguments in support of the view that it is not eternal, stated in sūtras 6 to 11.

Word is non-eternal, say the Naiyāyikas; (a) because we always find them brought into existence by the effort of the person using or uttering it; and what is brought into existence by an effort cannot but be evanescent. This sūtra contains the first argument against the eternity of words.

“अस्थानात्” ॥ ७ ॥

अस्थानात् Asthānāt, because of non-continuance or non-permanence.

7 (b) “Because it does not persist”—7.

COMMENTARY.

(b) Word must be evanescent, because as a matter of fact we find that it does not continue to exist for any length of time; one moment

it is pronounced, and the next moment it is gone. This would not be possible if the word were eternal.

“करोतिशब्दात्” ॥ ८ ॥

करोति Karoti, does, produces—शब्दात् Śabdāt, because of the use of the word,

8 (c) “Because of the use of the word *produces* (*utters*) [with reference to words.]—8.

COMMENTARY.

(c) Words must be non-eternal; because we find people making use of the word ‘karoti’ with regard to words. Just as with reference to the ordinary thing jar, they say ‘ghataṅkaroti,’ ‘he makes the jar,’ exactly in the same manner people say ‘śabdaṅkaroti’ which must mean ‘he makes or produces the word.’ This is the second argument against word-eternity.

“सत्त्वान्तरे यौगपद्यात्” ॥ ९ ॥

सत्त्वान्तरे Sattvāntare, in the (perception of) other beings. यौगपद्यात् Yaugapadyāt, because of simultaneity.

9 (d) “Because the word is found (to be pronounced) by [many persons] and in (many places) simultaneously.”—9.

COMMENTARY.

(d) Here we have the *third* argument against word-eternity. As a matter of fact we find that one and the same word is perceived (heard) by more than one person, and also in more than one place, at one and the same time. This is possible only in the case of a substance that is omnipresent, all-pervading, or that which is limited in its extent, but capable of being brought into existence at more than one place at the same time. The word is not an all-pervading substance; hence it must follow that when perceived by different persons at different places, it must be *produced* in so many places. It must be admitted, therefore, that any single word is not *one*, but *many*, all produced in different places.

“प्रकृतिविकृत्योश्च” ॥ १० ॥

प्रकृति Prakṛiti, original form—विकृत्योः Vikṛityoḥ, modification,—because of च Cha, also.

10 (e) “Also because of their having original and modified forms.”—10.

COMMENTARY.

(e) In many cases we find that the words which appear in the original form—‘dadhi atra’ for instance—become modified into the form ‘dadhyatra’; no such modification is possible in the case of things eternal,



which, by their eternality, must be unmodifiable. It cannot be denied that there is modification in the case of words : these, therefore, must be regarded as non-eternal.

“वृद्धिश्च कर्तृभूम्नाऽस्य” ॥ ११ ॥

वृद्धिः Vṛddhiḥ, increase. च Cha, also. कर्तृ Kartṛi, producer, pronouncer—
भूम्ना Bhūmnā, by multiplicity. अस्य Asya, of this (of words).

11 (f) “Also because a multiplicity of persons uttering the word bring about an increased magnitude (in the word-sound).”—11.

COMMENTARY.

When many persons pronounce the same word, there is always an increase in the magnitude of the word. If the pronouncing of the word consisted not in its production, but only in its manifestation, then the volume of the word would remain the same, notwithstanding the number of persons pronouncing it ; just as in the case of the jar manifested by lamps, the jar remains the same even if hundreds of lamps are brought in to illumine it. As a matter of fact, however, it is found that the volume of the word-sound as pronounced by a number of persons is always greater than when it is pronounced by a single person ; and this also proves that the word is modifiable ; and what is liable to modification cannot be eternal.

This closes the reasoning against the eternity of words.

समन्तु तत्र दर्शनम् ॥ १२ ॥

समम् Samam, equal. तु Tu, but. तत्र Tatra, in the matter in question.
दर्शनम् Darśanam, perception.

12. (In both cases) the (momentary) perception (of word-sounds) is equal.—12.

COMMENTARY.

With this aphorism begins the refutation of the *prima facie* arguments set forth in sūtras 6-11. It has been urged above that there are many well-known facts,—e.g., the momentary perception of the word-sound—that cannot be explained on the theory that all that the effort of the human utterer does is to manifest, or render perceptible, the word that has always been in existence, and the effort does not create or bring into existence, the word. It is urged in reply to this that, whether we regard the word as *manifested* by human effort, or as brought into existence by it, the fact remains that the word is perceived only for a moment. The

sense is that this well-known fact is as explicable under one theory as under the other.

सतःपरमदर्शनम्, विषयानागमात् ॥ १३ ॥

सतः Satat, of that which already exists. परम् Param, at another time. अदर्शनम् Adarśanam, non-perception. विषय Viṣaya, [with regard to the] object—अनागमात् Anāgamāt, non-operation.

13. It is of that (word) which already exists that there is non-perception at other points of time (before and after the utterance),—and this is due to the fact that (at such other points of time) there is no operation (of the manifestive agency) with regard to the object (word-sound.)

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued above under sūtra 7 that word cannot be regarded as eternal, because of the fact that it is not found to be permanent,—it disappears immediately after its utterance. The present sūtra supplies the answer to this argument. It has been pointed out under the preceding sūtra that whatever theory we accept with regard to the perception of word-sound, the fact remains that it is perceptible only for a moment. It is now pointed out that this fact can be satisfactorily explained only on the eternity of words; as on this theory it can be very rightly asserted that the word is heard at one moment and not at the other, because it is only at one moment that the manifestive agency—which in many cases is human utterance,—is operating towards its manifestation, and not at all moments; that this is so is shown by the further fact that as long as, and whenever, a man goes on uttering the word, we hear it; so long as the utterance is operating, the perception is there; when the utterance ceases to operate, the perception ceases; thus showing that what the utterance does is only to manifest, or render perceptible, what is already existing. If, on the other hand, the word were produced, or brought into existence, by our utterance,—just in the same manner as the jar is made by the potter,—it would be necessary that the word be heard all along since that point of time; just as from the point of time at which the jar is made, it continues to be perceived as long as it exists. As a matter of fact, this is not found to be the case with the word; which also goes to show that there is no production or creation of the word as there is of the jar. What the manifestive agency of the utterance does is to remove or set free the air enclosed within the vocal pipe, which is impeding the exit of the word-sound.

प्रयोगस्य परम् ॥ १४ ॥

प्रयोगस्य Prayogasya, of the utterance. परम् Param, pertaining, referring.

14. [As for the use of the word 'produces'] that refers to the utterance [of the word].—14.

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued in sūtra 8 that we find people making use of the word 'produces' with regard to words; and this shows that words are produced, not eternal. In answer to this it is asserted that when we speak of the production of the word what we are referring to is only its utterance by some speaker; and it is not that it is brought into existence, not having existed before. Just as when we say 'gomayāṅkuru,' what we mean is, not that the cow-dung has to be produced, but that a collecting of the cowdung has to be made; so 'śabdaṅkuru' must refer to the making or bringing into existence the utterance of the word.

आदित्यवद् यौगपद्यम् ॥ १५ ॥

आदित्यवद् Ādityavat, like the sun. यौगपद्यम् Yaugapadyam, simultaneity.

15. The simultaneity (of perception by many persons) is as in the case of the sun.—15.

COMMENTARY.

Sūtra 9 has argued that the very fact of the word-sound being heard at the same time by different people and in different places proves that the word is not one, and is not eternal. It is in answer to this that the present sūtra argues that it is true that different men at different places perceive the word at the same time; but this does not prove that the word is many and transient. The sun also is seen at the same time by many persons at different places; and yet it is one only and eternal; in the same manner it is quite natural that the word should be one and eternal, and yet perceived by different people at different places, at the same time.

वर्णान्तरमविकारः ॥ १६ ॥

[शब्दान्तरमविकारः v. l.]

वर्णा (शब्दा) न्तरम् Śabdāntaram, another word or letter. अविकारः Avikarāḥ, not a modification.

16. It (the change produce by the conjunction of letters) is a different letter; it is not a modification (of the original word).—16.

COMMENTARY.

When the two words 'dadhi' and 'atra' are pronounced in close proximity, we have the form 'dadhyatra', if this latter is a modification

of the former words, then being modifiable, words must be transient ; as it has been argued in sūtra 10. As a matter of fact, however, in the form 'dadhyatra' the syllable 'dhya' is not a modification of the original syllables, *dhi* and *a* ; it is an entirely different letter. The reason for this view is that if 'ya' (as occurring in 'dhya,' for instance) were a modification of the 'i' of 'dadhi' and 'a' of 'atra,'—then there would be no 'ya' apart from these latter ; *e.g.*, the ice being a modification of water, there can be no ice without water ; there is no such inseparable connection between 'ya' and 'i and a,' as there should be between the original and its modification.

नादवृद्धिपरा ॥ १७ ॥

नाद Nada, tone—वृद्धि Vṛiddhi, increase—परा Parā, in reference to.

17. The great increase (of magnitude) belongs (or is in reference) to the tone (not to the word itself.)—17.

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under sūtra 11, that when many persons utter the same word we perceive that the magnitude of the word undergoes an increase ; which shows that the word is liable to change, and as such transient. It is argued in answer to this that when many persons pronounce the same word, what happens is not any change in the word itself, but only in the tone, which becomes louder or fainter as the number of persons become more or less. In fact, on the theory of the Naiyāyika, no increase of magnitude, is possible in the word ; as the word is only a form of sound ; and sound, according to him, is only a quality ; and as no quality can have a quality, sound cannot have magnitude, which also is a quality. To speak, therefore, of the increase of the magnitude of sound is, for the Naiyāyika, a contradiction in terms.

नित्यस्तु स्यात्, दर्शनस्य परार्थत्वात् ॥ १८ ॥

नित्यः Nityaḥ, eternal. तु Tu, on the other hand. स्यात् Syāt, must be. दर्शनस्य Darśanasya, of the manifest, of the utterance. परार्थत्वात् Parārthatvāt, being for another purpose.

18. On the other hand (word) must be regarded as eternal ; specially because the utterance is for an altogether different purpose.—18.

COMMENTARY.

Having met seriatim the arguments propounded by the adversary, the author proceeds to put forward reasonings in support of the eternity of

words. The whole idea of the transient character of words is based upon the notion that utterance by us brings the word into existence. It is here declared that it is not so ; we utter the word not for the purpose of producing or creating the word, but only for the purpose of expressing what the word denotes. In fact, this purpose could not be served if the word uttered by us were transient ; as in that case it would be destroyed the moment that it was uttered ; and so not being in existence at the time that the hearer would comprehend the meaning,—whence could this comprehension arise ? The very fact of the comprehension being there shows that the word that we utter is not evanescent, but lasting.

सर्वत्र यौगपद्यात् ॥ १९ ॥

सर्वत्र Sarvatra, in all cases. यौगपद्यात् Yaugapadyāt, on account of simultaneity or unanimity.

19. Because in the case of all [words] there is simultaneity or unanimity [of recognition].—19.

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact we find that every word, as word, on several occasions is invariably recognised by all men as being the same : whenever we hear a word—‘cow’ for instance,—we always recognise it as the same word ‘cow’ that we had heard on previous occasions. This recognition of sameness is found, not with regard to one or a few words, but with regard to all words ; and not in the minds of a few men, but in that of all men ; and what is thus universally vouched for cannot be gainsaid. It must be admitted that the word that is heard and used to-day is precisely the same that has been heard from time immemorial ; that is to say, it is eternal.

सङ्ख्याभावात् ॥ २० ॥

सङ्ख्या Saṅkhyā, number—अभावात् Abhāvāt, on account of absence.

20. Also on account of the absence of number.—20.

COMMENTARY.

In ordinary parlance, when a certain word is pronounced more than once, what we say is that the word has been used ‘five,’ ‘ten’ or ‘twelve’ times ; and it is not said that ‘five,’ ‘ten,’ or ‘twelve’ such words have been used. If the word were produced and destroyed each time, we should have spoken of so many words, and not of the same word as spoken so many times. This universal usage also shows that the word is the same whenever it is used ; that is to say, it is eternal.

अनपेक्षत्वात् ॥ २१ ॥

अनपेक्षत्वात् Anapekṣatvāt, because of independence or absence of cause.

21. Because of the absence of cause.—21.

COMMENTARY.

In the case of all things that are liable to destruction people always find some cause of destruction ; there in no such cause or agent of destruction perceptible in the case of words ; consequently we cannot admit of such destruction ; and words must be regarded as 'indestructible,' eternal.

प्रख्याभावाच्च योग्यस्य ॥ २२ ॥

प्रख्याभावात् Prakhyābhavāt, on account of the non-mention. च Cha, and. योग्यस्य Yogyaśya, of that which is capable (of being perceived).

22. Also because what is perceptible [by the ear] is not what is spoken of (in the Vedic declaration 'the air becomes the word '].—22.

COMMENTARY.

The opponents of word-eternity bring forward the Vedic text 'the air becomes the word' in support of the contention that the word has a beginning, being, as herein declared, a mere product of the combination of air-particles. As against this view it is argued that this text cannot refer to what we know as the 'word ;' as this is what is perceptible by the ear ; and certainly no product of air-particles is such as can be so perceived,—air, according to the Logician, being perceptible by the sense of touch alone.

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ २३ ॥

लिङ्ग Liṅ a, indication—दर्शनात् Darśanāt, on account of our meeting with. च Cha, also

23. Also because we meet with [texts] indicative [of eternity of words].—23.

COMMENTARY.

This refers to such texts as 'vācā—virūpinyayā'—' by the word which is unmodifying and eternal'—where the word is distinctly spoken as eternal.

Stress is laid on the eternity of words inasmuch as if words have a source, they cannot but be fallible. Because such source must be in some sort of an intelligent person. As a matter of fact, we find that no such personal source is infallible. Hence the non-eternity of the word would strike at the infallible authority of the word—and of the Veda, which is a mere collection of words—upon which the whole fabric of Dharma, according to the Mīmāṃsaka rests.

Adhikarāṇa VII.—The Veda is expressive.

SŪTRAS 24-26.

“उत्पत्तौ वाऽवचनाः स्युः, अर्थस्यातन्निमित्तत्वात्”॥२४॥

[*v. l. वाचनाः*]

उत्पत्तौ Utpattau, even on eternality (or even on manifestation). वा Va, even. अवचना Avachanāḥ, not expressive (of the meanings). [*v. l. रचनाः* Rachanāḥ, products of human effort]. स्युः Syuḥ, they (sentences) would be. अर्थस्य Arthasya, of the meaning (of sentences). अतन्निमित्तत्वात् Atannimittatvāt, on account of not having that for its sole cause.

24. “Even though (words and their meanings were) eternal (or even on the manifestation of words and their meanings) (the sentences) would remain inexpressive (or would be the product of separate effort) because (the meaning of the sentence) does not depend entirely upon (the meaning of the words).”

COMMENTARY.

The question of the relationship between the word and its meaning having been settled, a further question is raised :—Granting that the word is eternal and that its relation to its meaning is also eternal, what has this to do with the authority of the Vedic injunction or with matters relating to dharma? Before entering into arguments bearing specifically on the Veda, the opponent takes his stand upon general principles. We grant that the words express their meanings and that they are eternal; all that this proves is that words provide us with correct ideas; how does this prove the trustworthy character of the Vedic injunctions? These injunctions are in the form of sentences containing more than one word; and for the comprehending of a conglomeration of words we need something more than the comprehension of the meanings of the component words. Consequently inasmuch as so far the Mīmāṃsaka has succeeded in establishing the eternity, and hence the trustworthiness of words only,—we must reject the authority of the Vedic injunction.

Some people read ‘rachanāḥ’ in place of ‘avachanāḥ’; the sense of the Sūtra in that case would be that ‘the meanings of sentences must be regarded to be originated by human agencies, and as such incapable of being accepted as eternal and authoritative on matters relating to dharma.’

In answer to the above we have the *final conclusion* embodied in the next two sūtras.

तद्भूतानाङ्क्रियार्थेन समाप्तायः, अर्थस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ॥२५॥

तद्भूतानां Tadbhūtanām, of words as pertaining or related to the things denoted. क्रियार्थेन Kriyārthena, with the word expressive of action. समाप्तायः Samāpnāyah, textual juxtaposition. अर्थस्य Arthasya, of the meaning (of the sentence). तन्निमित्तत्वात् Tannimittatvāt, on account of being dependent upon it (meaning of words composing it).

52. [In a sentence] all words denoting things are in close textual juxtaposition with the word expressive of an action; [and from this it follows that the meaning of the sentence must be got at through this juxtaposition of the words] specially because the meaning of the sentence is dependent upon the meaning of the words composing it.—25.

COMMENTARY.

In answer to the above it is shown that as a matter of fact the meaning of the sentence does depend upon the meaning of the words composing it; there is nothing to prove that the sentence has any other meaning apart from what is afforded by the component words. For instance, in the sentence 'agnihotrāṇjuhuyāt svargakāmaḥ' we find that the word expressive of the Agnihotra sacrifice and also the word expressive of desiring heaven are both found in close proximity to the word 'juhuyāt' which denotes the action of *offering*; and all the meaning that is afforded by this sentence is that which is got at through the signification of the two former words taken along with the signification of the verb. The meaning is that *one desirous of heaven—should offer—the agnihotra*, which is nothing more than the denotations of the three words linked together. Hence when the word and its meaning are eternal, sentences formed by these words must also be eternal; and thus the eternity of sentences being established, there is no incongruity in the view that the Veda is the trustworthy authority for all matters relating to Dharma.

लोके सन्नियमात् प्रयोगसन्निकर्षः स्यात् ॥ २६ ॥

लोके Loke, in ordinary parlance. सन्नियमात् Sanniyamāt, on account of restriction or limitation. प्रयोग Prayoga, usage—सन्निकर्षः Sannikarṣaḥ, explanation, justification.

26. Inasmuch as we find a restriction in the case of ordinary parlance, it follows that [in the Veda also] there would be a similar explanation for the use [of sentences].—26,

COMMENTARY.

In the case of ordinary usage it is found that it is only when we know the meaning of each individual word that we can use or comprehend the meaning of the sentence composed of those words; from this analogy it could be safely argued that the meaning of the sentence depends upon the meaning of the words. That is to say, it must be admitted that the meaning of the sentence 'agnihotrañjuhuyāt svargakāmaḥ' is nothing more or less than what is signified by each of the three words.

Adhikarāṇa VIII—The Veda is not the work of a personal author.

SŪTRAS 27-32.

“वेदांश्चैके सन्निकर्षपुरुषाख्याः” ॥ २७ ॥

वेदान् Vedān, the Vedas. च Cha, and. एकै Eke, some people. सन्निकर्षम् Sannikarṣam, (are) modern, or the work of an author. पुरुषाख्याः Puruṣākhyāḥ, (because) they are named after men.

27. “According to some people the Vedas are the work of human authors; being, as they are, named after men.”—27.

COMMENTARY.

It has been asserted above that the Veda is the sole authority on matters relating to Dharma; and that the Veda is trustworthy, because it is eternal, and as such free from all those discrepancies to which the words of human beings are liable. The opponent now proceeds to show that the Veda, and the injunctions contained therein, are the work of human authors, and as such they are not an absolutely trustworthy source of information. The Veda, it is argued, must have had a human author, because we find various sections of the Veda named after men; e.g., 'Kāthaka' after the name of Kāṭha, 'Paippalāḍa' after the name of Pippalāḍa, and so forth; all this proves that the section called 'Kāthaka' is the work of the person called Kāṭha, and that called 'Paippalāḍa' was composed by Pippalāḍa.

“अनित्यदर्शनाच्च” ॥ २८ ॥

अनित्य Anitya, non-eternal or transient things—दर्शनात् Darśanāt, also because of her finding. च Cha, also.

28. “Also because we find [in the Veda] [the mention of] many non-eternal things.”—28.

COMMENTARY.

Another argument in support of the view that the Veda is not eternal is here propounded. As a matter of fact, we find such statements in the Veda as—'Auddālakiḥ akāmayata,' 'Auddālaki desired,' 'Babara pravāhani desired,' and so forth—wherein are mentioned persons and events that cannot be said to be eternal. That is to say, the presence of such sentences as the above proves that the sentences were composed long after the persons spoken of therein lived on the earth; and that they did not exist before these persons; that is to say, the Veda has had a beginning in time.

उक्तन्तु शब्दपूर्वत्वम् ॥ २९ ॥

उक्तम् Uktam, has already been declared and proved. तु Tu, but. शब्दः Śabda, of words—पूर्वत्वम् Pārvatvam, priority or eternality.

29. But the eternality of the word has already been established.—29.

COMMENTARY.

In answer to the above arguments it is declared that arguments in support of the eternality of all words (and the Veda) have already been advanced above under sūtras 6-23, where it has been proved that all words are eternal. All that is necessary, therefore, on the present occasion is to answer the arguments put forward by the opponent in sūtras 27 and 28. And this is done in the following sūtras.

आख्या प्रवचनात् ॥ ३० ॥

आख्या Ākhyā, the name. प्रवचनात् Pravachanāt, [is due to] exceptionally excellent study and teaching.

30. The name [of the Vedic sections] is based upon exceptionally excellent study and teaching [of that section by a particular person.].—30.

COMMENTARY.

In answer to sūtra 27, it is urged that a certain section of the Veda is named 'Kāthaka,' not because it was composed by Kāṭha, but only because that section was made the subject of special study by a person of that name who was regarded as a specialist in that section of the Veda which, on that account, came to be known after his name.

परन्तु श्रुतिसामान्यमात्रम् ॥ ३१ ॥

परम् तु Param tu, the other (is). श्रुति Śruti, sound—सामान्य Sāmānya, similarity—मात्रम् Mātram, only.

31. The other is only a similarity of sounds.—31.

COMMENTARY.

As for the mention of the names of men and things in the Veda, there is nothing to show that the word as found in the Veda was actually the name of a person; it is, in fact, nothing more than a chance resemblance of sounds; the word as found in the Veda has since then been borne as the name of a certain person; that does not show that in the Veda it must be regarded as a proper name; it may be used there in a totally different sense; for instance, as the Bhāṣya points out, the word 'pravâhana' may mean only the *excellent carrier*.

कृते वा विनियोगः स्यात् कर्मणः सम्बन्धात् ॥ ३२ ॥

कृते Kṛite, towards or of an action. वा Vā, or विनियोगः Vinīyogaḥ, urging, injunction, inducement. स्यात् Syāt, may be. कर्मणः Karmaṇaḥ, of action. सम्बन्धात् Sambandhāt, on account of connection or relationship.

32. [Such apparently absurd Vedic declarations as 'trees performed this sacrifice' and the like] may be regarded as inducements towards certain actions; because of the relationship or connection [of those sentences] with actions.—32.

COMMENTARY.

The opponents of Vedic authority have argued that the Veda cannot be regarded as authoritative and trustworthy, because it contains such apparently absurd statements as 'the cows sat at the sacrifice,' 'the trees performed the sacrifice' and so forth. In answer to this it is urged that though these sentences are absurd when taken by themselves, they cease to be so when they are taken along with the context in which they occur. All these sentences are found in the section dealing with a certain sacrifice; and in praise of this sacrifice it is declared that even such inanimate things as trees and the like have had recourse to the performance of the sacrifice; so excellent it is, and so manifestly desirable are its results that even trees were induced to perform it; under the circumstances it is only natural that such intelligent beings as men should perceive the excellence of the action, and engage in performing it. There is nothing incongruous and absurd in the sentence if thus intelligently interpreted.

Thus then the Veda, not being the work of a human author—whereby it is free from all the discrepancies consequent upon such authorship—and there being nothing in the text of the Veda itself that shakes its authority,—it must be admitted that it is a trustworthy source of

knowledge of all matters relating to Dharma ; and as it has been shewn that no other source of such knowledge is available, the Veda must be also acknowledged to be the only source of knowledge relating to Dharma.

SECOND PĀDA.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE ARTHAVĀDA.

Adhikaraṇa I—Trustworthy character of Arthavāda passages in general.

SŪTRAS 1-18.

“आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानार्थक्यमतदर्शानाम्, तस्माद-
नित्यमित्युच्यते” ॥ १ । २ । १ ॥

आम्नायस्य Amnāyasya, of the Veda. क्रियार्थत्वात् Kriyārthavāt, being for the purpose of laying down actions. आनर्थक्यम्, Anarthakyam, (there must be) uselessness. अतदर्शानाम् Atadarśhānām, of those (parts of it) which do not serve that purpose. तस्मात् Tasmāt, for this reason (in regard to such parts). अनित्यम् इति Anityam iti, as non-eternal (not serving any eternally useful purpose in the shape of laying down actions). उच्यते Uchyate, (the Veda) are declared to be.

1. “The purpose of the Veda lying in the laying down of actions, those (parts of it) which do not serve that purpose are useless ; and in these therefore is the Veda said to be non-eternal (i.e., of no permanent value.)”—1.

COMMENTARY.

Having, in the preceding section, ascertained the fact of the Veda being authoritative and trustworthy, the author now proceeds to explain the usefulness, with regard to Dharma, of the entire Veda ; consisting, as it does, of (1) Injunctions and Prohibitions, (2) Valedictory and Deprecatory Passages (3) Mantras and (4) Names ; each of these is now going to be considered separately with reference to its bearing upon Dharma.

That the Injunctions and Prohibitions serve distinctly useful purposes in matters relating to Dharma follows from the very definition of dharma propounded in sūtra 1. 1. 2. above ; where it has been shown that the Vedic Injunction is the sole authority for Dharma, and that the chief purpose of Injunctions lay in the pointing out of *actions* that, as constituting Dharma, should be performed ; from this it follows that Prohibitions also have their use in the indicating of *actions*, which, as constituting Adharma, should not be performed. It is all right so far. Now the question arises—

We accept the Injunctive and Prohibitive Passages as authoritative, because they serve to point out the results, the materials and the methods pertaining to actions; but as regards the other three classes of passages contained in the Veda, inasmuch as they do not point out anything with reference to any actions to be performed,—should these also be regarded as authoritative or not? The matter of *Mantras* and *Names* will be taken up later on; at present we confine our attention to the passages called ‘arthavāda’—those that are *valedictory*, praising something, *e.g.*, the sentence ‘Vāyu is the swiftest deity’—as well as those that are *deprecatory*—*e.g.*, ‘Rudra wept, and from that was silver produced.’ Are these passages authoritative? That is, have they any bearing on *actions* and hence on *Dharma*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that these passages apparently can have no authoritative bearing on *Dharma*; for the simple reason that they do not declare anything with regard to any actions to be performed or avoided. For instance, the sentence ‘Vāyu is the swiftest deity’ says nothing as to any action; it simply declares an established fact; our knowledge of Vāyu as the swiftest deity does not help us in the performance or avoidance of any action. Similarly, the sentence ‘Rudra wept, and from that was silver produced’ does not say anything as to any action. All these passages then, not serving the purpose of pointing to any action, must be regarded as useless—having no bearing on *Dharma*; and as such, serving no eternally useful purpose; as it is only matters relating to *Dharma* that are of perennial interest; similarly with all purely *valedictory* and *deprecatory* passages.

“शास्त्रदृष्टविरोधाच्च” ॥ २ ॥

शास्त्र Śāstra, (of) scriptures.—दृष्ट Dṛiṣṭa, (of) directly perceived facts.—विरोधाच्च Virodhāt, because of the contradiction. च Cha, and also.

2. “And also because of the contradiction of the scriptures and of directly perceived facts.”—2.

COMMENTARY.

This sūtra puts forward another argument in support of the position advanced in the precedingsūtra.

The purely *arthavāda* passages,” continues the *Pūrvapakṣin*, can have no authoritative bearing upon *dharma*. Because in the case of such passages as ‘the mind is a thief,’ ‘speech is a teller of lies’ and the like, inasmuch as they describe a certain state of things as they exist, they can

have no bearing upon what should be done. In order to escape this predicament, it will perhaps be explained that what is meant by the declaration 'the mind is a thief' is that 'inasmuch as such an important sense-organ as the mind is a thief, one should commit theft by the other organs also;' and similarly by declaring that 'speech is a teller of lies' it is meant that 'we should tell lies;—both these passages in this manner laying down things to be done, and as such having a direct bearing upon Dharma. But in this case the passages would be *contradictory to the scriptures* that prohibit *stealing* and *telling of lies*. Similarly, we have such passages as—'during the day the smoke only is seen and not the brightness (of fire).' This passage is a direct *contradiction of a directly perceived fact*, because we actually see the brightness of fire during the day. Lastly we have the passage wherein the Brāhmaṇa priest is represented as saying 'we know not if we are Brāhmaṇas or non-Brāhmaṇas.' This contradicts a fact of perception, inasmuch as the Brāhmaṇahood of the Brāhmaṇa is a perceptible fact.

“तथा फलाभावात्” ॥ ३ ॥

तथा Tathā, also. फलाभावात् Phalābhāvāt, because of the absence of results.

3. “Also because of the absence of results.”—3.

COMMENTARY.

Another argument against the authoritativeness of arthavāda passages:—With regard to the *Gargatrivātra Brāhmaṇa*, it is said—'the face of one who knows this brightens up.' Now if the *brightening in the face* is an already established fact,—then the passage is purely descriptive of a fact; and as such can have no bearing upon Dharma. If, on the other hand, it does not exist, then the declaration becomes untrue—mentioning things as existing when, in reality, they do not exist. Lastly, if the passage is regarded as indicating the result that accrues from the reading of that particular *Brāhmaṇa*—this mention of the result implay-the propriety of the *reading*,—then also we find the declaration defective; because, as a matter of fact, we never find the face of the reader of the *Brāhmaṇa* brightening up. Thus we find that the result as mentioned in the passage never comes about. Hence the passage must be rejected as untrustworthy.”

“अन्यथानर्थक्यात्” ॥ ४ ॥

अन्य Anya, (of) others.—अनर्थक्यात् Ānarthakyāt, because of uselessness,

4. "Because of the uselessness of others (other passages)."—4.

COMMENTARY.

The arguments put forward in the preceding *Sūtra* demolish the authority of all those arthavāda passages which speak of excellent results following from trifling actions, e.g., such as the passage declaring that by acquiring the knowledge of the *Aśvamedha* one conquers earth. Even granting for the sake of argument that the passages mention real results, i.e., declares certain result as following from certain actions;—if it be true that one has to acquire the knowledge of the *Aśvamedha*, and that for the sake of becoming immortal,—or that one should offer the *Pûṇāhuti* and thereby obtain all that he denies,—then, inasmuch as all desires will have been fulfilled by the trifling act of the *Pûṇāhuti* offering, why should any intelligent person have recourse to such elaborate sacrifices as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the like? Thus by seeking to establish the authority of a few Arthavāda passages, you prove the uselessness of almost all real injunctions which actually and directly lay down definite actions.

“अभागिप्रतिषेधाच्च” ॥ ५ ॥

अभागि *Abhāgi*, (of) an impossibility (which cannot be negated). प्रतिषेधाच्च *Pratiṣedhāt*, because of the negating. च *Cha*, also.

5. "Also because of the negating of impossibilities."—5.

COMMENTARY.

In the Veda we meet with such passages as—'the fire is not to be kindled on the earth,' 'fire is not to be kindled in the sky,' and so forth; here we have the negation or prohibition of the kindling of fire in the sky; as it is never possible for the fire to be kindled in the sky, its negation becomes absurd; so also, as the kindling cannot be done except on the earth, the negating of this also becomes absurd; and as no authority can belong to such absurd declarations, such passages cannot be regarded as trustworthy.

“अनित्यसंयोगात्” ॥ ६ ॥

अनित्य *Anitya*, (of) non-eternal things. संयोगात् *Samyogāt*, because of the contact or presence (i.e., mention.)

6. "Because of the mention of non-eternal things."—6.

COMMENTARY.

We find in many passages, the names of things that are clearly non-eternal; this vitiates the eternal character of these passages (if not of the entire Veda, which point has been discussed under sūtras 1.1.28 and 31). We have, for example, the passage mentioning the 'son of Pravāhaṇa' as desiring something; this 'son of Pravāhaṇa' cannot but have been a perishable being; such passages, therefore, being non-eternal, cannot be regarded as trustworthy guides as to what is duty.

With this Sūtra 6, ends the statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa*; the upshot of which is that Arthavāda passages cannot be regarded to be as authoritative and trustworthy in matters relating to Dharma as the purely injunctive passages; for reasons put forward in the sūtras 1 to 6 above.

SIDDHĀNTA.

The Siddhānta or final conclusion is put forward in sūtra 7, and further discussed in sūtras 8 to 18.

विधिना त्वेकवाक्यत्वात् स्तुत्यर्थेन विधीनां स्युः ॥ ७ ॥

विधिना Vidhinā, with the injunctive passages. तु Tu, but. एकवाक्यत्वान् Ekavākyaṭvāt, inasmuch as they are syntactically connected. स्तुत्यर्थेन Stutyarthena, by reason of their serving the purpose of praising. विधीनाम् Vidhinām, of what is enjoined. स्युः Syuh, they would be (authoritative).

7. Inasmuch as they are syntactically connected with the injunctive passages, they (arthavāda passages would be) (authoritative), by reason of their serving the purpose of praising what has been enjoined.—7.

COMMENTARY.

The main contention of the opponent is that the arthavāda passages cannot have any authoritative bearing upon Dharma, because, merely describing settled facts, they have no connection with anything to be done. It is pointed out in the present sūtra, that it is not true that these passages have no connection with actions to be performed. As a matter of fact we find that all arthavāda passages are capable of being construed along with one or more injunctive passages; and the purpose that they serve is that of praising the action enjoined in the sentence with which they are related. For instance, we have the injunction—'one who desires prosperity should sacrifice the Śveta dedicated to Vāyu;' this naturally leads to the question 'why should that particular animal be

sacrificed? And it is in answer to this question that we have the arthavāda 'Vayu is the effest deity, it carries the performer to prosperity very swiftly;' thus we see that there is a syntactical affinity between these two passages, which leads us to construe them together; and inasmuch as the arthavāda serves the distinctly useful purpose of prompting men to the performance of the act enjoined by the injunctive passage, it cannot be said to have no bearing upon *Dharma*.

In this connection it may be noted that, in regard to every injunctive passage we have two kinds of *Bhāvanā* or injunction—the *actual* and the *verbal*, each of these having three factors of (1) the result, (2) the means and (3) the procedure; in the *actual bhāvanā*, the 'result' is the result accruing from the performance of the enjoined action; the 'means' is the action enjoined, and the 'procedure' is the various subsidiary actions that go to make up the enjoined action. But of the *verbal bhāvanā*, the 'result' is the activity or prompting of the person; the 'means' is the injunctive passage; and the 'procedure'—how is this prompting to be accomplished by means of the injunctive passage?—consists of the arthavāda passages which accomplish this by praising the action. Thus we find that the arthavāda enters as an essential factor in the Injunction.

Kumārila has applied the reasoning to similar passages in the Purāṇas. He says that the praises and descriptions contained in the Purāṇas need not be accepted as literally true; specially when they are not capable of being taken along with any injunction of actions. To this category belong such descriptions as those of the Gandhamādana and the like; these serve the purpose of giving pleasure in the mere recitation; the description of wars also are meant simply to encourage the brave and the warlike as also the coward. In this manner, all these serve distinctly useful purposes. Where no such result is found,—as in the case of the hymns to deities—we assume an unseen or transcendental result.

तुल्यञ्च साम्प्रदायिकम् ॥ ८ ॥

तुल्यम् Tulyam, (is) equal. च Cha, and, also. साम्प्रदायिकम् Sāmpradāyikam, the connection of long-established tradition.

8. And the connection of long-established tradition is also equal (to the Injunction and the Arthavāda passages).
 —8.

COMMENTARY.

The Arthavāda cannot be rejected as useless, because it serves a distinctly useful purpose as shown above; and also because of another

reason, put forward in the present sūtra. As a matter of fact, we find that the Arthavāda passages are treated, by students of Veda, with as much regard and attention as the Injunctive passages; from this we conclude that the rules laid down for the study of the Veda apply with equal force to both sets of passages; and this regard and attention could not be paid to the *Arthavāda* if they were entirely useless; in which case, the students could not have kept up the study of these passages.

Another interpretation of the sūtra given by Kumārila is as follows:—The injunction of Vedic study—upon which the traditional method of study is based—makes no distinction between the injunctive and the Arthavāda passages; and from this we infer that they have a distinct purpose of their own, in connection with the action laid down by the injunctive passages; and this purpose consists in the praising of that action and thereby persuading people to its performance.

**अप्राप्ता चानुपपत्तिः । प्रयोगे हि विरोधः स्यात् । शब्दार्थ-
स्त्वप्रयोगभूतः । तस्मादुपपद्येत ॥ १ । २ । ६ ॥**

अप्राप्ता Aprāptā, (is) not applicable. च Cha, and. अनुपपत्तिः Anupapattiḥ, incongruity or contradiction. प्रयोगे Prayoge, on their (Arthavāda passages) laying down actions. हि Hi, because. विरोधः Virodhaḥ, incongruity or contradiction. स्यात् Syāt, would be. शब्दार्थः Śabdārthaḥ, the meaning of the words; [or * it serves as an auxiliary to the injunctive word]. तु Tu, but. अप्रयोगभूतः Aprayogabhūtaḥ, (does not) lay down actions. तस्मात् Tasmāt, therefore. उपपद्येत Upapadyeta, it is all right (there is no incongruity).

9. And the incongruity (urged above) is not applicable; because there would be incongruity if the passages laid down actions; but (in reality) the meaning of the words does not lay down actions [or the passage is an auxiliary to the injunctive word, and does not lay down actions;*] hence it is all right (there is no incongruity).—9.

COMMENTARY.

The incongruities pointed out in Sūtra 2 *et. seq.*,—*viz.*, that the Arthavāda passages, 'mind is a thief' and the like, are contradictory to scriptures and well-established facts of perception, and so forth—are not applicable at all. Because there would be such a contradiction only if the passages really laid down actions; for instance, the passage 'the mind is a thief' would contradict the scriptures prohibiting theft, only

* This is the alternative explanation given by the Vārtika.

if it directly laid down the action of stealing. As a matter of fact the words of these passages are not taken in their literal sense; nor are words from without added to them to make them regular injunctions of actions; they are taken only as signifying praise; this praise cannot contradict any scriptures or well-ascertained facts; hence there can be no incongruity in regard to the authority of the arthavāda passages.

The *Vārtikā* notes three different readings of this sūtra: (1) '*aprāptāñchānupapattim*, etc.,' in this case the sūtra shall be rendered as 'we find the incongruity not applicable, etc., etc.' (2) '*aprāptāñchānupāpāttim*, etc.,' the rendering in this case being 'our theory is not open to the incongruity, etc., etc.' (3) as taken above.

गुणवादस्तु ॥ १० ॥

गुणवादः Guṇavādaḥ, (there is) indirect application. तु Tu, but.

10. But there is indirect application.—10.

COMMENTARY.

"It may be possible to take the *arthavāda* along with, and as auxiliary to, the injunctive passage when the two treat of the same subject; how can this be possible when the two treat of two entirely different subjects?—e.g., the arthavāda praises the water, while the injunction lays down the use of the branch of the Vetasa tree." The explanation given by the sūtra is that in all such cases there is an indirect application; that is to say, the praise though applying directly to the water, applies indirectly to all things produced in water; and the enjoined Vetasa being one such thing, the praise becomes related to the injunction, through this indirect application; the meaning being—'because water is calm, by the use of the Vetasa, which is produced in water, the sacrificer obtains calm and peace.'

रूपात् प्रायात् ॥ ११ ॥

रूपात् Rūpāt, on the (similarity of) form. प्रायात् Prāyāt, on the character of the greater part.

11. On the similarity of form, and on the character of the greater part (the indirect injunction of passages is based.)—11.

COMMENTARY.

This sūtra meets the objections urged in sūtra 2 with regard to the two arthavāda passages: (1) 'the mind is a thief,' and (2) 'speech is a liar.' These two sentences are not to be taken in their literal sense;

They are to be taken in their indirect signification : (1) The sentence 'mind is a thief' is to be taken in the sense 'the mind is hidden within the body,' this signification being based upon the fact that the mind is similar to the thief, in that both are hidden : the mind hides itself, just as the thief does. Similarly, 'speech is a liar' is to be taken in the sense that most speech is untrue, this signification being based upon the character of the greater part of speech being generally found to be untrue. Hence the sentences cannot be stigmatised as contradictory to scriptures or well-established perceptible facts. The purpose served by these passages is that gold is superior to both these, and so should be given at sacrifices.

दूरभूयस्त्वात् ॥ १२ ॥

दूर Dūra, distance. भूयस्त्वात् Bhūyastvāt, on account of the greatness of.

12. Because of the greatness of distance.—12.

COMMENTARY.

It has been argued under sūtra 2, that some arthavāda passages are direct contradictions of well-ascertained facts of perception ; as for instance, when a passage declares that 'during the day the smoke alone of the fire is seen.' The answer to this is that, as a matter of fact during the day when the fire is burning at a great distance, it is only the smoke—and not the bright flame—of the fire that is seen ; so the passage does not contradict a perceived fact. The purpose served by this passage lies in the justifying of the use, at the morning libation, of the mantra 'Sūryo jyotirjyoti-ragniḥ svāhā,' and at the evening libation of the mantra 'Agnirjyotirjyotiḥ suryaḥ svāhā.' Both of which contain the names of both Sūrya and Agni ; the use of those that are called 'mixed' mantra is justified by the declaration that during the day Agni enters into Sūrya as proved by the perception of smoke only ; and Sūrya enters into Agni, as proved by the non-perception of the Sun ; hence at both times both these deities being mixed up in one, it is only right that 'mixed' mantras should be used.

● स्त्र्यपराधात् कर्तुश्च पुत्रदर्शनम् ॥ १३ ॥

स्त्री Strī, (of) women. अपराधात् Aparādhāt, on account of the failing. कर्तुः Kartuh, of the father. च Cha, and. पुत्र Putra, of the son. दर्शनम्, Darśanam, (there is) the finding.

* The Bhāṣya and the Vārtika both read 'stryaparādhāt,' the omission of the initial 'stri,' therefore in the text of the sūtra in the Bibl. Indica edition must be regarded as an oversight.

31. On account of the failing of the woman, (there can be no certainty of caste); specially as the son is often found to belong to the father.—13.

COMMENTARY.

Under sūtra 2 it has been argued that the passage 'we know not if we are Brāhmaṇas or non-Brāhmaṇas' contradicts a fact of perception; inasmuch as the Brāhmaṇahood of the priest is a perceptible fact; when we see that the priest is the son of a Brāhmaṇa, there can be no doubt as to his Brāhmaṇahood. The answer to this is that there is always a chance of the mother having misbehaved with a man of a different caste; in fact such mixture of castes is not uncommon; and in the case of mixtures if the son belonged to the mother, then the misbehaving of the mother would not affect the caste of the child; but we find Smṛitis declaring that the 'son belongs to the father;' hence as there is always a chance of misbehaviour on the part of the mother, there can be no certainty as to the caste of any person. The passage praises the *recounting of one's pravara*—names of one's famous ancestors and declares that even if the reciter may have doubts as to his Brāhmaṇahood, it becomes universally recognised if he recounts the *pravaras*.

❀ अकालिकेप्सा ॥ १४ ॥

अकालिक Ākālika (for) immediate good. ईप्सा īpsā, desire.

14. There is desire for immediate good.—14.

COMMENTARY.

The opponents cite another passage which is opposed to the scriptures; for instance, the sentence, 'who knows whether or not there is such a thing as heaven etc.'; this denial of the heaven world is a direct contradiction of all those passages that lay down the performance of certain sacrifices for the attaining of heaven. The present sūtra explains the real purpose of the sentence in question: The sentence occurs in connection with the injunction of putting many wide windows in the Sacrificial House; the presence of many windows allows free exit to the smoke, and thereby removes one of the greatest discomforts of persons engaged in the performance; this is the 'immediate good' mentioned in the sūtra; the meaning of the sūtra is that there is always present, in the minds of men, a desire for immediate good, rather than for one that is expected to come after some time; consequently, with a view to eulogising the

* Some people read 'अकालिक' = 'which takes no time in appearing,' which is the same as 'immediate.'

giving of many windows, the arthvāda passages say—‘as regards such desirable results as the attainment of heaven and the like people may have doubts as to whether or not there is any such place as Heaven,—but there can be no doubt, as to the excellent results proceeding from the giving of many windows to the house;’ thus all that the sentence means is, not that there is no such place as heaven, but only that the results proceeding from the giving of many windows is so sure and immediate, that one cannot fail to realise its desirability.

विद्याप्रशंसा ॥ १ । २ । १५ ॥

विद्या Vidyā, (of) knowledge. प्रशंसा Praśamsā, (it is) praise.

15. It is praise of knowledge.—15.

COMMENTARY.

This sūtra meets the arguments urged in sūtra 3.

The passage declaring the ‘shining of the face’ of the man who studies a particular Brāhmaṇa of the Veda. is only a praise of that study; the meaning being that the ‘man who studies it becomes so learned that all his words come to him smoothly, that whenever he makes a speech, it is all in good form and reason, and it is a pleasure to all who hear him,—this is what is meant by his face ‘shining’ or ‘becoming beautiful.’ Thus there is no incongruity in the passage. As regards the declaration that ‘his children become wealthy,’ this also is a praise of his learning; the meaning being that ‘the children of the learned man being also learned, they are naturally invited to officiate at a large number of sacrifices, the perquisites whereof enrich them.’

सर्वत्वसाधिकारिकम् ॥ १ । २ । १६ ॥

सर्वत्वम् Sarvatram, the universality. साधिकारिकम् Ādhikārikam, pertains to the capability of the agent.

16. The universality (mention of *all*) pertains to the capability of the agent, to perform all actions.—16.

COMMENTARY.

This meets the arguments urged in sūtra 4.

When the passage declares ‘all desirable results’ accruing to one who offers the *pṛnâhuti*—which is the final offering completing the due kindling of the sacrificial fire—what is meant is that by thus having a duly kindled fire, the agent is *enabled* to perform *all* sacrifices, and thereby obtaining all desirable results. Even so, it may be argued, it is not right to speak of ‘all results’; as ‘all results’ do not proceed from the sacrifices

performed ; e.g., the *flying in the sky* is not spoken of as proceeding from any sacrifices ; consequently the declaration that 'the performer of the Pūrṇāhuti obtains all desires' remains as untrue as ever. The reply to this is that, even in ordinary parlance we often speak of *all the rice* having been cooked ; this does not mean that *all* the rice in the world has been cooked ; all that it means is that the cooking has been accomplished of all the rice that had been set apart for being cooked on the particular occasion ; in the same manner, what the passage means is not the accruing of *all* that may be desired, but only that of those results that follow from actions performed with the help of consecrated fire.

**फलस्य कर्मनिष्पत्तेः तेषां लोकवत् परिमाणतः फलविशेषः
 स्यात् ॥ १७ ॥**

फलस्य Phalasya, of the result. कर्मनिष्पत्तेः Karmanīṣpattēḥ, the accomplishment being due to actions. तेषाम् Teṣām, of those (actions). लोकवत् Lokavat, as in the ordinary world. परिमाणतः Parimāṇataḥ, due to the magnitude. फलविशेषः Phalaviśeṣaḥ, difference in the results. स्यात् Śyāt, there would be.

17. The accomplishment of the result being due to actions, there would be a difference in the results, due to the magnitude of the actions,—as in the ordinary world.—17.

COMMENTARY.

This sūtra supplies another answer to the objections answered in the preceding sūtra. There can be no incongruity even if we take the passage literally, and admit the fact of *all* results proceeding from the Pūrṇāhuti. Even if all results do proceed from this, the character of these results cannot but differ from similar results obtainable from more elaborate and difficult actions ; for instance the heaven, i.e., pleasurable existence—obtained by the performance of the simple Pūrṇāhuti would be of a kind far inferior to that obtained by the elaborate Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa. Just as in ordinary experience we find in the case of two cultivators—one of whom labours hard throughout the day while the other cultivates his lands only now and again and leisurely,—though both obtain the same result, in the shape of the harvest, that reaped by the lazy man is far inferior, both in quality and quantity, to that reaped by the laborious man. In this manner, there need be no incongruity in the passage in question.



Siddhânta.—Though the arthavâda does not contain a word denoting action, yet, inasmuch as it is construed along with injunctive sentences which contain such a word, the two come to be taken as one sentence; and as such the injunctive word cannot be said to be altogether absent in the arthavâda. The arthavâda, therefore, has a definite meaning only when construed along with the injunctive sentence.

Adhikarāṇa II.—Treating of the authority of such Arthavāda passages as have the form of Injunctions.

SŪTRA 1. 2. 19-25.

“विधिर्वा स्यात् अपूर्वत्वात्; वादमात्रं ह्यनर्थकम्” ॥ १२।१६ ॥

विधिः Vidhiḥ, an injunction. वा Vā, surely. स्यात् Syāt, must be. अपूर्वत्वात् Apūrvarvāt, because of its (laying down) something new (not known already). वादमात्रम् Vadamātram, a mere description. हि Hi, (specially) as. अनर्थकम् Anarthakam, (would be) useless.

19. “It must be an injunction; because it lays down something new; specially as a mere description would be useless.”—19.

COMMENTARY.

It has been shown in the preceding Adhikarāṇa that Arthavāda passages are authoritative, inasmuch as they are taken along with the injunctive passages, and serve the useful purpose of persuading men to perform the actions laid down by these latter. But we find some passages which, while containing the praise of something, contain also the injunction of an action; for instance, the passage ‘the sacrificial post is of uḍumbara wood: the uḍumbara wood is the essence of food; cattle are strong; through the powerful uḍumbara post one (the priest) acquires powerful cattle; the powerful (uḍumbara) tending to bring about power.’ With regard to this the question arises—Does it mention the result—the obtaining of strength and strong cattle—as actually following from the making of the post of the uḍumbara wood, the sentence thereby becoming an injunction of the result or does it only express mere praise for purposes of persuasion?

The *Pārvapakṣa* view is that—“the passage should be taken as an injunction, and not as a mere praise; and the reason given is that the passage lays down that *the post should be made of uḍumbara wood*, if one desires to obtain strength; and as this is not laid down by any other passage, we cannot but connect the mentioned result with the mentioned action; and so long as the passage is capable of being taken as an injunction, it would be absolutely meaningless to take it as mere praise.”

“लोकवदिति चेत्” ॥ २० ॥

लोकवत् Lokavat, (it may be) as in ordinary parlance. इति Iti, this. चेत् Chet, if (is urged).

20. “If it is urged that it may be as in ordinary parlance.”—20.

COMMENTARY.

An objection is raised against the Pūrvapakṣa view :—

In ordinary parlance we find that when one says—"This cow gives good milk," we do not take this praise as indicating the injunction of its purchase; we take it only as a praise of the cow, this praise serving the purpose of persuading the person to purchase the cow,—this purchase having been mentioned in another sentence; from the analogy of this ordinary usage we may conclude that the sentence in question is a mere praise.

“न पूर्वत्वात्” ॥१२।२१॥

न Na, that cannot be. पूर्वत्वात् Pūrvatvāt, because it is known beforehand.

21. “(We reply) that cannot be; because it is known beforehand.”—21.

COMMENTARY.

The Pūrvapakṣin answers the objection raised in the preceding sūtra. He says—“The analogy does not hold good; because in the case of ordinary parlance, what is praised is already known beforehand; and what is said in praise can also be verified by experience, by actually seeing the cow give good milk; the case of the Vedic sentence is entirely different; what is praised—the making of the post with udumbara wood—is not already known; nor is the fact put forward in the praise capable of verification by perception, etc. Hence we cannot apply the analogy of ordinary parlance to the case of the Vedic passage in question. If we did so, then as in the case of the cow, the praise is verified by experience, so here also we would find it necessary to verify what is said in praise; and as this is not possible because in ordinary experience, we can never find the udumbara to be ‘essence of food’, the whole declaration would become absurd. If, on the other hand, the sentence be taken as containing an injunction—and a Vedic injunction, being totally different in character from declarations in ordinary parlance,—there would be no need for any such corroboration.”

उक्तन्तु वाक्यशेषत्वम् ॥ १२।२२ ॥

उक्तम् Uktam, has been explained. तु Tu, but. वाक्यशेषत्वम् Vākyaśeṣatvam, the fact of being taken along with other injunctive sentences.

22. But the fact of (such passages) being taken along with (other injunctive) sentences has been explained (in sūtra 1. 2. 7).—22.

COMMENTARY.

The Pârvaapakṣa has urged that, if taken as mere praise, the sentence becomes absolutely meaningless. In answer to this it is pointed out that, when taken as mere praise, the sentence cannot be meaningless or useless, because containing such praise, the sentence can be taken along with other injunctive sentences serving the purpose of persuading the agent to perform the action enjoined by those sentences, as shown under sūtra 1. 2. 7. There are strong reasons against regarding the sentence as an injunction. In the first place, there is no injunctive word, the verb being in the present tense; consequently the injunction could only be got at through the praise contained in the sentence; under the circumstances, it is far more reasonable to take the praise as bearing upon an altogether different sentence; as in the case of ordinary *Arthavâda* passages. That is to say, the sentence 'one obtains powerful cattle' must be taken as mere praise; to be taken along with the sentence 'the post is of uḍumbara wood'; and it serves the very useful purpose of persuading the agent to make the post of that wood; and it does not mean that one who uses that wood actually acquires powerful cattle; the sentence, therefore, has to be taken as true only in its figurative or secondary sense of praise, and not in its literal signification.

विधिश्चानर्थकः क्वचित्, तस्मात् स्तुतिः प्रतीयते,
तत्सामान्यादितरेषु तथात्वम् ॥ २३ ॥

विधिः Vidhiḥ, the Injunction. च Cha, also. अनर्थकः Anarthakaḥ, useless, meaningless. क्वचित् Kvachit, in certain cases. तस्मात् Tasmât, from it. स्तुतिः Stutiḥ, praise. प्रतीयते Pratiyate, is deduced or understood. तत्सामान्यात् Tat-sâmānyât; by reason of the similarity to that. इतरेषु Itareṣu, in the case of other sentences. तथात्वम् Tathâtvam, the same character.

33. In certain cases the Injunction is found to be actually meaningless, in which case the sentence is taken as indicating praise; when other passages are found to be similar, these also must be accepted to have the same character.—23.

COMMENTARY.

It may be argued that it is not right to reject the direct or literal signification of a sentence in favour of an indirect or figurative one. But, says the sūtra, there are many sentences, where the direct signification, which points to the enjoining of actions, is found to have no meaning; and in all these cases, we reject that signification, and

accept the sentence as indicating mere praise; for instance, the sentence 'Vāyu is the eftest deity' when taken in its direct signification, must mean 'the Vayu should be made the eftest deity;' this is meaningless; as it is not possible for any agent to make Vāyu eft or otherwise; for this reason, we take the sentence as mere praise of Vāyu to whom an animal is laid down (by another sentence) as to be sacrificed. The contention of the sūtra is that when, in such cases, all parties agree in rejecting the direct signification of injunction in favour of the indirect indication of praise, there can be no objection to the same in the case of all sentences that may be found to resemble the above sentence; that is to say, when once we can, on sufficient grounds, reject the direct signification, there can be no reason why we should not do the same, whenever we have similar reasons for doing it.

प्रकरणे सम्भवन्नपकर्षो न कल्प्येत, विध्यानर्थक्यं हि- तम्प्रति ॥ २४ ॥

प्रकरणे Prakaraṇe, in, along with, the context. सम्भवन् Sambhavan, compatible. अपकर्षः Apakarsaḥ, removal or transference. न कल्प्येत Na-kalpyeta, is not right. विध्यानर्थक्यम् Vidhyānarthakyaṁ, meaninglessness of the injunction. हि Hi, because. तम्प्रति, Tamprati, with regard to that.

24. In the case of that which is compatible (capable of being taken along) with its own context, removal is not right; specially because an injunction would be absolutely meaningless in regard to that (particular sacrifice).—24.

COMMENTARY.

The present sūtra puts forward another argument in support of the view that in the case of many such sentences as the one in question, we find it necessary to reject the direct signification of injunction in favour of the indication of *praise*. The sentence referred to is the following—'that which is burnt becomes fit for the demon'—occurring in the *Darsha-Pûṇamâsa* section; according to the argument of the Pûrvapakṣa, the sentence must be taken as enjoining the demon as a deity for the sacrifice, to whom the burnt cake is to be offered; and this would imply the removal of the previously mentioned deities of the sacrifice, who should have to make room for the demon. As against this, the sūtra urges that so long as there is a possibility of the previously mentioned deities being retained there can be no justification for their

removal ; except for very strong reasons. In the case in question however, we find no such reason ; as we are perfectly justified in taking the sentence as a praise of the *unburnt cake*, which alone is fit for the gods, the burnt one being fit only for demons. If, in order to avoid this argument, the sentence were taken as an injunction by itself, laying down an entirely distinct action,—that of burning the cake intended for the demon,—then the reply is that such an injunction could have absolutely no sense, in regard to the particular sacrifice of the Darśa-Pûṛaṇamāsa, in whose context it occurs.

This shows that there are many cases where the indirect indication is preferred to the direct signification ; consequently there can be no objection to the same being done in the case of the sentence under discussion.

विधौ च वाक्यभेदः स्यात् ॥ २५ ॥

विधौ Vidhau, in the case of injunction. च Cha, and further. वाक्यभेदः Vākya-bhedaḥ, syntactical split. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

25. And further, in the case of the sentence being taken as an injunction, there would be syntactical split.—25.

COMMENTARY.

If the sentence in question be taken as an injunction, then it would have to be construed as—‘The Uḍumbara wood is strong—one should make the post of the Uḍumbara wood ;’ and thereby the one sentence would become resolved into two ; thereby causing a syntactical split, which cannot be justified except when there is no other way of construing the sentence.

The inevitable conclusion thus is that the sentence in question must be taken as mere praise, serving the purpose of persuading the performer to make the post of the particular wood mentioned.

According to Prabhākara, the argument for the Pûrvapakṣa is that, so long as the sentence ‘obtains powerful cattle’ can be taken as pertaining to *something to be accomplished* (e.g., the action of making the post of *uḍumbara* wood), it is not right to take it as pointing merely an accomplished fact—the mere praise. The argument for the Siddhānta is that so long as any one or more sentences can be taken as pertaining to a single injunction, it is not right to accept different injunctions ; hence when the sentence is capable of being taken as a *praise*, related to the previously enjoined action, we cannot regard it as an injunction of results, as held by the Pûrvapakṣa.

Adhikaraṇa (III).—Treating of such Arthavāda passages as appear to contain the statement of reasons for certain courses of action.

SŪTRA 1. 2. 26—30.

“हेतुर्वा स्यात् अर्थवत्त्वोपपत्तिभ्याम्” ॥ २६ ॥

हेतुः Hetuḥ, reason. वा Vā, only. स्यात् Syāt, must be. अर्थवत्त्वोपपत्तिभ्याम् Arthavattvopapattibhyām, because of usefulness and proof.

26. “The passage must be taken only as the statement of reason ; because of usefulness and proof.—26.

COMMENTARY.

There are certain passages which appear to contain the statement of reasons for a certain course of action. As for example, the passage ‘the libation should be poured with the śūrpa *because it is by means of this that food is prepared.*’ Now, with regard to this, there arises the question—does the sentence ‘because, etc.,’ lay down a reason for the pouring of the libation with the śūrpa ? or, is it a mere praise of the śūrpa meant to persuade the sacrificer to use it ?

The Pūrvapakṣa embodied in the sūtra is that—“the sentence must “be taken as containing the statement of a reason for the adopting of a “certain course of action ; (1) because when thus taken, the sentence “serves the very useful purpose of implying the use of all such implements “of cooking as the ladle, the vessel and the like, all of which are used “in the preparing of food ; and (2) because it is only when it is thus taken “that the assertion becomes at all true and justifiable ; that is to say, if the “sentence is taken as the praise of the śūrpa only, it fails to be “precisely true, as it is not only the śūrpa whereby food is prepared ; “on the other hand, if we take the sentence as stating a reason for the “using of the śūrpa, as also of all those things that are instrumental in “the preparing of food, it becomes perfectly true ; this is the ‘proof’ “spoken of in the sūtra.”

The Siddhānta in reply to the above is presented in the next sūtra.

स्तुतिस्तु, शब्दपूर्वत्वात्, अचोदना च तस्य ॥ २७ ॥

स्तुतिः Stutiḥ, (it is) praise. तु Tu, but. शब्दपूर्वत्वात् Śābdapūrvatvāt, because it is mentioned directly by the word. अचोदना Achodanā, non-injunction. च Cha, while. तस्य Tasya, of any other.

27. But it must be regarded as a praise (of the *śūrpa*), because this is enjoined directly by the word ; while there is no injunction of any other.—27.

COMMENTARY.

The use of the *śūrpa* is laid down directly by the preceding sentence—*śūrpeṇa juhōti* ; and as such this does not stand in need of any corroboration by the statements of reason ; it is enough for us to know that the *śūrpa* is laid down as the implement to be used ; we do not want to know why it is so laid down ; so if taken as stating a reason the sentence in question would become superfluous. If, on the other hand, it is taken as being a praise of the *śūrpa*, it serves the useful purpose served by all arthavādas, *viz.*, that of persuading the performer to use the *śūrpa*. Then again, the *Pūrvapakṣin* contends that if taken as the statement of reason the sentence includes all such implements as the ladle and the like, all of which are used in the preparing of food. The *Siddhānti* urges that this is all the more reason why the sentence cannot be taken as the statement of reason ; it would, in that case put the *śūrpa*, the use of which is directly enjoined by the preceding sentence, on the same footing as all other implements, which are not so enjoined ; and this could be far from right.

Then again, what the sentence in question praises is only that by which food is prepared ; while the injunction is that of the *śūrpa* ; and as that by which the food is prepared is the action of cooking,—and not the *śūrpa*, etc.,—the sentence in question does not, in reality, state any reason for what has been enjoined. This is the meaning that the *Vārtika* attributes to the last clause of the *sūtra*.

व्यर्थे स्तुतिरन्याय्या इति चेत् ॥ २८ ॥

व्यर्थे Vyarthē, the meaning expressed by the sentence not being applicable (to the *śūrpa*). **स्तुतिः** Stutih, praise. **अन्याय्या** Anyāyā not proper. **इति चेत्** Iti, Chet, if it be urged.

28. It it be urged that—“ the meaning expressed by the sentence not being applicable (to the *śūrpa* and the sentence thereby becoming meaningless) any praise by that sentence would be most improper.—28.

COMMENTARY.

It has been declared above that, the passage in question is a mere praise of the *śūrpa*, and cannot be taken as literally true ; because the

food is prepared by the action of cooking, and not by the sūropa. The present sūtra raises an objection :—"If the food is prepared by the action of cooking, then the sūropa cannot be rightly spoken as that by means of which food is prepared; consequently it cannot be right to praise it by that assertion any such praise of the sūropa would be most absurd."

अर्थस्तु, विधिशेषत्वात्, यथालोके ॥ २६ ॥

अर्थः Arthaḥ, (there is) use (for it). तु Tu, but. विधिशेषत्वात् Vidhiśeṣatvāt, because it forms part of the injunction. यथा Yathā, as. लोके Loke, in the ordinary world.

29. (Our reply is), but what is expressed by the sentence is applicable (to the sūropa), (and the sentence is not meaningless) because it forms part of the injunction; and it is exactly as in the ordinary world.—29.

COMMENTARY.

All that is meant by saying that the food is prepared by the action of cooking, and not by the sūropa, is that the former is the more immediate cause; and by this it is not meant to deny the instrumentality of the sūropa entirely; just as in ordinary parlance when a certain work is accomplished by a number of men, when we attribute the success to that person who has worked most, we do not deny the agency of the other workers, in the same manner, even though the sūropa may not be the direct and immediate cause of the preparation of food, it cannot be denied that it helps towards it. Such being the case, what is expressed by the sentence 'because by means of it food is prepared' becomes quite applicable to it; and the sentence cannot be regarded as meaningless; specially as it forms part of, and is intended to be taken along with, the foregoing injunction, 'the libation should be offered by means of the sūropa;' that is to say, being intended for being construed along with the injunction, the sentence is naturally taken not quite in its primary signification, as pertaining to the direct and immediate cause of the preparation of food; but in that secondary sense which is compatible with the sense of that injunction.

**यदि च हेतुः अवतिष्ठेत निर्देशात् । सामान्यादिति चेत् ,
अव्यवस्था विधीनां स्यात् ॥ ३० ॥**

यदि Yadi, if. च Cha, again. हेतुः Hetuḥ, reason. अवतिष्ठेत Avastīṣṭheta it would be restricted. निर्देशात् Nirdeśāt, because of the specification. सामान्यान्

Samānyāt, through similarity. इति चत् Iṭi chet, if it be urged that. अव्यवस्था Avyavasthā, indecisiveness or uncertainty, indefiniteness. विधीनाम् Vidhinām, of injunctions. स्यात् Syāt, there would be.

30. If it were the statement of reason, the assertion would be restricted (to the Śûrpa only); because it is that which is specially mentioned. If it be urged that 'by reason of similarity (the assertion would apply to other things also);'—we reply that in that case, the injunction would become vague and uncertain.—30.

COMMENTARY.

If the sentence in question were taken as asserting the reason for the use of the śûrpa, then the assertion—'because by that is food prepared'—would have to be restricted to the śûrpa only; and it could not be taken as applicable to any other instruments of the preparation of food; because of all these instruments, it is the śûrpa that is specifically mentioned. In answer to this it might be urged that—"all that the sentence asserts is the instrumentality towards food-preparation;" and as such it could be applicable to all things that are instrumental towards it; and it could not be restricted to the śûrpa only. But in that case, the sentence, declaring the reason, being found to be applicable to many things other than the śûrpa, there would be no finality in the injunction of the use of the śûrpa; and this injunction would become vague and indecisive; while, on the other hand, when the sentence is taken as praising the śûrpa, it strengthens the injunction, and helps to make it definite and decisive.

Prabhākara's argument in support of the Siddhānta is that the Vedic injunction does not stand in need of the support of any statement of reason; the injunction being self-sufficient, any statement of reason in corroboration of it must be superfluous; but as no sentence in the Veda can be entirely superfluous, the sentence must be taken as containing the praise of the implement whose use has been enjoined.

Adhikaraṇa IV—Treating of the use of Mantras.

SŪTRA 1. 2. 31-53.

“तदर्थशास्त्रात्” ॥ ३१ ॥

तत् Tat, with.—अर्थ Artha, in connection.—शास्त्रात् Śāstrāt, because of scriptural directions. [मन्त्रानर्थक्यम्, Mantrānarthakyaṃ, meaninglessness of mantras.] [This word has to be supplied from sūtra 39 below which closes the statement of the Pūrvapakṣa].

31. "Because of scriptural directions in connection with those (mantras) [Mantras cannot be meant to be significant of any meaning]."—31.

COMMENTARY.

It has been proved above that even such apparently absurd passages as many arthavāda passages are found to have a bearing upon *dharma*; and thus it is regarded as established that the entire Veda is to be regarded as authoritative on matters relating to *dharma*; from this it is naturally taken for granted that the *mantras* of the Veda also must be possessed of some such authority. This much being granted, the question naturally arises as to the particular use to which *mantras* are to be put. That the *mantras* are not injunctions is clear and as such they cannot serve the purpose of laying down an action, as injunctive sentences do; containing no praise or disparagement, they cannot serve the purpose that has been found to be served by the arthavāda passages; from this it follows that the only purpose that can be served by the *mantras* must lie in the use of the mere words composing the *mantras*; and in connection with such use, the question that naturally arises is—are the words of the *mantra* pronounced for the purpose of conveying some meaning? Or are they pronounced merely for the sake of the utterance, and no sense is intended to be conveyed by them?

The *Pūrva-pakṣa* view is that the *mantras* are not pronounced for the purpose of conveying any meaning,—they are in fact, not intended to be expressive of any meaning. Each of the following nine sūtras beginning with sūtra 31 gives a reason in support of this view.

(1) "In connection with the picking up of the *abhri*, we have the following text—*devasyatvetyârabhya gâyatrena chhandasâ âdade..... iti chaturbhirabhrimâdatte*;—where a set of four *mantras* is laid down as to be pronounced at the time of the picking up of the *abhri*; now the words of the *mantras* themselves signify the action of picking up; under the circumstances, if these words were really meant to be significant, the fact of the *mantras* being used for the picking up of the *abhri* would be signified by the words of the *mantras* themselves, what would be the use of the subsequent direction—'one should pick up the *abhri* with these four *mantras*?—inasmuch as it has been found necessary to add this direction to the *mantras*, it is clear that the words themselves are not intended to be significant; they are meant only to be recited as so many words, irrespective of any sense that might be conveyed by them."

“वाक्यनियमात्” ॥ ३२ ॥

वाक्य Vākya, of the sentences.—नियमात् Niyamāt, because of the fixity of order.

32. (2) “Also because the order of sentences (in the *mantras*) is irrevocably fixed.”—32.

COMMENTARY.

(2) “The second reason is that if the *mantras* were intended to be recited with a view to the sense conveyed by them, there would be nothing wrong in changing the order of the words of the *mantras*; for instance, in the case of the *mantra*—‘*agnimūrdhâ divaḥ, &c.,*’ it would make no difference at all if the *mantra* were recited in the form ‘*mūrdhâ agniḥ divaḥ, &c.,*’ as this change in the order of the words would not make any difference in the sense conveyed by the words. As a matter of fact, however, the order of the words composing a *mantra* is most rigidly fixed; and one may not displace a single syllable; from which it follows that the words are not recited for the purpose of conveying any sense; their use lies in the purely verbal recitation.”

“बुद्धशास्त्रात्” ॥ ३३ ॥

बुद्ध Buddha, (pertaining to) one who already knows.—शास्त्रात् Śāstrāt, because of scriptural directions.

33. (3) “Because there are directions addressed to one who already knows.”—33.

COMMENTARY.

(3) “We meet with such *mantras* as ‘*agnīdagnīn vihara varhriḥ striṇite,*’ the words of which mean ‘Oh Agnīdhra priest, move among the fires and spread kuśa;’ this *mantra* is addressed to the Agnīdhra priest; and as the priest already knows his duty—without which knowledge he could not officiate as priest—as consisting in moving about the sacrificial fires, and spreading the kuśa; it would be superfluous to address to him any such directions as ‘move among the fires, &c.’; but these words are laid down as to be addressed to him; from which the only inference is that the words as addressed to him, in the form of the *mantra*, are not intended to convey any meaning.”

“अविद्यमानवचनात्” ॥ ३४ ॥

अविद्यमान Avidyamāna, (of) things that do not exist.—वचनात् Vachanāt, because of the mention.

34. (4) "Because of the mention of such things as do not exist."—34.

COMMENTARY.

(4) "We meet with such *mantras* as '*chatvâri śṛiṅgâḥ trayosya pādâḥ*,' the words of which mean 'it has four horns and three feet'; now, as a matter of fact, we know that there is no animal, no substance in fact, which has four horns and three feet; and yet it is not possible for the Veda to speak of such absurdities. The only conclusion that is possible is that the words are not intended to convey any meaning at all."

“अचेतनार्थसम्बन्धात्” ॥ ३५ ॥

अचेतन Achetana, insensate.—अर्थ Artha, things.—सम्बन्धात् Sumbandhât, because of being addressed.

35. (5) "Because of their being addressed to insensate things."—35.

COMMENTARY.

(5) "We find many *mantras* laid down as to be recited—the words of which signify that they are addressed to insensate things; such *mantras*, for instance, as '*oṣadhe trâyâsva, &c.*' ('O herb, save me'), '*śṛṇvotu grâvârâḥ*' (listen, O ye stones!);—as the addressing of such requests to insensate things as herbs and stones would be absurd, we are led to the conclusion that the words are not intended to convey any meaning at all."

“अर्थविप्रतिषेधात्” ॥ ३६ ॥

अर्थ, Artha, (in) signification.—विप्रतिषेधात्, Vipratishedhât, because of contradictions.

36. (6) "Because of contradictions in the signification."—36.

COMMENTARY.

(6) "We find such *mantras* as '*Aditirdyaugh, aditirantarîkṣam*,'—the words of which can only mean 'Aditi is heaven, Aditi is sky,' a palpable absurdity; the same Aditi cannot be both *heaven* and *sky*; this is the contradiction spoken of in the sūtra; similarly, the *mantra* '*Eko rudro na dvitīyâḥ*,' ('there is only one Rudra, no second'), if it meant what it appears to mean, it would be a direct contradiction of the *mantra* '*asankhyâtâ sahasrânī ye Rudrâḥ*,' the words of which mean 'the number of Rudras is innumerable thousands.' As the Veda could not make such contradictory statements, it follows that the words are not meant to be significant of any meaning."

“स्वाध्यायवदवचनात् ॥ ३७ ॥

स्वाध्यायवत् Svādhyāyavat, as there is of the verbal text. अवचनात् Avachanāt, because of non-mention.

37. (7) “Because there is no mention (of the meaning), as there is of the verbal text”.—37.

COMMENTARY.

(7) “As a matter of fact we find all great teachers of the Veda exhorting their pupils to learn carefully the text of the *mantras*, which they present before them with a good deal of care; we do not find any Kalpa saying anything as regards the meaning conveyed by the words of the *mantras*; this is a clear indication of the fact that all teachers know that the words of the *mantras* are not intended to convey any meanings. Then again, with regard to the getting up of the verbal text, we have such Vedic injunctions as ‘*svādhyāyo dhyetavyaḥ*’ and the like; there is no such injunction with regard to the getting up of the meaning of the *mantras*; which also shows that the Veda does not intend these to convey any meaning.”

“अविज्ञेयात्” ॥ ३८ ॥

38. (8) “Because it is unintelligible.”—38.

COMMENTARY.

(8) “In the case of many *mantras* we find that the meaning of some words is absolutely unintelligible:—E.g., ‘*śrin̐yeva jarbhârîturphârî*’. This also proves that the words of *mantras* are not meant to convey any sense.”

“अनित्यसंयोगान्मन्त्रानर्थक्यम्” ॥ ३९ ॥

अनित्य Anitya, transient things.—संयोगात् Saṁyogāt, because of the mention. मन्त्रानर्थक्यम् Mantrānarthakyam, meaninglessness of the mantras.

39. (9) “Because of the mention of transient things,—the *mantras* cannot be regarded as conveying any meaning.”

COMMENTARY.

(9) “In the case of such *mantras* as—‘*kînte kṛivanti kîkaṭeṣu gâvaḥ*,’ if the words convey any meaning, they speak of certain particular cows of the Kîkaṭa country—both of which are transitory things; as it is not

possible for the eternal Veda to speak of such things, we must conclude that the words are not meant to convey any meaning at all."

Such is the statement of the Pūrvaapakṣa

अविशिष्टस्तु वाक्यार्थः ॥ ४० ॥

अविशिष्टः *Aviśiṣṭaḥ*, non-different. तु, *tu*, but. वाक्यार्थः *Vākyaṛthaḥ*, the signification of sentences.

40. But there is no difference in the signification of sentences (of the Veda and those in ordinary parlance).—40.

COMMENTARY.

In reply to the Pūrvaapakṣa put forward in the foregoing sūtras, the *Siddhānta* is that the *mantras* are always meant to convey a definite meaning; because in ordinary parlance we find that whenever a number of words are used as a sentence, they are always meant to convey a meaning; and as the words of the *mantras* also constitute sentences, there is every reason to suppose that these sentences also are meant to convey definite meanings. Just as in ordinary parlance, so in the case of the *mantras* also, in every sentence there are four factors, *viz.*, the words, the meaning of each of the words by itself, the sentence, and the meaning of the sentence; now when the *mantras* are recited at a sacrifice, the words and the sentence composed by them serve the purpose of fixing the verbal form of the text recited; the meanings of the component words collectively go to fix the meaning of the sentence; and it is the meaning of the sentence alone that does not serve any other purpose; hence it is by means of this last factor that the *mantra* can benefit the sacrificial performance; and this benefit, in most cases, consists in the indicating of the deity of the sacrifice.

गुणार्थेन पुनः श्रुतिः ॥ ४१ ॥

गुणार्थेन *Guṇārthena*, for purposes of qualification. पुनः श्रुतिः *Punaḥśrutih*, repetition.

41. The repetition is for purposes of qualification.—41.

COMMENTARY.

This sūtra answers the argument put forward in sūtra 31 above. The addition of the sentence *chaturbhirabhṛimādatte* is not for the indicating of the use of the *mantras* at the *picking up of the abhri*—which is already indicated by the words of the *mantras* themselves;—but for the pointing out of a further qualification of the *mantras*—this qualification being in the

form of the number 'four,' which number is not mentioned in the *mantras*. That is to say, though the words of each of the *mantras* are sufficient to point out the fact that each of them is to be recited at the picking up of the *abhri*, there is nothing in them to point out the fact that the *aberi* is to be picked up with *mantras whose number is four*; and inasmuch as the supplementary sentence supplies this new information, it can be regarded as a pure injunction.

परिसङ्ख्या ॥ ४२ ॥

परिसङ्ख्या *Parisankhyâ*, (there is) exclusion.

42. There is an exclusion.—42.

COMMENTARY.

Another *mantra* cited by the *Pûrvapakṣa* in connection with *sûtra* 31, is - '*imâmagribhṇam rashanâmṛitasya*,' to which is added the supplementary sentence '*ityaśvâbhidhânîmâdatte*'; and it is urged that if the *mantra* were intended to be significant, as the holding of the reins is already mentioned by the words of the *mantra* itself,—what would be the use of mentioning it over again by means of the supplementary sentence. The reply to this is that the supplementary sentence serves the purpose of exclusion;—that is to say, all that the words of the *mantra* signify is the holding of the reins; and as this could be the holding of the reins of the horse as well as that of the reins of the ass, the supplementary direction is added that the *mantra* is to be recited in the holding of the reins of the horse; which excludes the holding of the reins of the ass; thus the supplementary sentence serves a distinctly useful purpose.

अर्थवादो वा ॥ ४३ ॥

अर्थवादः *Arthavâdaḥ*, (it may be) an *arthavâda*. वा *Va*, or.

43. Or it may be an *arthavâda*.—43.

COMMENTARY.

This takes up the case of another *mantra*, that is cited in this connection by the opponent. The *mantra*—'*Urupratha uru prathasva*'—is found to be supplemented by the direction '*itî purodâsam prathayati*'; and it is argued that if the *mantra* was intended to be significant, as the becoming large of the cake is already mentioned by the words '*uru prathasva*,' the adding of the supplementary direction would be superfluous. The answer to this is that the words of the *mantra* '*uru prathasva*,' do not

really mention the enlarging of the cake ; in fact they cannot be taken in their direct signification ; as they are addressed to the cake an inanimate thing, the addressing to whom can have no meaning at all ; these words, therefore, have to be taken as mere Arthavāda serving the purpose of persuading the performer to do the enlarging of the cake laid down in the supplementary direction. That the words of the *mantra* are meant to be an Arthavāda is further shown by the fact that towards the end of the *mantra* we have the words ' *uru te yajgñāpatiḥ prathatām* ' (may your master of the sacrifice become magnified) ; if we put the two together, we get at the idea addressed to the cake :—'You may become large, and may thereby the master of the sacrifice become magnified' *i.e.* ; 'if the cake is enlarged the master becomes magnified' ; and this is a pure Arthavāda serving the purpose of persuading the priest to enlarge the cake, as laid down in the supplementary direction.

अविरुद्धम्परम् ॥ ४४ ॥

अविरुद्धम् Aviruddham, not incompatible. परम् Param, the assumption.

44. The assumption would not be incompatible.—44.

- COMMENTARY.

In sū. 32 above, it has been argued that, inasmuch as it is only when the words of the *mantra* are in a particular order that the *mantra* is recognised as such, and not when the order is changed,—it follows that no significance is meant to be attached to the words ; because the change in the order of the words does not change the meaning. The reply to this is that all that this argument means is that, in the case of the use of such *mantras* we have to assume that the desired transcendental result can follow only when the words of the *mantra* are pronounced in a particular order ; and this assumption is perfectly compatible with the view that the words are meant to be significant ; as even then there would be nothing incongruous in the assumption that a certain transcendental result follows when the words are uttered in a certain order. So this argument does not affect the case at all.

सम्प्रैषे कर्मगर्हानुपालम्भः संस्कारत्वात् ॥ ४५ ॥

सम्प्रैषे Sampraīṣe, in regard to the directions. कर्म Karma, action of signification.—गर्हा Garhā, reproach.—अनुपालम्भः Anupālambhaḥ, no objection (can be taken). संस्कारत्वात्, Saṁskāratvāt, because of its being an addition to his qualification

45. As regards the directions, no objection can be taken on the basis of reproach attaching to the signification ; because it serves the purpose of adding to his qualification.—45.

COMMENTARY.

In Sūtra 33 above, it has been argued that, in the case of such *mantras* as ‘*agnîd agnîm vihara, &c.*’ which are addressed to learned priests,—if they are meant to be significant, *i.e.*, if the *mantra* really were intended to convey the meaning ‘O agnîd priests, move among the fires,’—any such addressing would be entirely superfluous ; as the priest already knows what he has to do. The answer to this is that the objection is not well taken ; as even though the priest may already know what he has to do, if he is, at the time of actual performance, reminded of his duties,—this only adds to his qualification, enabling him to perform his duties more precisely than he would have done if he had only a vague notion of what was required of him.

अभिधानेऽर्थवादः ॥ ४६ ॥

अभिधाने Abhidhāne, on significance, being significant. अर्थवादः Arthavādaḥ, (the mantra is) an arthavāda.

46. Being significant, the *mantra* is regarded as an Arthavāda.—46.

COMMENTARY.

This answers the argument urged in sūtra 34. The *mantra* “having four horns, &c.” must be regarded as conveying a definite meaning ; and the sense conveyed need not be absurd ; as the whole is a highly figurative eulogy bestowed upon the deity of the sacrifice, the sun ; the “four horns” of the sun are the four quarters of the day,—the three feet refer to the three seasons,—the “two heads” to the two half-yearly periods, and so forth.

गुणादविप्रतिषेधः स्यात् ॥ ४७ ॥

गुणात् Gūṇāt, on account of expression being taken in its secondary (figurative) sense. अविप्रतिषेधः Avipratishedhaḥ, non-contradiction. स्यात् Syāt, there would be.

47. Inasmuch as the expression is figurative, there is no contradiction.—47.

COMMENTARY.

In sūtra 36, it has been argued that if the *mantra* 'Aditirdyaṇ' conveyed the meaning that 'Aditi is heaven,'—it would be contradicting a fact; because as a matter of fact, Aditi is not heaven. The answer to this is that the *mantra* is not intended to be taken as literally true; all that is meant by it is the praise of Aditi; and when one praises a certain deity, he can, figuratively speaking, speak of that deity, as anything and everything. So there is nothing in the sense conveyed by the *mantra* that can be called as 'contrary to fact.'

विद्यावचनमसंयोगात् ॥ ४८ ॥

विद्या-अवचनम् Vidyā-avachanam, the non-mention of the studying (of meanings). असंयोगात् Asamyogāt, is due to the fact of non-connection.

48. That the studying (of the meanings of *mantras*) is not mentioned (in the Vedic texts laying down Vedic study) is due to the fact that it (the knowledge of the meanings of *mantras*) has no connection (with the actual performance of sacrifices).—48.

COMMENTARY.

In sūtra 37 it has been argued that though we have texts that lay down the study of the verbal text of the *mantras*, there is none that enjoins the learning of their meanings, and that we donot find teachers of the Veda explaining the meanings of *mantras*. The answer to this is that the Veda does not lay down the studying of the meaning for the simple reason that the meaning of *mantras* has no direct bearing upon the performance of sacrifices; and the teachers donot take the trouble of explaining the meanings with care because the comprehension and retaining of the meaning is much easier than the retaining of the text.

सतः परमविज्ञानम् ॥ ४९ ॥

सतः Satāḥ, of that which exist. परम् Param, moreover. अविज्ञानम् Avijñānam, ignorance.

49. Moreover, there is ignorance (of the meaning) which is there all the same.—49.

COMMENTARY.

In sūtra 38, it is urged that there are certain *mantras* that are entirely unintelligible. The answer to this is that, that we donot grasp

the meaning of a certain *mantra* does not prove that it has no meaning ; as a matter of fact, every *mantra* has a definite meaning ; and when we cannot find out what it is in a certain case, that only shows that we are ignorant of it. In fact there is no *mantra* whose meaning cannot be found out by careful consideration and pondering. Examples of the interpretation of apparently meaningless *mantras* are given in the *Tantracārtika* (Translation, pp. 100-101.)

उक्तश्चानित्यसंयोगः ॥ ५० ॥

उक्तः Uktah, has been already explained. च Cha, and. अनित्यसंयोगः Anityasamyogah, the mention of transient things.

50. And the mention of transient things (in Vedic *mantras*) has already been explained.—50.

COMMENTARY.

In sūtra 39 it is urged that there are certain *mantras* which, if regarded as significant, would be found to make mention of transient things, which would not be compatible with the eternal character of all Vedic *mantras*. The answer to this is that the difficulty with regard to the mention in the Veda of apparently transient things, has already been explained above, under sūtra 1. 1. 31.

लिङ्गोपदेशश्च तदर्थत्वात् ॥ ५१ ॥

लिङ्गोपदेशः Lingopadeśah, the mention of *mantras* by indicative names. च Cha, also (proves that the *mantra* is significant). तदर्थत्वात् Tadarthatvāt, because such is the signification of those (names).

51. The mention of *mantras* by indicative names also [proves that the *mantras* are significant] because such is the signification of those names.—51.

COMMENTARY.

The above sūtras have refuted the arguments of the opponent. With this sūtra begins the statement of arguments in support of the *Siddhānta*. We find certain *mantras* designated by specific names. Such, for instance, as 'Āgneyi,' 'Aindri,' these names signify respectively 'that which has Agni for its deity,' and 'that which has Indra for its deity,' now the fact that the particular *mantra* has Agni or Indra for its deity cannot be ascertained except by taking account of what the words of the *mantra* signify, hence we conclude that inasmuch as such significant names have been given to *mantras*, they cannot but be regarded as intended to convey definite meanings.

ऊहः ॥ ५२ ॥

ऊहः Ūhaḥ, modification.

52. (The acceptance of) modifications proves that *mantras* are meant to be significant.—52.

COMMENTARY.

We find the Vēda referring to modifications in the wording of the *mantras*; for instance, the sentence ‘*na mâtâ vardhate*’ (‘the mother grows not’) precludes the possibility of nouns in the singular number being changed into those in the *dual* or *plural*; the sense of this sentence being that when a certain *mantra* contains the word ‘*enam*’ for instance, as referring to the sacrificial animal, this singular pronoun ‘*enam*’ should not be changed into ‘*enân*’ when the number of animals is more than one. This clearly shows that the words of the *mantra*, e.g., ‘*enam*’ in the present case is intended to be significant of ‘this,’ one animal.

विधिशब्दाश्च ॥ ५३ ॥

विधिशब्दाः Vidhiśabdāḥ, words in injunctive sentences. च Cha, also.

53. Then again, we meet with certain words in injunctive sentences which show that *mantras* are intended to be significant.—53.

COMMENTARY.

In the Vēda we find certain injunctions which make mention of the parts of certain *mantras*, not by means of the exact words of the *mantra*, but by means of other synonymous words. For instance, in one passage the *mantra* ‘*Śatam himaḥ*’ is referred to as ‘*Śatam hemantân.*’ This clearly shows that the Vēda itself intends *mantras* to be significant.

The Prābhākara view is, in the main, same as the above Bhātta view. “The *mantras* must be regarded as intended to be significant; because as part of the Vēda, they must have a useful bearing on actions; this they can have only if they are regarded as indicating certain details (in the shape of the deity, for instance) connected with the action.” (*Bṛihatî*). And so long as they are found to supply some such useful information, it is not right to regard them as being intended for mere recitation, which recitation brings forth certain transcendental results. There may be some *mantras* that are not found to convey any information useful in sacrificial performances; such *mantras* may be taken as being intended for mere verbal recitation for purposes of transcendental results only.

End of Pāda ii of Adhyāya I.

THIRD PĀDA.

THE AUTHORITY OF SMṚITIS AND USAGE ON MATTERS
RELATING TO DHARMA.

Adhikaraṇa I—The authority of Smṛitis in general.

SŪTRA 1. 3. 1-2.

“धर्मस्य शब्दमूलत्वादशब्दमनपेक्षं स्यात्” ॥ १ । ३ । १ ॥

धर्मस्य Dharmasya, of dharma. शब्दमूलत्वाद् Śabdāmūlatvāt, on account of the character of having the Veda for its basis. अशब्दम् Aśabdām, that which is not Veda. अनपेक्षं Anapekṣam, to be disregarded. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

1. “Dharma having the Veda for its sole basis, that which is not Veda should be disregarded.”—1.

COMMENTARY.

The preceding two pādas have established the authority of the Injunctions, Arthavādas and Mantras occurring in the Veda. What calls for consideration next is the character of such words and expressions as are the names of sacrifices. But before taking up this question, the sūtra takes up the question of the authority of the Smṛitis; and the reason for this lies in the well-known fact that the knowledge of Smṛitis is found to help in the comprehension of the true meaning of many Vedic injunctions; and in many cases, the authority of the Veda is open to rejection in favour of what is laid down in the Smṛitis; and thus it becomes necessary to ascertain how far the Smṛiti may be allowed to interfere in matters relating to dharma, for which the Veda has been found to be the sole authority. But before considering these comparatively doubtful cases,—where the Smṛiti goes directly against the Veda, the author deals with the more general question—Is the Smṛiti to be regarded as having any authority on matters relating to dharma?

To take a specific instance—the Smṛiti lays down the performing of the Aṣṭakā śrāddhas, with regard to which nothing is found in the Vedas. Now, the question arises,—Is the performance of the Aṣṭakā to be regarded as dharma to the same extent as the Agnihotra which is enjoined in the Veda?

The Pūrvapakṣa on this point is that, “any action laid down in works other than the Veda cannot be regarded as dharma; because dharma

has been defined in Sū 1. 1. 2 as that which is indicated by Vedic injunctions ; consequently, in all matters relating to dharma, all that is not Veda, —Smṛitis, Usage, &c.,—cannot be regarded as authoritative.”

अपि वा कर्तृसामान्यात्प्रमाणमनुमानं स्यात् ॥ २ ॥

अपि वा Api vā, but. कर्तृसामान्यात् Kartṛisāmānyāt, on account of the agent being the same. प्रमाणम् Pramāṇam, proof. अनुमानम् Anumānam, inference. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

2. But on account of the agent being the same, inference would be the proof (of Smṛiti having its basis in the Veda)—2.

COMMENTARY.

The *Siddhānta* on this point is as follows :—

It is true that Veda is the sole authority for all matters relating to dharma ; but how do we know that the Smṛiti is not based on the Veda ? As a matter of fact, we find that the Smṛitis have been compiled by Manu and other well-known writers ; and we also find that the works of these writers in the realms of science and philosophy afford satisfactory explanations of their respective subjects. Under the circumstances, with regard to the works of these writers, we can only have the following assumptions—(1) that Manu and others are totally mistaken in what they have asserted ; (2) that what they have asserted is based upon their personal observation and experience ; (3) that they learnt it from other persons ; (4) that they have wilfully made wrong statements, with a view to lead people astray ; or (5) that what they have asserted is based upon direct Vedic injunctions. We do not find sufficient reasons to justify the acceptance of the first four assumptions ; the only possible view, therefore, is the last one : whatever is laid down in the Smṛitis has its basis in direct injunctions contained in the Veda ; in the case of such Smṛiti assertions as are not found to be corroborated by known Vedic texts, the presence of such texts is to be inferred,—from the fact of Manu and other Smṛiti writers being trustworthy persons, taking their stand upon the Veda : that is to say, when in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred we find that what Manu has laid down is in strict accordance with Vedic texts as known to us, this justifies the inference that in the hundredth case also, the assertion must have its basis in some Vedic text not known to us ; specially when we know that many rescensional texts of the Vedas are lost to us ; and even those that are not quite lost are so scattered that it is not possible for us to lay our hands upon the exact text wanted.

The basic reason for this inference as declared in the sūtra is contained in the word 'kartṛis'mānyāt,'—'on account of the agent being the same;' this, according to the older commentators, means—'because the agents or persons who compiled the Smṛitis are the same that performed actions laid down in the Veda; that is to say, we know that during their lives, Manu, Yājñavalkya and other writers on Smṛiti, acted fully in accordance with the injunctions laid down in the Veda; and for persons who were such strict followers of the Veda in conduct, it is not possible that they should have made assertions except in accordance with direct Vedic injunctions known to them; therefore, we conclude that the Smṛiti is authoritative.'

This interpretation is not accepted by Kumārila; because, he asserts, as men of the world, Manu and other writers must have done many acts under the influence of a temporary impulse, which acts might be even contrary to Vedic injunctions. He, therefore, takes the phrase 'on account of the agent being the same' to mean—'because the persons that compiled the Smṛitis are the same that learnt and studied the Veda;' the reasoning being expanded in this form :—'What is laid down in the Smṛiti, the performance of the Aṣṭakā for instance, has been laid down, and recognised as dharma, by an unbroken line of teachers and students of the Veda; and this leads to the presumption that what is thus laid down is surely based upon direct Vedic injunctions.'

Though the word in the sūtra is 'Anumāna,' which means Inference,—and as such Kumārila's interpretation might be suspected to be a deviation from the sūtra—yet, he has been careful to point out that the word 'anumāna' in the sūtra has not been used in its technical sense of *inference*, but in its literal sense of 'what comes after sense-perception;' and in this sense Presumption is as much 'Anumāna' as Inference.

Though the above is the conclusion in regard to Smṛitis in general, Kumārila does not blindly accept the entire Smṛiti literature to be equally authoritative; he draws a distinction; he says :—

'Among the Smṛi is themselves, such portions as are related to Dharma or Deliverance have their origin directly in the Veda; while those that have mere pleasure, &c., in view are based upon the ordinary experience of the world. This rule also holds good respecting Itihāsas and Purāṇas'—(*Tantravātrika* trans., p. 119.)

Among the auxiliary sciences, of Śikṣā, Kalpa, Vyākaraṇa, &c., portions treating of things connected with sacrificial performances are based upon the Veda; while those treating of things serving some ordinary worldly purpose have their basis in ordinary experience.

According to Prabhākara, there is nothing intrinsically in the Smṛiti itself which necessitates its being accepted as authoritative; what makes us regard it to be so, is the consideration that if the Smṛiti were not authoritative, the Vedic passages upon which the Smṛiti is based would also have to be discredited. For instance, even though the Aṣṭakā is not directly enjoined in any Vedic passage, yet there are passages that are indicative of it; hence if the Smṛiti laying down that Aṣṭakā were rejected as not authoritative, a similar fate would befall the Vedic passage also.

As in the case of the Veda, so in that of the Smṛiti also, what is directly authoritative in matters relating to dharma is only the injunctive sentence; all the rest is only Arthavāda, related to certain injunctions. There are some portions of the Smṛitis which are not so related at all; for instance, the description of rivers and mountains; these are to be regarded as mere poetical descriptions calculated to give pleasure by recitation; the descriptions of battles are calculated to infuse courage and enthusiasm in the minds of the brave; the descriptions of countries are meant to afford some idea as to what places are fit for sacrificial performances, and so forth.

Adhikaraṇa II—Greatest authority rests in direct Vedic declarations.

SŪTRA 1. 3. 3—4.

विरोधे त्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम् ॥ ३ ॥

विरोधे Virodhe, there is contradiction. तु Tu, when. अनपेक्षम् Anapekṣam, to be disregarded. स्यात् Syāt, should be. असति Asati, when there is none. हि Hi, because. अनुमानम् Anumānam, inference or presumption (of corroborative Vedic texts).

3. Whenever there is contradiction between the Smṛiti and the Veda, the Smṛiti should be disregarded; because it is only when there is no contradiction that there is presumption [of Vedic texts in support of the Smṛiti].—3.

COMMENTARY.

The authority of the Smṛiti has been established in a general way. The author now proceeds to point out exceptions. In the case of such Smṛiti-assertions as bear upon matters in regard to which we meet with no declarations in the Veda, we are free to presume that there must be some Vedic texts, not known to us, that lend support to what is asserted in the Veda. But there are instances in which the assertion of the Smṛiti is

found to be contradictory to, or incompatible with, what is declared in a well-known Vedic text ; for example, we have a Smṛiti text laying down the covering of the whole sacrificial post with cloth, while, on the other hand, we have the Vedic text that the adhvaryu priest should sing a certain mantra while touching the post ; as this touching would not be possible if the entire post were covered with cloth, the assertion of the Smṛiti is found to be incompatible with what is laid down in the Veda. And the question naturally arises—are such texts to be regarded as authoritative ? The reason for doubt lying in the consideration that, if such a text were regarded as authoritative, on the basis of the conclusion of the preceding adhikarāṇa, that would imply the rejection of the Vedic text which it contradicts ; and this does not appear to be reasonable, in view of the unimpeachable authority of the Veda.

The *prima facie* argument—the Pūrvapakṣa—on this point implied by the sūtra, is as follows :—“ It has been established in the foregoing adhikarāṇa that there is no possibility of the assertions in the Smṛitis originating from ignorance, illusion or deception ; they are the assertions of persons known as fully trustworthy, and as such they must be accepted as authoritative. When once this position has been taken up we can turn back upon it ; if we rejected or doubted the authority of a single assertion of the Smṛiti, that would render the entire Smṛiti literature open to doubt and suspicion. It has been proved that the Smṛiti has its basis in the Veda ; and as such its authority cannot be doubted. Even in those cases in which the Smṛiti text is found to be contradictory to a Vedic text, we need not relax our position ; because, as a matter of fact, we know that there are such contradictions, in many cases between two well known Vedic texts ; e.g., when one text speaks of the Homa being performed before sunrise, while another speaks of it as to be done after sunrise. And similarly, it having been proved that all Smṛiti declarations have their corroborative texts in the Veda, we naturally presume that the Smṛiti-declaration that is found to be contradictory to a declaration in the Veda, must also have a corroborative text in the Veda ; if we cannot lay our hands upon such a text, that is because we do not possess all the Vedic texts (as held in the foregoing adhikarāṇa) ; hence this also comes to be only a case of contradiction between two Vedic texts. And thus in doubting the authority of the Smṛiti text, we should be doubting the authoritative character of the Vedic texts themselves. If the Mīmāṃsaka is to remain firm upon his conclusion of the foregoing adhikarāṇa he can have no justification for doubting the authority of any Smṛiti-declarations.”

In answer to the above, we have the Siddhānta laid down in the Sūtra.

Wherever there is any contradiction between the Smṛiti and the Veda, the authority of the Smṛiti is to be totally disregarded ; as it is only when there is no such contradiction that we can presume a Vedic text in support of what is said in the Smṛiti. Because the Smṛiti is not, like the Veda, self-sufficient in its authority ; in fact, it derives its authority from the Veda ; and hence we can presume a Vedic text in corroboration of what is said in the Smṛiti only when we do not find a Vedic text bearing on that subject ; so when such a Vedic text is found, and is found to be contradictory to what is asserted by the Smṛiti, there can be no justification for presuming a Vedic text in support of this latter ; and the presence of the Vedic text to the contrary cuts off the very basis of the authority of the Smṛiti. Thus then, in matters relating to dharma, the Smṛiti not being self-sufficient in its authority, the Smṛiti that contradicts the Veda cannot be taken as laying down an optional alternative ; as we assume in the case of two mutually contradictory Vedic texts. Because in the latter case, both the texts being equally self-sufficient in their authority, we have no reason for rejecting one in favour of the other ; in the case of a Smṛiti and a Vedic text, the latter is self-sufficient in its authority, while the former would derive its authority from a text that would be presumed ; so that we have a distinct reason for accepting the latter and rejecting the former. The conclusion, therefore, is that no authority attaches to such Smṛiti texts as are contradictory to direct assertions of the Veda.

हेतुदर्शनाच्च ॥ ४ ॥

हेतु Hetu, (of) causes — दर्शनात् Darśanāt, because of our finding. च Cha, also.

4. Also because we find causes.—4.

COMMENTARY.

Another reason is given for rejecting the authority of certain Smṛitis. In the case of many Smṛiti texts we find that the assertions therein contained are to be attributed to such causes as greed, &c., on the part of the priests ; for instance, the injunction that the entire post is to be covered has its root in the priest's desire for appropriating a larger piece of cloth. And in the case of assertions having such sources, we need not take the trouble to find their corroboration in any Vedic texts ; because when we find their basis in visible causes, we can have no justification for presuming unseen texts.

*Adhikarāṇa III.—[No authority attaches to such Smṛitis
 as have their origin in worldly objects.]*

The preceding sūtra 4 has, in the first place, been taken by the Bhāṣya, as supplying an additional reason for rejecting the authority of certain Smṛiti texts. It has also been taken as embodying a fresh adhikarāṇa. There are some Smṛiti texts which, though not contradictory to any Vedic texts, are found to have their origin in the greed of the priest and such other well-known causes. For instance, the text declaring the taking away by the priest of the cloth worn by the sacrificer during the Vaisarjana Homa. This assertion, being found to be due to the greed of the priest, does not stand in need of the corroboration of Vedic texts, the presumption whereof is precluded. Consequently no authority can belong to such declarations as have their source in such ordinary causes as the greed of the priest, for instance.

A note on Sūtras 3 and 4, as embodying Adhikarāṇas 2 and 3.

Kumārila does not accept the above interpretation of sūtras 3 and 4, whereby certain Smṛiti texts are shown to be absolutely devoid of authority. His point is that, in Adhikarāṇa (I) it has been proved that all that is contained in the Smṛiti has its basis in the Veda; and hence for every Smṛiti text, there is a corresponding Vedic text. Such being the principle once laid down, even when we find a certain Smṛiti text contradicting the Veda, we must regard this as a case of contradiction between two Vedic texts; because by the law laid down in the preceding *adhikarāṇa*, there must be a Vedic text as the basis of this Smṛiti text; hence the contradiction in all such cases lies between two Vedic texts; and consequently we must take Sūtra 3 as declaring that, wherever a Smṛiti text is found to lay down a course of action which is found to be contrary to what is laid down in a Vedic text, and thus there being a contradiction between the two, it is desirable that in practice, we should adopt the course laid down in the Vedic text; just as in the case of two optional alternatives laid down in the Veda, we may, for certain reasons, adopt one in preference to the other; and this does not mean that no authority belongs to the Smṛiti; because in the case of the optional alternative laid down in the Veda, if we give preference to one over the other, it does not mean that the text laying down the other alternative, is not authoritative. In practice, we can adopt only one; and if we adopt one, and not the other, that does not make the other text absolutely devoid of authority.

PŪRVA-MĪMĀMSĀ-SŪTRAS. I ADHYĀYA.

According to this view, the translation of Sūtra 3 should run as follows :—

When there is a contradiction between the ideas expressed by the Vedic text and the Smṛiti, that which is independent of all else (i.e., the Vedic text) should be accepted as authoritative.

That is to say, in cases where the Smṛiti texts have expressed in other words, the sense of certain Vedic texts, without quoting the exact words of these latter, they make their authority dependent upon the presumption of those Vedic texts whose meaning they are meant to express ; while the Vedic text, which declares what is contrary to what is declared in the Smṛiti, is self-sufficient in its authority, and as such this latter inspires greater confidence, and leads people to adopt the course laid down in this, in preference to the other course laid down in the Smṛiti. But this does not mean that the Smṛiti has no authority.

Kumārila suggests yet another interpretation of sūtras 3 and 4. They mean that, in matters relating to dharma, no authority can attach to such Smṛiti compilations as contradict the Veda—i.e., which can have no basis in the Veda—because they are found to have their source in such perceptible causes as avarice and the like ; and under this class of ' Smṛiti ' are to be included not the Vedic Smṛitis of Manu and others which have been proved to have their basis in the Veda,—but only the so-called ' Smṛitis ' of Buddha, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pāñcharātra, Pāsupata and the like,—all of which have within them, hidden under a thin coat of righteousness, instructions for the gaining of such visible ends as wealth, fame and respect, &c.

By ' Smṛitis ' in this connection, Kumārila takes only those that are recognised as authoritative throughout India—such, for instance, as the Smṛiti of Manu, the Itihāsas and the Purāṇas. The case of such local Smṛitis as those of Vasiṣṭha, &c., are dealt with later on under Sūtras 15 and 16.

According to Prabhākara, whose presentation of the adhikaraṇas is in accordance with the Bhāṣya, the Pūrvapakṣa is that,—the Smṛiti and the Veda being both equally authoritative, whenever the two are contradictory, we should reject the authority of both ; and in so far the universal authority of the Veda becomes weakened. The Siddhānta is that the two are not equal in their authority ; the Veda is self-authoritative, while the Smṛiti is dependent for its authority on the Veda ; hence where there is contradiction the Smṛiti must be rejected as unauthoritative.

Adhikarāṇa IV.—Declaration of Substance is most authoritative.

SŪTRA 1. 3. 5—7.

शिष्टाकोपेऽविरुद्धमिति चेत् ॥ ५ ॥

“ न शास्त्रपरिमाणत्वात् ” ॥ ६ ॥

शिष्टाकोपे Śistakope, when there is no disturbance of what is laid down in the Veda. अविरुद्धम् Aviruddham, there is no contradiction. इति चेत् Iti chet, if this be the accepted opinion. न Na, this cannot be right. शास्त्रपरिमाणत्वात् Śāstraparimāṇatvāt, because the limit is fixed by the scriptures.

5-6. “‘When there is no disturbance in what is laid down in the Veda, there is no contradiction,’—if this be the accepted opinion,—(5)—this cannot be right, because the limit is fixed by the scriptures.”—5-6.

COMMENTARY.

The case of the Smṛiti texts, dealing with actions to be done for the purpose of accomplishing certain results desired by man, has been dealt with in the preceding adhikarāṇa, where it has been shown that they are to be accepted as authoritative, or rejected as unauthoritative, according as they are found to be corroborated or contradicted by Vedic texts. The present adhikarāṇa deals with the Smṛiti texts bearing upon such small acts as are not performed for accomplishing any definite purpose, but only come to be performed on certain occasions in the course of sacrificial performances ; for instance, the text that lays down that, in course of the performance, if the performer happens to sneeze, he should rinse his mouth. In connection with this text all that has to be considered is whether or not they are contradictory to Vedic texts ; as when this question has been decided, the matter of their authoritative or unauthoritative character is easily determined by the foregoing adhikarāṇa. The Veda lays down the performance of a sacrifice, a performance consisting of a number of details carried into execution in a definite order of sequence ; if during such a performance, the performer happens to sneeze, he should rinse his mouth—says the Smṛiti ; if he were to do this, the sequence of the details of the sacrificial performance would be broken ; for instance, the libation to Indra being laid down as following the libation to Agni,—if the sneezing and rinsing due to sneezing were to be done after the libation to Agni, the libation to Indra could not follow immediately after the libation to Agni. Now the question arises, whether or not, in this case, there is a contradiction between the Veda and the Smṛiti ; and in this case all that we have to consider is whether or not

the acceptance of the Smṛiti-injunction (of rinsing the mouth) would interfere with the proper accomplishment of the action laid down in the Veda; that is to say, if we find that the rinsing of the mouth, in course of the sacrificial performance, is either not allowed, or distinctly prohibited, by the Vedic text laying down the procedure of the sacrificial performance, then the conclusion must be that there is a contradiction; if, on the other hand, we find that the introduction of the act (of rinsing) into the performance does not interfere with the main performance, but in fact helps in its accomplishment, we come to the conclusion that there is no contradiction.

The question being thus stated, the answer that naturally suggests itself is that the Smṛiti text that lays down an act in connection with, and in pursuance of, what is laid down in the Veda, cannot be regarded as contradictory to the Veda; specially as the performance of that act does not interfere with the performance laid down in the Veda. All that the Vedic text does is to lay down the accomplishment of a certain course of action; if the act laid down in the Smṛiti is not found to hamper that course,—and is in fact found to help its accomplishment, there is nothing to prevent us from accepting this act as an additional auxiliary to the Vedic sacrifice; for instance, if on sneezing, the performer went on with the offerings, and did not do anything to remove the impurity caused by the sneezing, this impurity would taint the whole performance; consequently, the act of rinsing, by removing that impurity, far from hampering the performance, is found to be helpful to it. Such texts, therefore, cannot be regarded as contradictory to the Veda. This is the opinion hypothetically put forward in Sūtra. 1. 3. 5.

The Pūrvapakṣin denies the validity of this opinion; for reasons given in Sūtra. 1. 3. 6:—"It cannot be denied that the limit or extent of the procedure of all performances laid down in the Veda is irrevocably fixed by the Vedic text bearing on those performances; under the circumstance, if a fresh action, not already included therein, is introduced into the performance, the performance will surely exceed its original limit; and this would certainly involve a transgression of the Veda that lays down that limit. As regards all performances the Veda lays down a definite order in which the various details are to be executed; this definite order will certainly be interrupted by the intrusion of an action not already included in the original action. For these reasons, it must be confessed that the Smṛiti texts laying down such acts as those of rinsing and the like, as to be done in course of the performance of actions laid down in the Veda, are directly contradictory to the Veda; and as such, they must be rejected as absolutely without authority."

अपि वा कारणाग्रहणे प्रयुक्तानि प्रतीयेरन् [तेष्वदर्श-
नाद्विरोधस्य] ॥ ७ ॥

अपि वा Api vā, but. कारणाग्रहणे Kāraṇāgrahāṇe, no motive being found. प्रयुक्तानि Prayuktāni, (as) useful. प्रतीयेरन् Pratiyeran, they should be recognised. तेषु Teṣu, in them. अदर्शनात् Adarśanāt, because of not being found. विरोधस्य Virodhasya, of contradiction.

7. But no motive being found, they should be recognised as useful; [specially because we do not find any contradiction in them.]—7.

COMMENTARY.

The final conclusion is put forward in this sūtra. The last clause, translated within square brackets, occurs in the next sūtra; but the Vārtika suggests its being taken along with the present sūtra.

In the case of Smṛiti texts, we are justified in rejecting the authority of only those that are found to emanate from such ordinary motives as greed and the like, as in the case of the injunction of the covering of the entire post. In the case of the acts under consideration *e.g.*,—the act of rinsing—we cannot attribute its injunction to any such motives as greed, anger, and the like; and hence, according to the foregoing Adhikarāṇa, we shall be justified in assuming that the Smṛiti texts laying down such acts have their basis in the Veda. Under the circumstances, the Smṛiti text cannot be rejected as absolutely devoid of authority. Then, in the case of the particular texts that may be found to be contrary to certain details laid down in the Veda;—*e.g.*, when the injunction of the rinsing of the mouth upsets the order in which the Vedic sacrifice is to be performed,—we must give preference to the Smṛiti (it having been proved to have its basis in the Veda) as against the Vedic texts; because in this case, the Smṛiti text enjoins an act, while what it contradicts is not the act enjoined by the Veda, but only an accessory detail connected with that act,—*viz.*, the order of its performance. If the Smṛiti text laid down the rinsing as to be performed in place of the sacrifice, then it would contradict the Vedic text laying down an act; as in that case the authority of the latter would be supreme; but as it is, it is only in regard to the minor detail—of order—that what is laid down by the Vedic text is affected, and not the act itself; and there can be no doubt that what lays down a minor detail should give way to that which lays down an act; that is to say, the order of the details of the Vedic sacrifice has to give way to the act of rinsing laid down in the Smṛiti.

The authority of the particular Smṛiti text in question is thus ascertained on the ground of its laying down a substance, in the shape of an act, as against the minor qualification—of order—implied by the Vedic text; specially as this order is not directly enjoined by the Veda, being only indirectly implied by the mention of a particular procedure to be adopted.

Thus then, the Smṛiti text being authoritative, the actions laid down by them must be accepted as useful—serving a useful purpose in connection with the Vedic sacrifice.

Nor is there any contradiction involved in the performance of such acts,—as rinsing and the like. Because the time taken by the performance of a sacrifice, as also the limit of its extent, is only a secondary element; and as such they are not irrevocably fixed; it will depend upon circumstances; and must vary with each particular performance; for instance, if the priest is active, the performance will last for—say 2 hours; while if he is lazy, it may last for 4 or 5 hours. And such being the case, much stress cannot be intended to be laid on these secondary details by the Vedic text. Such being the case if one were to perform acts rendered necessary by certain unforeseen occurrences—*e.g.*, sneezing—in the course of the sacrificial performance, the performance of such acts cannot, even though causing some interruption in the continuity of the sacrifice, be regarded as interfering in, or in any way affecting adversely, the main performance of the Vedic sacrifice; in fact, they come to form part and parcel of the main performance itself. Consequently, there is no ground for regarding the Smṛiti text as contradictory to the Vedic text.

NOTE ON SŪ. 5, 6 AND 7.

The above is the presentation of the Adhikaraṇa, according to the Bhāṣya. This is not in keeping with Kumārila's view of the Smṛitis, which, according to him, can never be contradictory to the Veda; as there is no instance in which what is laid down in the Smṛiti can be rightly taken as contrary to what is laid down in the Veda. He has, therefore, given a different interpretation of the three Sūtras (5, 6 and 7) which, according to the Bhāṣya, embody this Adhikaraṇa. According to Kumārila, sūtras 5 and 6 form one Adhikaraṇa bearing upon the authority of the scriptures of the Bauddha, the Jaina, &c.; and sūtra 7 constitutes a distinct Adhikaraṇa treating of the authority attaching to the practices of good men.

III PĀDA, IV ADHIKARĀṆA, Sū. 1. 3. 7.

[Adhikarāṇa IV(a).—Treating of the scriptures of the Bauddha, &c].

If the opponent holds the opinion that, "such declarations of Buddha, &c., as do not contradict the Veda, may be accepted as authoritative, without any fear of contradicting the Veda."—(Sū. 5),

We deny this; because the number and extent of authoritative scriptures is strictly limited.—(Sū. 6.)

The sense of sūtra 5, as representing the *Pārvaṇapakṣa*, may be summed up as follows:—"In the teachings of Buddha and such other heterodox teachers, we find many declarations that are perfectly compatible with the teachings of the Veda; for instance, Buddha's instructions as to the founding of resting-places and public parks, meditation, truthfulness, charity and the like; and in so far as these are concerned, we can accept these teachings to be authoritative scriptures."

The sense of the Siddhānta, as contained in sūtra 6, is as follows:—

As a matter of fact, the number of authoritative scriptures is strictly limited to the fourteen or eighteen Vidyās or sciences, which alone are acknowledged as authoritative on matters relating to Dharma; these 'Vidyās' include only the Vedas with their Aṅgas and Upāṅgas, the Dharmasamhitās and Purāṇas, the Śikṣā and the Daṇḍanīti; and the works of Buddha and such other teachers is not included in these; consequently, even though the teachings of these persons may contain things also contained in the Vedas, they cannot be accepted as having any binding authority with regard to Dharma; the case of these works would, in this case, be parallel to a case where a certain ordinary teacher, in course of his teachings, might make quotations from and references to such authoritative works as the Veda, &c.; but the mere presence of these quotations does not impart to his lucubrations an authoritative character. The chief reason for this lies in the character of the teacher, who, in his practice, is found to be acting against the direct injunctions of the Veda; thus in the case of all heterodox teachers, as they are known to have led lives not in strict accordance with Vedic injunctions, their teachings cannot be regarded as authoritative. The conclusion, therefore, is that Dharma is Dharma—i.e., brings about its due results—only when it is understood by the help of those scriptures that are recognised as having their basis in the Veda. The few Vedic truths that are found in the works of other teachers are so mixed up with admittedly wrong teachings that the entire work ceases to command our confidence.

[Adhikaraṇa IV(b)—*Authority attaching to the practices of good men.*]

Those actions, for which we cannot find any perceptible motive, and are yet found to be performed, must be recognised (as Dharma)—(Sā. 7.)

Among good men we find that many behave contrary to Vedic teachings,—being just like medical men leading unhealthy lives; and yet the fact of their being universally recognised and respected as good men leads us to think that all their actions must be in accordance with Vedic teachings. This gives rise to the doubt whether or not the practices of good men should be regarded as authoritative in matters relating to Dharma.

The *Pūrvaśakṣa* view is as follows :—“As a matter of fact we know of many instances, beginning from Prajāpati himself and down to our own times, of well-known good men behaving, on many occasions, contrary to all laws of morality; and further, we regard those people as ‘good’ whose conduct is good; if then we were to regard that conduct as ‘good’ which belongs to good men, we would fall into the meshes of a ‘vicious circle’ Lastly, these ‘practices’ are not included among the fourteen Vidyās which alone have been held to be authoritative.”

The Siddhānta embodied in sūtra 7 is as follows :—When we find that certain actions are performed by good men; and we cannot attribute them to any such perceptible motives as those of greed and the like, we are led to accept them as Dharma; but this does not refer to those actions that are performed either for the maintenance of the body, or for mere pleasure, or for some material gain; in fact, we are to accept as Dharma only those actions of good men which they do as Dharma; that is to say, any and every act done by good men is not to be regarded as Dharma; when they do an act, thinking it to be Dharma, then alone is that act to be regarded as Dharma; and the reason for this lies in the fact that persons doing the act are fully conversant with the Veda and its teachings; and hence what they regard as Dharma must be that which is so enjoined in the Veda; consequently, the action of a good man, when performed as Dharma, always points to the possibility of its being based upon the Veda. This meets all those cases of misconduct of good men that may be cited as instances to the contrary; for instance, when Yudhiṣṭhira told a lie, he did not regard that lying as Dharma; in fact, he knew it was not right, and yet did it under the force of desire to save his army from death at Droṇa’s hands. Those actions that are found to be due to such motives as love or hatred, anger or

jealousy, avarice and the like, cannot be regarded as Dharma; as the sūtra says, it is only that act which cannot be attributed to any such cause, and which (we add) is done by good men as Dharma, that can be accepted as such. The Smṛitis also assert the authoritative character of the 'practices of good men,' and 'the usages of particular castes and countries,' and though these practices are not included among the fourteen Vidyās, yet they derive their authority from the Smṛitis which declare that the practices are based upon the Veda.

There is yet another interpretation proposed by Kumārila; whereby Sūtras 6 and 7 are made into an Adhikarāṇa establishing the authoritative character of the practices of good men, sūtra 6 being taken as embodying the Pūrvapakṣa view that—"These practices cannot be regarded as authoritative in matters relating to Dharma,—because the authoritative scriptures are limited (Sū. 6) to the Vedas and their subsidiaries—the 'fourteen Vidyās'—which do not include the practices of good men." The Siddhānta in answer to this Pūrvapakṣa is embodied in sūtra 7, which is to be explained as in the preceding interpretation.

A fourth interpretation is suggested by Kumārila, whereby all the three sūtras (5, 6 and 7) are taken as embodying the Siddhānta in answer to the Pūrvapakṣa supplied from without, bearing upon the authority of the practices of good men. The sense of the three sūtras in this case would be as follows:—That which is taught in the Veda and the Smṛitis,—if this is not contradicted by the practices of good men, such practices can be accepted as authority on Dharma; but whenever there is the least contradiction of Vedic teachings, then, as there would be a conflict of authorities, the practice cannot be accepted to have any authority at all.

Adhikarāṇa V.—A word should always be taken in the sense attributed to it in the scriptures.

SŪTRAS 1. 3. 8-9.

“तेष्वदर्शनाद् विरोधस्य समा विप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात्” ॥१॥३॥८॥

तेषु Teṣu, in them. अदर्शनाद् Adarśanāt, on account of non-perception, विरोधस्य Virodhasya, of contradiction or incongruity. समा Samā, equal. विप्रतिपत्तिः Vipratipattiḥ, the various comprehensions.

8. “Inasmuch as no contradiction, or incongruity, is found in any of them, the various significations would be equal (in authority.)—8.

Of all the several significations, that which has the sanction and support of the Veda is to be regarded as the most authoritative ; because the Veda is the only means of obtaining the knowledge of dharma ; that is to say, in the case of the word 'yava' we find that the fact of its denoting the barley-corn is distinctly supported by the description of the corn contained in the Veda, which description is found to be applicable to the barley-corn, and not to long-pepper. In the same manner, in the case of all words with several meanings, that meaning is to be accepted as most direct and authoritative, which has the sanction of the Veda, and the support of all Vedic scholars. Specially as while all the various significations are equally sanctioned by ordinary usage, the one that we choose as the most authoritative has the additional authority of Vedic sanction.

NOTE.

The above is the presentation of the Adhikarāṇa, according to the Bhāṣya and Prabhākara. Kumārila objects to this interpretation, on the following grounds :—

(1) The examples cited by the Bhāṣya are purely artificial; because nowhere is the word 'yava' actually found to be used in the sense of long-pepper. (2) Even granting that it is so, the authoritative character of the meaning supported by subsequent passages of the Veda would come to be ascertained in accordance with sūtra 1. 4. 29, where it will be shown that in all doubtful cases of the signification of words, a definite conclusion is arrived at by the help of subsequent passages; in this same manner, we find that fact of the word 'yava' denoting barley-corn is ascertained by the help of the subsequent passage which describes the 'yava' plant as flourishing when all other plants are withered and leafless. (3) Under sūtra 1. 4. 23, we shall show that there are many grounds—in the shape of similarity—upon which the indirect denotation of words is based; in accordance with this law, the signification of long-pepper by the word 'yava,' or of blackberry by the word 'vetasa,' could be possible only when taken as indirect indication based upon similarity;—that is, the long-pepper is indicated by the word 'yava' because of its similarity to the barley-corn; and such being the case, there could be no doubt as to the superior authority of direct denotation as against indirect indication.

For these reasons, Kumārila takes the Adhikarāṇa as referring to the comparative authoritativeness of the signification of words as known among Āryas and Mlechchhas.

Adhikarāṇa V(a).—Signification recognised by the Āryas is more authoritative than that accepted by the Mlechchhas.

Whenever there happens to be a difference in the usage of the Ārya and that of the Mlechchha, there arises a doubt as to whether both are equally authoritative, or one is more authoritative than the other.

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows :—"In regard to all visible things, the significations accepted by the Ārya and the Mlechchha are equally authoritative (Śā. 1. 3. 8.); it is only in the case of superphysical things that the Ārya has superior authority. In the case of ordinary things, the expressiveness of all words must be accepted to be eternal—from the mere

fact of their being expressive ; consequently so long as the word denotes a certain meaning it does not make any difference whether the signification is known among the Āryas or the Mlechchhas. As an example we take the word 'pilu' which, among the Āryas, denotes a particular tree, while among the Mlechchhas, the elephant ; both of these significations must be regarded as equally eternal and authoritative."

In reply to this we have the Siddhānta in sūtra 1. 3. 9, as already explained above. As a matter of fact, the usage of the words among the Mlechchhas, when differing from that among the Āryas, must be put under the same category as the corrupt forms of words. That is to say, the expressiveness of the word 'pilu' as denoting the elephant is of the same kind as that of the corrupt word 'gāvi' as denoting the cow ; and hence it cannot be regarded as equally authoritative with the signification of words used among the Āryas. Hence the conclusion is that, inasmuch as it is the Ārya that takes his stand upon the scriptures, his ideas alone can have any authority in the matter of signification of words, —specially of those pertaining to dharma ; because the knowledge of dharma is entirely dependent upon the scriptures ;—and that among the Āryas also we should give preference to the usage of persons who are more conversant with the scriptures than others.

*Adhikaraṇa V(b).—Treating of the comparative authority
of Smṛitis and Usage.*

By a third interpretation, Kumārila makes the two sūtras 8 and 9 embody a different Adhikaraṇa, wherein the Smṛiti is proved to be possessed of greater authority than Usage.

In cases where Usage is found to be contrary to Smṛiti, the Pūrvapakṣa view is that both are to be regarded as equally authoritative ; *the contest* between them for authority being equal* (Sū. 1. 3. 8) ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that both equally have their basis in the Veda ; in fact, if there is anything to choose between the two, it is the Usage that is possessed of greater authority than the Smṛiti ; because its results, in the shape of actions, are directly preceptible."

The Siddhānta in reply to the above is that the Smṛiti is possessed of greater authority ; *because it is this that is based directly upon the Veda*

* The word 'Vipratipattiḥ' of the Sūtra is taken in this case in its primary meaning of 'contest,' and not in the indirect sense of Vividhā pratipattiḥ, as in the preceding interpretation.

(Śā. 1. 3. 9). In the case of the Smṛiti, the corroborative Vedic text is inferred directly, from the fact of the Smṛiti being compiled by people learned in the Vedas ; whereas in the case of Usage, we have first of all to infer a corresponding Smṛiti on which the Usage is based ; and it would be on the strength of this presumed Smṛiti that the ultimate corroborative Vedic text would be presumed ; thus in this case the support of the Veda is one step farther removed than in the case of the Smṛiti. Nor is there any Vedic text that sanctions all usages at one stroke ; and even those texts that are there can be got at only through the help of Smṛitis ; because Vedic texts in support of Usage are scattered over several parts of the Veda, and cannot be found out except through the Smṛitis.

Adhikarāṇa V(c)—The sense that a word conveys in the Veda is more authoritative than that conveyed in ordinary parlance.

Kumārila offers yet another interpretation of Sūtras 8 and 9. Some words are found in the Veda to convey a meaning entirely different from that conveyed in ordinary parlance ; for instance, the word 'asvabāla' in the Veda denotes seed, while in ordinary parlance it denotes horse's hair. In all these cases the Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"inasmuch as both meanings are equally well comprehended, the two significations should be regarded as of equal authority (Śā. 1. 3. 8) ; specially because in the matter of the signification of words, the Veda does not in any way differ from other sources of verbal knowledge ; its superior authority being restricted only to things pertaining to Dharma."

The Siddhānta is that, the signification of words which is based upon the scriptures is decidedly more authoritative, because the knowledge of Dharma is gained by means of the scriptures alone (Sūtra 1. 3. 9). A signification accepted and sanctioned by the Veda is irrevocably fixed and can never be set aside ; while that sanctioned by ordinary usage is variable, and liable to change under various circumstances. Consequently, the Vedic signification must be accepted as possessed of superior authority.

Adhikarāṇa VI.—Treating of the authority attaching to words used only by the Mlecchhas.

SŪTRA 1. 3. 10.

चोदितन्तु प्रतीयेत अविरोधात् प्रमाणेन ॥ १ । ३ । १० ॥

चोदितम् Choditam, sanctioned. तु Tu, but. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta, should be

recognised. अविरोधान् Avirodhāt, because there is no contradiction or incongruity. प्रमाणेन Pramāṇena, by the Veda.

10. [The word used by the Mlechchha] should be recognised as sanctioned by the Veda; because there is no incongruity [in this].—10.

COMMENTARY.

In the Veda we meet with some words that are not in use among the people of Āryāvarta; with regard to the meaning of those words there arise two questions: (1) Should we take these words in the sense in which they are used by the *Mlechchhas* among whom they are in use? (2) Should we give preference to the meaning that may be got at by breaking up the words so as to make them appear as being derived from Sanskrit roots and affixes, as against the meaning assigned to them by the usage of the *Mlechchhas*? As examples of such words of foreign origin may be mentioned—‘*pika*,’ ‘*nema*,’ ‘*tāmarasa*,’ &c.

The *Pārvaṇa* view is that,—“inasmuch as the usage of *Mlechchhas* cannot be a safe guide in comprehending matters relating to *Dharma*, we shall not be justified in accepting the meaning assigned to the words by *Mlechchhas*; it is necessary in all these cases to find out the Sanskrit roots from which these words are derived, and to assign to them meanings accordingly; that is to say, we should find out the etymology of the word in accordance with Sanskrit grammar, and assign to the words meanings indicated by this etymology; and as Sanskrit grammar forms part of the “scriptures,” the etymological meaning got at in accordance with strict grammatical rules should be regarded to be as authoritative as the ordinary meaning of any Sanskrit word. There is, therefore, no justification for accepting the usage of the *Mlechchhas*. Specially as there is a further danger in such acceptance of the subversion of the entire fabric of Vedic *Dharma*. If we once get into the habit of accepting as authoritative things apart from the Veda,—such as the usage of the *Mlechchhas*—this habit may have most undesirable extension. If we limit ourselves to the Veda and to the usage of Vedic people, we are forced to hunt out the requisite authority for our course of conduct among such sources; but if we once accept a non-Vedic source of information as authoritative in those cases where information from Vedic sources is not easily accessible, we shall be open to the temptation of accepting any non-Vedic information that may lie near at hand, and not make an effort to hunt out

the Vedic information. Hence the conclusion that the usage of non-Vedic people cannot be trusted in the ascertainment of the meaning of doubtful words."

The Siddhānta on this point is as follows :—

If we find that the word used by the Mlechchhas is exactly the same as that found in the Veda, and the word is entirely foreign to the Ārya vocabulary, we cannot but accept the sense which the word has in Mlechchha usage; for instance, the word 'pika' as found in the Veda being the same as that current among Mlechchhas, we must accept the same meaning of it that it has among the Mlechchhas; specially when such signification does not give rise to any incongruity in the authority of the Veda with regard to Dharma. According to this interpretation of the Sūtra, the word 'pramāṇena' = by the Veda. According to another interpretation, the sūtra *pramāṇena avirodhāt* means 'there being no contradiction of any authority'—i.e., there being nothing in the signification that contradicts, or goes against, the authority of the Veda with regard to Dharma.

The Vārtika cites a few very interesting examples of cases where, even in regard to matters of Vedic ritual, we have to accept the authority of people other than Brāhmaṇas versed in the Veda. For instance, when we meet with an injunction with reference to the 'loma' of the sacrificial animal, if we do not know what part of the animal's body is meant, we refer to the butcher, and accept his word as authoritative in this matter. Then again, in connection with the *Niṣādas*, etc., the Veda lays down that the sacrificial gift should consist of a base coin; what is really a base coin cannot be known to any one except low class people who deal in such coins; hence as to whether or not a certain coin is base, this question has to be decided on the authority of the counterfeit coiner. Exactly in the same manner, when we meet with such words as 'pika,' 'nema' and the like,—and find that we cannot ascertain their meaning either from the Veda or from the usage of the Ārya, we have to accept the authority of the usage of the Mlechchhas, among whom the words are used in a definite sense; specially as this acceptance would not be incompatible with our theory that the eternal significations of eternal words can be ascertained by means of the usage of men; because the Mlechchhas are as much men as any one else.

The Veda and the usage of Aryas is certainly more authoritative than the usage of the Mlechchhas; but this can be so only in cases where both are available; in those cases however where the former are not

available, the latter is the only authority available ; and there can be no justification for rejecting it.

It is only cases where the meaning of a word cannot absolutely be ascertained by usage, that we can be justified in looking out for its meaning in its etymology.

Adhikaraṇa VII.—No independent authoritativeness in the Kalpasūtras.

“प्रयोगशास्त्रमिति” चेत् ॥ १ । ३ । ११ ॥

न असन्नियमात् ॥ १२ ॥

प्रयोगशास्त्रम् Prayogaśāstram, scripture of ritual. इति चेत् Iti chet, if it be urged. न Na, it is not so. असन्नियमात् A-sanniyamāt, because there is no proper regularity.

11. If it be urged that—“they constitute the scripture of ritual (and hence are as self-sufficient in their authority as the Veda)”—11.

It is not so ; because there is no proper regularity.—12.

COMMENTARY.

This adhikaraṇa has been taken by Kumārila as having a four-fold bearing :—(a) according to the first interpretation, the question is as to whether or not the Kalpasūtras are self-sufficient in their authority, like the Veda. The case of the Kalpasūtras stands upon a level different from that of the Smṛitis ; because the Kalpasūtras contain only the mention in a systematic form, of what is actually found to be contained in the Vedas ; whereas in the Smṛitis we find many things not actually present in the Veda, and whose mention in the Veda is only presumed.

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that, “constituting as they do the ritualistic scripture, the Vedic character cannot be denied to the Kalpasūtras ; they may be taken as entirely independent of the Veda, as regards their authority.”

The Siddhānta is that, inasmuch as the Kalpasūtras are, like the Smṛitis, known to be the work of human authors, they are not as free from various sources of error as the eternal Veda is ; and as such their

authority cannot be as self-sufficient as that of the Veda ; nor are they eternal, like the Veda ; specially because in regard to the Kalpasūtras there is no regularity ; that is to say, there are no irrevocable rules of accent and pronunciation as there are in regard to the Veda ; or because there is no self-evident eternality and independence of human agency, as there is in the case of the Veda.

अवाक्यशेषाच्च ॥ १३ ॥

13. Also because of the absence of descriptive passages.—13.

Another reason why the Kalpasūtra cannot be regarded to be on the same level as the Veda, lies in the fact that in the Veda we meet with many such descriptive passages as are not met with in ordinary parlance, —for instance, such apparently absurd declarations as ‘Prajāpati cut out his own fat ;’ which shows that the Veda is not the product of the human mind ; in the Kalpasūtras there are no such passages ; which also proves that the two are not on the same footing.

सर्वत्रप्रयोगात् सन्निधानशास्त्राश्च ॥ १४ ॥

सर्वत्र Sarvatra, in the case of all. प्रयोगात् Prayogāt, because there are (contradictory) assertions. सन्निधानशास्त्रात् Sannidhānaśāstrāt, by reason of close proximity. च Cha, also.

14. Also because in all (Kalpasūtras) there are assertions (contradictory to the Veda) [this contradiction being easily perceptible] by reason of the easy accessibility of the assertions.—14.

COMMENTARY.

Absolute authority has been denied in the case of human utterances because men are often found to be making assertions contrary to the Veda ; as a matter of fact, this same circumstance is met with in the case of the Kalpasūtras also : they bristle with statements contradictory to the Veda—this contradiction being all the more remarkable by the fact of the Vedic texts contradicted being easily accessible. For instance, the Kalpasūtra declares that the ‘Paryagni’ should be made of all the substances used at the sacrifice, while the Veda distinctly declares that it is to be made of the sacrificial cake only.

In addition to the above presentation of the adhikarāṇa Kumārila deduces the following two more adhikarāṇas from the sūtras 11 and 12.

Adhikaraṇa VII(a).—The Smṛitis, and the Aṅgas of the Veda, Śikṣā, &c., like the Kalpasātra, have no independent authority, apart from the Veda.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that "Vedic character and authority cannot be denied to the Smṛitis, which are universally recognised as constituting the 'Dharmaśāstra' or 'scripture of Dharma'; specially when it has been proved that they are not devoid of authority on matters relating to dharma. The Smṛitis either are authoritative or are not authoritative; no middle course is possible; and as it has been proved in the opening adhikaraṇas of this pāda that they are authoritative, we cannot but accept them to be so, by themselves; because that which is not intrinsically authoritative, cannot be authoritative at all. Similarly, with the Aṅgas of the Veda, the Śikṣā and the rest: as they are recognised as the Aṅga or limb of the Veda, we cannot deny the independent authority of these."

The Siddhānta is that, in the case of the Smṛitis, and of the Aṅgas, as we have a distinct knowledge of their being the work of human authors, they cannot be regarded as independent *scriptures of dharma*; specially because *there is no proper regularity in these* (as explained above, under sūtra 12).

Adhikaraṇa VII(b).—No authority belongs to the Non-Vedic scriptures.

With regard to the non-Vedic scriptures of the Bauddha, &c., the Pūrvapakṣa is that, "inasmuch as these are as much *scriptures of action* as the Veda, their authoritative character cannot be denied. The eternal and authoritative character of these scriptures can be proved by the same arguments that have been put forward in support of the eternality of the Veda."

The Siddhānta is that, inasmuch as these other scriptures are acknowledged to have been the work of human authors, they cannot be accepted to be possessed of infallible authority. That they are not eternal is proved by their having been compiled by human authors; and also by the absence in those so-called 'scriptures' of all regularity; that is to say, they are found to be full of incorrect words and phrases; being composed principally in the Vernacular; which makes their eternality—and consequent infallible authority, impossible. Consequently in matters relating to dharma, it is the eternal Veda alone, which is independent of human agency, that can be accepted as possessed of infallible authority; and no other scriptures can be accepted to be so.

Adhikaraṇa VIII.—The Holākādhikaraṇa : Authoritative character of popular customs.

SŪTRA 1. 3. 15-23.

“अनुमानव्यवस्थानात्, तत्संयुक्तप्रमाणं स्यात्”॥१॥३॥१५॥

अनुमानव्यवस्थानात् Anumānavyavasthānāt, inasmuch as inference or presumption is limited in its scope. तत्संयुक्तम् Tatsamyuktaṁ, qualified by that. प्रमाणम् Pramāṇam, authority.

15. “Inasmuch as all presumption is limited in its scope, the authority (of customs, based upon the presumption of Vedic texts) must be qualified by that limitation.”—15.

COMMENTARY.

The usages have been held to be authoritative on matters relating to Dharma. Now with regard to popular customs—such, for instance, as the celebrating of the Holi in a certain fashion—the question is : is the authority of these restricted to limited areas? or have they universal force?

The Pūrvaśloka view is that—“The authority of customs and usages,—as of all sources of knowledge bearing on Dharma,—rests ultimately upon the presumption of their having their origin in the Veda ; and, as a matter of fact, we find that every one of these customs have only local currency ; consequently the Vedic texts presumed in support of these cannot but be in a form that would be limited in its scope, having only local, and not universal force.”

“Customs should be held to have limited authority, from the analogy of such usages and duties as are restricted within the limits of certain castes or families ; that is to say, the Vedic texts in support of customs may be presumed to be in the same limited form in which we find such texts as ‘the Rājāsūya sacrifice is to be performed by a Kṣātriya king ;’ the text in support of the customs of observing the Holāka will thus be in the form—the Holāka should be observed by the people of the east.”

अपि वा सर्वधर्मः स्यात्, तन्न्यायत्वाद्विधानस्य ॥ १६ ॥

अपि वा Api vā, but. सर्वधर्मः Sarvadharmah, duty incumbent on all men. स्यात् Syāt, should be. तन्न्यायत्वाद् Tannyāyatvāt, because of that character. विधानस्य Vidhānasya, belonging to injunctions.

16. But the duty must be incumbent upon all men ; as such is the character of all injunctions.—16.

COMMENTARY.

The Siddhānta on this point is that the customs in question cannot be regarded as limited in their authority ; because if the custom has any authority, it lays down a duty ; and, as a matter of fact, we find that all duties laid down by any recognised authority are accepted as incumbent on all men. For instance, when the Vedic injunction lays down the Agnihotra as to be performed, the performance of this Agnihotra is recognised as incumbent on all men. Such is the case with all Vedic injunctions ; and as the customs also owe their authority ultimately to Vedic injunctions, they also must be recognised to be as universally binding as the direct Vedic injunction. That is to say, the customs,—the observance of the Holi, for instance,—cannot be regarded as binding upon any particular class or individual, specially as it is not easy to find any such restrictive words as would be presumed to be contained by the Vedic injunctions, whereby the authority of the custom would become restricted.

दर्शनाद्विनियोगः स्यात् ॥ १७ ॥

दर्शनात् Darśanāt, due to direct perception. विनियोगः Viniyogaḥ, restriction. स्यात् Syāt, could be.

17. Restriction could only be due to [justified by] direct perception.—17.

COMMENTARY.

The Pūrvapakṣa has argued that the texts in support of local customs may be presumed to be in the same limited form as those laying down the duties of particular castes and sects. But this is not possible ; because in the case of the direct Vedic injunctions of duties for limited castes and sects, we have to accept the limitation of the application because the restriction is directly perceptible in the Vedic text itself ; similarly, in the case of usages with limited authority, we actually perceive that they are met within well-defined limits ; and so we are justified in holding that the corroborative texts presumed for these usages are in the restricted form ; in the case of the customs of observing the Holāka and the like, this method is not possible ; because, as a matter of fact, they are not found to be restricted within well-defined limits ; the observance is diffused over vast portions of the land, and we cannot lay our hands upon any demarcating line where the observance ends, beyond which it is not kept at all ; and when the restriction, if possible, could only be in a vague form no such vagueness could be possible in the case of Vedic texts.

लिङ्गाभावाच्च नितस्य ॥ १।३।१८ ॥

लिङ्गाभावात् *Lingābhavāt*, because there can be no indicative of limitation. च *Cha*, also. नितस्य *Niyasya*, of the eternal authority of injunctions.

18. *Also because there can be no indicative of limitation in the eternal authority of injunctions [or of particular agents.]-18.

COMMENTARY.

It might be urged that—even though limitation of country or province may not be possible, it may be possible with regard to the agents—persons to observe the custom. Even this is not possible; because the restriction of the agent is as impossible as that of the country; or because it is not possible for the Vedic injunction, which is eternal, to contain words indicative of limitation of its authority; consequently, the texts presumed in support of customs, cannot but be in a form that would make them binding on all men.

आख्या हि देशसंयोगात् ॥ १९ ॥

आख्या *Ākhyā*, name. हि *Hi*, because. देशसंयोगात् *Deśasamyogāt*, due to connection with place.

19. Specially because the name is due to connection with place.—19.

COMMENTARY.

The opponent might urge that the presumed Vedic texts may contain such restrictive words as the 'Easterner' and the like,—the text in support of the *Holāka* being in the form 'the *Holāka* should be observed by the Easterners.'

The answer to this is that there are no men with whom such a name as 'the Easterner' is inseparably and eternally connected; the name is due to the mere chance connection of a man with a definite place—the eastern country; hence while a man is resident in that country he will be included in the term 'easterner;' but when he would go to another country, he would cease to be so included; hence if the Vedic texts were to contain such a restriction, the number of persons upon whom it would be binding would be constantly variable, and this would make the text vague and indefinite,—a character foreign to the intrinsic authority of Vedic texts.

* According to the *Bhāṣya*, the *sūtra* should be translated thus—'also because there is nothing indicative of restriction to particular agents.'

As regards the particular custom of the Holāka, we know as a matter of fact that its observance is not restricted within any such provincial limits—as the east or the west ; it being observed by men of several provinces, situated in diverse parts of the country.

“न स्याद्देशान्तरेषु” इति चेत् ॥ २० ॥

स्याद्योगाख्या हि माथुरवत् ॥ २१ ॥

न Na, not. स्यात् Syāt, would be. देशान्तरेषु Deśāntareṣu, in other countries. इति चेत् Iti chet, if this is urged. स्यात् Syāt, it would be. योगाख्या Yogakhyā, literally significant. माथुरवत् Māthuravat, like the name “Mathura.”

20. As it [the custom] would not be prevalent in other countries [the names of people cannot be taken as based upon their connection with places of habitation, etc.],—if this is urged—20.

21. [Our reply is] The names would certainly be literally significant like the name “Māthura.”—21.

COMMENTARY.

In sūtra 19, it has been urged that the texts presumed in support of local customs could not contain the words limiting the customs to any particular people ; because any such mention by name of any people would be very vague and indefinite. The opponent retorts :—“ Very well ; we admit that names would be vague and indefinite ; that is just the reason why all such names as the ‘ Easterner ’ and the like should be taken as referring to connection with—residence in—a place ; these names must be regarded as not referring to any circumstance at all, being purely proper names, which do not depend for their application upon anything signified by the etymological constituents ; the text would limit the custom to the ‘ Easterners,’—whoever these people may be, and whatever the name might mean ; it is enough for our purposes to have the text restricting the custom to only a particular set of people.”

The answer to this is that the literal signification of such names cannot be gainsaid. For instance, we cannot deny that the word ‘ Māthura ’ is applied to certain people simply because they reside in Mathurā ; similarly, the name ‘ Easterner ’ cannot be applied to any man except (1) if he be an inhabitant of the eastern provinces, (2) or if he be one born in that province, (3) or if he be coming from that province at that time ; in any case the application of the name cannot but be due

to some sort of connection with the place. And we have shown above (under Śā. 19) that the prevalence of the customs in question is not always in accordance with their names; since we find many persons residing in the eastern provinces not observing the Hōlāka; while, on the other hand, certain residents of other provinces—on the north, on the west,—whose forefathers had migrated from the eastern provinces—keeping up the custom. Hence we conclude that, inasmuch as the presence of such names in the Vedic texts would make them vague and indefinite, the presumed text could not contain any such words as would restrict the authority of those texts.

“कर्मधर्मो वा प्रवणवत्” ॥ २२ ॥

कर्मधर्मः Karmadharmah, the property of the action. वा Va, or. प्रवणवत् Pravaṇavat, like the sloping.

22. “[The specifying names] may qualify the action, like the sloping”—22.

COMMENTARY.

Having found it impossible to presume Vedic texts with such qualifying words as would specify the agents, the opponent puts forward the theory that the names occurring in the text may be taken as qualifying and thereby limiting, not the agent,—the people performing the action,—but the action itself; that is to say, the epithet ‘Eastern’ will refer to the custom, and not to the people observing that custom; the text being that the custom can bring about its transcendental result only when observed in the eastern province; in this way when the custom is called an ‘eastern custom’ by the text, it cannot be binding upon people who do not live in the eastern province; because the custom cannot be ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ at the same time. The opponent adds that such specification of action is not very rare in the Veda; for instance, certain sacrifices to the Viśvedevas are qualified as ‘prāchinapravaṇa’—the sense being that the sacrifices can bring about their transcendental results only when performed on grounds sloping towards the east.

तुल्यन्तु कर्तृधर्मेण ॥ २३ ॥

तुल्यम् Tulyam, similar. तु Tu, but. कर्तृधर्मेण Kartṛidharmeṇa, the qualification or specification of the agent.

23. But that would be similar to the specification of the agent.—23.

COMMENTARY.

The reply to the foregoing sūtra is that this specification of the action also would be as vague and indefinite as that of the agent (as shown under sūtra, 18,; in this case also, as there is no well-defined limit as to what is the 'eastern' and what the 'western' country, any specification by means of these terms,—whether of the action or of the agent—would always be vague and indefinite. For instance, what is 'western' for the Burmans will be 'eastern' for the Afgans; and so forth; hence no such vague specification can find place in any Vedic texts.

For these reasons we conclude that the Vedic texts presumed in support of such local customs as the Holāka and the like, cannot be qualified by any specification of places, &c., and as such all these must be taken as having universal authority.

Sūtras 15 and 16 have been taken by Kumārila as also embodying an adhikaraṇa dealing with the authority of such partially accepted Dharma-Śāstras as the sūtras of Gautama, Śāṅkha, Likhita and the rest. There arises a doubt as to the exact nature of the authority of these works; because, in actual practice, the Dharmasūtras of Gautama and the Gṛhya-sūtras of Gobhila are accepted as authoritative only by the Sāmavedis;—the Dharmasūtra of Vasiṣṭha only by the Ṛigvedis; the Smṛitis of Śāṅkha and Likhita by the Vāyasaneyi-Śuklayajurvedis, and so forth. The Pūrva-pakṣa is that these works cannot be put on the same category as the universally recognised Smṛitis—that of Manu, for instance. They are acknowledged by only limited people; hence they cannot have that same universal authority that belongs to the Veda or the Manusmṛiti."—(Sū. 1. 3. 15.)

The Siddhānta is that, on account of the universal character of the injunctions contained in the Smṛitis in question, these must be accepted as applying to all persons capable of performing the act laid down by them. That is to say, as the Smṛiti texts themselves do not contain any words that would limit their application, the Vedic texts that we might presume in support of them could not contain any such words; hence there can be nothing to justify our restricting the authority of the Smṛiti texts in question.

Adhikaraṇa IX—Vyākāraṇādhikaraṇa.

[NECESSITY OF USING THE CORRECT FORMS OF WORDS.]

SŪTRAS 1. 3. 24-30.

“प्रयोगोत्पत्त्यशास्त्रत्वात् शब्देषु न व्यवस्था स्यात्” ॥१॥३॥२४॥

प्रयोगोत्पत्त्यशास्त्रत्वात् Prayogotpattyakāśāstratvāt, because there is no scriptural injunction as to their use. शब्देषु Śabdeṣu, in regard to the use of words, न Na, no. व्यवस्था Vyavasthā, restriction. स्यात् Syāt, there could be.

24. "As there is no injunction as to their use, there could be no restrictions with regard to the words used."—24.

COMMENTARY.

The sūtras dealing with Grammar have also been classed under 'Smṛitis;' and the next six Sātras proceed to consider the authoritative character of those grammatical Smṛitis. These would be authoritative and useful, only if the comprehension of the meanings of words and sentences were restricted to Sanskrit words alone; as it is these alone that are dealt with by the Smṛitis in question. Hence the discussion begins with a consideration of this question.

For the denoting of one and the same thing, we find people making use of pure Sanskrit words, as well as their vernacular corruptions; for instance, the cow is spoken as 'gauḥ' as well as 'gāya.' Now the question arises—Is it the Sanskrit word alone that directly denotes the cow—the vernacular form indicating it only indirectly, through its similarity to the Sanskrit word? Or, are all words, Sanskrit as well as vernacular, equally directly denotative of the cow?

The Pūrvaśakṣa view is as follows:—

'As a matter of fact we find that in ordinary parlance, the word 'gāya' is as capable of denoting the cow as the word 'gauḥ'; and this fact can be taken to prove the eternal character of the word 'gāya' and its denotative power; that is to say, we can reason thus—Because the word 'gāya' denotes the cow to-day, it must have denoted it hundred years ago and so on and on, the relation between the word 'gāya' and the cow must be accepted to be as eternal as that between the cow and the word 'gauḥ.' Hence the conclusion is that we may use any words we like, so long as all of them are expressive of what we intend to speak of. If we had any Vedic injunction to the effect that 'one should use only such words as are correct according to the rules of grammar,' we would not be justified in making use of any other words; but as a matter of fact, there is no such Vedic injunction; consequently there can be no ground for the restricting our usage to only such words as are correct by the rules of grammar; nor is there any Vedic authority for any such distinction as that it is only the Sanskrit word that is correct, and all others incorrect. In fact, it is impossible for any Vedic injunction to lay down any such restriction upon usage; because the sense of the Vedic injunction is expressed by its component words; then if the same injunction laid down

restrictions as to the use of words, there would be an interdependence between the words and the injunction,—the use of the words depending upon the injunction, which, in its case depends upon the words for the expression of its meaning; consequently the comprehension of all Vedic injunctions depending upon the ordinarily accepted signification of words, no words in ordinary usage could ever be differentiated by them as correct or incorrect. Further, a word can be regarded as incorrect only when it is not expressive,—as then alone would it fail in its purpose, which is the sole criterion of incorrectness; and hence so long as a word is found to be duly expressive of its meaning, there can be no reason for its being regarded as incorrect.

“It is true that we have the grammatical Smritis indicating certain words as correct, and discarding others as incorrect; and as Smritis they would lead us to presume similar Vedic texts also; but such a Vedic injunction could be possible only if such use of correct words led to transcendental results other than the perceptible result of expressing the meaning (which is found in the case of all words, Sanskrit as well as vernacular); but we have no grounds for believing in any such transcendental result, so long as all that is necessary is accomplished by facts of ordinary experience; that is to say, we are justified in assuming a transcendental element only when there is some incongruity without such assumption; while in the case in question we do not find any incongruity in the meaning being expressed by the vernacular word.

“Thus then, the grammatical Smritis relating to the use of words cannot have any basis in Vedic injunctions; and as such they cannot serve the purpose of laying down rules regarding the accomplishment of Dharma. The case of the grammatical Smritis stands upon an entirely different footing from the other Smritis that have been proved to be authoritative; because these latter are found to deal with subjects cognate to those dealt with in the Veda, while the grammatical Smritis deal with the use of certain words and phrases, which is a matter upon which, from the very nature of the thing, the Veda cannot have anything to say. There being thus no Vedic corroboration possible in the case of the grammatical Smritis these cannot be regarded as having any authority on matters relating to Dharma. Nor is there any use in studying the grammatical Smritis.

“The conclusion therefore is that all words—whether Sanskrit or vernacular—are equally correct, so long as they denote their meaning; and that, on that account, the science of grammar is absolutely valueless.”

शब्दे प्रयत्ननिष्पत्तेरपराधस्य भागित्वम् ॥ २५ ॥

[Var lecs. प्रयत्न]

शब्दे Śabde, in the word. प्रयत्ननिष्पत्तेः Prayatnaṇiṣpatteḥ, because it is accomplished by effort. अपराधस्य Aparādhasya, of discrepancy. भागित्वम् Bhāgi-tvam, possibility.

25. Because its utterance is due to (human) effort, there is a possibility of discrepancies in the word.—25.

COMMENTARY.

Before putting forward the Siddhānta, the Sūtra tries to weaken the position of the Pūrvapakṣa. The corrupt vernacular words have been declared, in the Pūrvapakṣa, to be eternal, on the sole ground of their being used in ordinary parlance from time immemorial, and being expressive of definite meanings. But, as a matter of fact, such long-established usage could be accepted only if we were sure that the word that the man had pronounced before me was exactly what he had heard from others. But in the case of all such words, as the utterance of the word is due to the effort of ordinary man, there is always a likelihood of his making mistakes, as no human effort is infallible; it may be that the form of the word as pronounced by the man before me is different from that of the same word as learnt from his father; hence in the case of all vernacular words, there can be no certainty with regard to its eternal usage in that particular form. Thus the continuity of the usage being doubtful, it cannot warrant any conclusion as to the eternality of the word.

Some people read the second word of the sūtra as 'aprayatna-ṇiṣpatteḥ'; and the sense in that case would be—'because the utterance of words is often brought about without proper effort on the part of the speaker, there is always a possibility of his making mistakes in the pronunciation.'

अन्यायश्चानेकशब्दत्वम् ॥ २६ ॥

अन्यायः Anyāyaḥ, not reasonable. च Cha, and. अनेकशब्दत्वम् Anekaśab-datvam, to have more than one word.

26. And it is not reasonable to have more than one (synonymous) word.—26.

COMMENTARY.

The sole reason for assuming the significant potency of a word consists in the necessity that there is of speaking of a thing by some name. That is to say, we accept the fact of the word 'gauḥ' being expressive of the cow, simply because in the absence of some such word we could not

speak of the cow. Therefore, as this fact of the cow being spoken of would be accomplished by a single word, there would be no reason for assuming more than one word as expressive of the same thing; thus for expressing any one thing, it is not reasonable to assume more than one word. In the case of Sanskrit words, however, when we find more than one word to be actually used in the Veda as expressive of the same thing, we are forced to accept all these words as expressive of it; as otherwise the infallible Veda would become open to the charge of meaninglessness. There is no such reason in the case of the vernacular words; in fact, when the thing—the cow for instance,—has already got its expressive word 'gauḥ,' which is found in the Veda, we have no further ground for accepting any vernacular word as expressing the same thing. The conclusion, therefore, is that even when one and the same thing is found to be expressed by more than one word, it is only one of these words that can be accepted as having an eternal denotative relation to that thing; the using of all the other words must be taken as being due to some incapacity in the speaker to get at the true word; and the fact of these other words being expressive of that thing must be attributed to some sort of similarity that they bear to the true word.

तत्र तत्त्वमभियोगविशेषात् स्यात् ॥ २७ ॥

तत्र Tatra, on this point. तत्त्वम् Tattvam, that (denotative potency). अभियोगविशेषात् Abhiyogaviśeṣāt, due to the peculiarity of close application. स्यात् Syāt, could be (ascertained).

27. On this point, that a word is really denotative could be ascertained by the application of certain general principles.—27.

COMMENTARY.

When we have a number of words denoting the same thing, what would be the criterion as to which of these is endowed with real denotative potency, and which expresses the thing only indirectly? That is to say, what is there to show that it is the Sanskrit word that is really denotative of the thing, and the vernacular words are, at best, only indicative of its indirectly?

The only practical criterion available lies in certain general principles, whereby—by the close application of which—we could find out which of the words fulfil the conditions indicated by those principles; this will lead us to accept only these words as really denotative, and to reject

those that do not fulfil those conditions. All such principles we find collected for us in the Smṛitis of grammar; wherein we have all that is necessary for ascertaining which form of a word is the correct one—i.e., which is that form which is naturally and eternally denotative of the thing. And as it is only the Sanskrit form of the word that will satisfy the grammatical requirements, the inevitable conclusion is that it is the Sanskrit word, and not its vernacular counterparts, that is endowed with real denotative potency.

Herein lies the usefulness and authoritativeness of the grammatical Smṛitis; as without the help of these we could never discriminate between the correct word and its corruptions.

तदशक्तिश्च तदनुरूपत्वात् ॥ २८ ॥

तदशक्तिः Tadaśaktiḥ, an incapability. च Cha, then again. तदनुरूपत्वात् Tadanurūpatvāt, because of its similarity to it.

28. Then again [every case of the uttering of vernacular words is due to] an incapability [to pronounce the correct word]; [and the meaning is expressed by the vernacular word] because of its resemblance to the correct word.—28.

COMMENTARY.

In all cases where vernacular words are used to express a certain meaning, the use of these instead of the correct Sanskrit word, must be attributed to the fact that the man is unable to pronounce the latter, and therefore pronounces it in another form; and hence the vernacular usage must be regarded as by its very nature based upon the incapacity of the speaker; and as such it cannot be accepted to be as authoritative and trustworthy as the usage of Sanskrit words.

Even though it is so yet the word, in the corrupt form, is found to express the intended meaning; and the reason for this lies in the fact that it resembles the correct word in sound; that is to say, the word 'gāya' denotes the cow, because it resembles the word 'gauḥ;' and hence when it is uttered, it recalls, by similarity, the word 'gauḥ,' which, in its turn, brings to mind the cow; so in this case also it is the correct word that is really denotative of the thing, cow.

एकदेशत्वाच्च विभक्तिव्यत्यये स्यात् ॥ २९ ॥

एकदेशत्वात् Ekadeśatvāt, because it is a part. च Cha, and. विभक्तिव्यत्यये Vibhaktivatyaye, in a case where the correct endings are absent. स्यात् Syāt, it would be.

29. In the case of those corrupt words in which the correct endings are absent, the denoting of the meaning would be due to the fact of such a word being a part of the correct word.—29.

COMMENTARY.

Another point in which the vernacular word differs materially from the Sanskrit word is that the declensional and inflexional endings are totally absent in the former. For instance, when in vernacular we use the basic noun in its Sanskrit form, we do not use the affix, &c.; as when we speak of the man going, we use the word 'manuṣya' for man; while the real Sanskrit form of the word would be 'manuṣyaḥ.' In such case the vernacular form 'Manuṣya' is found to be expressive, because it forms a part of the correct word 'Manuṣyaḥ'; and thereby brings to our mind this complete word, which is what really expresses the meaning.

As against the usefulness of the Grammar-Smritis, an objection is raised :—"As all the correct words would be found in the Veda, a knowledge of the Veda would suffice to give us an idea as to which word is correct and which is incorrect; and thus there would be no need for any grammatical rules, etc., for the ascertaining of the correct forms of words."

The answer to this is that the Veda does not contain all the possible correct words; it is true that the words contained in the Veda are all correct; but it is not true that all correct words are contained in the Veda. Consequently it becomes necessary to have certain definite rules whereby the correctness or incorrectness of a word can be ascertained. And these rules must be accepted to be eternal, (1) because we cannot think of any point of time when there were no grammatical rules; and (2) because we actually find Vedic injunctions supplying the basis for every one of the six factors of grammar :—*viz.*, the etymology of words, the correct forms of words, the necessity of using the correct forms of words, the actual use of such words, the prohibition of the using of words not shown to be correct by the rules of grammar, and the actual avoidance of such words. And all these injunctions being Vedic, these must be regarded to be as eternal as the injunctions laying down the use of kuśa and such other things at sacrifices.

Thus then, the rules of grammar, being all based upon the Vedic grammar, must be allowed the same regard as all other Smritis; that is to say, they must be accepted as having an authoritative bearing upon dharma; specially [as the chief use of grammar has been held to lie in the laying

down of certain restrictions which help in the fulfilment of dharma. For instance, the restrictions that Grammar lays down are—(1) that one should use only the correct forms of words, the knowledge and use of such words leading the speaker to heaven and helping him to accomplish the Vedic sacrifices; and (2) that 'such and such words are correct'—and without the rules of grammar it would not be possible to distinguish correct from incorrect words. Thus then the rules of grammar, being that part of the Vedic dharma which consists of the use of the duly discriminated correct forms of words, serve the purpose of pointing out such correct word-forms as are really expressive.

According to Prabhākara, it is necessary to enquire into the trustworthy character of Grammar, not because it is a Smṛiti, but chiefly because if the science of grammar were not trustworthy, the whole fabric of Vedic dharma would be jeopardised; that is to say, that a certain word denotes a certain thing and not any other is ascertained finally by the rules of grammar alone; consequently, if these were untrustworthy, there would be no certainty in regard to the meanings of words; and in that case the meaning of all Vedic texts would be doubtful and vague; and this would shake the authority and trustworthy character of the entire Veda. The presentation of the pūrvapakṣa and the siddhānta by Prabhākara does not differ from that by Kumārila.

Adhikaraṇa X(a).—The words used and the things denoted by them in the Veda are the same as those in ordinary parlance.

SŪTRA 1. 3. 30.

प्रयोगचोदनाभावादर्थैकत्वमविभागात् ॥ १ । ३ । ३० ॥

प्रयोगचोदनाभावाद् Prayogachodanābhāvāt, because, otherwise, there would be no injunction of actions. **अर्थैकत्वम्** Arthaikatvam, sameness of denotation. **अविभागात्** Avibhāgāt, on account of non-differentiation.

30. On account of non-differentiation [between the word as used in the Veda and as used in ordinary parlance] the two must be regarded as the same; specially because, if it were not so, no injunction of action would be possible.—30.

COMMENTARY.

It having been proved that it is necessary to use the correct forms of words, it becomes necessary to consider the character of the denotation of words; and, as it is the Veda with which we are immediately concerned, the first point that we have to consider is whether the word 'gauḥ' used

in the Veda is the same as that word used in ordinary parlance,—and also if what the word denotes in the Veda is exactly what it denotes in ordinary parlance.

On this point the Pūrvaapakṣa is that—“as a matter of fact we find that there are many points of difference between the Vedic and the ordinary word; for instance—1) in the Veda we have certain restrictions as to accentuation, which do not apply to words in ordinary parlance; (2) the conjugational forms met with in the Veda are not the same as those found in ordinary language; e.g., the form ‘jahghanat’ which stands for ‘ahanat;’ (3) the Vedic words can be studied by the three higher castes only, while there is no such restriction with regard to ordinary words. For these reasons, the word ‘gauḥ’ as used in the Veda, must be regarded as different from that same word as met with in ordinary parlance.”

The Siddhānta view is put forth in the sūtra:—We must admit the two words to be the same, and also their denotations to be the same. That is to say, the word ‘gauḥ’ as found in the Veda is the same as,—and denotes the same thing as—the word ‘gauḥ’ as met with in ordinary parlance;—because if this were not so, the Vedic words would be something entirely new to the ordinary person; and so would be absolutely meaningless to him; thus the injunctions would fail in their purpose, which consists in prompting men to action; when it would not be comprehended, how could it do the prompting?

Another reason for accepting this conclusion lies in the fact that as a matter of fact, we do not find any difference between the two sets of words. That is to say, (1) we do not perceive any difference in form between the word ‘gauḥ’ as found in the Veda and the same as met with in ordinary parlance; (2) we do not perceive any difference in their denotation; in both cases the word denotes the cow.

Sūtra 30 has been explained above as embodying an adhikaraṇa by itself. By another interpretation, it is taken by the Bhāṣya as the first of a set of sūtras (30-35) propounding the Pūrvaapakṣa of another adhikaraṇa. This adhikaraṇa is as follows:—

*Adhikaraṇa X(b) [Words denote communities,
not individuals].*

SŪTRA. 1. 3. 30-35.

“प्रयोगचोदनाभावादर्थैकत्वमविभागात्” ॥ १ । ३ । ३० ॥

प्रयोगचोदनाभावान् Prayogachodanābhāvat, because there would be no injunction of actions (if words denoted communities.) अर्थैकत्वम् Arthaikatvam, the denotation

of words must be one only. अविभागात् Avibhāgat, because the class is never found apart from the individual.

30. “[Words must denote individuals] because otherwise, there could be no injunction of actions; [they cannot denote both community and individual] because words can have only one denotation; and also because the community is never found apart from the individuals (there is no necessity for its separate denotation).—30.”

COMMENTARY.

We have seen that the word used in the Veda, and the thing denoted by it as used therein are the same as those in ordinary parlance; the next question that presents itself for consideration is as to the exact denotation of words; as until we know this we cannot grasp the real sense of Vedic injunctions. The question is :—Does the word denote the individual or the community ?—i.e., when we use the word ‘cow’ do we mean an individual cow, or the whole community or genus ‘cow’ ?

The Pūrvaśakṣa view embodied in the sūtra is as follows :—“In the Veda we meet with such injunctions as ‘offer the goat in sacrifice ;’ now it is clear that what is meant to be sacrificed must be a single goat and not the whole community ; because what is offered in sacrifice must be perishable, while the community is something that never perishes ; if words denoted communities no Vedic injunctions would have any meaning ; hence we conclude that words denote individuals. We cannot accept the view that words denote individuals as well as communities,—that is, in the case of passages where the denotation of the community would be compatible we will take that as denoted by the word ; and other cases we shall take the individual as denoted ; this view we cannot accept ; because it has been proved that a word can have one and only one denotation ; as otherwise the meanings of words would always remain vague and indefinite. Then as regards the idea of community that we have, this is easily explained :—the community is never found apart from the individuals that constitute it ; hence whenever the individual would be denoted by the word, the community would be indirectly indicated as its inseparable concomitant.”

“अद्रव्यशब्दत्वात्” ॥ ३१ ॥

31. “Also because [in case communities were denoted by words] there would be no word expressive of the properties of an object.”—31.

COMMENTARY.

"If the word 'cow' denoted the community cow, we could not have any words expressive of the properties of cows; because all properties pertain to individuals, how could we have any such expression as the *white cow*? The community cow is certainly not white. Nor again could we have any numerals in connection with nouns: how could we speak of *twenty cows*, when the community cow is one only? There are no properties that could be spoken of as belonging to the entire community. For this reason also, it is necessary to admit that words denote individuals."

The Vārtika does not accept this interpretation given in the Bhāṣya of sūtra 31; on the ground that it is too far-fetched, the word 'dravya' being taken in the sense of 'dravyâ-śraya,'—and cannot be got at directly from the words of the sūtra. According to the Vārtika, the sūtra should be translated and explained in the following manner:—

"Also because [if words denoted communities], there would be no denotation, by words, of any individual substances;—

and the inevitable result of this would be that there would be a vast divergence between the noun and its adjective; that is to say, if the word 'cow' denoted the community cow, it could never denote any individual substance, in the shape of a particular cow; and as all properties belong to individuals only—and never to any entire class—no adjectives, which denote properties, could ever be co-ordinated with, or applied to, the word 'cow.'"

“अन्यदर्शनाच्च” ॥ ३२ ॥

32. "Also because we find the word 'another' used [in connection with nouns]."—32.

COMMENTARY.

"Another reason is put forward against the theory that it is the community that is denoted by words. In the Veda we meet with such assertions as 'if one animal should run away, another animal should be got;' now, if the word 'animal' denoted the community 'animal,' there would be only one animal, all animals being included in that community; and hence no such expression would be possible as 'another animal;' this would involve a contradiction in terms."

This sūtra is omitted by the Vārtika.

आकृतिस्तु कियार्थत्वात् ॥ ३३ ॥

आकृतिः Ākṛitih, the community. तु Tu, but. कियार्थत्वात् Kriyārthatvāt, because it serves the purpose of actions.

33. It is the community that is denoted by words; because it is the community that serves the purpose of actions.—33.

COMMENTARY.

In view of such Vedic injunctions as 'Śyenachitam chinvita'—'the kite-altar should be built'—we must take the word to be denotative of the community that includes a number of specific individuals; that is to say, in the injunction quoted, it could not be meant that the altar should be built in the form of any particular individual kite; if it meant that, then no altar could be built by people who had not seen that particular kite; the injunction must mean that the altar to be erected should be of that shape which forms the common feature of all individual kites—that is, the word 'kite' must signify that commonality or community in which all kites are included. Similarly in ordinary parlance, when a man is told to 'bring a cow,' he does not bring any particular cow; he brings in any animal that is found to possess those characters that are common to all cows. Further, if distinct individuals were denoted by the word,—the denotation of the word would become as diverse and multifarious as there are individuals; each individual is bound to have some feature or features that are not present in any other individual; if it were not so, it would not be an individual. Consequently the denotation of a word if pertaining to individuals, would be as infinite in number as there are individuals; that is, the denotation of the word 'cow' would not consist of the one community including all cows, but of the infinite number of individual cows of the past, the present and the future. Then again, as each individual cow would be possessed of many qualities distinct from those possessed by the others, the connotation of the word also would be diverse. All this would create a great deal of confusion. If, on the other hand, no individual cow is denoted by the word, but it signifies the entire community, then whenever a person would be asked to 'bring a cow,' though he would comprehend the word as signifying the entire community of 'cows,' yet what he would bring would not be this community,—there would be no such absurdity,—he would naturally bring that individual of the community which would be available to him. The propriety of bringing the individual, and not the entire community, being indicated, by the proximity

of the word 'bring' which could never be taken as applying to any community.

This shows that it is the community alone to which all injunctions—both Vedic and profane—of actions can apply. Specially because all individual objects being ephemeral, if the words—specially of the Veda—were to denote individuals, the relationship of the word to its denotation could never be regarded as eternal—; thus the entire fabric of Mīmāṃsā would fall to the ground.

The practical purpose served by this adhikaraṇa lies in regard to those cases where we have a conflict between a rule and its exceptions. It is only when words denote communities that any rule can be regarded as general; and if no rule can be regarded as general—a contingency rendered necessary under the view that all words denote specific individuals only—then, there would be no justification for rejecting it in favour of a special rule.

(The Vārtika gives here a full discussion of the various theories in regard to the denotation of words).

“न क्रिया स्यात्” इति चेत्—“अर्थान्तरे विधानन्न द्रव्यम्”
इति चेत् ॥ ३४ ॥

तदर्थत्वात् प्रयोगस्याविभागः ॥ १ । ३ । ३५ ॥

न Na, no. क्रिया Kriyā, action. स्यात् Syāt, would be. इति चेत् Iti chet, if this is urged. अर्थान्तरे Arthāntare, pertaining to another thing. विधानम् Vidhānam, injunction. न Na, no. द्रव्यम् Dravyam, substances (properties). इति चेत् Iti chet, if this is urged तदर्थत्वात् Tadarthatvāt, because words denote communities (and indicate through these the individuals forming the communities.) प्रयोगस्य Prayogasya, of action. अविभागः Avibhāgaḥ, no dissociation or disjunction.

34. If it be urged that—[if words denoted communities]—(a) “there could be no action [according to injunctions]”—and also that, “(b) there could be no injunction of ‘another thing’; and (c) there would be signification of substances (and their properties)”—34.

35. [The reply is]—because words denote communities [and through these indicate indirectly also the individuals forming the communities,] there would be no dissociation [of individuals] from action [laid down by injunctions].—35.

COMMENTARY.

The objections that have been urged in sūtras 30, 31, and 32, against the view that words denote communities, are recapitulated in Sūtra 34 and answered in Sūtra 35. The objections are three:—

(a) "There would be no injunction of actions if words denoted communities; as all actions, in practice, pertain to individual things."—(Sūtra 30).

(b) "We find Vedic injunctions laying down the use of another thing, if one thing is spoilt,—if the word denoted the community as a whole, there could be no 'one' or 'another.'" (Sūtra 32).

(c) "No signification of substances with properties would be possible."—(Sūtra 31).

The answer given in Sutra 35 is as follows:—

(a) Though it is true that what is directly denoted by the word is the community, yet the relation between the community and its constituent individuals is so close and inseparable that one will always imply the other; hence in the case of all injunctions, though the words would actually directly denote the community, they would indirectly indicate their invariable correlatives, the individuals also; and the reason for this indirect indication,—and our acceptance of it in preference to the direct denotation—would lie in the very fact that the opponent urges: it is only with reference to individual things that actions can be performed; hence it becomes necessary to accept the words as indicating the individuals. As this would explain all that is necessary in regard to injunction and actions, we find no justification for denying the primary position that in its ultimate denotation, the word denotes the community,—and accepting the other view that words denote individuals, in face of the many inseparable objections urged above.

(b) Even though there can be no 'one' and 'another' in regard to the community, these would be quite compatible with the individuals; and as we admit these latter to be indirectly indicated by the words, the objection loses all its force.

(c) Similarly, for the adjectives denoting properties: even though these may not apply to the community, they could pertain to the individuals.

Thus we conclude even though words must be regarded as denoting communities—in view of reasons shown above,—they would also indicate the individuals, as inseparable from the communities; and in this

way it would be always possible to connect or associate enjoined actions with individual things; this is what is meant by the sentence—‘there would be no dissociation.’

According to Prabhākara, as according to the Bhāṣya, the ground of doubt as to the real meaning of a word, is that words have no denotations apart from injunctive sentences, and injunctive sentences always refer to individuals; whereas for several reasons (detailed above) it does not appear right to accept the view that words denote individuals. Because words have no denotations apart from injunctive sentences, Prabhākara bases his argument in favour of the view that words denote communities, entirely upon such injunctions as ‘*śyenachitam*, &c.,’ where it is impossible for the word to denote any individual.

Kumārila, on the other hand, not admitting the view that words have no meaning apart from injunctive sentences, makes the ground of doubt consist in the fact that, though by means of words we actually comprehend communities, Grammar indicates the plausibility of the view that it is the individual that is denoted by words. And, not depending upon injunctive sentences alone, he has put forward many other arguments in favour of the orthodox view that words denote communities.

FOURTH PĀDA.

TREATING OF THE NAMES OF SACRIFICES.

Adhikaraṇa I.—Words like ‘Udbhid’ are names of sacrifices.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 1-2.

“उक्तं समान्नायैदमर्थ्यम्, तस्मात्सर्वन्तदर्थं स्यात्” ॥ १।४।१ ॥

उक्तम् Uktam, has been explained. समान्नायैदमर्थ्यम् Samānnāyaidamarthyam, the part of the Veda pertaining to actions. तस्मात् Tasmāt, therefore. सर्वम् Sarvam, the whole of it. तदर्थम् Tadartham, for that purpose. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

1. “It has been explained that the Veda pertains to [helps in the performance of] actions; therefore the whole of it should be taken as serving that purpose.”—1.

COMMENTARY.

In the Veda we meet with many such words as ‘Udbhid,’ ‘Chitrā’ ‘Agnihotra’ and so on—which do not appear to be either injunctions, or arthavādas or mantras. With regard to these, there arises a doubt as to

whether these words lay down certain accessory details in connection with sacrifices,—or they are only the names of particular sacrifices.

On this question, the Pūrvapakṣa as embodied in sūtra 1, is as follows:—"The conclusion arrived at in the foregoing sections of the sūtra is that the Veda always lays down something that is directly or indirectly conducive to the accomplishment of actions; for instance, the injunctions lay down actions not known otherwise; the arthavādas praise certain things in connection with actions laid down by the injunctions, and thereby serve to prompt men to perform those actions; the mantras indicate certain details—principally the deity—connected with the sacrificial action; thus it follows that the entire Veda should be regarded as laying down things connected with some sort of sacrificial performance. From all this we conclude that the words under discussion, as forming part of the Veda, are expressive of things connected with sacrificial performances; such being the case, we cannot take them as arthavādas, because they are not found to be subservient to any injunctions; nor are they found to have the character of mantras; consequently, they must be taken as enjoining certain materials to be offered at sacrifices; that is to say, the word 'udbhid' means etymologically, that which cuts, *i.e.*, the axe, or any such cutting instrument; the meaning of the sentence thus will be that 'one should perform the sacrifice in which a cutting instrument is to be offered;' and similarly, in the case of all such words, we could find some such etymological meaning, by which it would denote some sort of a material substance that could be offered at sacrifices."

अपि वा नामधेयं स्यात् यदुत्पत्तावपूर्वमविधायकत्वात् ॥ २ ॥

अपि वा *Api Vā*, but. नामधेयम् *Nāmadheyam*, a name. स्यात् *Syāt*, must be. यत् *Yat*, which. उत्पत्तौ *Utpattau*, when met with for the first time. अपूर्वम् *Apūrvam*, appears to be new, *i.e.*, is not recognised as denoting anything already known. अविधायकत्वात् *Avidhāyakatvāt*, because it cannot be injunctive.

2. But that which, at the very outset, is not recognised as denoting anything already known, must be a name; because it cannot be injunctive [of any thing].—2.

COMMENTARY.

When we come across such a word as 'udbhid,' for instance, in the sentence 'udbhidā yajeta,' we do not at first recognise it as denoting anything that is known to us; it is only when we come to look into the etymology of the word that we find that it may denote a cutting instrument; thus inasmuch as the word is not readily recognised as having

such meaning, it cannot be taken as laying down a material, the significance whereof by the word is got at with great difficulty; and it is much more reasonable to take it as a name. Or (according to another interpretation of the sūtra proposed by Kumārila) the word must be taken as the name of that sacrifice which is found to be mentioned in the same sentence as accomplishing a transcendental result;—in the case of 'udbhid,' the sacrifice whose performance is declared to accomplish the transcendental result which would bring cattle.

The reason why the word should be regarded as a name is—because it cannot be injunctive of anything; that is to say, it is not capable of enjoining a material. Because if, in the sentence in question, 'udbhida yajeta pasukāmaḥ,' the word 'udbhid' were to lay down a material to be offered, it would lay this down,—either with reference to the result, the meaning being that 'one should seek to acquire cattle by means of the cutting instrument,'—or with regard to the sacrifice, the meaning being that 'one should accomplish the sacrifice by means of the cutting instrument,'—or with reference to both, the sense being that 'one should acquire cattle by means of the offering of the cutting instrument in sacrifice.' Now, by the first of these, it would appear as if the cattle were to be acquired directly by means of the instrument, without the making of any offering at all;—by the second, the mention of the result would have no connection with the sentence; under the third, the word 'udbhida' in the instrumental, would have to be taken as equalifying the word 'yāgena,' implied in the verb 'yajeta;' and thus 'udbhida' will have to be taken as standing for 'udbhidvatā,' 'that which has the udbhid for its material,'—thus involving the undesirable contingency of making a word renounce its direct meaning and taking an indirect one,—a contingency permitted only in cases where no other interpretation is available; while, in the present case, the word can be taken as the name of a sacrifice, which obviates the necessity of having recourse to indirect or forced interpretation.

Thus then, inasmuch as the word cannot enjoin a material, it must be taken as the name of a sacrifice.

The above is the interpretation of the sūtras 1 and 2, according to the Bhāṣya, by which both sūtras form one adhikaraṇa, the first being taken as the Pūrvapakṣa and the second as the Siddhānta. Kumārila takes exception to this interpretation, on the ground that the present adhyāya being devoted to the subject of the Means of knowing Dharma, the opening adhikaraṇa of the pāda must bear directly upon that subject; and also on the ground that there is nothing in the first sūtra that is not

perfectly compatible with the Siddhānta standpoint, in view of which it could be taken as embodying the Pūrvapakṣa. By Kumārila's interpretation the first sūtra represents an entirely distinct adhikaraṇa, which may be expanded as follows :—

In regard to such words as 'udbhid' as occurring in the Veda, there arises a question—as these are neither injunctions, nor arthavādas, nor mantras, can they be regarded as having any bearing upon Dharma? The Pūrvapakṣa view is that “inasmuch as these words have no connection with the performance of actions, they can have no bearing upon dharma.” The Siddhānta is—*It has already been explained that the Veda bears directly upon the performance of actions ; hence the whole of it (including the words under discussion) must be accepted as serving that purpose.* (Sūtra 1.)

It having been established that as forming part of the Veda, the words in question must be taken as bearing upon dharma, the next question that naturally arises is—What bearing have they? In what way do they help our knowledge of dharma? And it is on this question that we have the next adhikaraṇa, represented by sūtra 2. The Pūrvapakṣa has to be supplied from without,—its sense being that “the words in question must be taken as laying down materials for the sacrifices ; because such meaning of the word as could be got at through its etymology is apt to be accepted and recognised by all men ; and also because being thus taken, the word would serve the distinctly useful purpose of pointing out the material to be offered,—a point on which the rest of the sentence affords no information.”

The Siddhānta is embodied in sūtra 2, as explained in accordance with the Bhāṣya.

According to Prabhākara who accepts the interpretation as given by the Bhāṣya, the pūrvapakṣa view is that the word 'udbhid' lays down the cutting instrument as a material to be offered at some unknown sacrifice ; while according to the Pūrvapakṣa as put forth by Kumārila, it is in connection with the well-known Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice that the word lays down the material.

Adhikaraṇa II.—‘Chitrā,’ &c., are names of Sacrifices.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 3.

यस्मिन् गुणोपदेशः प्रधानतोऽभिसम्बन्धः ॥ १ । ४ । ३ ॥

यस्मिन् Yasmin, that (word) in which. गुणोपदेशः Guṇopadeśaḥ, mention of

accessories. प्रधानतः Pradhānataḥ, with the principal factor. अभिसम्बन्धः Abhisambandhaḥ, is related.

3. That word which [if taken as an injunction] would mention more than one accessory must be taken as related to the principal factor [i.e., the action mentioned in the sentence].—3.

COMMENTARY.

The foregoing adhikaraṇa dealt with such words as had no meaning of their own, and whose meaning had to be deduced from their etymology. The present adhikaraṇa deals with those words which have a well-recognised meaning of their own; for instance, the word 'chitrā' as occurring in the sentence 'chitrayā yayeta paśukāmaḥ;' with regard to this word, there arises the question—is the word 'chitrā' here to be taken as laying down the female animal of variegated colour (which is what the word actually signifies)? Or is it to be regarded as the name of the sacrifice mentioned by the word 'yajeta'?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"the word must be taken in its ordinary sense, the meaning of the sentence being—'one should perform a sacrifice with an animal which is female, and of variegated colour; that is to say 'the animal sacrificed for the Agniṣomiya offering, should be a female and of variegated colour,'—there being no justification for abandoning the natural meaning of the word, so long as it is found to be compatible with the context."

The Siddhānta view put forward in the sūtra is as follows:—In all cases where a word, if taken as laying down accessories, is found to mention more than one accessory detail, it is not right to take it as such an injunction of accessories; because this would rise to a syntactical split; for instance, in the case of the word 'chitrā,' if we take it in the way suggested in the Pūrvapakṣa, it would lay down three factors—(1) the animal, (2) its female sex and (3) its variegated colour: and the right construction of the sentence would be—'The sacrifice should be performed with an animal, —this animal should be a female,—and this animal should be of variegated colour;'—thus a single sentence being split up into three sentences, 'a split' permissible only when the sentence admits of no other construction. In the sentence in question, we have a simpler construction available:—the word 'chitrā' may be taken as "related to the principal factor" of the sentence, —viz., the sacrifice denoted by the root in the word 'yajeta;' and the only way in which it can be so related is to take it as the name of that sacrifice.

Adhikarāṇa III.—‘*Tatprakhyanyāya*’: “*Agnihotra*” is the name of a Sacrifice.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 4.

तत्प्रख्यञ्चान्यशास्त्रम् ॥ १ । ४ । ४ ॥

तत्प्रख्यञ्च Tatprakhyam, injunctive of that. च Cha, and. अन्यशास्त्रम् Anyasāstram, other sentences.

4. There are other sentences injunctive of that accessory.—4.

COMMENTARY.

Adhikarāṇa I dealt with words whose etymological signification pointed to the sacrificial material only indirectly ; that is to say, ‘*udbhidā*’ had to be taken by the Pūrvapakṣa as standing for ‘*udbhidvatā*,’ before it could be taken as laying down the material for the sacrifice ; and this contingency formed the chief reason for rejecting the Pūrvapakṣa. The present adhikarāṇa deals with those words whose etymological signification points to a sacrificial accessory directly, for instance, the word ‘*agnihotra*,’ as occurring in the sentence ‘*agnihotreṇa jubuyāt svargakāmaḥ*,’ signifies etymologically, *that in which the offering is made to Agni* and as such can be taken as laying down Agni as the deity of the sacrifice ; and as this does not necessitate recourse to indirect indication, there arises the question as to whether words like these are to be taken as names of sacrifices, or as laying down accessory details in connection with the sacrifices.

The Pūrvapakṣa view is as follows :—“ The word ‘*agnihotra*’ directly signifies that in which (‘*yasmin*’) the offering (hotram) is made to Agni (‘*agnaye*’) ; and as such there can be no objection to its being taken as laying down Agni as the deity of the sacrifice ; specially as in connection with the particular sacrifice herein referred to there are many minor sacrifices whose deity is nowhere mentioned ; consequently, the word, when taken as laying down the deity, supplies a distinct need.”

The Siddhānta view, embodied in the sūtra, may be summed up as follows :—Inasmuch as in connection with the sacrifice in question we find other sentences laying down all necessary accessories, an enjoining of these by another word would be entirely superfluous. For instance, the mantra ‘*Agnirjyotiḥ*, &c.,’ distinctly points to Agni as the deity of the sacrifice, what need then is there of that same deity being mentioned by the word ‘*agnihotra* ?’ Consequently, the conclusion is that the word must be taken as the name of the sacrifice ; specially as the connection of the deity Agni with the offering having been established by the aforesaid mantra, and in accordance with this, people being actually found to take up the

performance of that sacrifice, the word 'agnihotra' cannot but be taken as merely referring to, and being descriptive of, that same sacrifice.

Adhikaraṇa IV—Tadvyapadeśanyāya': "Śyena" and such other words are names of sacrifices.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 5.

तद्व्यपदेशञ्च ॥ १ । ४ । ५ ॥

5. That also [should be taken as name] which points to a similarity [between the sacrifice and the accessory that it would indicate.]—5.

COMMENTARY.

Adhikaraṇa II has dealt with these words which, though capable of being taken directly as laying down accessory details, give rise to needless syntactical splits; the present adhikaraṇa takes up the case of those words whose direct signification points to things that can be used as materials of offering, &c., and which, when taken in this sense, do not occasion any syntactical split. For instance, the word 'Śyena' in the sentence 'Śyenena yajeta' may be taken in its direct signification of the kite-bird; and this word is quite capable of being used as the material to be offered at the sacrifice; the meaning of the sentence being 'one should make an offering of the kite-bird.' This is the Pūrvapakṣa view.

The Siddhānta put forth in the sūtra is that, the word must be taken as the name of the sacrifice, as is clearly implied by another Vedic text in connection with the sacrifice; this other text says 'just as the kite-bird falls upon its prey, so does this sacrifice fall upon his enemy;'; this implies that there is a similarity between the kite-bird and the sacrifice, which, on that account, may be taken as having, 'Śyena' for its name. If, in the sentence in question, the word 'Śyena' meant the kite-bird itself, then this other text would be describing a similarity of the kite-bird to itself, which would be absurd.

And further, as in the case of 'udbhidā,' it has been shown that before the word could be taken as laying down the sacrificial material, it would be necessary to regard it as equivalent to 'udbhidvatā' so, in the same manner, in the case of the word 'Śyenena,' before it can be taken as laying down a material, it will be necessary to take it as equivalent to 'Śyenaivatā;'; as without this, the word 'Śyenena' in its original form could not be construed with 'Yāgena.' This undesirable contingency is obviated by taking the word as the name of the sacrifice.

Adhikarāṇa V.—‘Vājapeya,’ etc., are names of Sacrifices.

SŪTRAS 1. 4. 6—8.

“नामधेये गुणश्रुतेः स्याद् विधानम्”—इति चेत् ॥ ६ ॥

तुल्यत्वात् क्रिययोर्न ॥ ७ ॥

नामधेये Nāmadheye, in the case of what appears as a name. गुणश्रुतेः Guṇaśruteḥ, because there is a mention of an accessory. स्याद् Syât, should be. विधानम् Vidhānam, an injunction. इति चेत् Iti chet, if this be urged. (6) तुल्यत्वात् Tulyatvât, on account of becoming similar. क्रिययोः Kriyayoh, of the two actions. न Na, this cannot be (7).

6. “In the case of what appears to be a name, inasmuch as there is distinct mention of an accessory, it should be taken as the injunction [of that accessory]”—if this is urged.—6.

7. This cannot be; because in that case the two actions would become similar.—7.

COMMENTARY.

The opponent reiterates his position with regard to all those words that are taken as names. “In the case of all words that you take as names”—says the Pûrvapakṣin—“when we find a distinct mention of the material or other accessories, we cannot but regard them as injunctions of such accessories; and there could be no reason for taking them as names of sacrifices. For instance, in the case of the word ‘Vājapeya,’ as occurring in the sentence ‘Vājapeyena svârâjyakâmo yajeta,’ we find that the word distinctly mentions a material, in the shape of the juice or extract (‘peya’) of food-grains (‘vâja’); and so we must take it as laying down this grain-juice as the material to be employed at the sacrifice performed for acquiring the Kingdom of Heaven; consequently the words cannot be taken as a name.”

This is the Pûrvapakṣa embodied in sūtra 1. 4. 6. The Siddhânta, in reply to this, is put forth in sūtra 1. 4. 7. If the sacrifice mentioned in the sentence in question had for its material the grain-juice, as held by the Pûrvapakṣa, it would be a sacrifice of the ‘Iṣṭi’ class; and thereby come to have its procedure exactly similar to that of the Darśa-pûrṇamâsa, which is the archetype of all grain-sacrifices; which would be an absurdity; as the procedure of the sacrifice is that of the Jyotiṣṭoma, which is the archetype of the ‘Saumika’ class. For this reason, the word ‘Vājapeya’ cannot be taken as laying down the grain-juice as the material for the sacrifice; it must be taken as the name of the sacrifice performed in accordance with the procedure of the Jyotiṣṭoma, with a view to acquire the Kingdom of Heaven.

ऐकशब्दे परार्थवत् ॥ ८ ॥

ऐकशब्दे Aikashabde, in that which is expressed by a single word परार्थवत् Parārbhavat, there would be mutually contradictory characters.

8. That which is signified by a single word would come to have contradictory characters.—8.

COMMENTARY.

In case the word 'Vājapeya' signified the grain-juice as the material, then the sentence 'Vājapeyena svārājyakāmo yajeta' would have to be construed as follows—(a) 'one should obtain the sovereignty of heaven by means of the sacrifice, and (b) the sacrifice should be accomplished by means of the grain-juice;' and thus the sacrifice, though signified by the single word 'yajeta,' would have the character of an instrument with regard to the sovereignty of heaven, and the character of the object to be accomplished, in regard to the grain-juice; but as a matter of fact, it is possible for one and the same thing to have, at one and the same time, the mutually contradictory characters of the instrument and the object; so we conclude that the word 'Vājapeya' does not lay down the material, grain-juice; and that it must be taken as the name of a sacrifice.

Adhikaraṇa VI—'Āgneya' is not the name of a sacrifice.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 9.

तद्गुणास्तु विधीयेरन्न विभागाद्विधानार्थे, न चेदन्येन शिष्टाः ॥ १ । ४ । ६ ॥

तद्गुणाः Tad-guṇāḥ, that and its accessories. तु Tu, but. विधीयेरन् Vidhiyeran, should be enjoined. अविभागान् Avibhāgāt, because there is combination. विधानार्थे Vidhānārthe, in regard to the object of injunction. न Na, not. चेत् Chet, if. अन्येन Anyena, by another. शिष्टाः Śiṣṭāḥ, laid down.

9. The sacrifice as well as its accessories should be enjoined [by the word],—because there is a combination of all factors of the injunction;—specially if they are not laid down by any other word.—9.

COMMENTARY.

The general character and function of names having been pointed out in the foregoing sūtras, with the present sūtra begins the consideration of certain exceptions to the principles laid down,

In connection with the word 'Âgneyaḥ,' as appearing in the sentence—'Yadâgneyo' ṣṭakapâlo' mâvâsyâyâm, etc.,—the question arises :—Is it the name of a sacrifice? Or, does it lay down certain accessory details of a sacrifice?

The Pûrvapakṣa view is as follows :—"The word must be taken as the name of the sacrifice at which the cake baked on eight pans is to be offered; it cannot be taken as laying down accessories; because all the necessary accessories are got at by other means: for instance, the Deity is mentioned by the mantras, and the material in the form of the cake, is mentioned by the word 'Aṣṭakapâla' itself, as it is only a cake that can be *baked on pans*. Nor can the word lay down the sacrifice itself; as the sacrifice also is already indicated by the mention of the cake as baked upon eight pans; as it is only for being offered to a deity that a cake can be so baked. Thus not being capable of being taken as laying down either the sacrifice or its accessories the word 'Âgneya' must be taken as the name of the sacrifice at which the cake is offered to the deity Agni mentioned by the mantras. The word cannot be taken as laying down materials, as that would involve a syntactical split, as urged by the Siddhânti himself in the foregoing Adhikaraṇas."

The Siddhânta view embodied in the sûtra is as follows :—When the sacrifice and its accessories are not found to be laid down by any other word, they must be taken as enjoined by the word in question; specially because the word 'Âgneyaḥ,' alone implies all the necessary factors of the injunction.

It has been asserted in the Pûrvapakṣa that the sacrifice and its accessories are already got at by means of the other words of the sentence. This is not true : (1) As regards the sacrifice itself, the mere mention of the cake as baked upon eight pans does not necessarily indicate any sacrifice to a deity; because there is nothing to establish any such relationship between the cake mentioned in this sentence and the deities indicated by other mantras; that is to say, the mere mention of the 'cake baked on eight pans' does not point to any action of the human agent, during the performance of which action those mantras would be recited which would recall any deities to his mind. The mantra also—'Agnirmûrdhâ divaḥ, etc.,' does not mention any action at all; hence this also cannot point to any relationship between the cake and the deity Agni spoken of in this mantra. (2) As regards the sacrificial material, this also is not laid down by any other word of the sentence in question; because it is only after the sacrifice has been mentioned that anything spoken of in the sentence can be taken as the material for that sacrifice; we have seen that the sacrifice

is not mentioned by any other words; therefore we must conclude that the fact of the cake being the sacrificial material is also not mentioned by any other part of the sentence. (3) Lastly, the deity also cannot be taken as indicated by the other words of the sentence. There are only three ways of mentioning the deity to whom a certain material is to be offered—(a) by means of a nominal affix, *e.g.*, the affix 'an' in the word 'aṇḍram' in the sentence 'aṇḍram charum' shows that the charu is dedicated to Indra; (b) by means of the dative ending—*e.g.*, the ending in the word 'Viṣṇave' in the sentence, 'Viṣṇave dvādaśakapālam,' shows that the cake is to be offered to Viṣṇu; and (c) by certain significant words of mantras—*e.g.*, the word 'Sāryaḥ' in the mantra 'Suryojyotiḥ, etc.' shows that the morning libation is to be offered to Sārya; and among these three the one that follows is always of less authority than that which precedes; hence so long as we can get at a deity mentioned by the nominal affix, we cannot accept that which is indicated by any words of mantras; that is to say, in the case in question, inasmuch as the fact of Agni being the deity is expressed by the nominal affix 'dhak' in the word 'Āgneyaḥ,' we cannot seek for the required deity in the words of the mantra 'Agnirmūrdhā, etc.'

Under the circumstances, the inevitable conclusion is that it is the word 'āgneyaḥ' that denotes the connection between the cake and Agni; and it is by virtue of this relationship that the sacrifice also comes to be denoted. Thus the word 'Āgneyaḥ' must be taken—(1) as pointing out the deity, by means of the basic noun 'Agni,' (2) as indicating the fact of the cake to be offered to Agni, by means of the affix 'dhak,' and (3) as expressing the sacrifice, by reason of the fact that, the cake cannot become 'āgneya,' until it is offered to Agni—and this offering constitutes the sacrifice.

Thus all the factors, the sacrifice and its accessories in the form of the deity and the material, are pointed out by the word 'āgneyaḥ'; and as all these factors of the injunction are mingled together, there is no syntactical split at all.

Adhikaraṇa VII.—Such words as 'Varhiḥ' and the like denote the genus.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 10.

वहिराज्योरसंस्कारे शब्दलाभादतच्छब्दः ॥ १ । ४ । १० ॥

वहिराज्ययोः Varhirājyayoh, of the grass and the butter. असंस्कारे Asamskāre, even when no consecration has been made. शब्दलाभाद् Śabdalahāt, even when no consecration has been made.

because the words are applied. अतच्छब्दः Atachchhabdah, the words cannot be regarded as applicable (to consecrated grass and butter only.)

10. Because the words 'varhiḥ' [grass] and 'ājya' [butter] are found to be applied to unconsecrated grass and butter, the words cannot be regarded as applicable only to consecrated grass and butter.—10.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with names we proceed to consider the significations of the names of materials. In regard to such names as 'varhiḥ' (grass), 'ājya' (butter) and 'puroḍāśa' (cake), there arises the question—Do these words apply respectively to only such grass, butter and cake, as have been consecrated for sacrificial purposes, or to all grass, butter and cake in general? Though the sūtra mentions only the 'varhiḥ' and the 'ājya,' the Bhāṣya has added the 'puroḍāśa' also.

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"according to sūtra 1. 3. 9, the words in question must be taken to be used by sacrificers, in the sense of the consecrated or sacrificial materials only."

The Siddhānta is that it is a well-recognised fact that the words found in the Veda are the same as those used in ordinary parlance and their significations also are the same in both cases (sūtra 1. 3. 30); and as it has been proved under sūtra 1. 3. 30 that all words denote communities and not individuals, we must take the words in question to be denotative of grass, butter and cake in general. Such being the case, there can be no justification for restricting these significations to only such of these things as have undergone a process of consecration.

Adhikaraṇas VIII and IX—The names 'Prokṣaṇi' (VIII) and 'Nirmanthya' (IX) must be taken in their literal signification.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 11 and 12.

प्रोक्षणीष्वर्थसंयोगात् ॥ १ । ४ । ११ ॥

तथा च निर्मन्थ्ये ॥ १ । ४ । १२ ॥

प्रोक्षणीषु Prokṣaṇiṣu, in the case of the Prokṣaṇi (washing water). अर्थसंयोगात् Arthasamyogāt, because the literal signification is applicable. तथा Tathā, so. च Cha, also. निर्मन्थ्ये Nirmanthye, in the case of the Nirmantha (fire produced by friction.)

11. Because in the case of the 'washing water,' the literal signification of the word 'prokṣaṇi' is applicable [the word must be taken in its literal sense].—11.

12. And so also in the case of the 'fire produced by friction' [the word 'nirmanthya' should be taken in its literal sense].—12.

COMMENTARY.

In regard to the name 'prokṣaṇi' as applied to the water, the question arises as to whether the word has its denotation conventionally restricted to water? Or it has to be taken in its literal sense of that *with which things are washed*?

The Pūrvapakṣa is that—"the conventional meaning of the word being most direct and easily known, we can have no justification for taking the name 'prokṣaṇi' as denoting that *with which things are washed*."

The Siddhānta is that, it is true that the conventional denotation is most authoritative, but in cases where we find the literal signification quite compatible with the conventional signification, we can have no reason for rejecting this latter; for instance, in the case in question, we find that the literal meaning of the word 'prokṣaṇi'—'that by which things are washed'—is quite applicable to the water; consequently we must take the name as used its literal sense; this view having the advantage that the scope of the word-denotation is extended to all those liquids with which things can be properly washed, and not restricted to water only.

Similarly in regard to the name 'Nirmanthya,' though it appears to be used in the sense of consecrated fire, yet it cannot be taken in its literal sense of *fire produced by friction*; the advantage of this view being that it is only when we take the word thus that we can do the baking with fire produced by friction at the time of the baking, and not by any ordinary fire produced at any other time.

Adhikaraṇa X—The word 'Vaiśvadeva' is the name of a sacrifice.

SŪTRAS 1. 4. 13 and 14.

“वैश्वदेवे विकल्प” इति चेत् ॥ १ । ४ । १३ ॥

न वा, प्रकरणात् प्रत्यक्षविधानाच्च, न हि प्रकरणन्द्र-
व्यस्य ॥ १४ ॥

वैश्वदेवे Vaiśvadeve, in the case of the word 'Vaiśvadeva.' विकल्पः Vikalpaḥ, there is option. इति चेत् Iti chet, if this is urged. न वा Na vā, not so. प्रकरणात्

Prakaraṇāt, because of the context. प्रत्यक्षविधानात् Pratyaksavidhānāt, because of direct injunction. च Cha, also. न Na, there is not. हि Hi, because. प्रकरणम् Prakaraṇam, context. द्रव्यस्य Dravyasya, of the thing.

13. If it be urged that "in the case of the word 'Vaiśvadeva,' there is an option."—13.

14. This is not so; because of context [being the sole authority for regarding it as laying down the deity;] while there is a direct injunction [of another deity]; and certainly the context cannot set aside the thing [laid down by direct injunction.]—14.

COMMENTARY.

The case of the word 'Vaiśvadeva' as occurring in the sentence 'Vaiśvadevena yajeta' is different from all other words dealt with in the foregoing sūtras. (1) If we take it as laying down the deity Viśvedeva, we find such signification to follow directly from the word, without having recourse to any indirect indication as was found necessary in the case of the word 'Udbhidā'; (2) it does not lay down any accessories; and hence causes no syntactical split,—as the word 'Chitrā' does; (3) there is no ambiguity about the meaning of the word as pointing to the deity—as in the case of the word 'Agnihotra'; (4) the word 'Vaiśvadeva' does not point to any particular sacrifice,—like the Vājapeya.

The question that arises in regard to this word is this:—Does the word point to Viśvedeva as the deity of the sacrifice of the Chāturmāsya? Or, is it the name of this sacrifice?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that.—"the word lays down the deity Viśvedeva; and as another deity, Agni, i.e., for the same sacrifice, is already laid down by another direct injunction, we must regard Viśvedeva and Agni as the two deities to be accepted optionally. We must accept this view, because no useful purpose would be served by making the word a name of the entire Chāturmāsya sacrifice."

The *Siddhānta* embodied in the sūtra is that the word must be taken as the collective name of all the minor sacrifices that go to make up the Chāturmāsya sacrifice. We cannot take it as pointing to a deity of the sacrifice; because Agni, &c., have been laid down as the deities of these sacrifices, by direct injunctions; while the fact of Viśvedeva being their deity would, at best, be indicated only by the 'context'—i.e., by the word 'Vaiśvadevena' occurring in the same sentence as 'yajeta'; and certainly the deity thus indicated by the context cannot be regarded as on the same footing as those laid down by direct injunctions. The indication

of the deity by the affix in 'Vaiśvadeva' is not of the same kind as that by the similar affix in 'āgneya'; because in the case of the latter the connection of Agni with a distinct material (the cake) is distinctly mentioned in the same sentence; while in the case of the word 'Vaiśvadeva,' no such material being mentioned, the relation of the deity to some sort of material will have to be assumed before the connection of the deity with the sacrifice can be established. Consequently the indication of the deity by this word must be regarded as more indirect, and hence less authoritative, than that by direct injunction. Consequently we must accept, as the deity of the sacrifices in question, Agni and the rest, which are laid down by direct injunctions;—and not Viśvedeva.

For these reasons we must take the word 'Vaiśvadeva' as the name of the entire set of sacrifices that go to form the Chaturmāśya; this collective name serving the distinctly useful purpose of bringing together all the several sacrifices and making them capable of being spoken of collectively by means of the single word 'Vaiśvadeva.'

मिथश्चानर्थसम्बन्धः ॥ १५ ॥

मिथः Mithah, mutual. च Cha, and. अनर्थसम्बन्धः Anartha-sambandhaḥ, relationship is highly improper.

15. And mutual relationship is highly improper.—15.

COMMENTARY.

The opponent might urge that, in the sentence 'Vaiśvadevena yajeta,' the word 'Vaiśvadeva' may be taken as the name referring to all the eight sacrifices, and at the same time it may also be taken as indicating the deity Viśvedeva in connection with a ninth sacrifice of which the material also will be something entirely different from those of the eight sacrifices; the sentence being construed as—'among the Vaiśvadeva sacrifices there should be one of which Viśvedeva is the deity.'

This will not be right; because, in that case the same word would indicate the eight sacrifices, and also lay down the deity for another sacrifice; and the same word 'Vaiśvadeva' would contain the subject as well as the predicate; which would be highly improper, unless the sacrifice is repeated twice.

परार्थत्वाद् गुणानाम् ॥ १६ ॥

परार्थत्वाद् Parāthatvāt, because being of only secondary importance. गुणानाम् Guṇānām, of accessories.

16. Specially because accessories are only of secondary importance.—16.

COMMENTARY.

The opponent might urge that if it is only necessary to repeat the sacrifice in order to establish the property of the construction proposed in the Pûrvapakṣa—this repetition might be done. To this the answer is that in all injunctions the sacrifice forms the most important factor; and the accessories, being only subordinate to the sacrifice, are of secondary importance. Consequently it would not be right to repeat the sacrifice for the sake of finding room for the deity (which is after all only an accessory) denoted by the word 'Vaiśvadeva.'

For these reasons, the only reasonable view is that 'Vaiśvadeva' is the name of the eight sacrifices.

Adhikarāṇa XI—The mention of the number 'eight' in connection with the Vaiśvânara sacrifice is only an arthavâda.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 17-22.

“पूर्ववन्तोऽविधानार्थास्तत्सामर्थ्यं समाज्ञाये” ॥ १ । ४ । १७ ॥

(var. lec. न्तो विधा)

पूर्ववन्तः Pûrvavantah, words expressive of things already known. अविधानार्थाः Avidhānārthah, cannot serve the purposes of injunction. तत्सामर्थ्यम् Tatsamarthyam, capability of serving as injunction. समाज्ञाये Samājnāye, in the text in question.

17. “It is only words expressive of things already known that cannot be taken as injunctions; the text in question is fully capable of being taken as such.”—17.

COMMENTARY.

The consideration of the question as to whether certain words are names of sacrifices or injunctions of accessories having been finished, we now proceed to consider whether certain words can be taken as injunctions of accessories.

The sentence 'Vaiśvânaram dvâdaśakapālam nirvapet putre jâte'—lays down the *the cake baked on twelve pans* as to be offered at the Vaiśvânara sacrifice; this sentence is followed by a number of sentences making mention of cakes baked upon eight and nine pans; now the question arises—is the word mentioning the 'cakes baked upon eight pans,' &c., to be taken as laying down a distinct material for the Vaiśvânara sacrifice? Or, is it to be taken only as arthavâda, eulogising the cakes?

The Pûrvapakṣa view embodied in the sūtra is as follows:—“As a general rule, when a word signifies something that is already known,

It has to be taken as either a name or an arthavāda; in the sentence in question, we find that the expression 'cake baked on eight pans' signifies a substance not known before,—the preceding sentence having spoken of the 'cake baked on twelve pans;' consequently there is nothing to prevent us from taking it as laying down a second material; so that there are two optional materials, for the Vaisvānara sacrifice—the cake baked on twelve pans, and the cake baked on eight pans."

The Vārtika notices a different reading of the sūtra—पूर्ववन्तो विधानार्थाः, etc.; in which case the sense of the Pūrvaapakṣa as embodied in the sūtra would be as follows:—"Those words whose meanings are already known can be utilised only by being taken as injunctions; while those whose meanings are not known should be taken as names, as shown under sūtra 1. 4. 2; hence the mention of the number 'eight' must be taken as laying down a fresh accessory."

This statement of the Pūrvaapakṣa, as the Vārtika remarks, is not correct; because the mere fact of the signification of a word being unknown cannot make it a name; on the other hand, just as the fact of a word being altogether new, having its ordinary signification unknown proves that it cannot be taken as laying down the accessory of a sacrifice,—exactly in the same manner, it is all the more impossible for it to be taken as the name of a Vedic sacrifice; hence such a word cannot be taken as a name; because it is a well-recognised fact that it is only when the ordinary signification of a word is well-known that it can be taken as a name, on the ground of its being mentioned along with a certain sacrifice.

गुणस्य तु विधानार्थेऽतद्गुणाः प्रयोगे स्युरनर्थकाः न हि तम्प्रत्यर्थवत्ताऽस्ति ॥ १८ ॥

गुणस्य Guṇasya, of accessories. तु Tu, but. विधानार्थे Vidhānārthe, if it were an object of the injunction. अतद्गुणाः Atadguṇāḥ, not being accessories of the sacrifice. प्रयोगे Prayoge, in actual performance. स्युः Syuḥ, they would be. अनर्थकाः Anarthakāḥ, useless. न Na, not. हि Hi, because. तद् Tam, to it. प्रति Prati, with regard to. अर्थवत्ता Arthavattā, usefulness. अस्ति Asti, is.

18. If the word laid down accessories, these accessories, not belonging to the sacrifice, would be useless in its actual performance; because they do not serve any useful purpose with regard to it.—18.

COMMENTARY.

The Siddhānta embodied in the sūtra is as follows :—

The Vaisvānara sacrifice having its own specific number of pans distinctly laid down as *twelve*, any other number, eight, nine, &c., even though enjoined, could not be enjoined with reference to that sacrifice; nor could these latter numbers be enjoined with reference to any other sacrifice, because no such other sacrifice is mentioned in the sentence. Nor could the clause mentioning these numbers be taken as laying down such a sacrifice; because all that this clause does is to describe a certain kind of cake; and it says nothing as to that cake being offered to any deity; and without the mention of this latter fact, no sacrifice could be indicated.

Thus then, the number, as an accessory, even if it be enjoined by the words in question, could not pertain to any sacrifice; and hence these would serve no useful purpose in regard to the performance of any sacrifice; specially as the baking on eight pans would not serve any useful purpose, when not belonging to any sacrifice. Or, the last clause of the sūtra may mean, the mention of the number eight cannot serve any useful purpose with regard to the Vaisvānara sacrifice, the number of pans for which has already been laid down as *twelve*; specially as the baking on eight pans would not serve any useful purpose with regard to the cake that has already been baked on twelve pans.

Not being capable of being taken as an injunction, the mention of the number must be taken as Arthavāda, eulogising the Vaisvānara sacrifice,—the sense being that—‘when the baking on eight pans brings about such excellent results, how much better results could be accomplished by the baking on twelve pans, which is done at the Vaisvānara sacrifice?’

“तच्छेषो नोपपद्यते” ॥ १६ ॥

तच्छेषः Tachchhesāḥ, being supplementary to that. न Na, not. उपपद्यते Upapadyate, is possible.

19. It is not possible for the sentences in question to be taken as supplementary to the preceding injunction.—19.

COMMENTARY.

An objection is raised :—

“The injunction mentions the ‘baking on *twelve* pans;’ while the sentence in question praises the baking on *eight* pans; how then could the latter praise apply to the former?”

अविभागाद्विधानार्थे स्तुत्यर्थेनोपपद्येरन् ॥ २० ॥

अविभागान् Avibhagāt, on account of non-exclusion. विधानार्थे Vidhānārthe, from what is enjoined. स्तुत्यर्थेन Stutyarthena, serving the purpose of praising. उपपद्येरन् Upapadyeran, it would be possible.

20. Inasmuch as [the smaller number] is not excluded from the greater, it is quite possible for the sentences in question to be taken as serving the purpose of praising [the latter.]—20.

COMMENTARY.

As the numbers 'eight' and 'nine' are included in 'twelve,' any praise of the former will certainly apply to the latter; as it would only be a case of the praise of the part being applied to the whole; when the use of eight pans brings "Brahmic glory," and that of nine pans gives vigour, the use of twelve pans must bring about still better results.

“कारणं स्यात्” इति चेत् ॥ २१ ॥

आनर्थक्यादकारणम्, कर्तुर्हि कारणानि, गुणार्थो हि विधीयते ॥ २२ ॥

कारणं Kāraṇam, instigator. स्यात् Syāt, could be. इति चेत् Iti chet, if it be urged. आनर्थक्यात् Ānarthakyāt, on account of uselessness. अकारणम् Akāraṇam, not an instigator. कर्तुः Kartuh, pertain to the agent. हि Hi, because. कारणानि Kāraṇāni, instigators. गुणार्थः Guṇārthaḥ, for the purpose of praising. हि Hi, and: विधीयते Vidhiyate, is mentioned.

21. If it be urged that,—“[the desire for Brahmic glory, &c.] could be taken as the instigators of the numbers in question.”—21.

22. [Our reply is that] inasmuch as the sentences would become useless (meaningless), the results cannot be regarded as instigators; specially as all instigators must pertain to the agent; consequently [we conclude that] the numbers in question are mentioned for the purpose of praising.—22.

COMMENTARY.

The opponent urges.—“The injunction of the numbers eight, &c., would not be incapable of belonging to a sacrifice; because the meaning of the sentences mentioning the number 'eight' would be 'one who desires brahmic glory should perform the sacrifice at which the offering consists of the cake baked on eight pans;' that is to say, the sense of the

whole would be 'if one performs the Vaiśvānara sacrifice without having a view to any definite result, he should offer the cake baked on twelve pans; but if he desires Brāhmic glory, he should offer the cake baked on eight pans.' In this way the injunction of 'eight' would not be absolutely useless as regards the actual performance of sacrifices.

"This is what is meant by the results (Brāhmic glory, &c.) being the 'instigators' of the numbers; which means that it is the different results that lead to the acceptance of the different numbers."

This is the interpretation according to the Bhāṣya and the Vārtika. Later commentators explain the sūtra to mean that 'the numbers are the cause of the results,' i.e., the use of eight pans is the cause of—brings about—Brāhmic glory; and so forth. This interpretation of the word 'kāraṇa,' however, is not compatible with its use in the next sūtra.

The answer to the above objection is given in sūtra 1. 4. 22. The sense of the reply is that, if the mention of the several numbers were taken as laying down the acceptance of these numbers in the event of the performer desiring certain results,—then this would give rise to a syntactical split; as is evident from the construction of the sentences in question as proposed under the preceding sūtra; which would further lead to the very undesirable severance of all connection of the injunction of the Vaiśvānara sacrifice with the mention of certain results, following after the mention of the numbers under discussion:—the whole section running thus—'At the Vaiśvānara sacrifice one should use the cake baked on twelve pans;—the use of eight pans leads to Brāhmic glory; the use of nine pans accomplishes vigorousness;—he on whose birth the Vaiśvānara is performed, becomes vigorous, a large eater of food, with vigorous organs and powerful cattle.'

By reason of these syntactical splits, the proposed meaning of the sentences is not permissible; under the circumstances, if the sentences in question be not taken as Arthavāda, praising the Vaiśvānara sacrifice, they become meaningless and useless. With a view to avoid this uselessness, we must take the sentences as Arthavāda.

Then again, how can the result in the case in question be the 'instigators' of the acceptance of the numbers? It is the agent or performer to whom all instigators should pertain; that is to say, it is when the result belongs to the performer that it can serve as the 'instigator'; in the case in question, the results are mentioned as accruing to the new-born child while the sacrifice is performed by the father. Consequently, the results cannot serve as 'instigators,' as held by the opponent.

Adhikaraṇa XII.—The mention of the grass-bedding as 'master of the sacrifice' is only a praise. [Figurative Description based upon Accomplishment of Purpose.]

SŪTRA 1. 4. 23.

तत्सिद्धिः ॥ १ । ४ । २३ ॥

23. The accomplishment of purpose.—23.

COMMENTARY.

Sūtras 23-28 deal with cases of figurative descriptions; herein are pointed out those facts upon which figurative representations are based. Sūtra 23 mentions the *accomplishment of purpose* as the first of these bases; an example of this we have in the sentence 'Yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ,' where the *prastara*, grass-bedding, is described as 'the master of the sacrifice'; because of the fact that the bedding accomplishes the Master's purposes of comfort, &c., in the same manner as he accomplishes his own purpose; hence the sentence must be taken as a figurative description in praise of the useful character of the bedding.

Adhikaraṇa XIII.—The Brāhmaṇa is praised as 'Agni' [Figurative description based upon sameness of origin.]

SŪTRA 1. 4. 24.

जातिः ॥ १ । ४ । २४ ॥

24. Birth or Origin.—24.

COMMENTARY.

The *similarity of origin* is the second basis for figurative description; e.g., when in the sentence 'Agniḥ brāhmaṇaḥ' the Brāhmaṇa is figuratively described as 'Agni,' it is because both 'Agni' and the Brāhmaṇa are declared in the Veda to have been born out of Prajâpati's mouth; this description implying the praise of the Brāhmaṇa.

Adhikaraṇa XIV.—The sacrificial post is praised as the Master of the sacrifice and as the sun [Figurative Description based upon similarity of form].

SŪTRA. 1. 4. 25.

सारूप्यात् ॥ १ । ४ । २५ ॥

25. Similarity of shape.—25.

COMMENTARY.

Similarity of shape is the third basis of figurative description ; e.g., when the sacrificial post is praised as the 'Master of the Sacrifice' because it is as upright in form as the master is ; similarly it is praised as the sun, because it is as bright in colour as the sun.

Adhikaraṇa XV.—Indirect Description based upon praise.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 26.

प्रशंसा ॥ १ । ४ । २६ ॥

26. Praise.—26.

COMMENTARY.

Mere *praise* forms the fourth basis of figurative description ; e.g., in the sentence 'apaśavo go-aśvebhyah,' 'animals other than the cow and the horse are no animals'—the word 'no animals' is only an indirect praise of the cow and the horse ; this figurative description of the other animals as "no animals" being based solely upon the praise of those two animals.

Adhikaraṇa XVI.—Figurative description based upon greatness of number.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 27.

भूमा ॥ १ । ४ । २७ ॥

27. Great large numbers.—27.

COMMENTARY.

Greatness of number forms the fifth basis of figurative description ; e.g., when a number of mantras are called 'sṛiṣṭi' in the sentence 'sṛiṣṭi rapadadhâti' it is because of the recurring of the word 'sṛiṣṭi' in a great number of mantras ; by which even those that do not contain the word are called 'sṛiṣṭi.'

Adhikaraṇa XVII.—Figurative description based upon the presence of an indicative sign.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 28.

लिङ्गसमवायात् १ । ४ । २८ ॥

28. Because of the presence of an indicative sign.

—28.

COMMENTARY.

The presence of an indicative sign forms the sixth basis for figurative description ; e.g., when a number of mantras are called Prāṇabhrīṭ, simply because the word 'prāṇa' occurs in the opening mantra of the set ; which is taken as the indicative sign of the entire set of mantras.

Adhikaraṇa XVIII.—Doubts relating to the true meaning of sentence may be set aside by subsequent passages.

SŪTRA. 1. 4. 29.

सन्दिग्धेषु वाक्यशेषात् ॥ १ । ४ । २९ ॥

सन्दिग्धेषु Sandigdheṣu, in all doubtful cases. वाक्यशेषात् Vākyaśeṣāt, by means of subsequent passages.

29. In doubtful cases, doubts are set at rest by the aid of supplementary passages.—29.

COMMENTARY.

Arthavādas, declarations of praise, have been shown to refer to the object of Injunctions ; it may be that in regard to an injunction, or to an arthavāda, it is doubtful which arthavāda refers to which injunction ; and there may be doubts with regard to the injunction itself ; as when we meet with the injunction—'wet pebbles are to be put in,' there arises the doubt as to the particular liquid with which the pebbles are to be wetted ; this doubt is set aside by the supplementary passage—'tejo vai ghṛitam'—which praises butter ; as this indicates the butter as the liquid with which the pebbles are to be wetted. This is due to mutual need : the injunction needs the indication of a particular liquid, and the praise of the butter needs an injunction with which it may be construed ; and this mutual need leads us to take the two together, and thereby come to the conclusion that the pebbles wetted with butter are to be put in.

Adhikaraṇa XIX.—The indefinite is defined by the peculiar potency of things.

SŪTRA 1. 4. 30.

अथार्था कल्पनैकदेशत्वात् ॥ १ । ४ । ३० ॥

अथार्थ Arthāt, by the potency of things. वा Vā, also. कल्पनैकदेशत्वात् Kalpanaikadeśatvāt, because such an assumption would form part of the Veda.

30. Doubtful cases are also settled by the potency of things ; because assumption based thereupon would form part of the Veda.—30.

COMMENTARY.

One set of doubtful cases may be settled by supplementary declarations ; there are some doubtful cases, however, in which no such declarations are available ; in such cases what helps us to solve the doubt is the inherent capacity of things ; for instance, the word 'añjali' is found to signify the joining of the two palms flatly in cases where it is laid down as the form of salutation to superiors ; but in the case of drinking water by the 'añjali,' the same word is found to signify the cup-like shape formed by the joining of the two hands ; consequently when we come across the injunction in connection with the *Śaktu-Homa*, that the offering is to be made "with the añjali," there arises a doubt as to what the word 'añjali' means in this case. This doubt is set at rest when we come to consider the fact that the flat palm-to-palm 'añjali' cannot contain anything to be offered, while the cup-shaped 'añjali,' is what will contain the flour to be offered ; this inherent capacity of things leads us to conclude that the offering is to be made with the cup formed by the joining of the two hands.

That the offering is to be offered with the hands joined in this form is to be regarded as possessed of the same degree of authority as the original Vedic injunction. Because, inasmuch as the injunction is vague and hence incomplete without this assumption, the assumption must be regarded as an integral factor of the injunction.

Here ends Chapter I, wherein the Means of Knowing Dharma have been fully explained. In the Chapter II, begins the consideration of the character of, and other details connected with, those actions that constitute Dharma.

End of Adhyāya I.

SECOND ADHYĀYA.

FIRST PĀDA.

DIFFERENTIATION OF ACTIONS AND TEXTS PRESCRIBING THEM.

Introductory—

In section I, Jaimini has described the *means* of knowing Dharma. The first sub-section has shown that the Vedic Injunction is such a means *par excellence*, and the other sub-sections have shown that the character of being such means belongs also to Arthavādas, Names, Mantras, Smṛitis, Usage, Supplementary Explanations and Indirect Implications. Thus the first section has supplied the full answer to the question—‘what are the means of obtaining the true knowledge of Dharma?’ In answering this question in detail, it has also been shown that the true character of Dharma belongs to such actions as (for instance) the Agnihotra and the Jyotiṣṭoma (directly enjoined in the Veda), the Aṣṭakā (laid down in the Smṛitis), the Holāka (as established by custom), and so forth. But in the preceding section, these actions have been mentioned only by way of exemplifying the general principles therein discussed; and the detailed question of the individual character of these actions was left over for the second section. Thus the second section supplies the detailed answer to the second question propounded by the Bhāṣya—‘what is Dharma?’—that is to say, ‘what are the particular acts that are to be regarded as Dharma?’—or as Prabhākara, with his usual desire for turning the entire body of the Sūtras upon the Veda itself, states the subject of the adhyāya :—‘what are the *several texts* that lay down the various acts that constitute Dharma?’—Hence according to Prabhākara the subject-matter of Adhyāya II consists of difference among the texts prescribing the actions, and not among the actions directly, these latter being regarded as different according to the difference of the texts prescribing them. This view of the subject-matter of Adhyāya II has been argued in the Śāstradīpikā in the beginning of Adhyāya III.

In order to find out each individual act laid down as Dharma, it becomes necessary to have some basis for proceeding with the enquiry as to differentiating one action from the other—among a number of

actions laid down in the Veda, &c. ; and it is this basis that is discussed in the present section, where it is shown that one action is to be known as different from another when the two are found to be mentioned by different words, and so on (*see below*). Then again, inasmuch as one action cannot be regarded as entirely different from another, unless the transcendental results—apûrvas—proceeding from them be also different, we have here an explanation of the difference among the Apûrvas also. Lastly, so far it would seem that for each act there is a distinct Apûrva ; so in order to set aside this view, we have the further distinction of actions into 'primary' and 'subsidiary,' in connection with which it is shown that it is only the 'primary' action that leads to an independent Apûrva, while those actions that are 'subsidiary' tend merely to complete that 'primary' action to which they are subsidiary, and as such have no distinct Apûrvas of their own. But this distinction between the 'primary' and the 'subsidiary' action is merely mentioned here,—its detailed consideration being left over to sections (3) and (4).

Kumârila's view of the connection of the adhyâya is thus set forth in the Tantravârtika :—What is explained in the present Adhyâya is that one action is known to be different from another on account of the two being mentioned by different words ; and it is in the wake of this difference that we have an explanation of the difference among the Apûrvas (resulting from the actions) ; and lastly, it is for the purpose of ascertaining which is the action that brings about the Apûrva, that we have the consideration of the fact of actions having the character of the Primary or the Subsidiary. That is to say, (1) the difference among actions is the natural and direct subject-matter of the Adhyâya ; and the mention of the non-difference among certain actions is only a denial of the aforesaid difference ; (2)—and with a view to establish the difference and non-difference of actions, we have an explanation of the difference and non-difference of their Apûrvas ;—(3) thus then, so far, it would seem that for each distinct action there is a distinct Apûrva ; and here comes in the use of the consideration—as contained in Adhikaraṇa III—of the Primary and Subsidiary character of actions, which serves to set aside the former mis-conception with regard to Apûrvas ; (inasmuch as it shows that it is only the Primary action that has a distinct Apûrva of its own ;). For instance, even in the case of the sentences "vrihin prokṣati" and "vrihin avahanti," though the words 'avahanti' and 'prokṣati' are different, yet, inasmuch as these actions are found to have their sole end in the visible effects (of the preparation of rice and its cleaning), we conclude

that they cannot bring about any Apūrva (transcendental result). As for the Apūrva that is held to follow from the restriction of the method of preparing the rice, to *threshing* alone, it does not result from an action, and as such is of no consequence in the present context. Hence we find that it is only when certain actions have a distinctly primary character with reference to the substance, etc., that they are cognised as leading to distinct Apūrvas, and as such being totally distinct actions. And it is for the due differentiation of such primary and subsidiary character, that the sūtra (in Adhyāyas III and IV) will supply us with full explanations of such character; and it is an exception to these explanations that are delineated in the two Adhikaraṇas contained in sūtras II.i.9, and II.i.13.

Thus then, the two characters of verbs having been pointed out, a third has to be shown in the shape of 'Denotativeness'; and in connection with this, we have a consideration of the character of Mantras; and then follow the definition, &c., of these; and thus these definitions, etc., treated of to the very end of the Pāda, are indirectly connected with the main subject. Then, having spoken of the difference among Actions, as based upon the *difference of words*, and *repetition* (of Injunctions), the sūtra will point out, under the Adhikaraṇa on 'Paurṇamāsyā' (II.ii.3 *et seq.*), an exception to the fact of 'Repetitions' being a ground of difference; because in the particular case in question the frequent repetitions are taken only as explanatory to the whole context. Then as an exception to this exception, we have the Adhikaraṇas in sūtras II.ii.9 to 20. Then the sūtra proceeds to point out the difference among actions as based upon differences of *Number, Name and Properties*; and the treatment of the difference of properties goes on till the commencement of the treatment of the differences of *context*; and this continues till the beginning of the Adhikaraṇa treating of the differences of the *Branches* or *Rescensions* of the Vedas. And herein is also contained a denial of any other ground of difference among actions, save the six, treated of above.

Thus then, the whole subject-matter of the Adhyāya on Differences is taken up in the setting aside of objections to the fact of the difference of actions being based upon the difference of name, repetition, difference of properties, and difference of context. And it is necessary to explain this fact in detail; because such ascertainment of difference is absolutely necessary in the due knowledge of the relationship of subserviency between actions; and as for other facts, the present is no opportunity for any mention of these.

Thus alone can the connection of the Adhyâya be shown. Because (1) the relationship between the Primary and the Subsidiary, etc., is dependent upon a due ascertainment of differences among actions; (2) it is only when the action has been duly cognised that there can be any question as to a person being entitled to its performance; and (3) it is only when the Injunctions have been duly comprehended that there can be a transference of the properties of one action to another.

That is to say, until the means of knowledge has been duly defined there can be no consideration of the meaning of the Veda; and as such no discussion as to the *marks of difference among actions* (treated of in Adhyâya II) can be introduced; and inasmuch as it is only in the case of actions that have been found to be different, that there can be any idea either of *relationship of the Primary and the Subsidiary* (Adhyâya III), or of their usefulness or otherwise (Adhyâya IV) or of the *order* of their performance (Adhyâya V),—none of these discussions could be raised, until we had thoroughly considered the marks of difference among actions; so too, it is only when the character of the action has been fully cognised that there can be any consideration of the question as to whether a certain person is entitled to its performance or not (Adhyâya VI); and thus we find that this last question stands in need of all the five foregoing Adhyâyas. In the same manner, the Adhyâyas VII-XII, treating as they do of the *transference* of properties, presuppose a full knowledge of all Injunctions; and as such the whole of this latter half of the sūtras is found to be dependent upon the whole of the former half.

Thus it is clear that after the consideration of the Pramāṇa next comes that of the marks of difference, a treatment of which is therefore begun in Adhyâya II.

Adhikaraṇa I.—Bhâvâarthâdhikaraṇa

[Dealing with Apûrva.]

SŪTRAS 1-4.

The question to be treated of in this Adhikaraṇa has been stated thus :—Which is the word in an injunction to which the Apûrva is related; and which would on that account indicate the difference or non-difference among the Apûrvas leading up to the results, and thence also among the actions themselves?

The first step to the answer of this question is that the Apûrva is related to only one word in the injunctive sentence; and the second that it is related either to the noun or to the verb. This then leads to the

final question—to which of these two, the noun or the verb, is the Apūrva related? The answer to this question is contained in the present Adhikaraṇa.

The Pūrvapakṣa to the Adhikaraṇa is not contained in the sūtras. It has been thus stated by Kumārila :—

“All the words signifying substances and properties, and denoting well-known entities, are well capable of being taken as expressing Instrumentality, &c.; and hence it is through this that they come to be related to the result. As a rule the result, being a thing yet to be accomplished, stands in need of the Means or Instrument, which is an already accomplished entity, and not in that of another result. Thus then, the substances signified by Nouns, being well-established entities, are capable of supplying this need of the result; which need cannot be supplied by the verb, which itself is something yet to be accomplished. For these reasons, the result must be admitted to follow from the substance, &c., signified by Nouns, and not from verbs.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

भावार्थाः कर्मशब्दास्तेभ्यः क्रिया प्रतीयेतैष ह्यर्थो
विधीयते ॥ २ । १ । १ ॥

भावार्थाः Bhāvarthāḥ, indicative of Bhāvanās. कर्मशब्दाः Karmaśabdāḥ, verbs. तेभ्यः Tebhyāḥ, from these. क्रिया Kriyā, apūrva. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta, is known. एष Eṣa, this. हि Hi, because. अर्थः Arthāḥ, object; fact. विधीयते Vidhīyate, is laid down.

1. All verbs are indicative of Bhāvanās; and the knowledge of the Apūrva proceeds from these; because this is what is laid down.—1.

That is to say, the verbs that denote the Bhāvanā bring about the cognition of the accomplishment of the Apūrva; because the particular fact that one should accomplish heaven by means of the sacrifice is laid down by these.

That the result cannot be related to the noun follows from the very nature of nouns (see Sec. 3); Nouns are the names of things already accomplished, and not standing in need of any thing else,—being self-sufficient in their denotation. That word, on the other hand, to which the main result is related, must, as a matter of fact, be something that has yet to be accomplished, and as such stands in need of such agencies as would help in its accomplishment. It is only verbs that are found to be expressive of things that do not already exist at the time, but have got to

be accomplished with the help of certain agencies. And inasmuch as the Apûrva also is something that is yet to be accomplished, it is to the verb that it must be closely related.

As to how the Apûrva is related to the verb, this may be thus explained:—Every verb in an injunctive sentence is found to be made up of a verbal root and the injunctive affix. This affix denotes what has been called 'vidhi' or, more technically, 'bhâvanâ,' by which is meant the activity of the agent towards a certain course of action. That is to say, the injunctive affix in the word 'yajeta' signifies that "the agent must put forth his effort towards a definite end." This is what has been called the 'Ârthibhâvanâ;' while the factor of prompting that accompanies the injunctive is called the "Śābdî-bhâvanâ." But in the present connection it is the 'Ârthî-bhâvanâ' that concerns us.

As soon as we have realised the above import of the 'bhâvanâ,' we are confronted by the following three questions—(1) what is it that is to be accomplished by the effort of the agent? (2) by what is it to be accomplished? and (3) how is to be accomplished? As for the first question, it naturally follows that it is the desirable result mentioned in the sentence that has to be accomplished; as regards the second, the answer is supplied by the particular action expressed by the verbal root in connection with which the injunctive affix appears,—in the case of the word 'yajeta,' the action of yāga, sacrifice, denoted by the root 'yaji'; and lastly, as regards the third question, the answer is supplied by the details of procedure laid down in the Veda in connection with the action. Thus it is to the verb alone that the result can be related, both grammatically and materially; and hence it is the injunctive verb alone that can show whether or not any two Apûrvas are different; and this would help to determine if any two actions expressed by the two verbs are one and the same or different.

A question is here raised as to how is it that in the case of the injunctive verb 'yajeta,' the root is set aside and the 'bhâvanâ' is said to be signified by the affix alone, the meaning of the injunctive affix being laid down as 'bhāvayet'? The affix in bhāvayetâ is the same as that in 'yajeta,'; what then is the use of adding the root 'Bhâvi' in explaining the meaning of the root of 'yajeta.'

To this question Kumārila offers the following answer:—

"In all cases, it is a general rule that when the verbal conjugational affix denotes the action of an agent, who is a fully accomplished entity, then the sense of 'karoti' (accomplishes) is recognised as co-extensive with the meaning of the verb. There are certain roots, added to which, a

conjugational affix signifies only that action of the agent which ends in his acquiring his own existence,—e.g., 'is,' 'exists,' and the like. In the case of other roots, when the agent is an already accomplished entity, the action signified is that which brings about the existence of something else,—e.g., 'sacrifices,' 'gives,' 'cooks,' and the like. And the word 'vyāpāra' ('action') signifies only a particular substance,—endowed with peculiar potencies, moved in its pristine character, having a mixed nature, having an existence in the past and in the future,—as moved from its former position and not reached the next. And in the case of some verbs it is the agent himself that is cognised as being in this position; while in that of others, where the agent is a well-established entity, it is something else. Hence in a case where the agent himself happens to be in the said unsettled position, he stands in need of something else, for the fulfilment of his own existence; and as such not functioning towards the accomplishment of any other substance, he cannot be spoken of as 'karoti'; when, however, the agent is a well-established entity, and functions towards the fulfilment of something else, then he is spoken of as 'karoti' (does). Thus it is that when one asks 'kim karoti' (what does he do?) the reply given is 'paṭhati' ('reads'), which latter combines within itself the generic ('karoti') as well as the specific action ('paṭhati') [since the word 'paṭhati' = 'pātham karoti']; whereas in reply to the same question there can be no such reply as—'bhavati' (exists).

Thus then, it is clear that all conjugational affixes that signify the actions of agents that are well-established entities, have the sense of 'karoti' (accomplishes). And as such there must be *something to be accomplished*; because unless there is *something to be accomplished* the word 'karoti' is never used, and it is the nominative of the verb 'to be' (bhavati) that becomes the objective of 'karoti.' That is to say, the verb 'karoti' being transitive, unless there is *something to be accomplished*, the sense of the verb is not complete. It is a well-recognised fact that all nouns, in whichever case, are nominatives of certain intervening minor actions; and then it is that with reference to the principal action, they come to be recognised as the Objective, Dative, &c. And thus in the case of each individual principal action, there is a multiplicity of actions dependent upon the capabilities of the objects concerned. And according to this rule we come to the conclusion that the nominative of the action 'to be' is the objective of the action 'karoti.'

“सर्वेष्टां भावोऽर्थ” इति चेत् ॥ २ ॥

सर्वेष्टां Sarveṣām, of all (words.) भावः Bhāvah, instrumentality of the



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येषां तूत्पत्तावर्थे स्वे प्रयोगो न विद्यते तान्याख्यातानि ;
तस्मात्तेभ्यः प्रतीयेताश्रितत्वात् प्रयोगस्य ॥ ४ ॥

येषां Yeṣām, whose. तु Tu, on the other hand. उत्पत्तौ Utpattau, on utterance. स्वे अर्थे Sve Arthe, with regard to their objects. प्रयोगः Prayogaḥ, use. न विद्यते Na Vidyate, is not found. तानि Tāni, those. आख्यातानि Ākhyātāni, are verbs. तस्मात् Tasmāt, therefore. तेभ्यः Tebhyāḥ, by means of these. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta (the Apūrva) would be cognised. आश्रितत्वात् Āśritatvāt, on account of being dependent. प्रयोगस्य Prayogasya, of their use.

4. Such words, on the other hand, on whose utterance the objects denoted by them are not found to be present at the time, are verbs ; therefore, it is by means of these that the Apūrva should be cognised ; specially as what is signified by such words is dependent (upon other factors).—4.

COMMENTARY.

In the sentence “ somena yajeta ” the verb ‘yajeta’ denotes something which is yet to be accomplished. Hence it requires the mention of such factors as the means of accomplishing it, the purpose served by its accomplishment and the process by which the accomplishment is brought about, and so forth. Thus as the Apūrva ‘is’ one of these factors, it is naturally more closely connected with the verb than with the noun.

Adhikaraṇa II.—(There is such a thing as Apūrva.)

SŪTRA II. 1-5.

चोदना पुनरारम्भः ॥ ५ ॥

चोदना Chodanā, Apūrva. पुनः Punaḥ, and. आरम्भः Arambhaḥ, injunction.

5. And Apūrva exists because of the Injunctions (of actions).—5.

COMMENTARY.

The above discussion as to the means of the comprehension of Apūrva has presupposed the existence of the Apūrva itself. But inasmuch as its existence is not generally admitted the present sūtra is introduced with a view to establish the existence of Apūrvas.

The Pūrvapakṣa supplied from outside is as follows :—“ Any such thing as Apūrva cannot be perceived by the senses, because it has neither colour, nor taste, nor touch, nor smell, nor sound ; nor is it



cognisable by means of inference, because it has never been found to be actually concomitant with any other thing whose presence might lead to the inference of an Apûrva on the basis of that concomitant; nor is it amenable to verbal cognition; as we find no mention of it in the Vedas; nor is it amenable to analogical cognition; as having never been perceived, nothing could be known as similar to it, which makes all analogy impossible; lastly, it cannot be known through presumption; as there is nothing that cannot be explained without the assumption of the Apûrva. Thus the only pramāṇa to which the Apûrva is amenable is negation; which means that no such thing exists."

In answer to the above we have the following Siddhānta, as formulated in the above sūtra. Inasmuch as sacrifices have been laid down for the purpose of certain definite results, to follow after the lapse of a long time—such deferred fruition of the action would not be possible, unless there was an intervening agency of the Apûrva. That is to say, the apparent inconsistency of the relationship of sacrifices and such results as the attainment of Heaven, etc., laid down in the Veda,—points to the fact that the existence of the Apûrva also is laid down in the Veda itself; and as such it is quite authoritative.

The Pûrvapakṣa argument against the assumption of Apûrva is thus stated by Prabhākara:—"The injunction imparted by the injunctive word only urges the agent to the performance of a certain *action*, and not towards anything desired by him; the *action* is something ephemeral, and is not present immediately before the attainment of heaven by the agent; hence in order to meet these difficulties we must accept the sacrifice itself to be either everlasting, or bringing about a certain faculty in the agent, or the favours of the deity; and there is no reason for assuming any such thing as the Apûrva."

In answer to the above, he continues—

'At the very outset you commit a mistake in assuming that the injunction prompts the agent to *action*; what the injunction really does is to prompt him to *exertion*; and the particular *action* denoted by the root is only the *object of that exertion*. [Thus then, what is denoted by the injunctive sentence is the 'Niyoga' (decree or mandate,); this 'mandate' urges the man to *exertion*; and this 'exertion' pertains to some sort of action (denoted by the verb)]. The assumption that the action itself is everlasting is against all evidence; the self also is, by its very omnipresence, inactive; hence what brings about the final result cannot abide in the self.'

The above passage from the Brihati is not quite clear; nor has it been possible for us to obtain a manuscript of this portion of the commentary, Rījuvimalā. But the whole subject is discussed, from the Prābhākara standpoint, in the Prakaraṇapañchikā (page 185 *et seq.*) from which the following may be gleaned :—

There can be no doubt as to the ephemeral character of the sacrifice itself; it is borne out by everyday experience. Nor can the sacrifice be held to be laid down for the purpose of obtaining the favour of the deity; as there is no evidence in support of this; as a matter of fact also, sacrifices are never performed for that purpose; the deity is only one to whom the offering is made; and we could please a deity by only such acts as could reach it; then again, it is not possible for any deity to get at all the offerings made by different men at all times; specially because no deity is eternal or omnipresent. Nor can we accept the view that the verb with the injunctive affix expresses an action tending to produce in the agent, a certain faculty, which is the immediate cause of the final result. This is the view favoured by Kumārila. We cannot accept this view; as there is no proof for the postulating of the appearance of any such faculty in the agent. That the sacrifice produces such a faculty is not proved either by Perception or by Inference, or even by Verbal Authority, —there being no Vedic texts pointing to any such faculty; specially as we find that the *action* is brought about by the *exertion* of the agent; and therefore the casual potency must reside in this *exertion*, —which *exertion* therefore should be denoted by the injunctive sentence. The assumption of the faculty in question might be said to be proved by presumption, based upon the consideration that the action cannot be the cause of the final result, without some such faculty lasting during the time intervening between the completion of the action and the appearance of the result. But what presumption can justify us in assuming is some faculty or potency *in that thing itself which is found to be incapable* in the absence of that faculty; so in the case in question, the presumption can only point to some faculty in the *action*, and not in the *agent*; what appears in the *agent* cannot be regarded as belonging to the *action*; hence what is brought about by the faculty abiding in the *agent* cannot be regarded as produced by the *action*.

The whole matter of what the Bhātta calls 'Apūrva' and the Prābhākara 'Niyoga,' is thus explained in the Prakaraṇapañchikā (p. 187):—

(1) The second aphorism of Adhyāya I has shown that what the injunctive sentence denotes is *kārya*, *something to be brought about*. (2) In

the begining of Adhyāya VI, it has been shown that, of this kârya denoted by the sentence, the niyojya—i.e., the person prompted to its bringing about—is one who is desirous of acquiring for himself some desirable result in the shape of Heaven and the like,—this being related to the kârya. (3) In the Bâdaryâdhikarāṇa (III. i. 3) it has been proved that it is the kârya that is the direct cause of the production of that desirable result which is desired by (and as such, qualifies) the *prompted* person. (4) In the Devatâdhikarāṇa (Śā. IX. i. 9) the Bhâṣya has shown that this kârya cannot be the *act* (of *sacrificing*, for instance); as this *act* cannot possibly be the direct cause of the final result; nor could it be held to lead to the result through the favour of the deity to whom the sacrifice is offered; nor can it be regarded as leading to the result through a certain potency in the agent; and it is well known that either the act itself, or any potency abiding in itself, does not last long enough to bring about the result. (5) In the Apûrvâdhikarāṇa (II. i. 5) we have the final conclusions led up to by all the above adhikarāṇas: That which is denoted by the injunctive affix and other factors of the injunction is the kârya inhering in the agent who is prompted by the sentence, and as connected with whom the kârya is indicated; as this kârya is not cognisable by any other means of knowledge, it has been called Apûrva, something new, not known before. The connection of this kârya with the agent and the action may be thus traced:—The kârya by its very nature is something brought about by kṛiti, or operation; and this operation is none other than the exertion of the agent. In the Bhâvârvâdhikarāṇa (II. i. 1) again, it is shown that no such exertion is possible, independently of some act denoted by the verbal root. Hence what the injunctive sentence denotes, in this connection, is the Niyoga or prompting, relating to that act. This act, thus being the object of that prompting, comes to be spoken of as the instrument by which that prompting is accomplished as shown under III. i. 3. Even though the kârya is brought into existence at a time other than that of the appearance of the final result, yet, inasmuch as it is inseparably related to the prompted agent,—in whom the desire for that result is present,—there is nothing incongruous in regarding that kârya as the direct cause of the result. This kârya has been called Apûrva by the Bhâṣya by reason of its being something new to all other means of knowledge, save the injunctive sentence, but the name given to it by Prabhākara is Niyoga or prompting, by reason of the fact that it acts as an incentive to the prompted person (Niyojya) and makes him put forth an exertion towards the accomplishment of the action denoted by the verbal root. This kârya or Niyoga is expressed

neither by the verbal root, nor by the injunctive affix, nor by any other word in the sentence, but it is denoted by the sentence as a whole; all other necessary factors being expressed by the several words of the sentence individually, what the sentence as a whole expresses is this Niyoga as related to the prompted person expressed by one of the words in the sentence. (i.e., the word signifying the result, the person desiring which is the prompted person). That the Niyoga is thus expressed by the sentence is also proved by the fact that the general rule is that, that which is the principal thing made known by the sentence forms its denotation; and there is no doubt that of all things made known by the sentence, the Niyoga is the most important; for even though the final result has all the appearance of the most important factor, yet it is the Niyoga that is really such, because it is the direct and immediate cause of the result, and it is also the immediate effect of the action performed; and further because the result also has to be regarded as subservient to the Niyoga, in view of the fact that the result enters as one of the factors necessary for the making up of the full character of the Niyoga. To explain—The Niyoga cannot be a true Niyoga until there is a Niyojya, the person to be prompted to exertion, as without exertion there can be no Niyoga; then again, without the agent there can be no exertion; nor can an agent put forth the exertion—and be a Niyojya—until he is entitled to the undertaking resulting from that exertion; and lastly, it is only the person desiring the result issuing from the undertaking that is entitled to its performance; thus indirectly, through the agent, the result becomes a necessary factor in the Niyoga; this relation between the Niyoga and the result being similar to that between the master and the servant; without the servant the master cannot be a true ‘master,’ and yet it is the master that is the more important person of the two.

The Prakaraṇapañchikā raises an interesting question here:—

“Granted that the injunctive sentence—‘One desiring heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma,’—expresses the Niyoga as proceeding from the action of Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, and as being the direct cause of attaining heaven. But just as the sacrifice, being an effect, has only an ephemeral existence, and cannot continue till the appearance of the result,—so in the same manner, the Niyoga also, as an effect, could not but be transient, and as such unable to continue till the appearance of the result. Thus the very purpose for which the hypothesis of the Niyoga has been put forward, fails to be accomplished by it. This cuts off the ground entirely from under the whole fabric of the Niyoga or Apūrva.” The

author fails to answer this objection satisfactorily. All that he says is that the Niyoga does not bring about the result immediately after it itself comes into existence, because in its action towards the bringing about of the result, it stands in need of certain auxiliaries, which are not always available, and until whose appearance the result cannot appear. This explanation does not meet the difficulty that the Niyoga itself cannot, and does not, exist at the time that the result appears. He has explained in another place that it is through the prompted agent that the Niyoga, though itself appearing at the present time, brings about the result. This, however, is as much as to say that the Niyoga produces something in the agent, which latter something brings about the result; and thus this much-vaunted theory of the Prabhākara is found to be less acceptable than the Bhātta view, by which the action,—of sacrificing— itself produces a certain faculty in the agent, which faculty brings about the result at the proper time; while Prabhākara appears to assume a Niyoga intervening between the action and the something lasting that is produced in the agent, he does not call it faculty, but which comes to be the same. In order to meet the difficulty Śālikanātha has been forced to call in the aid of 'Fate;' he says that it is only when the Niyoga is aided by Fate that it brings about the result. This, after all, is a very poor explanation to be offered by the 'Mīmāṃsāniṣṇāta' as he has called the followers of Prabhākara.

Another question arising in this connection is that, what has been said above may be all right so far as those actions are concerned which are laid down as to be performed with a view to a certain result; but how would it apply to those actions which are to be performed merely in fulfilment of a duty incumbent upon all persons, without reference to any result, or to those passages that lay down the *non-doing* of certain acts? The answer to this is that, in the explanation of Niyoga, the Prabhākara has brought in the *result*, not as something desired by the agent, but only as something the presence of which makes a person entitled to the performance of a certain act; in the case of those actions then, that are laid down as *necessary* duties to be performed *throughout life*, any person *who is endowed with life* being entitled to the performance of those acts, the character of the agent becomes fully accomplished; and this is all that is needed for the explanation of the Niyoga.

By Kumārila's view the Apūrva is 'a capability in the principal action, or in the agent, which did not exist prior to the performance of the action, and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures.' Before the sacrifices laid down as leading to heaven are performed, there is in

the sacrifices themselves, in the first place, an incapability of leading to heaven, and in the second place, in the agent, that of attaining to heaven. Both these incapacities are set aside by the performance of the sacrifice ; and this performance creates also a positive force or capacity, by virtue of which heaven is attained ; and to this latter force or capacity we give the name Apūrva. The proof for the existence of such an Apūrva lies in presumption,—based upon the fact that without some such force many Vedic passages are wholly inexplicable. For instance, there are many passages declaring that certain sacrifices lead the sacrificer to heaven,—the idea being that he goes to heaven, not indeed immediately on the completion of the sacrifice, but after death. The question then arises, that as a general rule the effect comes into existence while its cause is still present, or immediately after the cause has ceased to exist ; but in the case in question, the sacrifice ceases to exist at the present time, while the attainment of heaven comes ten or twelve or more years later. This can be explained only by the hypothesis that the sacrifice, on its completion, produces directly a certain potency or faculty in the agent, which resides in him like many other faculties throughout life, at the end of which it leads him to heaven. Without some such intervening potency—as the connecting link between the sacrifice and its ultimate result—the causal relation between these two cannot be explained. Apūrva thus is nothing more than a force set in motion by the performance of the action,—this force being the direct instrument whereby, sooner or later, the action accomplishes its result. There is nothing incongruous in this hypothesis ; as every action is actually found to set going certain forces, either in some substance, or in persons connected with those substances ; and the force thus set going accomplishes its result, as soon as it reaches its full development with the aid of attendant auxiliaries. The whole process is thus briefly stated systematically in the Nyâyamālāvistara :—

“(1) The sentence—‘one desiring heaven should perform sacrifices’—lays down the fact that the sacrifice is instrumental in the bringing about of the attainment of heaven. (2) Then arises the question—how can the sacrifice, which ceases to exist at the moment that it is complete, bring about the result at a much later time ? (3) The answer to this is that the sacrifice accomplishes the final result through the agency of the force called Apūrva. (4) A further question arises—how is the Apūrva brought into existence ? (5) The answer is—by the performance of the sacrifice.”

In all simple sacrifices, there is a single Apūrva leading to a single result. But there are certain elaborate sacrifices which are highly

complex, being made up of a number of subsidiary sacrifices ; such for instance, as the Darśapaurnamāsa sacrifices. In all such sacrifices, there are, as a rule, four kinds of Apūrva :—(1) The Phalāpūrva—that which brings about the result directly, and which is the immediate cause of the result ; (2) the Samudāyāpūrva—in the Darśa-paurṇamāsa sacrifices, the three sacrifices performed on the New Moon day form one group and the three performed on the Full Moon day another group ; each of these groups occurring at different points of time could not have a single Apūrva ; hence each group has a distinct Apūrva of its own, the two Apūrvas combining to produce the final Phalāpūrva ; and each of these distinct Apūrvas is called a ‘Samudāyāpūrva’ ; (3) the Upattyāpūrva—i.e., the three Apūrvas following from each of the three sacrifices forming the Darśa group ; these three Apūrvas lead to the Samudāyāpūrva of the ‘Paurṇamāsa’ group, leads to the final Phalāpūrva ; (4) the Aṅgāpūrva—each of these sacrifices of the group is made up of a number of minor acts, each of which in its turn, must have a distinct Apūrva of its own ; as otherwise the act could not help in the final Phalāpūrva.

The purpose served by this Adhikaraṇa has been thus explained in the Tantravārtika :—“If the result were directly connected, not to a transcendental apūrva but, to the material offered into the fire and such other visible accessories of the sacrifice, then there would be transcendental results following from each of these factors. And thus in the case of any particular material being lost, or otherwise rendered useless, during the performance of a sacrifice, it would be absolutely impossible to finish the sacrifice with a substitute. In case, however, the result is related to the action, the use of the material would be merely a visible one ; and as such its place could very well be taken by its substitute, which is equally capable of fulfilling that visible purpose.”

Adhikaraṇa III.—Divisions of Action into Primary and Secondary.

SŪTRA II-1-6.

तानि द्वैधं गुणप्रधानभूतानि ॥ २ । १ । ६ ॥

तानि Tāni, those aforesaid verbs. द्वैधं Dvaidham, are of two kinds. गुणप्रधानभूतानि Guṇapradhānabhūtāni, being primary and secondary.

6. “Verbs (and actions denoted by them) are of two kinds—primary and secondary.”—6.

COMMENTRY.

It would seem from the above that there is always an Apūrva in connection with each distinct verb ; consequently the author now proceeds to differentiate the Subsidiary from the Primary actions (which latter alone are followed by an Apūrva.) But on this point we have the following *Pārvapaksha*.—"All verbs having the common character of a verb, inasmuch as the potency of the objective, proceeding from the object to be accomplished, is always brought about by fully accomplished objects, the actions denoted by all verbs are all primary. That is to say, so long as a definite purpose can be assumed, it is only right that every action, being expressed by a verb, should be accepted as serving a distinctly useful purpose, and as such, being Primary, and the means of bringing about an Apūrva. Consequently, like the verb 'yajati' (offers a sacrifice), the meaning of the verbs ('avahanti'), and the like also have so many distinctly useful purposes served by the corn, &c. That is to say, just as the sacrificing is accomplished by the material offered, so is the threshing accomplished by the corn that is threshed. And as such the threshing must bring about an Apūrva."

To the above, we make the following reply :—

Siddhānta.—In the matter of the relationship subsisting between the noun and the verb, that action alone of which we do not perceive any distinct purpose can be accepted as leading to a transcendental result ; which cannot be in the case of any other action ; and such a supposition would be absolutely groundless. That is to say, in all cases where a certain action is related to a certain material, inasmuch as no action can be accomplished without a certain material, the material, being in the first instance found to bring about the action, is at once taken as serving the distinctly visible purpose of accomplishing the action. Subsequently, however, in certain cases the action turns upon itself and imparts an aid to the material itself (as in the case of threshing which serves to purify the corn) ; while in other cases, the action rests within itself, its sole purpose lying in its own fulfilment (as in the case of *Sacrificing*). And in this latter case, [there naturally arises in us a desire to know what the use of the action would be ; and as no visible purpose is found to be served, we can always assume a transcendental one (in the shape of an *Apūrva*). In that case, however, where the action is found to have its sole purpose in the fulfilment of a visible purpose—such as the preparation of rice, for instance,—we can have no business to assume a transcendental purpose ; and the Injunction of the action having been

justified by a visible purpose, the action is not recognised as bringing about any transcendental result.

Adhikarāṇa III(A)—Definition of the Primary Action.

SŪTRA II-i-7.

यैर्द्रव्यं न चिकीर्ष्यते, तानि प्रधानभूतानि, द्रव्यस्य
गुणभूतत्वात् ॥ ७ ॥

ये: Yaiḥ, by means of which. द्रव्यं Dravyam, a material substance. न Na, not. चिकीर्ष्यते Chikirṣyate, is meant to be produced or purified. तानि Tāni, those. प्रधानभूतानि Pradhānabhūtāni, are primary actions. द्रव्यस्य Dravyasya, of the substance. गुणभूतत्वात् Guṇabhūtatvāt, because of being a secondary factor.

7. Those actions that are not meant to be productive or purificatory of material substances are Primary, because the material substance is a secondary factor.—7.

COMMENTARY.

The reason for this is that those actions which do not serve to bring into existence any material substance, or to produce a certain peculiarity in a substance already extant—cannot but be regarded as bringing about transcendental results, and as such being 'primary.'

Adhikarāṇa III(B).—Definition of Secondary Actions.

SŪTRA II-i-8.

यैस्तु द्रव्यं चिकीर्ष्यते गुणस्तत्र प्रतीयेत, तस्य
द्रव्यप्रधानत्वात् ॥ ८ ॥

ये: Yaiḥ, by means of which. तु Tu, while. द्रव्यं Dravyam, a material substance. चिकीर्ष्यते Chikirṣyate, is meant to be produced or purified. गुणः Guṇaḥ, secondary. तत्र Tatra, in that case. प्रतीयते Pratiyeta, should be recognised. तस्य Tasya, in regard to these. द्रव्यप्रधानत्वात् Dravyapradhānatvāt, on account of the material substance being the dominant factor.

8. While those that tend to produce or purify a material substance are to be recognised as secondary, because in regard to these the material substance is the dominant factor.—8.

COMMENTARY.

Those actions, however, that either produce a material,—e.g., the fire by the *Laying*,—or *accomplish* or *prepare* it,—e.g., the preparing of the priest by *appointment*,—or *purify* it,—e.g., the purifying of the corn by *threshing*, or the preparing of the rice by *grinding*—are all subsidiary ones, because they are always subservient to the preparation of the material.

Without the aforesaid differentiation of actions into primary and secondary, we would have the following anomalies:—If there were no such distinction, even where the material to be offered is the rice of the *Priyaṅgu*, the *threshing*, which would be necessary for the preparation of the *Priyaṅgu*, would come to be applied to this *vṛīhi* corn, because according to that theory the *threshing* is also a primary action, and as such the material mentioned along with it (*viz.*, the *vṛīhi*) could not set aside the secondary material; just as in the case of the butter in connection with the *pryâjas*; and consequently the *threshing* could not be removed from the *vṛīhi*. Whereas in accordance with the *Siddhânta*, the secondary material would be set aside because the material that is of use in the primary action is affected by the preparatory actions also; and hence the *Priyaṅgu* corn to be used at the sacrifice, would certainly have to undergo all the processes of threshing, washing, &c.

It may be noted here that the distinction of actions into 'primary' and 'secondary' is distinct from the subject of 'Aṅga' or 'Śeṣa' (Subsidiary) and 'Aṅgin' (Principal); as the former refers to *actions* alone, while the latter is a relationship subsisting between *actions* on the one hand and Substances, Qualities and Purifications on the other. This latter forms the subject-matter of Adhyāya III.

Adhikaraṇa IV.—The character of Primary does not belong to such actions as the cleaning of the *sruba*, etc.

SŪTRA II-i-9 to 12.

“धर्ममात्रे तु कर्म स्यादनिर्वृत्तेः प्रयाजवत्” ॥ २।१।९ ॥

धर्ममात्रे Dharmamātre, in the case of all actions. तु Tu, but. कर्म Karma, character of primary action. स्यात् Syāt, there would be. अनिर्वृत्तेः Anirvṛtṭeḥ, because of the non-fulfilment of any visible effect. प्रयाजवत् Pryajavat, as in the case of the Prayāja sacrifice.

9. “Actions would have the primary character; because of their not producing any visible effects.”—9.

COMMENTARY.

In the course of a sacrificial performance there are many such actions as the sanctifying of the various implements, *Sruva*, etc. ; and with regard to these the question arises as to whether these should be regarded as Primary or Secondary Actions.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this point is as follows :—We may regard those actions as secondary which produce some visible effect, either in the shape of a material substance or in that of some perceptible change in a substance. But so far as the purely sanctificatory actions are concerned they are not found to produce any perceptible effect; e.g., when a little water is sprinkled over the sugar, the sanctification that is produced in it is a purely imperceptible one. Consequently, as these actions are not productive of either a material substance or a visible effect, we cannot but regard them as “primary” according to sūtra (7).

तुल्यश्रुतित्वाद्वा इतरैः सधर्मः स्यात् ॥ १० ॥

तुल्यश्रुतित्वात् Tulyaśrutitvāt, on account of the [similarity of mention. वा Va, but. इतरैः Itaraiḥ, to others. सधर्मः Sadharmah, similar. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

10. But on account of the similarity of mention they should be similar to others.—10.

COMMENTARY.

Sūtra (10) represents the *Siddhānta* view which is as follows :—

As a matter of fact we find that in all the texts that speak of secondary actions, the material substance, or the effects therein meant to be produced, is always expressed by means of words with the accusative ending ; for instance, ‘vrihin avahanti,’ ‘purodāśam prathayati.’ In the texts that speak of the actions under consideration we find the same fact, e.g., ‘*sruvam sammūrṣti*.’ Thus as in both cases the words used are similar, there is no reason why the sanctifying of the *sruva* should not be taken in the same category as the *threshing* of the corn. Thus, even though the subsidiary character of such actions is not proved by the appearance of any perceptible result, yet we have for it the authority of the Vedic word itself.

“द्रव्योपदेश” इति चेत् ॥ ११ ॥

द्रव्योपदेशः Dravyopadeśaḥ, (there is) mention of the material substance. इति चेत् Iti chet, if it be urged.

11. If it be argued that “there is such mention of the material substance [in the case of primary actions also].”—11.

In the word *saktūn* the Accusative by itself expresses predominance only ; but this being found to be incompatible with the rest of the sentence, we accept it to indicate its correlative, *subserviency*. That is to say, by its own natural potency, the accusative always expresses the objective, in the character of the *predominant* ; but this natural meaning is found, in the sentence in question, to be incompatible with something more authoritative ; and as such it cannot be admitted ; then, finding that the character of the *kâraka* or case-relation is also indicated by the Accusative, as its invariable concomitant, we accept this indicated meaning of the Accusative, as not incompatible with the rest of the sentence ; which thus comes to mean that *the Saktu has something to do with the accomplishment*

of the Homa. But such generic agency not being of much use, we naturally seek for a specific function of the Saktu ; and thus come to the conclusion that it must be taken as the Instrument, specially in accordance with the law that ' that which is an accomplished entity is laid down for the sake of that which is yet to be accomplished '—as propounded in Sūtra VI. i. 1.

Question.—" But in what way do you find the predominance of the Saktu incompatible with the rest of the sentence ?"

Reply.—Only that substance is held to be an object of purification, or preparation, which has already been utilised or is to be utilised ; as for the Saktu, it is never going to be used after the Homa ; nor has it ever been utilised before. That is to say, only that substance which is found to have been utilised in some way, or which is to be utilised at some future time, is capable of any process of purification ; and as such it attains predominance with reference to the action. And when the substance concerned is such as has never been utilised, nor is going to be utilised, any purification of that would be absolutely useless ; and hence any injunction of such preparation would be wholly purposeless. The Saktu in question is such that it is never used before the Homa ; nor can it be used after it, having been turned into ashes ; specially as there is no Injunction as to any such ashes of Saktu being used. Under the circumstances, the only alternatives that we have are—(1) that the whole sentence is absolutely useless, or (2) that the Accusative is to be taken in its indirect sense. And the authority of the Veda having been an established fact, there can be no hesitation in accepting the second alternative. It is a common fact that the direct meaning of a word is always set aside as mistaken, whenever it is faced by such exceptional circumstances (of incompatibility). And the acceptance of the indirect meaning of a word is always due to the necessity of avoiding the uselessness of the sentence ; otherwise if there were no such uselessness, it would be always possible to accept the original signification of the word. It is for these reasons that we accept the sentence in question to be an injunction of a Homa with the Saktu as the necessary material, such an Injunction being in keeping with the context in which it occurs.

The practical purpose of the Adhikarāṇa is as follows :—(1) In the primary sacrifice, there being many auxiliaries to the cleaning of the sruk, we conclude that the number of such auxiliaries must be three only, in accordance with the maxim of the ' Kapiṅjala ' (XI.i.38-45) ; and hence even when there is a multiplication of vessels,—as in the case of the ' Paśuchâturmāśya,' only three sruks would have to be cleaned, in accordance with the theory of the Pûrvapakṣa. In accordance with the Siddhānta,

on the other hand, all the sruks have to be cleaned ; because of the necessity of repeating the purificatory process with each substance. (2) And again, in accordance with the maxim of the 'Paśu' (IV.i.11-16), significance attaching to the number 'one,' only one Paridhi would have to be cleaned, according to the Pūrvapakṣa ; while according to the Siddhānta, all the Paridhis would have to be cleaned ; and there would be some distinction made in a case where there is a multiplication of Paridhis. (3) And similarly, the circling round fire, believed (according to the Pūrvapakṣa) to appertain to one cake, comes (according to the Siddhānta) to apply to all the cakes. (4) Similarly, according to the law "Viṣaye laukikam syāt," in the case of the sentence 'agnimupasamādhāya stuvate,' the cleaning would pertain to the ordinary fire, according to the Pūrvapakṣa ; while according to the Siddhānta, the cleaning of ordinary fire being absolutely useless, the cleaning laid down must appertain only to such sacrificial fires, as the 'Āhavanīyā' and the like.

Adhikaraṇa V.—Mahendrādhikaraṇa :

The Stuti and the Śastra hymns are primary.

SŪTRAS II—i—13 to 29.

स्तुतशस्त्रयोस्तु संस्कारो याज्यावदेवताभिधानत्वात् ॥ १३ ॥

स्तुतशस्त्रयोः Stutaśāstrayoh, from the stotra and śastra hymns. तु Tu, in reality. संस्कारः Saṃskārah, (proceeds) a sanctification. याज्यावत् Yājyāvat, as in the case of Yājyā hymns. देवताभिधानत्वात् Devatābhidhānatvāt, because they signify deities.

13. "The Stotra and Śastra hymns bring about sanctification like the Yājyā hymns, because they distinctly signify deities."—13.

COMMENTARY.

Stotra is the name of those hymns that consist of mantras capable of being set to music and sung,—as distinguished from the Śastra which is the name given to the hymns consisting of mantras not sung. The case of these is brought up as an exception to the general principle laid down in the eighth sūtra above.

A hymn is that which describes the relationship subsisting between an object and its properties ; and as such, in the first instance, it is accomplished by such objects and properties ; specially as in the absence of these the hymn would be mere words, and not capable of being called a "hymn." Of these two again, inasmuch as the properties described do not form part of the action to be performed, they serve no useful purpose with regard to the action ; and as such they are taken absolutely as

serving the purpose of completing the hymn itself. Then the question arises—The hymn thus accomplished, does it serve the purpose of bringing about an idea of the object hymned? and as such, is it subservient to this latter? or, is it something independently by itself, leading to a certain transcendental result?

On this point we have the following *Pârvapakṣa*:—"Inasmuch as we actually find the hymns perceptibly bringing about a remembrance (of the Deity) that serves to accomplish the sacrifice, we cannot but admit them to be subservient to such Deities."

SIDDHĀNTA.

अर्थेन त्वपकृष्येत देवतानामचोदनार्थस्य गुणभूत-
त्वात् ॥ १४ ॥

अर्थेन Arithena, by its meaning. तु Tu, but. अपकृष्येत Apkṛisyata, would be carried away. देवतानामचोदनार्थस्य Devatānāmachodanārthasya, to the mention of the deities' name. गुणभूतत्वात् Guṇabhātātva, because it would be subservient.

14. But in that case the hymn would be carried away from its sphere by the meaning [purpose served by it]; because it would be subservient to the mention of the deities' name.—14.

COMMENTARY.

The sūtra points out the fact of the *Pârvapakṣa* being contrary to other authoritative evidences.

That is to say, if the hymn in question consists of a Mantra, the object described in which does not exist at the time, then this object would carry away the hymn from its present context, and as such, there would be a setting aside of that which is directly laid down. For instance, in a case where we have an Injunction laying down the use of a particular hymn on a particular occasion, if the Injunction happen to contain the name of a Deity—as in the case of a Hymn addressed to Indra being laid down as to be sung in connection with the 'Māhendra-graha' sacrifice,—the Injunction would depend upon the Deity therein mentioned; and hence in a case where that particular Deity (Indra) does not exist (as in the case of the Māhendra Sacrifice)—the particular hymn will have to be carried away from the Māhendra Sacrifice to another sacrifice where Indra might exist. And this would be a direct contradiction of what is authorised by the order and position of the hymn, &c. The particular sequential order that would be contradicted in the present instance is that in which the Mantra is laid down as to be recited in the subsequent hymns;

while the position contradicted would be—either the mention of the hymn by the Injunction of the Rathantara, or the particular context in which they occur.

“वशावद्वा गुणार्थं स्यात्” ॥ १५ ॥

वशावद् वाśavat, like the word ‘Vaśā.’ वा Va, but, गुणार्थं Guṇārtham, qualificatory. स्यात् Syāt, could be.

15. “But the the word Māhendra could be taken as pointing to a qualification, exactly as in the case of the word ‘vaśā.’”—15.

COMMENTARY.

The Pūrvapakṣi offers an explanation of the difficulty urged by the Siddhānta in the preceding sūtra.

“The above objection does not apply to the case in question. Because a carrying away of the Mantra could be possible only if it mentioned something entirely different; in the case in question, however, the hymn in question belongs to the same Deity that is referred to by the name ‘Mahendra’; as the words ‘Indra’ and ‘Mahendra’ are non-different. That is to say, the Indra that is hymned by the hymns in question is the same that is sacrificed to in the Māhendra sacrifice; and as such, the object referred to being actually present, wherefore should there be any necessity of carrying it away from its context? Nor is it absolutely necessary for the Mantra to make mention of every minute detail of the object connected with the sacrifice; it is always found to mention something more or less than that, in accordance with its own capability, and as such it does not matter if the Injunction of the Hymn speaks of Indra only, without the qualification ‘Māhā.’ For these reasons, the Hymn should be taken as pointing to Indra as apart from any attributes, because much significance does not attach to the attributes, as the attributes are pointed out by the context itself;—all this being exactly similar to the pointing out of materials apart from qualifications. Nor does the Deity consist of the word alone—as we shall show under Chapters IX and X. And hence Indra cannot be taken as different from Mahendra, simply on the ground of difference between the words.

The example of the ‘vaśa,’ ‘barren goat’ is cited in support of this; though for Vāyu, the texts lay down the barren goat, the animal, in all related mantras, is spoken of as ‘goat’ only.

“Thus then, it must be admitted that that which is mentioned by the word ‘Indra’ is the same that is mentioned by the word ‘Mahendra’; specially as there is no reason for assuming the two to be distinct.

Consequently, there being no ground for the charge of the improper carrying away of the hymns, these must be admitted to be the subservient accessories of the Deity."

न, श्रुतिसमवायित्वात् ॥ १६ ॥

न Na, this cannot be. श्रुतिसमवायित्वात् Śrutisamvāyitvāt, because of the connection with the direct word of the Veda.

16. This cannot be, as the mantra is connected with the direct word of the Veda.—16.

COMMENTARY.

It has been urged above that the hymns pointing to Indra, as apart from all qualifications, there is no need for any carrying away. But this is not so; because the carrying away of the hymns is by no means avoidable. For, if there were sufficient grounds for holding the identity of Indra and Mahendra, then alone would it not be necessary to carry away the hymns; as a matter of fact, however, there is a distinct difference between the two.

To explain—In the case of the word 'Mahendra' some people seeking to establish its identity with the word 'Indra,' explain it etymologically as 'Mahân' + 'Indraḥ' = 'Mahendraḥ' (the Great Indra), and then 'Mahendro devatâ asya' becomes 'Mâhendra,' (that Sacrifice of which the Great Indra is the presiding Deity). And in that case what the word 'Mâhendra' would signify would be that of which the presiding Deity is Indra as endowed with the attribute of greatness. But such a connotation is not possible; as the signification of a word taken as one complete whole is always more authoritative than that which is sanctioned by its etymological constructions; and hence the word 'Mahendra' more directly denotes a distinct Deity in the shape of Mahendra than it does the 'Great Indra.'

Then again, if the word 'Mahendra' is broken up etymologically (as shown above), there is a distinct syntactical split; and if, in order to avoid this split, the etymological explanation is not resorted to, then the word 'Mahendra' distinctly denotes something entirely different from Indra.

For these reasons, the word 'Mâhendra' cannot be explained as that Indra is the deity of the sacrifice, and that Indra is qualified by greatness. What is possible is that the word be taken as one independent whole, independently of the component parts, as in that case alone could the nominal affix be rightly explained. And thus it is established that Mahendra is a deity other than Indra.

Nor can it be urged that Indra himself came to be called 'Mahendra,' the 'Great Indra,' after he had performed the grand feat of killing Vṛittra; as in that case the Veda, in which the word 'Mahendra' occurs, would have a beginning in time. Consequently, the mention of the killing of Vṛittra must be taken as only eulogising 'Mahendra,' which is a name eternal and complete in itself.

व्यपदेशभेदाच्च ॥ १७ ॥

व्यपदेशभेदात् Vyapadesābhedāt, because of the difference of names. च Cha, also.

17. Also because of the difference of the (two) names.—17.

COMMENTARY.

'Indra' and 'Mahendra' must be regarded as two distinct deities for the very simple reason that the two names are distinct.

गुणश्चानर्थकः स्यात् ॥ १८ ॥

गुणः Guṇah, the qualification. च Cha, further. अनर्थकः Anarthakaḥ, useless. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

18. And further because the qualification would be useless.—18.

COMMENTARY.

Whether the qualification be eternal or transient (i.e., natural or caused), if it be taken only as eulogising Indra, and not as entering into his *deific* character, then its mention (in the sentence 'Māhendragraha,' &c.) would be absolutely useless. Because the only purpose for which a deity is spoken of, or enjoined, is to show how the particular action could be performed with reference to Him. And whether the qualification be laid down or not, when the performance of the Action would be quite possible with regard to mere Indra, there would be no use of laying down the qualification.

तथा याज्यापुरुरुचोः ॥ १९ ॥

तथा Tathā, As also. याज्यापुरुरुचोः Yājyāpuroruchoh, In the case of the Yājyā and the Puroruch mantras.

19. As also in the case of the Yājyā and the Puroruch mantras.—19.

COMMENTARY.

The Yājyā and the Puroṣuvākya mantras are recited at sacrifices. By means of the Yājyā mantras offerings to the Deities are thrown into the fire; and by means of the Puroṣuvākya mantras the Deities are invoked. Both these sets of mantras make mention, either directly or indirectly, of

particular Deities to whom they are severally applicable. Now as regards the deities Indra and Mahendra, we find that the Yājyâ and the Puroṇuvâkyâ mantras for Indra differ from those of Mahendra. From this also it is clear that Indra and Mahendra are two distinct Deities.

On this Sûtra Mr. Kunte makes the following observations:—

“Jaimini uses the term Puroruch in the Sûtra. It deserves to be specially considered. Āśvalâyana in his Śrauta Sûtra (I. 5. 10. 5. 4.) states that there are seven ṛiks of the name of Puroruch. These ṛiks are not to be met with in the printed edition of the Rîgveda Saṃhitâ. There is a separate Adhyâya called Nivid-kuntâpa, which gives the Puroruch verses. These last are not in any way connected with the Yājyâ-mantra. But the term “Puroruch” is used in the Sûtra in connection with the Yājyâ, while the Puroruch-mantras are to be recited on the occasion of the repetition of what is known as Prauga Śhastra. Hence commentators interpret “Puroruch” verses into Puroṇuvâkyâ verses..... With regard to the use of the term “Puroruch” in the sense of Puroṇuvâkyâ we believe that the Sûtra offers a difficulty which can be solved only on the supposition that the Sûtra has been incorrectly handed down.”

वशायामर्थसमवायात् ॥ २० ॥

वशायाम् Vaśâyām, in the case of the word “Vaśâ.” **अर्थसमवायात्** Arthasamavâyât, because the thing is in contact.

20. In the case of the word “Vaśâ,” because the thing is in contact (with our perceiving senses,—what has been urged above in Sûtra 15 cannot be accepted as right).—20.

COMMENTARY.

It has been urged above in Sûtra 15, that the object laid down as the “barren goat” is subsequently spoken of as “goat” only, and hence the qualification ‘barren,’ and also ‘goat’ must be taken as qualifying the object, and not as having any independent significance. But the fact is that such objects as the ‘barren goat’ and the like, help the sacrifice, by their material forms; and as such all their specifications being directly perceptible, when it is found that the purpose is equally served by the use of a generic form ‘goat’ only, the Mantra does not attach much importance to the actual words “barren goat” employed in the foregoing Injunction.

“यत्रेति वाऽर्थवत्त्वात् स्यात्” ॥ २१ ॥

यत्र Yatra, wherever. **इति** Iti, there. **वा** Vâ, but. **अर्थवत्त्वात्** Arthavatvât, because distinctly useful purpose would be served. **स्यात्** Syât, it could be.

21. "There may be [a carrying away of the hymn in question] to an action wherever mere Indra might be the Deity, and as a distinctly useful purpose would be served by it [there can be nothing objectionable in it].—21."

COMMENTARY.

The Sūtra may be interpreted in two ways: (i) "The Pūrvapakṣa could be rightly renounced only if it were found to be opposed to a strong authority. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so; because the Liṅga (Indicative Power) of the words of a hymn is certainly much stronger than that of order or context, etc.; and hence we cannot very well give up the Pūrvapakṣa theory."

(ii) "The word 'Indra,' being a part of the word 'Mahendra,' could be taken as signifying the sense of the latter compound; as by so doing we reconcile the otherwise contradictory bearings of the Liṅga and the Krama; just as we have in the case of the word 'Agni' as occurring in the Manotâ hymn (*vide* X. iv. 42). That is to say, it would not be necessary to remove the Hymn; as on account of close proximity, we could accept the part 'Indra' to indicate the whole 'Mahendra,' specially as in so doing we avoid the contradiction between Liṅga and Krama, and also the necessity of having to presume a transcendental result (for the hymn). For instance, in the case of the Agnishomiya, though we find the word 'Agni' alone in the 'Manotâ Mantra' yet, finding from context that it forms part of a compound ('Agniśoma') we accept it as indicating 'Soma' also and as such affording the sense of the whole compound."

"Consequently there is nothing incompatible, even if we do not remove the Hymn from its place."

न त्वाम्नातेषु ॥ २२ ॥

न तु Na Tu, this could not be. आम्नातेषु, Āmnāteṣu, with those that are laid down in the scriptures.

22. This could certainly not be the case with those [mantras] that are laid down in the Vedas.—22.

COMMENTARY.

A transference of passages, phrases or words consists in reading and interpreting the same together, though they occur in different parts of the treatise. The words or phrases transferred are simply redundant and useless. An illustration:—

"(He) repeats the Yāmyâ mantras."

"(He) repeats the Shipivistavati mantras."

"(He) repeats the Pitṛi-devatâ mantras."

These mantras are to be repeated on the occasion of the third Soma-libation of the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice. They constitute the Agni manota Śāstra which is described in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (III. 27), where it is considered whether the mantrās are to be transferred backwards and forwards or not. The Sanskrit word for *backward transference* is 'apakarṣa' and for *forward transference* is Utkarṣa. The uses of Utkarṣa or Apakarṣa are mentioned in the Vedas. Therefore we cannot adjust or arrange them; the Vedas help themselves.

As a matter of fact, we find that in many places we do not find the same meaning in all Mantras that are laid down in that connection, when these latter are removed from that context. For instance, in the case of the sentence 'Yāmyāḥ śaṁsanti' and the like—inasmuch as Yama is not the Deity of the other Grahas, if the Mantras laid down in that context were to be removed from there, they could not point to him. And as in that case the very Injunction of these could be useless, it would be necessary to admit the fact of their leading to transcendental results. And this may be said of all similar cases (as the one in question). And hence we cannot accept the hymn to be merely subservient to the Deity.

“दृश्यते” ॥ २३ ॥

23. “But such is actually found to be the case.”—23.

COMMENTARY.

This Sūtra proceeds to show that the removing of the Mantra would not make any injunction useless.

“Though Yama, etc., are not the Deities of the Grahas, yet they could be indicated by the Mantras, as being of use in other actions. For instance, (1) the Mandūka hymn is used in the Agni, as it is therein laid down that the fire is to be drawn in with Mandūka Sūkta; (2) the Akṣasūkta is employed in the Rājasūya, as therein it is laid down that the gambling is done with the dice (akṣa); (3) the Mūṣikasūkta is employed in the Ekādaśin as in this the sentence 'ākḥustu, etc.,' having described the connection of a certain place, this makes the hymn one eulogising that place. As for the 'Kushumbka' and other hymns, if we do not find any particular use of these, we can accept them as having their use in those cases where the general term 'Mantra' is used in the Injunction (and no particular Mantra is specified); as for instance, we find that all Mantras are laid down as to be employed in the Vāsastoma. So too in the case of the Aśvina sacrifice it is laid down that in case the sun should rise before the sacrifice is finished, all Rik verses should be recited (as an expiatory rite). In cases like these, however, inasmuch as

we find that the Mantras laid down do not mention any object that appears in the sacrifice in its material form, we have to accept the fact of their leading to transcendental results. But because a transcendental result is admitted in one case, that is no reason why we should reject a visible purpose, even where it is present, and always assume a transcendental one. For instance, because the reciting of the Vaiṣṇavī verse is found to serve only a transcendental purpose, it does not follow that only transcendental results follow also from that of the Yājyā and the like, which are found to serve distinctly visible purposes.

अपि वा श्रुतिसंयोगात्प्रकरणे स्तौतिशंसती क्रियोत्पत्तिं
विदध्याताम् ॥ २४ ॥

अपि वा *Api vā*, it is not so. श्रुतिसंयोगात् *Śrutisamyogāt*, because of direct mention. प्रकरणे *Prakaraṇe*, appearing in the context. स्तौतिशंसती *Stautishamsati*, such words as "Stauti" and "Śamsati." क्रियोत्पत्तिं *Kriyotpattiṃ*, production of transcendental result. विदध्याताम् *Vidadhyātām*, could bring about.

24. The above position is not tenable, as on account of the direct mention in the Veda [of the locative and the genitive, etc.], such words as 'stauti' and 'śamsati' appearing in the context should be taken as bringing about transcendental results [Apūrva]."—24.

COMMENTARY.

It has been urged that like the word 'Agni' in the Manotā, the the word 'Indra' would indicate the sense of the compound, 'Mahendra.' But this is not correct; as there being nothing incompatible in the directly expressed meaning of the word 'Indra,' there is no reason why it should give up that meaning, and take to indirect Indication. And then again, as it would always be possible, by some sort of an indirect indication, to find a visible result for all that is held to be leading to transcendental results,—this process of interpretation is by no means allowable.

Then again, it has been urged that there would be nothing wrong, even if the hymn were removed from its place. But it is not so; because Direct Assertion, defined by the proximity, distinctly points to the fact of the Hymn in question forming a part and parcel of the hymns with which it is mentioned. As for the functioning of *Liṅga*, it can have no injunctive potency, until the recognition of a general relationship (between the Mantra and Deity).

And further, the various case-endings that we come across—*viz.*, the locative in 'Kavatishu stuvati,' the genitive in 'Indrasya vīryāṇi' and the accusative in "Praugam samsati"—as also the words 'Stauti' 'Samsati' and the like, would have their direct meaning only according to our theory, according to you, they will have to be taken as signifying something else. That is to say, the action of denoting the qualification and the qualified resting in the letters of a word, thus alone could the presence of the locative be explained. If, on the other hand, the Kavati were taken as serving the purpose of pointing out the Deity, then the word would have to appear with the Instrumental ending.

Then again, the Injunction or Bhāvanā of eulogy in the word 'Stauti,' and 'Samsati'—is cognised as extending over a definite period of time; and in this Injunction, the denotation of the root serves as the means; while all other nouns, with several endings, come to be related, only in so far as they help in the fulfilment of what is signified by the root. Thus then, when the mantras serve the purpose of accomplishing the hymns, then, inasmuch as they accomplish something that is desired, they serve a purpose laid down in the scriptures, and as such come to have a distinctly useful end; when they do the manifestation of the Deity, on the other hand, they do something that is not laid down in the scriptures; and as such are found not to serve any apparent purpose. Hence it is more reasonable by far to have the hymns serving distinctly useful purposes.

Further, for us, the genitive (in 'Indrasya vīryāṇi, etc.) directly expresses the subordinate character of the deity; and that which is subordinate cannot be the predominant factor; hence it being impossible for the Deity to be the predominant factor, the mantras cannot be taken as subservient to them; and consequently predominance must be attributed to the Hymn. If, in the case in question, predominance belonged to the Deity, then, as it would be expressible by a noun only, the word mentioning it would be found with the nominative ending, which could not express anything else,—as we find in the sentence "agnirmurdhā," etc., etc. In the case in question, however, even that which we find having the nominative ending is actually found,—on account of the fact of the homogeneity of the sentence as preceded by the capability of the words used,—to be for the purpose of expressing the connection of the qualification; as for instance, 'Indra yāto jangamasyavasitasya rājā.' And as there is no use of the qualifications, these cannot be accepted as the predominant factor; and hence the only reasonable course open to us is to accept the word expressive of the Deity to the subservient to the hymn, which latter cannot be taken as subserviently pointing out the Deity.

And thus the words 'Stauti,' and 'Śamsati' cannot, in any way, be taken as serving the purpose of the indirect indication (of the Deity); and as such predominance must be attached to the eulogistic Hymn only.

शब्दपृथक्त्वान्च ॥ २५ ॥

25. Also because of the distinctness implied by the word.—25.

COMMENTARY.

We find it declared in the Veda that "the Agniṣṭoma is accompanied by twelve hymns;" and here the mention of the number 'twelve' shows that each hymn is distinct by itself. If it were not so, and if all the hymns equally served the purpose of pointing out the Deity, there could be no mention of the number 'twelve.' If, on the other hand, the manifestation of the Deity by all the Hymns be not accepted to be identical, a distinct Deity could come to be pointed out by each verse, and by each word; and thus being innumerable, they could not be spoken of as 'twelve.'

अनर्थकं च तद्वचनम् ॥ २६ ॥

अनर्थकं, Anarthakam, useless. च, Cha, also. तद्वचनम्, Tadvachanam, the mention of it.

26. The mention of it would also be useless.—26.

COMMENTARY.

In the case of such sentences 'āgneyagrahā bhavanti,' and then as again, 'āgneyiṣu stuvanti'; the Vedic sentence being enough for the purposes of pointing out the fact of the "Āgneyi-mantras" being the means of hymning Agni, there would be absolutely no use for the second sentence. That is to say, if the word 'Āgneyi' only served the purpose of pointing out the fact of Agni being the Deity, then the employing of these hymns would be enjoined by the first sentence itself; and there would be no use for the second sentence. As a matter of fact, however, the second sentence should be taken as serving the purpose of pointing out the Hymn as an Independent Action.

अन्यश्चार्थः प्रतीयते ॥ २७ ॥

अन्यः, Anyaḥ, different. च, Cha, also. अर्थः, Arthaḥ, signification. प्रतीयते, Pratiyate, is recognised.

27. The signification of the two hymns is also recognised to be different.—27.

COMMENTARY.

The Vedic text “sambadhdhe vā stotra-shastre” (the Stotra and the Shastra hymns are related) shows that the Veda recognises a difference between the two; as it is only when two things are different that they can be related to one another. Now, if both the hymns were to serve the same purpose of signifying the Deity (Indra), there would be practically no difference between the two. They can, on the other hand, be regarded as distinct only if each of them serves the purpose of accomplishing a distinct Apūrva. Thus we have the authority of the Veda itself in support of the view that the two hymns accomplish distinct transcendental results and are, as such, Primaries.

अभिधानं च कर्मवत् ॥ २८ ॥

अभिधानं, Abhidhānam, mention. च, Cha, also. कर्मवत्, Karmavat, like that of the Primary Actions.

28. Their mention also is similar to the mention of other Primary Actions.—28.

COMMENTARY.

(i) In the text ‘pra-ugam samsati,’ inasmuch as the Pra-uga-Hymn is spoken of by means of the accusative, this would be another argument in favour of the view that the hymn is a *primary* by itself. The principal action is always such as is desired for its own sake (and as such accompanied by the accusative ending)—e.g., ‘agnihotrm juhōti,’ ‘āghāramāghārayati’ etc. This could not be the case with the subsidiary actions, which are wholly subordinated to others, and as such not desired in themselves.

(ii) The Sūtra may be explained in another way. The very mention of the two names ‘Stotra’ and ‘Śastra’ is meant to point to the fact of these being principal actions; otherwise the word used should have been prakāśana (manifestation) only; or there would be no name at all, as in the case of the words ‘avahanti’ and the like.

फलनिर्वृत्तिश्च ॥ २९ ॥

29. Then again there is fulfilment of the result.”—29.

COMMENTARY.

We find in the Mantras composing the hymns in question requests for the fulfilment of certain desirable results. The particular desirable results that are asked for in the Mantra would be possible only if the

hymn were a principal action by itself; because, requests are always preferred to one who occupies the predominant position. According to you, on the other hand, the results would be asked for from the Deity, which you hold to be the predominant factor, as in the case of ordinary sacrifices; because so long as the Master (Principal factor-Deity) exists, no one would think of preferring his request to the servant (the subsidiary hymn which serves the purpose of manifesting the Deity).

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE ADHIKARAṆA.

The above is an exposition of the Adhikaraṇa according to the Bhāṣya. The Tantravārtika, however, takes exception to this exposition and contends that Indra and Mahendra are the names of the same Deity, arguing that in the compound *Mahendra* the two factors 'Mahâ' and 'Indra' do not, as the Bhāṣya holds, function simultaneously; and therefore by the gradual functioning of these two factors all that the word 'Mahendra' denotes is *Indra qualified by greatness*. Thus the main position of the *Pārvaṇapakṣa* remaining unshaken, the *Siddhântî* must have recourse to another line of argumentation with a view to the effectual refutation of the *Pārvaṇapakṣa*.

The following is the *Siddhânta* as explained by the Vārtika:—

As a matter of fact, the Deity enters into the sacrifice, not in its material form, but in the verbal (i.e., in the form in which it happens to be mentioned in the Scriptural Injunction); consequently, inasmuch as it is by the word 'Mahendra' that the Deity is mentioned, we cannot but accept Mahendra as the Deity. Even if the meanings of the two words 'Indra' and 'Mahendra' be identical,—the deity in the particular Sacrifice in question must be that which is spoken of by the word 'Mahendra' in accordance with the law laid down in the Sūtra: 'Vidhiśhabdasya mantrātve, &c.' (X. iv. 23)—and none other. And hence the character of the deity could not belong even to those mentioned by such names as 'Bṛihadindra,' &c.,—words that are more akin to 'Mahendra' than to 'Indra'—to say nothing of such other words as 'Indra' and the like. When we find a certain Deity in a certain form laid down in connection with a certain sacrifice,—even though the Deity be the object denoted, and not the merely 'verbal' form, yet, if we find the slightest difference from it in another otherwise expressed, we cannot admit this to be the Deity of that sacrifice.

That is to say, the character of the Deity is such as is not cognisable by the ordinary means of cognition, Sense-perception and the like; and hence the only means of knowing it is afforded by Vedic Injunction.

alone ; hence we can be assured of the fact of the sacrifice having been performed in due accordance with the Injunction in the Veda, only when we actually find that the Deity invoked has been exactly the same as is there-in laid down. If, however, the slightest difference is made in that,—the functioning of the Injunction having ceased "with the laying down of the real Deity, &c.,—we will have to look for another authority for this slightly different Deity ; but as a matter of fact, there is no such authority ; and as such the invocation of that Deity cannot but be unauthoritative. This will be explained later on, where it is shown that 'Agni is the Deity of the Ashṭākapaḷa, and not of the Ājya, because with regard to the latter Agni is not laid down as the Deity. In accordance with this rule (1) when the Injunction has spoken of Indra as the Deity, the deific character cannot be attributed to Agni, (2) when Indra is laid down as the Deity of Soma, he cannot be the Deity of the Cake, (3) when Indra is laid down as the Deity of the pounded Soma, he cannot be the Deity of the creeper itself, (4) when pure Indra is laid down as the Deity, we cannot have him as qualified by some attributes ; so in the same manner, when we find the Injunction laying down the qualified 'Great-Indra' (Mahendra) as the Deity, we cannot take Indra alone.

Another reason for this is that, inasmuch as in the Injunction in question, the Deity is predicated of something else, due significance must be attached to its qualifications and adjuncts : specially as no such significance could be attached to them, only in case the Deity were that with regard to which something else was predicated. That is to say, if in the matter of the relationship expressed by the nominal affix (in 'Māhendra'), the Deity were that with regard to which it was predicated, then we could not attach any importance to the mention of its attributes. If, however, the Deity were not predicated, it would not have the character of the Deity, and hence we cannot but admit it to be predicated. And as such, due significance must be attached to its qualifications ; hence the removal of the qualification would do away with the very character of the Deity. For instance, in such sentences as—"the white-clothed persons should be fed," "the red-turbaned priests pass along," "the person with the stick repeated the 'Praiṣa Mantras'"—if we take away the qualification, what is left behind ceases to form a material part of the sacrifice. If, however, the qualifications were such as having something else predicated of them—*e.g.*, "bring in those that have white clothing"—the men could very reasonably be brought even without the white clothing (which they might lay aside before coming in). Hence, in the case in question, even if the Deity were to enter into the sacrifice, in its material

form, we could not accept it as without its qualification ; as a matter of fact, however, we find that it helps the sacrifice, in its verbal form,—and consequently anything else, that would be mentioned by a word apart from the Injunction, could not be recognised as the prescribed Deity.

And further, when the Deity is mentioned by means of a compound it would not be open to the fault of the Injunction referring to more than one thing. Hence the Deity that would belong to the 'Māhendra-graha' could never be mentioned by the word 'Indra.' That which is mentioned by this latter word can never be the Deity of that sacrifice ; and as such in the case of an injunction of this sacrifice, any mention of that Deity would be absolutely useless.

Thus then we find that the sense of sūtra 16 comes to be that the cognition of the Deity depends upon actual verbal expression ; and the fact of a certain word expressing the Deity comes to be accepted only if it is found that such expression is in keeping with the character of the Nominal Affix. Hence we conclude that there is a distinct difference between the deities 'Indra' and 'Mahendra.'

Adhikaraṇa VI.—The non-injunctiveness of Mantras.

SŪTRA 30-31.

“विधिमन्त्रयोरैकार्थ्यमैकशब्द्यात्” ॥ ३० ॥

विधिमन्त्रयोः Vidhimantrayoh, of the vidhi and the mantra. ऐकार्थ्यम् Aikārthyam, same purport. ऐकशब्द्यात् Aikāśabdyāt, because of same words.

30. The Vidhi and the Mantra must have the same purport because they contain the same words.”—30.

अपि वा प्रयोगसामर्थ्यात् मन्त्रोभिधानवाची स्यात् ॥ ३१ ॥

अपिवा Api Vā, 10. प्रयोगसामर्थ्यात् Prayogasāmarthyāt, because of its functioning during action. मन्त्रः Mantraḥ, mantra. अभिधानवाची Abhidhānavācī, expressing mere direct meaning. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

31. It is not so because the mantra functions only during Action, it must be taken as expressing only its direct meaning.—31.

COMMENTARY.

We have seen in the preceding Adhikaraṇas that the whole question of an action being primary or secondary turns ultimately upon the exact

meaning of verbs contained in the Vedic passages relating to the actions. In this connection a further question arises as to whether or not every verb that we meet with in the Veda enjoins an action. As regards the verbs that appear in the purely injunctive passages there can be no such doubt; they do enjoin actions; and the only question with regard to these is as to these actions being primary or secondary. But when we come to mantras it is clearly doubtful whether or not the verbs contained in these enjoin any actions.

In accordance with the Bhāṣya, the Adhikarāṇa is explained as follows:—Taking for example certain Mantras, there arises a question as to whether or not the verbs occurring in them serve the purpose of enjoining, as do those occurring in the Brāhmaṇa passages. And on this, the position of the Pūrvapakṣa is that, inasmuch as the words in the Mantra are the same as those in the Brāhmaṇa, there is no reason why the former should not have the injunctive potency. And this is met by the Siddhānta, which holds that, inasmuch as it is a Mantra, and has its subject already laid down in other passages, it cannot have any injunctive potency; hence all that the Mantra does at the time of the performance of the sacrifice is to recall to the mind that which has been previously laid down in the Brāhmaṇa passages. That is to say, the action, Goyāga, for instance, spoken of in the mantra is not different from the same action mentioned in the Brāhmaṇa, because it is actually recognised as the same; nor does the mantra lay down any accessories of the action (with regard to which it might be taken to have an injunctive potency); nor, lastly, can it be taken as containing an eulogy of something enjoined in another sentence; because the Mantra is an independent sentence altogether, and as such cannot be taken along with any other sentence.

In contradistinction to serving the purpose of recalling to the mind that which has been laid down elsewhere, all that the Mantra could be taken as, would be as an Injunction or an Arthavāda. As matter of fact, however, neither of this is possible. In the first place, the form of the action, that would form the object of injunction, is already known as laid down elsewhere; as for its accessories, in the shape of the material, the result and the occasion, none of these is mentioned in the Mantra, which therefore can not be taken as laying down these. Secondly, when the Injunction in the case occurs in another (Brāhmaṇa) passage, which has all its needs already fulfilled, it is not possible for the Mantra to be taken as an Arthavāda to that Injunction. This we have already explained under the Adhikarāṇa on Mantras (Adhyāya I). For these reasons, mantras should be taken only as recalling what has already been enjoined elsewhere.

Kumārila has taken exception to the above exposition of the Adhikaraṇa and this on the following grounds:—

(1) What reason is there by which the injunctive potency of the verb is suppressed simply by the fact of its occurring in the mantra, and is enlivened by appearing in the Brāhmaṇa? We actually find verbs in mantras serving the purposes of injunction, *e.g.*, “Vasantāya kapiñ-jalanalabhate”; and conversely there are, sometimes, verbs occurring in the Brāhmaṇa, not having the injunctive potency:—*e.g.*, “Yasyobhayam havirārtimārchhet, etc.” Therefore there can be no such absolute rule as has been shown in the above Sidhānta.

(2) Further, if the mantra be taken as supplementary to the Brāhmaṇa, simply on the ground of the action having been enjoined in the latter,—why could not we take the Brāhmaṇa injunction itself as simply recalling the action previously enjoined by the mantra? That is to say, there is no special reason whereby it could be ascertained whether the mantra, having its injunctive potency suppressed by the fact of the Action having been enjoined by the Brāhmaṇa, should serve the purpose of recalling the action thus enjoined, or *vice versa*. Thus then, we conclude that, inasmuch as neither the Mantra nor the Brāhmaṇa is capable of being taken as supplementary,—specially as there is no feature in either that could point it out as distinctly supplementary,—both are equally injunctive. And as for the repetition of the same Injunction—as occurring in the Mantra and in the Brāhmaṇa—we can take the two as two distinct actions. As for the fact of the one being recognised to be the same as the other, we shall explain this under the “Abhyāsādhikaraṇa” (V. ii. 23, etc.) Therefore the non-injunctive character of the Mantras cannot be taken as established in the above manner.

Some people assert that, inasmuch as the mantras are laid down by the Brāhmaṇas, as instrumental in the performance of sacrifices,—exactly as the corn, etc., are,—they cannot have any injunctive potency; just as the corn, etc., have none.

But these people also have only been led astray by a misleading semblance between the two cases. Because the mere fact of the mantra being laid down in the Brāhmaṇa as to be employed in the sacrifice cannot do away with its injunctive potency. Therefore the mantras would serve the injunctive purpose; and also, on account of their being laid down in the Brāhmaṇa, serve to recall that which has been enjoined by the Brāhmaṇa. Because there is no authoritative law which lays down that that which has been laid down as to be employed cannot serve the purposes of an Injunction, specially if it happens to be naturally endowed with the

injunctive potency. If, however, the presence of this potency in the mantra be denied absolutely,—then it would be altogether needless to bring forward the fact of its having been laid down as to be employed, for the purpose of denying that potency; because much reasoning is not required in denying what is impossible. Nor is there any self-contradiction in the fact of the mantra performing both the functions. For instance, even the Brāhmaṇa, though in itself injunctive, could serve the purpose of recalling something enjoined elsewhere; this we shall explain under the Sutra V. i. 16

And further, in the case of those mantras that are not laid down in any Brāhmaṇa passage, as to be employed in a sacrifice, your argument being inapplicable, there would be no ground for denying the injunctive potency of these. Hence even this argument of yours does not help in the matter.

As a matter of fact, however, there is no necessity of bringing in the mantras, specially in the present Adhikaraṇa, as they have no particular connection with the present context. Hence we explain the Adhikaraṇa otherwise as follows:—

Verbs have been declared in the preceding Adhikaraṇa to be of two kinds only—the Primary and Subsidiary. And the question now started is as to whether there are only these two methods of the functioning of verbs, or there is yet another method. And the position of the Pūrvapakṣa is that there is no third method.

In reply to this Pūrvapakṣa, we have the following:—

Siddhānta.—Sūtra (31): *But because of the power of usage, the mantra would express only the direct meaning.*

There is a third method—that of denotation. Just consider the following: Those verbs that have their injunctive potency destroyed by the presence of such words as 'yat' and the like (words which make that which they precede, an Uddeśya, and which therefore can never be the Vidheya or object of injunction) must, in all cases, serve the purpose of simple Denotation. That is to say, whether the verb occurs in the Mantra or in the Brāhmaṇa, when its injunctive potency happens to be set aside by the presence of another word, then, in that case, the verb must be admitted to be denotative.

Examples—(1), In 'na tānaśanti, etc.,' the Injunctive having become suppressed by the word 'yat,' becomes supplementary. (2) In 'ahe budhniya mantram me gopāya,' the suppression is by the vocative ending. (3) In 'dāmi grihṇāmi,' it is done by the First Person ending. (4) In 'yadi somamapahareyuh' it is done by the word 'yadi.'

The fact is that such instances occur mostly in mantras; and that is the reason why the Bhāṣya has mentioned mantras only; specially as it is a common idea that mantras are not injunctive. In Brāhmaṇas, on the other hand, there are many Injunctive affixes, and that is why the Brāhmaṇa is commonly known to be injunctive. And it is only in very few instances that the Brāhmaṇas are not injunctive; that is the reason why no Brāhmaṇa passage has been cited as an instance.

In the matter of the Brāhmaṇa or the Mantra being injunctive or not, there is no other reason save that which has been explained above (*viz.*, the presence or absence of such words as 'yat' and the like); and the presence and absence of the injunctive potency is not determined by the fact of the sentence being a Mantra or a Brāhmaṇa.

But we do perceive the following point of difference between the Mantra and the Brāhmaṇa: In the case of the Brāhmaṇa, the injunctive potency of the verb occurring in it having been suppressed by the above-mentioned causes, this verb comes to be recognised as serving the purpose of pointing out something which affords the occasion for another action; and the mere verbal form of the Brāhmaṇa is not capable of being employed in the sacrifice. In the case of the Mantra, on the other hand, as soon as we learn its form—such as 'dāmi,' 'grihṇāmi,' 'agnīn vihara,' etc., etc., we at once realise that even the verbal form can serve the purpose of recalling certain actions; and hence we come to the conclusion that the words of the Mantras are to be used in the sacrifice. Because in the performance of actions, it is necessary that there should be a recalling (or remembering) of certain things; and inasmuch as this recalling cannot be done by any means other than Mantras (*vide* Mantrādhikaraṇa Adhyāya I) we find it only accomplished by such mantras as have no other function. That is to say, at the time of the performance of a sacrifice, nothing can be duly performed, unless it is duly remembered; and thus the recalling of certain things being absolutely necessary, it would stand in need of a fit means of its accomplishment; and it would begin to take up such means as either the recalling of the words of the injunctive Brāhmaṇa passage, or the recalling of what has been performed in the preceding moment, or the remembering of the Kalpasūtra bearing on the point, or the recalling of the very sentence which gave the first idea of that action, or a certain witnessing priest chiefly employed for that purpose. Consequently when, at such a time, it is found that there are certain mantras mentioned in the context, which have no other purpose to serve,—and which are taken along with the injunctive sentence, with a vague general notion that something might be done by them,—and it is

realised that these mantras are just the sort of sentences that are required for the purpose of reminding,—we come to infer, on the strength of *Liṅga* and *Context*, a *Śruti* passage laying down the employing of these mantras ; and then these come to serve the purpose of simple Denotation. And it is also ascertained that it is only when we perform the action as recalled by these mantras that the proper desirable results follow.

Now we have to explain the *Bhāṣya* in accordance with the above interpretation of the *Adhikaraṇa*. The assertion of the *Bhāṣya*—“*Na, asakṛidapyuchchāraṇe tatparyāt*”—does not refer to the fact of the Action having been already enjoined elsewhere. What it means is that on account of the presence of the word “*yat*,” the verb in the mantra distinctly says that the mantra speaks of something laid down elsewhere. If the verb, with the words ‘*yat*’ etc., be uttered even a hundred times, it can never, by itself, give rise to any idea of an *Apūrva* ; and it is on account of this fact that we have the idea of the action being laid down elsewhere.

Prabhākara’s view of this *Adhikaraṇa* is thus expressed in the *Bṛihati* :—

From the very nature of mantras it is clear that they cannot be taken as injunctions ;—being, as they are, entirely devoid of any kind of injunctive word ; also because all mantras are found, either syntactically or by direct declaration, or by indirect implication, constructed along with other passages, which are injunctions. So if the mantras themselves were to enjoin another action, there would be two actions enjoined by what is practically only one ‘sentence.’ Nor are the mantras found to contain any praise or deprecation ; so they cannot be taken as *Arthavāda*. With all this, however, the mantras cannot be regarded as absolutely meaningless or useless ; forming an integral part of the *Veda*, they must serve some purpose, must have some meaning, expressing something that is needful in the actions prescribed by the injunctive passages.

Adhikaraṇa VII.—(Definition of Mantra).

SŪTRA II. 1. 32.

तच्चोदकेषु मन्त्राख्या ॥ ३२ ॥

तच्चोदकेषु *Tachchodakeṣu*, tending to that. मन्त्राख्या *Mantrākhyā*, the name mantra is applied.

32. The name *Mantra* is applied to those that serve the purpose of denoting things connected with prescribed actions.—32.

COMMENTARY.

The preceding Sūtra containing the word 'Mantra' leads the author to define the Mantra. The definition herein provided is that it is a name given to those Vedic passages which indicate things connected with the performance of actions. All the commentators are, however, agreed that this definition is only a tentative one, put forward for the sake of convenience, and no precise definition of mantra is possible. Later writers have sought to define it as the instrument of offering. But the substances offered, the various implements used, and such other accessories of the sacrifice are all as much instruments of offering as the mantras. It is for this reason that the more logical writers on Mīmāṃsā have contented themselves with explaining mantra as a name including 'all those Vedic passages to which the learned men apply that name,' says Prabhākara.

With regard to the definition given by the Sūtra Kumārila remarks that it has been given here for the sake of terseness; specially because it is thus that it is spoken of among teachers and pupils; and also because it applies to nearly all Mantras.

The Bhāṣya on page 126 enumerates the different kinds of mantras. For the various divisions and sub-divisions of the mantras the reader is referred to my *Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, pp. 113-115.

Adhikaraṇa VII.—(Definition of Brāhmaṇa).

SŪTRA II. 1. 33.

शेषे ब्राह्मणशब्दः ॥ ३३ ॥

शेषे Śeṣe, to the rest. ब्राह्मणशब्दः Brāhmaṇaśabdah, the name Brāhmaṇa.

33. To the rest of the Veda the name 'Brāhmaṇa' is applied.—33.

COMMENTARY.

The definition of the Mantra leads on to the definition of the Brāhmaṇa. The Veda has been defined as the collection of Mantras and Brāhmaṇas. Of these, those to which the learned apply the name 'mantra' are Mantras, while all the rest, to which they also apply the name 'vidhi' are Brāhmaṇas;—the Arthvādas and the Nāmadheyas are also included under these latter;—Brāhmaṇa proper being the name applied to the injunction, and the Arthavāda and Nāmadheya passages being included under that name, by reason of their always, in some way or the other, subserving the injunctions along with which they are construed.

The various kinds of Brāhmaṇas are enumerated in the Bhāṣya on page 127; and for other classifications the reader is referred to my *Prābhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, page 111.

Adhikarāṇa IX.—(Modified Mantras are not mantras).

SŪTRA II-1-34.

अनामनातेष्वमन्त्रत्वमामनातेषु हि विभागः ॥ ३४ ॥

अनामनातेषु Anāmnāteṣu, to those that are not found in the Veda. अमन्त्रत्वम् Amantratvam, the character of mantra cannot belong. आमनातेषु Āmnāteṣu, with reference to sentences found in the Veda हि Hi, because. विभागः Vibhagaḥ, distinction.

34. The character of mantra does not belong to what is not found in the text of the Veda. Because the aforesaid distinction applies only to such passages as are actually found in the Veda.—34.

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the recitation of certain passages it is necessary to make certain modifications in the original words of the passage, *e.g.*, the mantra 'Agnaye nirvapāmi' has to be changed 'into Sūryāya nirvapāmi,' when the offering is made to Sūrya instead of to Agni. Into the text of certain mantras it is necessary to introduce the name of the sacrificer and also the names of his Pravara Ṛṣis. Now the question arises as to whether on the introduction of the foreign elements the mantras cease to be mantras.

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that, fulfilling as they do the conditions of the definition laid down in sūtra 32, they must be regarded as mantra. The Siddhānta is that even though the passages signify things connected with the performance, yet they cannot be regarded as mantras; as the definitions of Mantra and Brāhmaṇa are held by all learned men to apply to only those passages that form the actual text of the Veda.

In connection with this Adhikarāṇa, Kumārila raises the further question—when only one word in a mantra is modified, does the whole mantra cease to be mantra? or only that part of it which has been altered? The Pūrvapakṣa view on this point is that the entire mantra ceases to be mantra; as the name 'mantra' is applied to a certain aggregate of vowels and consonants arranged in a particular order; so that as soon as the slightest alteration is made in the text, that order becomes changed and the name can no longer be applicable. The Siddhānta is thus laid down in the Tantravārtika:—

It is only the modified portion that ceases to be mantra; because the generic form of the mantra having been ascertained to exist in a certain sentence, that generic character does not entirely disappear by a mere

excess or diminution in a certain part of it. For instance, when a swelling appears on the neck of the cow, or when its horns have disappeared, it does not entirely cease to be a 'cow'; and the reason of this is that there are other parts of its body that are enough to show that it belongs to the class 'cow'; and we find that so long as even a part of the original body remains, the whole body is recognised as the same. In the same manner, it is a fact of ordinary perception that the character of a mantra manifested by the presence of a number of vowels and consonants arranged in a definite order, does not entirely disappear on the slightest modification made in it.

For instance, there are many cases where the change of a letter or its deletion or some modification in the accent, is actually laid down in the scriptures, and certainly when these changes happen to be made in a mantra, it does not cease to be a Mantra; e.g.,—(1) We have the direction in the Veda 'Airam kṛtvodgeyam' (the mantra should be recited after the word 'girā' has been changed into 'irā'); (2) though a certain mantra has three accents at the time of the reading up of the Veda, yet it is laid down as to be recited in a single accent, at the time of the performance of sacrifices, and in neither of these two cases, do people cease to think of the mantras, thus modified, as mantras.

Adhikaraṇa X—(Definition of Rik).

SŪTRA II-1-35.

तेषां ऋग् यत्रार्थवशेन पादव्यवस्था ॥ ३५ ॥

तेषां Tesām, among them. ऋग् Rīg, those are called Rik. यत्र Yatra, wherein. अर्थवशेन Arthavaśēna, in accordance with the meaning. पादव्यवस्था Pādavyavasthā, division into metrical feet.

35. Among the mantras those are called 'Rik' wherein there is division into metrical feet in accordance with the limitations of the meaning.—35.

COMMENTARY.

Mantras have been classed under three heads—Rik, Sāman and Yajus. Though the definition of the various classes of mantras has got no direct connection with the subject-matter of the Adhyāya, yet the Sūtras treat of them, because a consideration of these is connected with the mantras, a consideration whereof was introduced in connection with the question as to their primary or secondary character.

Though the Sūtra defines the Rik as that where the division into feet is in accordance with meaning, the commentators are agreed on the

point that division into feet is the only essential condition, and that the division should be in accordance with the meaning is added only by way of illustration, e.g., in the case of the Rik 'Agniḥ purvebhiḥ, etc.,' there is no verb in the first foot, and as such, there being no sense completed within it, the division into feet in this case is in accordance with the metre, and not the meaning.

Thus then, on this point the conclusion is that the name Rik is applied to those mantras that are divided into feet, that is, certain well-defined parts, each consisting of a definite number of syllables; and are called on that account by such prosodial names as Gâyatrî, Triṣṭup, etc.

Adhikaraṇa XI—(The Definition of Sâman).

SŪTRA II-1-36.

गीतिषु सामाख्या ॥ ३६ ॥

गीतिषु Gitisu, to music. सामाख्या Samakhyā, the name Sâman.

36. (Among mantras) the name 'Sâman' is given to the music.—36.

COMMENTARY.

The word 'Sâman' does not strictly apply to the mantras themselves; it is applied to the music to which certain mantras are set, and not to the words; hence a mantra can be called 'Sâman' only when it is set to music and sung as such (Mīm. Sû. VII. ii. 1 to 21). Thus one and the same mantra set to different kinds of music, becomes known under different names—such as 'Rāṭhantara,' Bṛihat and the like. This setting to music is regarded as a saṃskāra, a purification of the mantras. (Mīm. Sû. IX. ii. 3 to 13) and as such owes its origin to the singer, and in so far it cannot be regarded as Veda proper, which is independent of all sources, human or divine. For instance, the syllables âhau, etc., that are added to the mantras by the exigencies of music, are by no means fixed; they depend upon the singer, who may or may not use a certain syllable or sets of syllables (Mīm. Sû. IX. ii. 29.) In the case of all mantras, where they are used as praise, they must be used in their Sâman form, that is set to music and sung; as the praise pleases more, if it is sung than when it is merely recited (IX. ii. 30-31). Sâmans are divided into several kinds, the division being based upon the different methods of singing; for instance, the Bṛihat Sâman is to be sung with force and very loudly, while the Rāṭhantara is to be sung neither loudly, nor with force (Mīm. Sû. IX. ii. 46.)

Adhikaraṇa XII—(Definition of Yajuṣ).

SŪTRA II-1-37.

शेषे यजुःशब्दः ॥ ३७ ।

शेषे Śeṣe, to the rest. यजुःशब्दः Yajuṣśabdah, the name Yajuṣ.

37. To mantras other than those specified the name 'Yajuṣ' is given.—37.

COMMENTARY.

The name 'Yajuṣ' is given to all those mantras that are neither arranged in regular feet nor set to music.

From the very definition of the Rik it would follow that there can be no metre in the Yajuṣ mantras. But Pingala in his Chhandah-sūtra says that there are metres in these also. That this is a later innovation is proved by the fact that true 'Vedic authority' is not accepted by many old writers (Karka, for instance) to belong to those Yajuṣ-mantras that are differentiated by metres; and that even those who accept their authority (for instance, Devayājñika) assert that there is no metre in many Yajuṣ mantras, on account of the number of syllables in them not being fixed. Herein may be found an orthodox authority for the view propounded by Western Orientalists, that the metrical portions of the Yajurveda are comparatively modern.

Adhikaraṇa XIII—(Nigada is included in Yajuṣ).

SŪTRA II-1-38-45.

“निगदो वा चतुर्थं स्यात् धर्मविशेषात्” ॥ ३८ ॥

निगदः Nigadah, the Nigada mantra. वा Vā, verily. चतुर्थम् Chaturtham, the fourth. स्यात् Syāt, should be. धर्मविशेषात् Dharmaviśeṣāt, because of its peculiar character.

38. “The Nigada should be regarded as the fourth kind of mantra, because of its peculiar character.”—38.

COMMENTARY.

There are some mantras to which the name 'Nigada' is given. With regard to these the question arises as to whether these are included under Rik, or Sāman or Yajuṣ or they form a class apart by themselves. The Pārva-pakṣa view is that these must be regarded as entirely distinct, because their characteristics are entirely distinct from those of the other three kinds; e.g., they have no metre, so they cannot be Rik; not being set to music they cannot be Sāman; lastly, inasmuch as they are intended to be addressed to other persons they have to be recited loudly, whereby they have to be distinguished from the Yajuṣ mantras, which are laid down as to be

recited quietly. For these reasons the Nigada must be regarded as the fourth class of mantras.

“व्यपदेशाच्च” ॥ ३९ ॥

व्यपदेशात् Vyapadeśāt, because of its different name. च Cha, also.

39. “Also because of its having a distinct name.”

—39.

COMMENTARY.

Another reason for regarding the Nigada as a distinct kind of mantra lies in the fact that it is named differently from all other mantras.

यजूंषि वा तद्रूपत्वात् ॥ ४० ॥

यजूंषि Yajūṁṣi, mantras. वा Vā, but. तद्रूपत्वात् Tadrūpatvāt, because they have the same form as that.

40. But the Nigadas must be regarded as Yajuṣ, because they have the same form as that.—40.

COMMENTARY.

The Siddhānta is that Nigada must be taken as included under the class ‘Yajuṣ’, because its form is exactly like that of the Yajuṣ. Being like this latter, devoid of both metre and music. Then, again, the Veda itself in the passage—‘Ahe budhniya mantram me gopaya richo samāni. yajūṁṣi’—speaks of only three classes of mantras; which shows that there can be no justification for assuming a fourth class, in the shape of the Nigada.

वचनाद्धर्मविशेषः ॥ ४१ ॥

वचनात् Vachanāt, because they are intended to be addressed to others. धर्मविशेषः Dharmaviśeṣaḥ, the peculiar qualification.

41. It is on account of the fact that the Nigada is meant to be addressed to others that the peculiar qualification of it is mentioned.—41.

COMMENTARY.

Among the Yajuṣ mantras there are some whose words distinctly indicate that they are to be addressed to others by way of direction. From this it naturally follows that they should be recited loudly, and not quietly like the ordinary Yajuṣ mantras.

अर्थाच्च ॥ ४२ ॥

अर्थात् Arthāt, because a distinct purpose is served. च Cha, also.

42. Also because a distinct purpose is served (by its being addressed to other persons.)—42.

COMMENTARY.

There is a distinct purpose served by the addressing, to other persons, of such sentences as 'Agnīd vihara,' etc.: Unless these were addressed to other people, the action of 'walking' round the fire by the Agnīdhra priest would not be accomplished; and there would be no use of addressing, unless it were done loudly enough for others to hear; it is for this reason that the particular qualification 'loudness' is mentioned. It is in this way too that the etymology of the word 'Nigada' becomes explained. As for the 'quiet utterance,' though it is directly enjoined by the Veda (as belonging to all Yajus), yet as such utterance would hamper our purpose, it could not rightly form part of the Action; and hence we take that injunction to refer to the Yajus other than the Nigadas.

गुणार्थो व्यपदेशः ॥ ४३ ॥

गुणार्थः Guṇārthaḥ, for the purpose of expressing qualification. व्यपदेशः Vyapadeśaḥ, name.

43. The different name is only for the purpose of expressing the particular qualification.—43.

COMMENTARY.

It has been urged in sūtra 39 that the Nigada must be regarded as different from the Yajus, because it has a different name. The answer to this is that the difference in name is to be explained as being similar to the assertion 'Feed the Brāhmaṇas with curd, and the Parivrājakas with milk,' where the Parivrājakas also are Brāhmaṇas, but with a particular qualification. So in the case in question also, the Nigadas are Yajus, but with this qualification, that they are to be uttered loudly.

“सर्वेषामिति चेत्” ॥ ४४ ॥

न, ऋग्व्यपदेशात् ॥ ४५ ॥

सर्वेषां Sarveṣāṃ, to all. इति चेत् Iti Chet, if this be urged (44.)

न Na, not so. ऋग्व्यपदेशात् Rīgvyapadeśāt, because of their being distinctly named Rik. (45.)

44. If it be urged that the name 'Nigada' would apply to all mantras.—44.

45. Our reply is that this cannot be; as they are distinctly named as Rik.—45.

COMMENTARY.

An objection is raised :—"If the word 'Nigada' be explained as that which is recited loudly ('Nigadyate'), then all mantras would become Nigadas (because the Rik and the Sâma mantras also are recited loudly); hence the name cannot be said to be for the purpose of expressing a particular property."

Sûtra 45 supplies the answer to the above objection :—"There can be no such incongruity as mentioned above; because we find Vedic texts laying down in certain cases the use of the Rik, after having denounced the Nigada (as for instance, in the sentence 'Ayâjyâ vai nigadâh'). And if both Rik and Nigada were the same, then these texts would enjoin the same thing that they have denounced, and this is an impossibility. Nor is there any incongruity in the signification of the root 'gada;' because what it does is to denote a particular property of sentences that have the character of the Yajus (and as such it could not apply to the Rik and the Sâma)."

*Adhikaraṇa XIV.—Definition of "one sentence" or
Syntactical Connection.*

SŪTRA II. 1. 46.

अर्थैकत्वादेकं वाक्यम् साकाङ्क्षञ्चेत् विभागे स्यात् ॥ ४६ ॥

अर्थैकत्वात् Arthaikatvât, being expressive of a single idea. एकं Ekam, one. वाक्यं Vakyam, sentence. साकाङ्क्षञ्चेत् Sākāṅchē, if found wanting. विभागे Vibhāge, on being taken severally. स्यात् Syât, should be.

46. So long as a single idea is expressed by number of words, which on being separated are found to be wanting in expressiveness, they should be taken as forming one sentence.—46.

COMMENTARY.

This Adhikaraṇa lays down the principle of Syntactical Connection. Both Prabhākara and Kumārila take this principle as applying to the Yajus mantras only; as the extent of the Rik and the Sâma is fixed respectively by the metre and the music. The principle may be thus stated :—"When a number of words are found to be such that when construed collectively, they are expressive of a single idea,—and when taken severally they are not expressive of any idea being short of some necessary syntactical factor,—these words must be regarded as forming a single sentence. As an example we have the following :—"In connection with the Darśa-Pṛṇa-māsa sacrifices, we read the sentence 'Devasya tvā savituh prasave—

asvinorbāhubhyām—puṣṇo hastābhyām agnaye juṣṭam nirvapāmi' (Śatapatha Br., I. 1. 2. 17). Here we find four distinct parts, each of which might be taken as an independent sentence and mantra, unless we had something to show that the whole must be taken and used as a single sentence and Mantra. This something we have in the form of the principle in consideration. If we take the first part—devasyā tvā savituḥ—we find that it does not express any idea, being wanting in the verb; similarly with each of the other parts we find that it is wanting in some integral syntactical factor; the last part also 'agnaye juṣṭam nirvapāmi'—though otherwise complete, is found to be in need of an instrumental nominative in connection with the passive past participle 'juṣṭam'; we further observe that if we take the whole together, it expresses the single idea of the nirvāpa, or preparation, of something resorted to or accepted by the arms of the Aśvins and the hands of Pūṣan.

There is a difference of opinion among the followers of Kumārila as to the exact meaning of the word 'artha' (translated above as *idea*) in the Sūtra. Pārthasārathi Miśra takes it to mean *purpose*; and thus according to him, all the words, phrases and clauses that serve a single purpose are to be regarded as 'one sentence.' Someśvara Bhatta, on the other hand, in his Nayāyasudhā takes it in the sense of *idea*. According to Prabhākara, 'artha' here means the 'reminding' or 'indicating of what is to be done'; and he distinctly favours the Miśra view, specially as being an Anvitābhidhānavādin, he could not very well accept the words to have any meaning apart from the other words; hence he says that the word 'artha' must mean 'prayojana' or *purpose*; as this is the most important factor, and all words must be related to the most important factor (See Brihati, p. 51.)

The above embodies the Siddhānta. The Pūrvapakṣa view is that in the sentences cited above even deficient sentences should be regarded as full sentences, as even a single word is capable of affording some meaning.

Adhikaraṇa XV.—The definition of "distinct sentences" or Syntactical Disjunctions.

SŪTRA II. I. 47.

समेषु वाक्यभेदः स्यात् ॥ ४७ ॥

समेषु Sameṣu, when the sentences are equal. वाक्यभेदः Vākyabhedah, distinct sentences. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

47. When all the sentences are equally independent of one another, each should be regarded as a distinct sentence.—47.

COMMENTARY.

With regard to such mantras as—(1) “*Ihe tvâ—Ūrje tvâ*, etc.”; (2) “*Āyuryajñena kalpatām prāṇo yajñena kalpatām*, etc.”—the question arises as to whether the entire mantra is to be regarded as one sentence, or every syntactically complete part is to be regarded as a distinct mantra. The Pūrvaṇṣa view is that the reciting of a mantra produces only an invisible result; consequently the less the number of mantras the less the number of assumed invisible results; so that it is far more desirable to take the whole as one mantra rather than regard it as composed of as many distinct mantras as there are syntactically complete parts in it. The Siddhānta view is that so long as a number of words expresses a complete idea independently of other words, there can be no justification for taking them as component parts of another sentence.

This Adhikaraṇa lays down the principle of Vākyabheda or Syntactical Split. This principle, an antithesis of the foregoing, may be thus stated:—When a number of words are found to be such that when each word, or set of words, taken severally, independently of others, is equally capable of expressing one complete idea, each of these should be regarded as a distinct sentence. For instance, in the passage,—*Āyuryajñena kalpatām—prāṇo yajñena kalpatām*, etc. (Vājas, Sam. 9-21), each part is a distinct sentence, complete in itself, because it expresses a complete idea, independently of the other. That this construction is the correct one is also proved by the Vedic junction ‘*klīptīrvāchayati*’ where the passage in question is spoken of by the name ‘*klīptīh*’ in the plural, which shows that the passage contains as many distinct sentences as there are repetitions of the word ‘*Kalpatām*’ in it. This principle applies, not only to cases where the words of the mantras are found to be construable, but also to those cases where, even though the words actually present in the mantra are such as not allowing of separate construction, yet such words are added to the mantra, under proper authority. For instance, in the mantra—*Ikhe tvōrje*, etc. (Vājas, Sam. I. 1),—we find that the mantra as it stands, is not capable of being broken up into many sentences; but in connection with the several parts of this passage we meet with such Vedic injunctions as ‘with the words *ūrje* he washes it’ and so forth (*vide* Śatapatha Br. 1, 1, 6, 6; 1, 7, 1, 2; 4, 3, 1, 1, 7); on the authority of these injunctions then, it becomes necessary to supply to the mantras such words as ‘*chhinadmi*’ and ‘*anumārjmi*’ and so on; and with these supplied, each of the several parts of the passage becomes a complete sentence, expressing a complete idea—such as—(1) ‘*O palāśa branch, I am cutting thee for the obtaining of desirable food*,’ and (2) ‘*I am washing*

thee for the obtaining of strength,' and so forth. In connection with this, however, it may be noted that a single *Yajus* cannot be broken up into many sentences without sufficient authority. We had such authority in both the cases cited above. This 'syntactical split,' as it has been called, is permissible only in very rare cases; in fact, not until it is shown that no other construction is possible,—either in view of the structure of the sentence itself, or in virtue of some direct injunction necessitating such split; and the reason for this is that in cases where the nature of the sentence is such that it admits of being taken as a single sentence, if we do have recourse to 'syntactical split,' we incur the responsibility of abandoning the natural syntactical construction without any authority; and further, where the sentence, taken as a single mantra, would lead to a single transcendental result, we—by forcing the syntactical split—make it necessary to assume a number of such results preceding from each of the different mantras into which the original passage may be split up. And in a case where we have no direct injunction necessitating the syntactical split—and where the split necessitates the addition of more words,—these words, being supplied by ourselves without the authority of the Vedic injunction, cannot be regarded as 'Vedic'; and hence the mantra containing those non-Vedic words would no longer remain 'mantra' in the proper sense of the term.

To this principle we have a corollary to the effect that, when different parts of a mantra are found by their implication to be meant for serving distinct purposes, each such part should be regarded as a distinct sentence. For instance, in the mantra—*Syonante sadavankṛiṇomi...tasmin sīda* (Taittī. Brāhmaṇa, 3, 7, 5, 2; and Mānava Śrāutasūtra 1. 2. 6. 19),—we find that the first part, by its meaning, is intended to be employed in the act of preparing the 'seat' for the cake, while the last part, in the same manner, for that of actually keeping the cake upon that 'seat'; hence the passage is regarded as containing two distinct mantras. This has been called 'syntactical split due to difference in use' (see *Bṛihati Ms.*, p. 79 b).

Adhikaraṇa XVI—Anuṣaṅgadhikaraṇa : Elliptical Extension.

SŪTRA II. 1. 48.

अनुषङ्गो वाक्यसमाप्तिः सर्वेषु तुल्ययोगित्वात् ॥ ४८ ॥

अनुषङ्गः Anuṣaṅgaḥ, elliptical extension. वाक्यसमाप्तिः Vākyasamāptiḥ, method of completing the sentence. सर्वेषु Sarveṣu, to all. तुल्ययोगित्वात् Tulyayogitvāt, being applicable.

48. Elliptical Extension serves to complete the sentence, as it is equally applicable to all.—48.

COMMENTARY.

This Adhikarāṇa embodies what has been called the principle of Elliptical Extension. In many *Yajus* passages it is found that there are several sentences that stand in need of a certain word or phrase or clause, while the whole *Yajus* contains only one such word or phrase or clause; in such cases it would appear, and has been held, as the Pūrvapakṣa, that this word, phrase or clause is to be construed and used along with only that one of the several sentences which happens to be nearest to it, and the lacunæ in the other sentences are to be filled up by means of words borrowed from ordinary parlance; and it is the possibility of this construction that the present principle precludes. By this principle the word, phrase or clause is to be used along with every one of the sentences, provided that every one of these is of the same type and form; and the reason for this is that the intervention of a similar sentence does not become an obstacle to syntactical connection. As for example, we have the passage—‘yā te agne ayāsyā tanūrvarṣisthā gahvareṣṭhā ugram vacho apāvadhittveṣāmapāvadhīt svāhā—yā te agne rajāṣayā yā te agne harāṣayā (Vajas. Sam. 5-8; and Śatapatha Br., 3. 4. 4. 23). Here by the principle above stated, the clause (tanūḥ..svāhā) has to be repeated along with ‘yā te agne rajāṣayā, as also with yā te agne harāṣayā; and its connection does not cease only with yā te ayāṣayā. In this example the clause to be connected with different sentences, forms the principal clause in each sentence; but it does not make any difference even if the clause in question be a subordinate one. For instance, in the passage—chitpatistvā punātu vākpatistvā punātu—devastvā savitā punātu—achchhidreṇa pavitreṇa vasoḥ sūryasya raśmibhiḥ—(Taitti. Sam. 1. 2. 1. 2) the subordinate clause ‘achchhidreṇa...raśmibhiḥ’ has to be taken with each of the sentences ending in ‘punātu.’

Supplement to Adhikarāṇa XVI.

Question:—The above discussion applies to those cases where a sentence itself is wanting in an essential part. There are cases, however, where the sentences are complete in themselves, and it is only a certain part of the sentence that is found to be standing in need of sentences to which it could be attached; as, for instance, we have a series of complete sentences—chitpatistvā punātu, Vākpatistvā punātu, Devastvā savitā punātu; and at the end of these we find the words achchhidreṇa pavitreṇa. And in this case how would this last be construed?

On this we have the following:

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

“ The concluding words would have become fully satisfied by being construed with the sentence that immediately precedes them ; because all the other sentences being complete in themselves, there would be no reason for admitting of an Anuṣaṅga.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply : If the words formed part of the whole of that sentence which precedes them immediately, then it could be as asserted above. But as it is, they are found to be related only to the verb ‘ punātu ’; and as such they can not but be construed with all the three sentences (as all of them contain the same verb). That is to say, independently of any immediate sequence, the words in question become related to the verb ‘ punātu ’; and as this verb is the same in all the three sentences the meaning of this also must be the same in all. Nor can the difference of nominatives Citapati, Savitr, etc., make any difference in that meaning as connected with Citapati, or Vākpati or Savitrī Deva. Nor is the action concerned (i.e., of purifying) subservient to the instrumentality (of achchhidra pavitra) whereby it would rest satisfied with its single contact with such instrumentality. Thus then, the instrument (achchhidreṇa pavitreṇa) being subsidiary to the action (verb punātu), the words denoting the instrument will have to be used as often as the verb would be used, just as the fuel is used as long as there is cooking.

Adhikaraṇa XVII—Cases where Elliptical Extension is not permissible.

SŪTRA II. 1. 47.

व्यवायानानुषज्येत ॥ ४६ ॥

व्यवायात् Vyavāyāt, on account of intervention. न Na, not. अनुषज्येत Anuṣajyeta, could be extended.

49. Where there is an intervention of unconnected words, there can be no elliptical extension.—49.

COMMENTARY.

This Adhikaraṇa is brought in simply by way of a counter-instance to the functioning of mere Proximity (in the matter of Anuṣaṅga). As it is found that where the intervention is by words not connected with the factor to be brought in, we do not accept an Anuṣaṅga in view of the incongruity involved.

For instance, in the case of the sentences (1) ‘ Sante Vāyurvātena gachchhatām (2) Sañjayatrairangāni, and (3) Samyajñapatirōṣiṣā, though the

missing factor 'gachchhatām' is admitted as forming part of the first mantra, it is found to be incapable of being taken along with the second, because of the plural number of the noun 'aṅgāni' (which would take the verb 'gachchhantām' and not 'gachchhatām'); and thus the factor in question not being equally construable with all the mantras in question it cannot be taken along with the third mantra, through the nominative in this, 'yajñā-patiḥ,' is in the singular; and as such quite compatible with the singular of 'gachchhatām.' It is on account of the intervention of the unconnected second mantra, between (1) and (3), that this verb 'gachchatām' is not taken with (3).

And thus the missing factor of (2) and (3) not being found in the Veda, we are forced to admit one out of ordinary parlance; hence in both of these we supply the necessary word from without. And though the word 'gachchhantām' (in the second mantra) and 'gachchhatām' (in the third) are not actually pronounced, yet their existence must be admitted as otherwise the signification of the sentence would remain incomplete for want of a verb.

Thus then in the case in question there is no Anuṣaṅga.

The use of this discussion lies in the fact that, if certain words formed an 'Anuṣaṅga,' they would form a mantra; and as such, any mistake in the pronunciation of these would have to be accompanied by expiatory rites; whereas if the words supplied are out of ordinary sentences, they do not constitute a mantra and hence any mistakes in pronunciation, etc., are not so serious as to entail an expiatory rite.

To this end it has been declared that, (1) that which is directly mentioned in the Veda, and (2) that which is brought in by means of an Anuṣaṅga, are counted as having the character of a mantra, whereas all sentences of ordinary parlance, being similar to assumed sentences, can never be recognised to have the character of mantras.

This is the end of the first Pāda of Adhyāya II.

SECOND ADHYÂYA.

SECOND PADA.

Adhikarana I.—Difference in the Apûrva of subsidiary sacrifices. Difference of Actions based upon the difference of words signifying the action.

SÛTRA II. ii. 1.

शब्दान्तरे कर्मभेदः कृतानुबन्धत्वात् ॥ १ ॥

शब्दान्तरे Śabdântare, the word being different. कर्मभेदः Karmabhedah, difference of action. कृतानुबन्धत्वात् Kritānubandhatvât, because of its being specially qualified.

1. When there is a different word there is a different action because it is specially qualified.—1.

COMMENTARY.

In the foregoing introductory chapter we have dwelt with all matters connected, directly and indirectly, with the subject under consideration ; and now we are going to take up the subject-matter of the Adhyâya in the shape of the difference among actions on the ground of the difference among words, etc.

And first of all we take up the differences caused by the difference of expressions, because it is this difference that points out most clearly the difference among actions. In connection with this we should have cited the examples of all verbal forms connected with one or many verbal affixes such as *yajati*, *dadati*, *juhoti*, *nirvapati*, etc. The Bhâṣya has cited only three—‘*yajati*, *dadati* and *juhoti*,’ because, inasmuch as all these denote the *giving away* of something, their significations are all akin, and as such they naturally appear to have identical meaning.

And on this point, inasmuch as there are *three* kinds of *Pârvapakṣa* introduced in the Bhâṣya, it seems as if the doubt on the point in question should also have been expressed in three ways.

These are :—(1) Do the three Bhâvanâs denoted by the three words (*yajati*, etc.)—bring about a single *Apûrva*, or three distinct *Apûrvas* ? (2) Do the three denotations of the three roots qualify a single *Bhâvanâ*, or three distinct *Bhâvanâs* ? (3) Do the three roots denote a single object or three distinct objects.

As a matter of fact, however, there is only *one doubt* in connection with this subject. In the case of the three verbs, is there only one *Bhāvanā* as qualified by the denotations of the three roots, or is there a distinct *Bhāvanā* for the denotation of each root? What the word '*karma*' (in the sūtra) denotes is the *Bhāvanā* as qualified by the denotation of the root. And it is the *Bhāvanā* that would be differentiated by means of different words, etc. As for the *Apūrva*, inasmuch as it is not directly expressed by the words in question, and as it follows in the wake of the action itself, it cannot form a subject of separate treatment. Though the "*unity of three root meanings*" spoken of in the *Bhāṣya* is not possible in the case of all root-endings, yet it might be mentioned, somehow or other in connection with the roots '*yajati*,' etc., in question, but in the case of these, though it may be possible yet much stress should not be laid upon this unity. Thus then the root-meanings being really different, there seems to be yet another ground for doubt in the mind of the *Pārvapakṣi*, viz., is the *Bhāvanā* mentioned as subservient to the root-meaning, and as such does it end with each root-meaning? or are root-meanings subserving to the *Bhāvanā*, and as such they conjointly serve to qualify it?

On this we have the following

Pārvapakṣa (A).

"It is *conjointly* that the root-meaning qualifies the *Bhāvanā*. Inasmuch as the *Bhāṣya* often uses the word '*Samudāya*' (combination)—as in the sentence *Samudāya—Schhikīrṇitah*, '*Samudāyādikāmapūrvam*,' *nachâśabdah samudāyah*, etc.—and as it speaks of the *Apūrva* as one only, it seems clear that the idea desired to be conveyed was that *a single Apūrva follows from all the three Bhāvanās*. And in support of this idea the *Bhāṣya* brings forward the following arguments: In the first instance, that which is not seen is concluded to be *non est*; and also so long as (in the absence of the unseen factor) there appears no incompatibility in what is actually seen (with what is spoken of), it is concluded that the unseen does not exist; it is only when there is a contradiction between the *seen* and the *spoken*, that we can rightly assume the existence of the *unseen*; and hence, when the contradiction is removed by the assumption of only one such unseen factor, there need be no assumption of many such factors. It is with a view to this that it has been declared: '*When there is a contradiction, then alone can an unseen factor be assumed, whereby the seen or the heard would become supported.*' And under the circumstances if there were no difference—on the ground of simplicity—

between the assumption of one and that of many factors, then we might go on assuming many factors; but, as a matter of fact, we do perceive such a difference, hence it must be admitted that a single unseen 'Apūrva' follows from the combination of the three Bhāvanās." [Thus is Pūrvapakṣa A.]

This statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* however, is open to the following objection: 'What is that word that has laid down the combination of *Bhāvanās*, wherefrom the single *Apūrva* would follow?' And in view of this objection the *Bhāṣya* states the *Pūrvapakṣa* somewhat differently as follows:—

Pūrvapakṣa (B).

The Action laid down by the three sentences is one only, but variously coloured, like the rainbow, by the denotations of the three roots; and in support of this the following arguments have been brought forward: If we accept this conclusion then it is necessary to make but a slight assumption of the unseen factor. If the actions are held to be different, then it would be necessary to assume many unseen factors, for which there could not be the least justification. For these reasons 'a single composite is meant to be expressed,'—by which it is meant that there are many parts of a single action. Therefore we must conclude that in the word '*yajati*' the first part '*yaji*' signifies the *sacrifice* and the second part signifies the *Bhāvanā* and so forth. Some people seem to think that the expression 'Athavā' in the *Bhāṣya* is a mistaken reading. But it could be very well explained in the following manner: The *Bhāṣya* has brought forward two sets of arguments in favour of the *Pūrvapakṣa*; having explained the first of these, in the sense of the advantage of assuming less of the unseen than what is necessary in the other theory, it is only right that it should introduce the second by *Athavā* (or *secondly*). That is to say, the sense of the *Bhāṣya* comes to be this: It is not necessary for us to point out the disadvantage, in the other theory, of having to assume much more of the unseen element, as it is by means of the words themselves that we shall prove the *Bhāvanā* to be one only. And it proceeds to do this by showing that though the first parts of the verbs differ from one another, yet inasmuch as all of them have the same affix, their denotations are identical. This is what is meant by the sentence (in the *Bhāṣya*): '*tathā dadatitipurvo dātatyartham uttarastameva bhāvayediti.*' The latter portion of this seems at first sight to mean that the *second party shows that the object of the Bhāvanā is the root-meaning*; but this is not what is meant; because it has been shown that in all cases that which is denoted by the root can never be the object of the *Bhāvanā*; and also

because any such assertion could never be of any use to the *Pārvapakṣi*. In the same manner it cannot be said that the root-meaning is described by the second part of the verb. Therefore we must construe the sentence as follows : On the word '*dadati*' the first part (the root *dā*) signifies to give ; and the second part (the affix) serves to describe that *Bhāvanā* which has been previously denoted by the affix in '*yajeta*'—the only purpose of this descriptive reiterations by '*dadati*' of the previously denoted *Bhāvanā* being the connecting of the said *Bhāvanā* with the denotation of a root other than the former (*yaji*). The same may be said with regard to the word '*juhoti*' also. That such is the sense of the *Bhāṣya* is also shown by the fact that in connection with the word '*yajeta*' the '*Bhāṣya*' does not make use of the word '*anuvadati*' (describes) the only reason whereof being that in this case there is no *Bhāvanā*, previously expressed, that could be described (by the affix in '*yajeta*'). If the *Bhāṣya* had meant the denotation of the root to be the object of the *Bhāvanā* then this would apply to the first verb, as well as to the other two (and thus there could be no difference in the way of explaining the signification of the three verbs); and the *Bhāṣya* could not have left off the first verb ('*yajeta*') and made the declaration (of the root denotation being the object of the *Bhāvanā*) with regard to the last two only. Consequently we must take the *Bhāṣya* only as pointing to the singleness of the *Bhāvanā*. Thus then, there is a single *Bhāvanā*, and a single Action, in the case in question.

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta* :—

Whenever there is a difference in the denotations of the roots, we must conclude that the *Bhāvanā* also is distinct in each case. And when a *Bhāvanā* has once appeared as qualified by the denotation of one root, it is not possible for the same *Bhāvanā* to be subsequently qualified by others as well.

That is to say, though the word denoting the *Bhāvanā* is on only and its denotation—the *Bhāvanā*—forms the predominant factor, yet whenever there is a difference in the qualifying root-denotation, the *Bhāvanā* must be admitted to be distinct also. Nor, is it possible for three root-denotations to fall in within a single *Bhāvanā*. Nor can they form a single composite whole, because all of them equally have the same purpose of expressing the instrumental factor (of the *Bhāvanā*) ; and also because each of them is expressed by a different word, quite independently of another. Nor is it possible for a single root-denotation to include within itself three root-denotations ; and it is not possible for three roots, independent of one another, to be laid down in a single word, for

the sake of any affix ; because in the matter of the adapting of affixes Pāṇini uses the word 'dhātoḥ' (III-i-91), where great significance attaches to the singular number (and this shows that in one word one root can be adapted to only one affix). Nor is it possible for the three verbs to form a single sentence ; as they do not serve the same purpose, they do not appear incomplete on being separated (and as such they do not fulfil the conditions of syntactical unity) ; and it is not possible to make a single sentence out of them, by assuming a single *Apūrva* (as following from them) ; because such an assumption has been negatived under *Sūtra* II-i-47, and also because the difference or non-difference among Actions is not dependent upon a difference or non-difference among *Apūrvas* ; as a matter of fact it is quite the contrary (i.e., the difference or non-difference of *Apūrvas* depending upon that of Actions).

For these reasons the actions expressed by the three verbs must be held to be different. In support of this we have the following : when a piece of rock-crystal has been spoken of as *red*, the mention of *black* could not but be taken as referring to another piece of crystal ; in the same manner, when one word has spoken of the *Bhāvanā* as connected with one root-denotation, the mention of other roots could not but be taken as referring to other *Bhāvanās*.

Adhikaraṇa II.—Difference of Actions based upon Repetition of the same word : as in the case of the Samits and other sacrifices.

SŪTRA II. II. 2.

एकस्यैवं पुनःश्रुतिरविशेषादनर्थकं हि स्यात् ॥ २ ॥

एकस्य Ekasya, of one word. एवं Evam, also. पुनःश्रुतिः Punahśrutih, repetition. अविशेषात् Avišeṣāt, if there were no distinction. अनर्थकं Anarthakam, useless. हि Hi, as. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

2. The repetition of the same word also (is a means of differentiation) ; as because the word does not lay down any specific particulars the repetition would be useless.—2.

COMMENTARY.

We meet with such sentences in the Veda as :—"samidho yajati, vidoyajati tanunpatamyajati, varhiryajati, swāhākāram yajati" ;—here we find each sentence mentioning the Action by means of the same word 'yajati.' The question then arises—does the word 'yajati' repeated five times lay down one Action and one *Apūrva* or five Actions and five *Apūrvas* ?

The Pûrvapakṣa used is thus stated in the Tantravârtika :—

They indicate only *one* Apûrva ; because as shown in the previous *Adhikarana*, though the signification of the affix be the same, yet a difference in the roots serves to differentiate the Actions ; when, however, the root also is the same, what would be there to point out the Actions to be different ?

Further, on the utterance of the first sentence—*samidhoyajati*—an idea of the Action '*yâga*' presents itself to the mind ; and hence when the same verb is pronounced again, the Action denoted by this is at once recognised as the same that had previously come to the mind ; and as such the repetition does not point out any difference in the Action.

The Siddhânta is that the given words denote five distinct Actions and Apûrvas. And this on the following grounds :—

The sentences in question occur in connection with the Prayaja sacrifices performed in course of the Darśa Pûrṇamâsa ; the verb '*yajati*' in these sentences cannot be taken as enjoining an original sacrifice, as this sacrifice is already laid down by the text laying down the original Darśa Pûrṇamâsa. Each repetition of the word '*yajati*' therefore, must be taken as *referring* to that original sacrifice ;—on this account the words '*samidhaḥ*,' '*tanunputam*' and the rest can be taken as laying down either the materials to be offered or the deities to whom the offering is to be made ;—as a matter of fact, however, we know that both these accessories of the original sacrifice are laid down in another sentence, directly connected with the primary injunction of the original sacrifice—*agneyoṣ-takapalobhavati*, where Agni is mentioned as the deity and the cake baked on eight paṇas as the material ;—if then the words '*samidhaḥ*' etc., must be taken as injunctions of accessories and *not* in connection with that same sacrifice (and not in connection with five other sacrifices) each of them must be taken as mentioning a distinct deity which would mean that the actual action of *Sacrificing* or offering is to be repeated as many times as there are deities mentioned ;—so that each '*yajati*' stands for a distinct act of offering leading to a distinct Apûrva.

In the above reasoning the Siddhânta has proceeded after admitting for the sake of argument that the sentences lay down accessories. As a matter of fact, however, this is not possible : the word '*Samidhaḥ*,' etc., ending as they do with accusative cannot be taken as denoting materials to be offered as has been shown under Sûtra II-i-11, 12. Nor again can they be taken as mentioning the deity as will be shown later on under Sûtra IX-i-9. Thus in any case the sentence must be taken as laying down five distinct Actions and five distinct Apûrvas.

Adhikaraṇa III.—Treating of the relation of subserviency between the Agharas and the Agneya, etc.

SŪTRAS. II. ii. 3 to 8.

प्रकर्णन्तु पौर्णमास्यां रूपावचनात् ॥ ३ ॥

प्रकर्णं Prakarṇam, the context. तु Tu, verily. पौर्णमास्यां Paurṇamāsyām, to the Paurṇmāsī. रूपावचनात् Rūpāvachnât, none of the details being mentioned.

3. The context certainly refers to the Paurṇamāsī (as the principle); specially (with regard to the other sacrifices the details are not mentioned).—3.

COMMENTARY.

The present Adhikaraṇa has been introduced as dealing with the exceptions to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing Adhikaraṇa. There are two texts—

We have the text—‘*yadâgneyaṣṭak’opalô’ mâvaryâyâṁ paurṇamāsyam châchyuto bhavati*’: and then come the six sentences—(1) ‘*upâmsūyajau,*’—(2) ‘*âghâramâghârayati,*’—(3) ‘*âjyabhâganyajati,*’—(4) ‘*sviṣṭakrite samavadyati,*’—(5) ‘*patnisamyâjan yajati,*’—(6) ‘*samīṣṭayajurjuhoti*’; and lastly, all these are followed by the text ‘*ya evamvidvân paurṇamāśīm yajati ya evamvidvân amâvâsyâm yajati, &c.*’

Now the question arises,—do the two verbs in the two last sentences lay down two entirely independent actions or do they only refer to the six actions that have been laid down by the preceding sentences which go to constitute the Dârśa Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices. As regards the six actions the Agneya and the rest themselves that they are distinct from one another is shown by their difference in their accessories.

On this point the Pūrvaapakṣa view is as follows :—

Inasmuch as all the sacrifices in question are mentioned by *different words* and also by *repetitions of words*, they must be all of equal importance. Though these two reasons—Difference of words and Repetition—are not connected directly with the fact of ‘Equal Importance,’ yet they are taken along with this, through the difference in actions (that these would indicate), which is also implied in the assertion of ‘Equal Importance’ (as shown above). That is to say, the sacrifices denoted by the two ‘*yajetas*’ are shown to be different from those of the Actions (mentioned along with the Dârśa-Pūrṇamāsa) that are not yâga (but Homa, etc.) by the *difference in words*; while they are shown to be different from the yâgas, by the repetition of the word ‘*yajeta*’; and hence they must all be

taken as of equal importance. (That is to say, when each 'yajeta' mentions a distinct sacrifice, all the sacrifices mentioned in the passages quoted become independent of one another, and as such all equally are *primary* sacrifices.)

Nor could any special purpose be served by taking the two 'yajati's in question as mere references to the previously enjoined sacrifices (because the only purpose that is found to be served by such references is the pointing out of fresh accessories) ; and as a matter of fact we do not find any accessories in the shape of materials, etc., mentioned in the two sentences in question ; and as such we cannot make the injunctive potency of these 'yajetas' give up the function of laying down the actions themselves. And thus also even when the sacrifices enjoined by the two *yajatis* in question are distinct from the *Agneyâ*, etc., they are found to have distinct forms of their own ; and hence they must be admitted to be distinct actions ; and as such, there being nothing to show that the results follow from the six primaries *Agneyâ* and the rest only, (because the only sentence that had been accepted as showing this was 'ya evam,' etc., which however has been shown to be the injunction of a distinct sacrifice altogether), the character of the primary belongs equally to all the sacrifices mentioned in the various sentences quoted (*i.e.*, to the *Prayāja*, etc., the *Āghâra*, etc., as well as to the *Āgneya*, etc.).

The *Pûrvapakṣa* to this *Adhikarāṇa* has also been stated in the following somewhat different form :—

We admit that the sacrifices are distinct ; but we cannot admit of the fact of the character of the Primary belonging equally to all. Because the names 'Amāvasyâ' or 'Darśa' and 'Paurṇamâsî' would apply only to some of the sacrifices, and not to all ; and the result is spoken of as following from these that are qualified by these names ; and as such there can be no equality in the character of all the sacrifices. That is to say, the words 'Darśa' and 'Paurṇamâsa' denote sacrifices with a qualification (that of being named by these words) ; and as from the sentence—'Darśa paurṇamâsâbhyâm svargakârmō yajeta'—it is clear that it is only from such qualified sacrifices that the particular result could follow, we must take these alone as the primary sacrifices ; and all other sacrifices mentioned along with them (and without any distinct results of their own) must be accepted as the subsidiaries of these two. It may be noted that this second *Pûrvapakṣa* is at variance with the *Siddhânta* only as regards the difference of the sacrifices mentioned by the two 'yajetas' from the primary sacrifices of the *Darśa Paurṇamâsa*. The final form of *Pûrvapakṣa* is

simply that inasmuch as the application of the names Darśa and Paurṇamāsa depends upon the signification of the root 'yajī' all the sacrifices in question must be held to be equally primary.

In answer to the above we have the following Siddhānta :—

The words 'yajeta' in these sentences, or the words 'Amāvasyā' and 'Paurṇamāsa' do not denote *sacrifice in general*; nor do you (we hold the sentences to lay down two independent sacrifices) admit of these words pointing to all the sacrifices in question. Then all that you can do is to make them lay down two independent sacrifices. But in that case, inasmuch as the details (material deity, etc.) of these sacrifices are not mentioned, no one would be found to perform them; and hence the sentence would become wholly futile. If, however, they are taken as referring to the sacrifices mentioned in the text, then the materials and the deities of all these sacrifices, as also the particular points of time at which they have to be performed, being found to be duly mentioned, the full form of the sacrifices becomes known; and as such the sentence becomes utilised in pointing out the time at which they should be performed.

It has been argued above that the material and the Deity of the four sacrifices are also clearly cognisable. But though it is true that the common material, *Dhruva*, might be taken as the material employed, yet inasmuch as there is no mention of a Deity, the sacrifice remains as indistinct as ever:

Nor it is possible for the Deity to be indicated by the words of the *mantras* employed; because the *mantras* in question are distinctly pointed out, by the *order* in which they occur, to belong to the *Ājyayabhāgas*.

For these reasons there can be no Injunction of the Deity, through the sentences brought forward; because these have been shown to have no connection with the matter. And hence the sacrifice held to be enjoined by the sentence 'Ya evām, etc.,' not having its details of material and Deity clearly mentioned, it cannot be taken as one different from those previously laid down. The result being found to follow from only those sacrifices that go to form the *composite whole*, all the sacrifices other than these must be taken as subsidiary to them (the former ones the *Agneya* and the rest, being taken as the *Primary Sacrifices*, and as such they are not all of 'equal importance.'

विशेषदर्शनाच्च सर्वेषां समेषु ह्यप्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ॥४॥

विशेषदर्शनाच्च Viśeṣa Darśanāt Cha, also because we find peculiar quantity. सर्वेषां Sarvesām, of all. समेषु Sameṣu, if equal. हि Hi because. अप्रवृत्तिः Apravṛtṭih, they could not appear in them. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

4. Also because we find a peculiarity (in the shape of the appearance of the subsidiary Prayâja in the modifications of the Primaries) (we cannot hold all to be equally Primaries) because they (the Prayâjas) could not appear in them (the modifications) if all were equal—4.

COMMENTARY.

If the sacrifices mentioned by the sentences '*ya evâm etc.*' were distinct from all others, then the Aghāra and the other subsidiaries would all equally be Primaries ; and, hence, in accordance with the Sūtra VIII-i-20 the subsidiary *Prayâjas*, etc., also, like the Agneya and the other Primaries, would enter into the instrumental factor (in the bringing about of the principal result) ; and as such they would no longer be able to supply the want of the method in the Bhāvauâ (bringing about) of the modifications of the Primary, which has its *Instrument* or *means* already laid down ; and as such these modifications would no longer take into themselves these *Prayâjas*, etc.; they are actually found to be taken up by these modifications ; as otherwise we could not have a text enjoining '*Kṛṣṇala*' as the material to be used at the *Prayâja*, when performed in connection with the modifications.

Consequently in order to establish the fact of the *Prayâja*, etc., being subsidiary to the *Agnêya* and the rest, we must take the two sentences in question as referring to the previously mentioned sacrifices.

गुणस्तु श्रुतिसंयोगात् ॥ ५ ॥

गुणस्तु *Guṇastu*, accessories. श्रुतिसंयोगात् *Śruti saṁyogāt*, because of direct mention.

5. Objection: "The sentences (*Yadâgneya*, etc.) lay down accessories, because of the direct mention (of the root '*yaji*' in the other sentences)."—5.

COMMENTARY.

If we accept distinct sacrifices to be laid down by the sentences '*ya evâm, etc.*' then we have the following advantages: (1) The singular number in the word '*paurṇamâsīm*' because quite explicable with reference to the noun itself, without having recourse to any indirect indication, by the word, of the composite of sacrifices. (2) If we accept these sentences as Injunctions, we have a further advantage, *viz.*: the root '*yaji*' is found to be directly mentioned, and it is not necessary to infer it from the mention of the Deity (as you have got to do in the case of holding the

Injunction to lie in the sentence 'yadāgneya,' etc.). (3) In your case the sacrifices enjoined by these inferred 'yajis' being more than one, their *Apūrvas* would also be more than one and thus in comparison with the process of taking the sentences as referring to the beforementioned sacrifices, that of taking them as independent Injunctions is far more advantageous. As for the appearing of the *Prayājas* in the modifications (urged in the preceding *Sūtra*) it can be explained, either by qualifying the injunction of *Kṛṣṇala* in the performance of the *Prayājas* in the modifications, by adding the condition 'in such cases when there are sentences that must be taken as *Anuvāda*, or by taking it as laying down a material for the *Prayāja* occurring in the primary itself.

चोदना वा गुणानां युगपच्छास्त्रात् चोदिते हि तदर्थत्वात्
तस्य तस्योपादिशीयत् ॥ ६ ॥

चोदना Chodaná, injunction. वा Vā, but. गुणानां Guṇānām, of accessories. युगपत् Yugapat, simultaneously. शास्त्रात् Śāstrāt, by the scripture. चोदिते Chodite, being declared. हि Hi, because. तदर्थत्वात् Tadarthatwāt, for the sake of accessories. तस्य तस्य Tasya tasya, with each. उपादिशीयत् Upādiśīyat, would be enjoined.

6. Reply : But they are Injunctions ; as otherwise many accessories would be declared simultaneously by the scripture, because if they appeared after the sacrifices had been enjoined then their such appearance could be only for the sake of the accessories and as such we would have to admit of an injunctive word with each accessory.—6.

COMMENTARY.

The sentences 'yadāgneya,' etc., cannot be taken as laying down the accessories of the sacrifices enjoined by the sentences 'ya evām, etc.' Because it is a well recognised rule that when the Action is one that has been already enjoined (by a previous sentence) we cannot lay down more than one accessory with regard to it ; as it is only when the Action has not been otherwise enjoined that even a number of accessories could be laid down by a single effort (of that Injunction).

That is to say, in all original Injunctions of Actions, the Injunctive Affix proceeds to enjoin only the *Bhāvanā* because it is only this factor that is not got at by other means. And so long as this *Bhāvanā* is not fully equipped with all its factors, by means of the Denotation of the Root and the other factors in the sentence (denoting the various auxiliaries of the sacrifice), it cannot be brought to action ; and hence until all this

has been fully laid down, the Injunction is not complete. And it so happens that by the apparent inconsistency of the generic character of the auxiliaries that are recognised as constituting the factors of the *Bhāvanā*—this inconsistency leads us to look for a specification of the said auxiliaries,—then it is that the *Bhāvanā* comes to be specified by those specifications which are implied by the Instrumental case-endings found in the same sentence, and which also are on the look out for the *Bhāvanā* (as the object to be specified). And in the case of each word, the *Class*, *Gender* and *Number*, that belong to an object,—all these come to be recognised, by means of the direct signification of the particular case-ending, as auxiliaries to the *Bhāvanā* because all these (class, etc.) on account of being expressed by the same word, have among themselves the relation of the qualification and the qualified, and are not recognised as belonging to, or depending, upon one another (and as such must be concluded to form part of something else; and that is the *Bhāvanā*). And thus it is that all words near the *Bhāvanā* or removed from it, fall in with the *Bhāvanā*, notwithstanding their remoteness or proximity—in the way that we have explained under the *Adhikarāṇa* or *Anuṣṅga* in the foregoing *Pāda* of this *Adhyāya*. And it is only then that, having got hold of a *Bhāvanā* fully endowed with all its qualifications, the Injunction becomes complete.

And as in all such cases the Injunction lays down the qualified *Bhāvanā* by a single effort, it does not entail any such anomaly as the assumption of various potencies in the Injunction. Because it is only when the direct functionings of words are multiplied that it becomes very complicated; and when the words end in expressing a single fact then there is nothing incompatible in the *indirect implication* of many things. That is to say, the direct Injunction having been once utilised in the laying down of the qualified *Bhāvanā*—if it were taken again to *directly* function towards the laying down of something else, then it would be necessary to repeat the Injunctive word over again, and this being incompatible with the Veda, would not be warrantable; when, however, the Injunctive word has ceased its functioning with having laid down the *Bhāvanā*, then, on account of the apparent inconsistency of its own signification it would give birth to (*i.e.*, indirectly imply) other Injunctive words expressive of such qualifications (as would be necessary for removing the said inconsistency); and in this the original injunctive word would not have to give up its one form as appearing in the Vedic text; although it would serve all the purposes that would be served by various repetition of itself.

And though in this manner the Injunction of the qualification would appear *after* the original Injunction of the *Bhāvanā* itself, yet in accordance with the law laid down under the *Adhikaraṇa* on 'Ākṛiti' (in the first *pāda* of the first *Adhyāya*), the qualifications themselves will have appeared before that. That is to say, though, as a matter of fact, the Apparent Inconsistency due to the fact of the *Bhāvanā* being qualified, appearing subsequently leads to an idea of the Injunction of the qualification, long after that of the original Injunction (of the *Bhāvanā*), yet, in accordance with the rule arrived at in the *Adhikaraṇa* on 'Ākṛiti' as it is impossible for the *Bhāvanā* to be *qualified*, in the absence of the qualifications themselves, it must be admitted that these must have been full fledged entities from before ; as it is through these alone that any idea of the *Bhāvanā* being *qualified* could be brought about.

All these injunctions (of qualification), pointed out by the apparent inconsistency of a perceptible fact, operate either simultaneously or one after the other. And thus we find that if we admit a sentence to be the Injunction of a fresh *Bhāvanā*, then it becomes an easy matter to get at the Injunctions of its accessories by the help of the original Injunction of the *qualified Bhāvanā*, which is capable of giving birth to various Injunctions.

On the other hand, however, (if the sentence be taken as only referring to a *Bhāvanā* previously enjoined by another sentence), this is not possible. Because as a rule, it is only when Primary is carried to a place, that it draws with itself all its accessories ; while if it is one of the accessories that is carried, it does not carry with itself another accessory, because these two are not so intimately connected. That is to say, when the *Bhāvanā* is such as has been got at from another sentence, then the *Injunctive* word in the sentence in question cannot enjoin that *Bhāvanā* over again—as a repeated Injunction of the *Bhāvanā* would be as useless as the powdering of that which has already been powdered ; and then not performing its *injunctive* function, it does not become the means of giving birth to various Injunctions with regard to things connected with that *Bhāvanā* ; as it is only when the *Injunctive* word *enjoins* the qualified *Bhāvanā* that it makes possible assumption of such Injunctions ; and this is not possible in the case in question ; hence the *Injunctive Affix* is found to be such as has its direct expressive potency quite inoperative (towards the injunction of the *Bhāvanā*) and, hence, in accordance with the rule laid down under the *Sūtra ānarthaky at tadangeṣu*, that *Injunctive Affix* comes down from the *Bhāvanā* and directs itself towards the auxiliaries connected with it. And then those qualifications of Class, Gender and

Number, which qualify the auxiliary expressed by a single word, serve to point out that auxiliary,—exactly in the way that we have explained in the case of the Injunction of a qualified *Bhāvanā* : and as such these qualifications are all enjoined, and hence in the case of a single word, even though the *Bhāvanā* has been enjoined by another sentence, it is possible to have the Injunction of many things (in connection with it). When however there is a combination of many auxiliaries mentioned by many words (as in the case of the sentences '*Āgneyoṣṭākāpālah*, etc.') then in that case, there being no sort of relationship among these auxiliaries themselves, the words expressing them also remain unconnected (with one another); and hence when the Injunction betakes itself to one of them, it has nothing to do with any other; and when it would betake to this latter, it could not have anything to do with another, and so on; because all of them being wholly unconnected with one another. For these reasons it is not possible, in this case, to have the one implied by the other, as we had in the case of the Injunction applying to the *Bhāvanā*.

Thus then in this case, the original Injunction not giving birth to other Injunctions, the former being one only, would be wholly taken up in the laying down of one auxiliary; and then the declaration that it lays down another also, would not be possible, unless we meant to repeat the original Injunction; this would entail the anomaly of all these repeated Injunctions being of human origin (and as such having no authority). This is what is meant by the second half of the *Sūtra*, which means that if the sentence were taken as laying down an action that has been already previously enjoined, as such laying down could only be for the purpose of mentioning the accessory, the Injunctive word would have to be repeated for the sake of the Injunction of each one of the accessories.

Thus then in the sentence '*Āgneya*, etc.' we must have the injunction of the connection of a material and a Deity; but this connection is not possible with regard to any sacrifice that may have been previously enjoined by other sentences; and hence, in accordance with the *Sūtra* '*Gundachchapārva Sambandhah*' we must admit a distinct sacrifice to be actually enjoined by this sentence (*yadāgneyah*, etc.); and then we have the same rūpavachana (non-mention of the form) 'that was urged in the third *Sūtra*'; and as such the sentence '*ya evam*, etc., must be taken as only referring to the sacrifices enjoined by the sentence '*yadāgneyah*, etc.' And by this we are forced to have recourse to indirect indication, etc. for the purpose of explaining the singular ending (in *Paurṇamāstam*).

व्यपदेशश्च तदवत् ॥ ७ ॥

व्यपदेशः Vyapadeśa, the mention. च Cha, also. तदवत् Tadavat, is like that.

7. The mention of these also is like that.—7.

COMMENTARY.

If the Amāvasyâ were a single sacrifice, then the two materials—the *Sānnâyya* (Curd and Butter) and the *Oṣadhi* (Herbs) would be optional alternative, and then why should there be any mention of the preparation of one of these before the other, (as it would be necessary to employ and prepare only one of the two alternative materials)?

When there are various sacrifices, then the *Sānnâyya* and *Oṣadhi* come to be taken as both forming the materials to be offered in various sacrifices, and as such all the various materials having to be prepared for the *Amāvasyâ* sacrifices, it becomes quite relevant to speak of the preparation of one of these before the other,—which would be entirely irrelevant in any other case.

And, further, in accordance with the *Pārvapakṣi* over and above the three sacrifices there would be a fourth (in the shape of that enjoined by the sentence ‘*ya evam,*’ etc.): and as such the passage quoted in the *Bhāṣya* would refer to them as *uttarani* (in the plural) and not as *utrari* (in the Dual) which refers to the two composite sacrifices, the *Darśa* and the *Paurṇamāsa*.

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ ८ ॥

लिङ्ग Linga. दर्शनम् Darśanāt. च Cha, and.

8. Also because we find (in the Veda) indicative words,—8.

COMMENTARY.

If the sentences ‘*ya evam,*’ etc.’ enjoined two distinct sacrifices, then the number of sacrifices would be more, and if they enjoined accessories, the number would be less than ‘thirteen’ and ‘fourteen’ which are the numbers that are mentioned in connection with the libations in the *Darśa* and the *Paurṇamāsa*. Because these numbers could be possible only if in the *Paurṇamāsa* there were three, and in the *Darśa* two primary libations (and this would not be the case if the sentences ‘*ya evam,*’ etc.’ are taken either as the Injunctions of independent sacrifices, or as the Injunctions of Accessories).

For these reasons we conclude that the sentences ‘*ya evam, etc.*’ merely refer to the two previously maintained composite sacrifices. To this effect, we have the following declaration :

“(1) Because the enjoined sacrifice has no form (material, etc.), (2) because the words of the sentence directly denote the sacrifices mentioned in the context, and (3) because it is only in these latter sacrifices that we find distinct forms and details,—we must admit the sentences, ‘*ya evam, etc.*’ to be mere references to the two composite sacrifices laid down in the preceding sentences.”

Adhikarāṇa IV.—Exception to the foregoing Adhikarāṇa.

SŪTRAS II. ii. 9 to 12.

“पौर्णमासीवत् उपांशुयाजः स्यात्” ॥ ९ ॥

पौर्णमासीवत् Paurṇamāśivat, like the Paurṇamāśi. उपांशुयाजः Upāṁśuyājah, the Upāṁśu sacrifice. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

9. “The case of the Upāṁśu sacrifice should be exactly like the Paurṇamāśi.”—9.

COMMENTARY.

The next three Adhikarāṇas deal with the exceptions to Adhikarāṇa III.

There is one sentence :—*Jāmi vā etadyajñasya kṛiyate yadanvanchau purodāṣan, upāṁśuyājāmantara yajati*; and then we have a set of sentences—*Viṣṇurupāṁśu, yaṣṭavyo jāmitvāya, prajāpatirupāṁśu, yaṣṭavyo jāmitvāya, agniṣomāupāṁśu yaṣṭavyāvajāmitvāya*; and on these three arises the following question : does the expression ‘*upāṁśuyājā*’, in the first sentence, only serve to speak of (refer to) the whole batch of sacrifices mentioned in the latter set of sentences? or does it serve to lay down an independent sacrifice by itself? And on this question, we have the *Pūrvapakṣa* embodied in the *Sūtra*; and in support thereof we have the following arguments.

To the sentence ‘*Upāṁśuyājā*’ &c., apply all the conclusions arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*.

“Because inasmuch as the sacrifices laid down in the latter set of sentences have their accessories in the shape of the respective deities duly mentioned, while that which is mentioned in the first sentence has no such accessory mentioned, we cannot but conclude that this latter sacrifice depends upon the former sacrifices.

“That is to say, in the three sentences we have the affix *tavya* with the verb ; and as such they have the character of absolute Injunction, and, hence, if we were to assume these sentences to enjoin independent sacrifices, then we would render ourselves open to all the aforesaid objections of the details of these being unknown, and also of the necessity of having to assume many unseen factors.”

“And, further, we find each of the latter three sentences mentioning the removal of the evil effects of the *jami* (a technical flaw in the performance of a sacrifice, explained below); and it is with regard to this flaw of the *jami* that the first sentence mentioned the *Upâñśu* sacrifices. That is to say, looking at the whole section, from the first sentence to the last, we find that the mention of *jami* (in the first sentence) and the removal of *jami* (mentioned in the last three) form one subject; and from this it is clear that it is the last three sentences that contain the real Injunctions, whereas in the first sentence we do not find any distinct *Arthavâda* or Injunction (by which it could be taken as containing the Injunction of a sacrifice). Then again, the special purpose served by the first sentence referring to the whole set of the three sacrifices (laid down in the latter sentences), is that it is only thus that any one of the three sacrifices (laid down by the three sentences) can be taken as a sacrifice independent of the other two; it is only by making the first sentence (which mentions a definite point of time; in the shape of the interim between the offering of two cakes, supplementary to the last three sentences, that all the three sacrifices becoming connected with that particular time,—each of them comes to be taken as an independent primary sacrifice.

चोदना वा अप्रकृतत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

चोदना Chodanâ, injunction. वा Vâ, certainly. अप्रकृतत्वात् Aprakritatvât, not being mentioned in the context.

10. But it must be an injunction as there is no other sacrifice mentioned in the context.—10.

COMMENTARY.

The sentence ‘*Upâññyâjan yajati*’ is the Injunction of an independent sacrifice, and it is not a mere reference to the set of three sacrifices mentioned in the three sentences: (1) Because there being no other sacrifices mentioned in the context, the sentence cannot be taken as a mere reference, and (2) because no sacrifice is actually enjoined by the sentences *Vişnu*, etc.

In the case of the sentence mentioning the *Vaisvānara* sacrifice, we find that from beginning to end the text treats of 'twelve cakes,' and hence the mention of the numbers 'eight' and the rest come to be taken as forming part of the twelve; and as such the sentences mentioning these small numbers are not taken as separate Injunctions of those numbers. In the same manner in the case in question, we find that the Injunction is introduced by the words '*jami va etat*' which describe a certain flaw in the sacrifice; and it is clear that such mention of the flaw must have some bearing on, and be needed by a certain enjoined, sacrifice; consequently it appears that the sentences '*Viṣṇu, etc.*,' speaking of the removal of the flaw serve the purpose of eulogising that enjoined sacrifice. When it so happens that between the offering of two cakes there is no other action to be performed, then we have what is called the flaw of '*jami*' and hence the mention of the 'removal of *jami*' must be taken as eulogising that action which would be laid down as to be performed between the two offerings; and from this it follows that in the case in question, what has to be eulogised in the sacrifice *Upāṁśu*, which is distinctly laid down as to be performed '*in the interim*'; while in the sentences '*Viṣṇu, etc.*,' we find described the '*removing of the jami*,' which is the eulogy required by the aforesaid *Upāṁśu* sacrifice; and consequently we disregard the injunctive character of these sentences, because their injunctiveness is nowhere found to be required, and hence all of them come to be taken as mere eulogistic sentences. Specially as we do not find the "interim" mentioned as to the time, in the sentences, '*Viṣṇu, etc.*'; and as such the '*jami*' with a mention of which the context was introduced, not having any direct connection with these sentences, these cannot be taken as embodying the Injunctions of any action for that '*jami*'; and hence too the '*removing of jami*' mentioned in these sentences cannot be taken as eulogising these latter Injunctions. On the other hand, that action, which is mentioned directly in connection with the time '*interim*' is distinctly found to be the object of Injunction by the sentence that begins with the mention of '*jami*'; and then on this ground the other sentences come to have their use in eulogising that action; under the circumstances, it is scarcely right to accept an Injunction that we entail the assumption of many imperceptible elements.

And further, in the case of the sentences '*Viṣṇu, etc.*,' these being taken as connecting the sacrifices with the *Viṣṇu, etc.*, the 'sacrifice' would be *indirectly* implied as subordinate to that connection; and so long as a directly expressed sacrifice is available (in the sentence *Upāṁśum, etc.*) it is not right to accept an indirectly implied sacrifice to be enjoined.

That is to say, the affix 'tavya' in the 'yastavyah' is in the passive and as such the predominant factor in the sentence is 'Viṣṇu' to whom the 'sacrifice' is subordinate (sentence meaning etymologically that *Viṣṇu is the objective of the sacrifice*); and the performability of the sacrifice could be only inferred indirectly from the sentence,—the factor of the 'sacrifice' being extracted out of the word 'yastavyah' and this would be scarcely proper; because we have a direct Injunction of the sacrifice in the sentence 'antara yajati.' Even though it were possible for the sentence 'Viṣṇu' to be taken apart from the sentence 'antara yajati' yet all that they could do would be to lay down the Deities for that sacrifice which is laid down as to be performed in the 'interim' (in the sentence *antara*, etc.); and they could not lay down distinct Actions.

As a matter of fact, it is not possible even for the Deity to be laid down by such sentences. Because the word 'yastavyah' in these does not signify either the Deity or *that to which something is given*; because all that they actually signify is a *material subordinate* (belonging) to the sacrifice; consequently what we have to do is to take the potency of the *objective* as the predominant element; and as such what the word would signify would be what is signified by the Accusative case-ending; and certainly that does not establish the Character of the Deity. Because the root 'yaji' meaning 'to give away' its actual objective is *that which is given away*, and hence the only possible explanation would be that the deity approached by the object given away, comes subsequently to be indirectly connected with the sacrifice. But in this way, the words come to have two objectives; and, hence in accordance with the Sūtra *sampatīḥ śabdārthaḥ* [H. iv. 23] what happens is that the objective, in the shape of the thing given away, is set aside, and another, in the shape of the Deity worshipped, becomes manifested; and the verb thereby coming to be recognised to have only one objective (in the shape of the Deity worshipped); it is only after its Dative potency has been wholly suppressed, that the Deity could be spoken of as the objective, as in the sentence 'Viṣṇum yajati' (in the Active Voice) or *Viṣṇuryastavyah* (in the Passive Voice). And certainly in this we do not find any denotation of the Deity; all that we find in the character of Deity (of *Viṣṇu*) is indirectly indicated by the apparent inconsistency of its objective character. And consequently, in taking this sentence as an independent Injunction, we would have to get at the requisite *Bhāvanā* only by undertaking all the trouble of assuming a Deity. And certainly in comparison with all these assumptions, it is more reasonable by far to take the sentence as a mere Arthavāda (of the sacrifice laid down in 'antara yajati'.)

गुणोपबन्धात् ॥ ११ ॥

गुण Guṇa, property. उपबन्धात् Upavandhāt, on account of mention.

11. Because the property is mentioned.—11.

COMMENTARY.

That action (is enjoined by the sentence ‘antara etc.’) in connection with which we find the property of *Upamśu* mentioned in the sentence ‘*Upamśu paurṇamāsyām yajāt*,’ which serve the purpose of laying down the time (*Paurṇamāsi*) for the sacrifice. But this sentence is not the original injunction of the said property; because the sentence not embodying an injunction of a sacrifice, the said injunction of the property would involve the injunction of many things (which is highly objectionable). And for this reason we must take the sentence *upamśu* ‘*paurṇamāsyam*, etc., as only describing that which has been enjoined by the sentence *antara*, etc.

प्राये वचनाच्च ॥ १२ ॥

प्राये Prāye, as if it were. वचनात् Vachanāt, on account of mention. च Cha, also.

12. Also because the sacrifice in question is mentioned in Vedic texts as if it were a primary sacrifice.—12.

COMMENTARY.

We find the sentence *Hridayamupamśuyajāt* which eulogises the *Upamśu* sacrifice as if it were (*Prāya*) the principal limb (heart) of the sacrificial person; and thus clearly shows that it is a primary (and not secondary) sacrifice.

Adhikarāṇa V.—The Aghāra, etc., are independent actions.

SŪTRAS II. 11. 13 to 16.

“आघारान्निहोत्रमरूपत्वात्” ॥ १३ ॥

आघारान्निहोत्रम् Aghāragnihotram, the Aghāra and the agnihotra. अरूपत्वात् Arūpa-twāt, because they have no forms.

13. “The Aghāra and the Agnihotra (merely refer to other sacrifices) because we do not find mentioned in the Veda the forms (the accessory details) of these sacrifices.”—13.

COMMENTARY.

[This *adhikarāṇa* is based upon two sets of passages: (1) We have the sentences ‘*Urdhvamāgharayati*,’ ‘*Santatāmāgharayati*’ and ‘*rjum*

agharayati followed by *agharam agharayati*; and (2) we have the sentences '*dadhnâ juhoti*,' and '*payasâ juhoti*,' etc., followed by '*agnihotram juhoti*.' And the question is as to whether the two sentences '*agharamagharayati*' and '*agnihotram juhoti*' lay down actions totally distinct from those mentioned in the preceding sentences, or they only refer to those same actions? And the position taken up by the *Pûrvapakṣa* is that the sentence '*agharamagharayati*' only refers collectively to the set of actions mentioned by the sentences '*ûrdhavam*, etc.,' and so also with the sentence '*agnihotram juhoti*.' Nor can this *Adhikaraṇa* be said to have been included in the foregoing one; because]. The *Aghara* and the *Homa* that present themselves to the mind on the utterance of the sentence '*Urdhva-magharayati*' and '*payasâ juhoti*' are exactly as they are pointed out by these sentences; nor in this case is there a suppression of the *Bhâvanâs* of the *yâja* and the *homa* by the supervening character of the material; as we have in the case of the sentence '*Viṣṇurupâṃśu yaṣṭaryah*,' and further, in the case in question the various sentences cannot be taken together as forming a single sentence (as in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*); nor does any of the two parties admit of the sentences being mere eulogistic ones; and hence the Injunction would be an absolute one, of the Action, just as (in the previous case) you hold it to be that of the Accessory.

That is to say, we do not, as in the case of the sentences '*upâṃśu*, etc., admit the fact of all the sentences in question forming a single sentence; nor do they serve the purposes of glorification; and hence according to both parties the sentences come to be accepted as Injunctions and the only question that arises is as to whether the Injunction is one of the Accessory only, or that of the Action accompanied by that Accessory? And on this we have the following

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

"The Injunction is one of the Action. Because the Injunctiveness being mentioned by the Affix, can never belong to the Noun. It may be urged that the Injunction of the Noun would follow from the *Bhâvanâ*, but in that case, it would be the *Bhâvanâ* that would be enjoined first.

That is to say, the Injunctive character does not rest with the words '*dadhi*' and the rest; and being expressed by the Affix, that character could not be related to the *curd*, etc., except by means of the *Bhâvanâ* and the *Root-meaning*. For we have no such sentence as *dadhnâ-yut* (the *yut* being the injunctive affix only, apart from the Verbal Root); the sentence that we have is (*dadhnâ kuryât* where the relationship of the *dadhi* with the affix is through the root '*kr.*' Thus then the performability of the

dadhi etc., being due solely to the *Bhâvanâ* and the *Root-meaning*—how is it that these letters are denied to be the objects of the Injunction? For, certainly, without the Injunction of these we can never point out any Injunction of the Accessory. Because no sooner do we proceed to show such an Injunction than the Injunction of the *Bhâvanâ* and the *Root-meaning* presents itself forcibly. Consequently we must admit that what is enjoined is either the *Homa* or the *Bhâvanâ* as qualified by the *dadhi*.

And, then each of the *Bhâvanâs*, being duly recognised as having distinct accessory details of its own, the very fact of their following one after the other, points to the fact of their forming a single collective whole; and it follows that it is this collective whole that is meant by the sentence '*agnihotram juhoti*.' And the use of this reference lies in the unification of the Injunctions of the *means* and the *result* of these sacrifices. And thus *dadhi* and the other materials, each belonging to a distinct Action by itself, we are saved the undue necessity of taking them as optional alternatives.

In the same manner, in the case of the sentences '*Ūrdhvamagharayati*, etc., etc., though we do not find the material or the Deity of these mentioned, yet in accordance with the rule laid down in connection with *upâṃśu* qualifications of *ūrdhva* etc. may be taken as specifying differentias; and through these those Actions being taken as having their accessories mentioned, it is only the action mentioned by the sentence *agharam agharayati* that remains without a mention of its accessory details; and as such being wholly incapable of attracting men towards itself, it has to be taken as a mere reference to the previously mentioned sacrifices. And in that case, too, the use of such reference lies in the unification (of the three sacrifices) which is necessary for the purpose of the employing in them of the *mantra ida urdhas adhvāra* etc., and the connection of the single Deity mentioned in the sentences (*tasyagharamagharya*, etc.)

“संज्ञोपबन्धात्” ॥ १४ ॥

संज्ञा Samjñā, names. उपबन्धात् Upavandhāt, presence.

14. “Because distinct names are given.”—14.

COMMENTARY.

“And further, names are employed only with a view to pointing out a certain definite peculiarity; and in the case in question we do not perceive what these peculiarities are (that are pointed out by the names '*agharā*' and '*agnihotra*' unless we take them as referring to the foregoing sacrifices). If the name '*agnihotra*' were taken only as pointing to *Homa* in



“अप्रकृतत्वात्” ॥ १५ ॥

15. Because it is not related to the context.—15.

चोदना वा शब्दार्थस्य प्रयोगभूतत्वात्, तत्सन्निधेर्गुणार्थेन पुनः श्रुतिः ॥ १६ ॥

16. They are really Injunctions of independent Action because the words distinctly express something to be performed and the repetition of the same words is for the purpose of laying down accessory details.—16.

It is clearly perceived that the words '*agharayati*' (in '*agharama-gharayati*') and '*juhoti*' (in '*agnihotram juhoti*') not having their Injunctive potency taken up by any other word, cannot but distinctly express the injunction of definite actions. Nor can it be urged that the actions of '*Aghara*' and '*Homa*' are already enjoined by the sentences '*ârdhvan, etc.,*'

and 'dadhnâ, etc.,' because the Injunctive potency of these sentences is taken up by laying down of the accessories in the shape of 'ârdhva' and 'dadhi,' which are not laid down by any other sentence ; and as such we cannot very well discard the idea of these sentences merely referring (by the words 'agharyati' and juhoti') to the actions of *Aghara* and *Homa* (enjoined by the two former sentences).

Whenever we come across the Injunction of a qualified Action what we have to consider in the first sentence, is what factor of the object of Injunction is such as has been laid down elsewhere and what is not so ; and when this has been duly discriminated, the Injunction comes to be taken as pertaining wholly to that factor which has not been laid down elsewhere ; in the case of the sentence 'dadhnâ juhoti,' as the object of injunction is the action of 'Homa as qualified by dadhi,' when we find that the *Homa* has already been laid down by the sentence 'agnihotram juhoti,' we conclude the Injunction in question to pertain to the *dadhi* only, and the *Bhâvanâ* and the *Root-meaning* (denoted in 'dadhnâ juhoti') are said to be mere references to those enjoined elsewhere ; and it is never said that from the very beginning the sentence 'dadhnâ juhoti' enjoins only the accessory with reference to the previously enjoined *Bhâvanâ* and *Root-meaning*.

The arguments of the *Pûrvapakṣa* are thus disposed of in the *Tantra Vârtika*.

(1) As for the names 'Agnihotra' and 'Aghara' they can be explained as serving the purpose of pointing out the peculiarity indicated by the verbs 'juhoti' and 'agharayati' and in the present instance, they serve to distinguish the two actions in question from all other actions (of *Homa* and *Aghara*) ; on the ground of these two being enjoined.

(2) As for the absence of the accessory details (as urged under *Sâtra* 15), we find that the material and the Deity are distinctly pointed out by the context. Nor can it be urged that there being no *method* mentioned in the injunctive sentence (that there would be no context) ; because no such *method* would be looked for until the relationship with the Result had been established.

(3) Nor it is possible for us to have the Injunction of the Result with regard to an Action of which the Material and the Deity have not been laid down. Because the Result might very well be laid down with regard to the *Homa* only, of which the material and the Deity might be mentioned later on ; and there would be no incongruity in this.

(4) As a matter of fact, in similar cases, we do admit of reference to previously enjoined actions. But the acceptance of this reference always depends upon the fact of the action referred to being one that

has been already enjoined (or mentioned) ; and as such it always stands in need of recognising the Actions as the same as that which has been previously enjoined.

(5) The mere fact of the *Aghara* being mentioned in another *Prakarana* does not do away with all the intervening *Prakaranas* of the *Aghara*. Because even in the case of the *Aghara* (as laid down by the sentence '*agharamagharayati*') the conjugational affix always raises in us a desire to know the *Object*, the *Instrument* and the *Method* of the action ; and hence it is quite possible for the material and the Deity to be indicated by the *Prakarana* (as the said desire could be fulfilled only by an indication of these).

Then again, your theory would necessitate the assumption of many unseen factors. Because you make each of the sentences '*dadhnâ juhoti*' etc. and '*urdhvamagharayati*,' etc., lay down an independent Action, and we do not find any deity laid down either for the *Homa* of *dadhi* or for the *ûrdhva aghara*, etc., and in the case of the sentence '*urdhvamagharayati*,' the material too is not mentioned, and inasmuch as you hold each of them to be the injunction of an independent action, they could not be taken as laying down the *materials*, etc., for one another.

For these reasons it must be said as we have put it.

(6) It has been argued above that in the sentence '*agnihotram juhoti*,' if the first word were to express an action, then, inasmuch as an Action could never be the objective, the accusative ending (in '*agnihotram*') would be wholly inexplicable. In reply to this we urge that an action can be the objective of such verbs as *Saṅkalpa* (determination) and the like ; and as such the accusative ending in '*agnihotram*' could be explained as with reference to the determination implied by the word '*juhoti*' and as such there is nothing incongruous in the accusative ending in '*agnihotram*.'

Adhikarana VI.—The Paśuyâga and the Somayâga are independent actions.

SŪTRAS 17 to 20.

द्रव्यसंयोगात् चोदना पशुसोमयोः प्रकरणे ह्यनर्थको द्रव्य-
संयोगो नहि तस्य गुणार्थेन ॥ १७ ॥

द्रव्यसंयोगात् Dravyasamyogât, on account of connection with certain materials.
चोदना Chodanâ, injunction, पशुसोमयोः Paśusomyoh of the Paśuyâga and the Soma-
yâga. प्रकरणे Prakaraṇe, in the context. हि Hi, as. अनर्थको Anarthako, would be



17. Because of the connection with certain materials the words, 'Paśu, etc.' and 'Soma, etc.' contain injunctions; as in the context the mention of the mere material would be useless—specially because the words do not serve the purpose of laying down accessory materials.—17.

(1) We have a sentence '*Pasumâlabhetâ*' and in continuation of this we have the sentences '*hridayasyâgre vadyati, atha jihvâya athavakṣasâḥ*.' (2) Then again we have the sentence '*Somena yajati*' and in its continuation, the sentences '*Aindravâjavan grihṇâti, maitravaruṇam grihṇâti*,' etc. And the question that arises is this: Is *Âlabheta* a mere reference to the actions laid down by '*avadyati*' and is '*yajeta*' a mere reference to those laid down by '*grihṇâti*' or do they lay down independent actions by themselves? The question is ultimately stated in the following form: Is the word '*Paśu*' a mere reference to the *hridaya*, etc., and the word '*yaji*' to the sacrifices implied by the word '*avadyati*' or do they lay down an independent '*yâga*' and '*Paśu*' (as its material), the other sentences only serving to point out their accessory details? In the same manner, the question with reference to the other set of sentences is this: Is the word '*yajeta*,' a mere reference to the sacrifice implied by the relationship of the material and the Deity, as mentioned in the sentences '*âindravâyavam*, etc.'; and the word '*Soma*' to the juice used at those sacrifices or the sentences '*Somena yajeta*' lays down an independent action together with the material to be used in it?

The words in question are mere references to a number of actions taken collectively.

Because as in the case of the sentences '*Yadâgneyosṭakapâḥ*,' etc., the real end of the sentence is not served until the 'sacrifice' has been inferred (because the cake cannot be spoken of as '*Âgneya*' until it has been *offered in sacrifice* to the Deity *Agni*)—So also in the case of the sentences '*Aindravâyavam*,' etc., their full signification would not be accomplished until they implied a sacrifice (at which the *Soma* would be offered to *Indravâyu*, when alone it could be spoken of as *Aindravâyavam*). That is to say, the relationship of the Deity and the material mentioned in the

word '*Aindravâyavam*' cannot be complete until a sacrifice has been implied, and so long as the sentence itself is not complete, it cannot stand in need of any other sentence (in the shape of '*Somena yajeta*,' for which according to the Siddhânta it would lay down as accessory detail); and as such the sacrifice mentioned by the sentence '*Somenâ yajeta*' could not yet come in as the sacrifice sought after; nor, on the other hand, would it be possible for the sentences '*Aindravâyavam*,' etc., to lay down the Deities for the sacrifice laid down by the sentence '*Somena yajeta*'; which having no Deity mentioned, is wanting in an accessory detail of another sacrifice, we are forced to admit that that spoken of in the sentence '*Somena yajeta*' is a mere reference to those sacrifices that have been laid down in the context (by the sentences '*Aindravâyavam grîhñâti*,' etc.)

In answer to the above the Siddhânta, as put forward by the Bhâṣya, is as follows :—

It is only when the sacrifice mentioned in a sentence is actually recognised to be the same as those mentioned before, that we take it to be a mere reference to these; in the case in question, however, we do not find this to be the case.

That is to say, if in the case in question we recognised the sacrifice to be exactly the same in all its details as those mentioned before,—as we do in the case of the *Purnamâsa* sacrifice, then we could take the sentence as a mere reference. If again, the sentence were held to be a reference to the root '*yaji*' alone, then we could conclude it to be a reference bereft of the qualifications. In the cases in question, however, we find the sacrifices mentioned before are—(1) those that have the '*Hridaya*,' etc., and (2) those having the juice, for the material to be offered; while the sacrifices mentioned by the sentences in question have, for their materials, the *Paśu* and the *Soma*, respectively; and thus these letters not being recognised to be the same as the former ones, we cannot take these sentences to be mere references to the former sacrifices.

The Vârtika is not satisfied with the above presentment of the Adhikaraṇa. Against the above statement of the Siddhânta it quotes the following argument of the opponent :—

In the case of the *Aṣṭakapâla* cake, etc., though we find that these cakes are directly laid down as the materials, yet we accept the corn (*Vrihi*) as the material, though this is pointed out only by syntactical connection; and in the same manner we could accept the '*Soma*' as the enjoined material. It is only when there is a contradiction between two things that the stronger sets aside the weaker; and this is not the case when two things are quite compatible with one another. In the case in

question we find that the '*Soma*' is quite compatible with the *juice* because this latter stands in need of something from which it could be extracted and the *Soma-plant* comes in as fulfilling this requirement. For instance, in the case of the sentence '*Āgneyo'stakapālah*,' etc., though we find that the '*Aṣṭakapāla*' is directly laid down by the sentence, yet when the *Vrihi* and the *Yava* come to be laid down as the materials, there is no contradiction ; for these corns are actually required as the material out of which the *Aṣṭakapāla* cake would be made ; and certainly in taking up the *Vrihi* one does not give up the making of the *Aṣṭakapāla* ; and hence in this case the action with reference to which *Vrihi* is laid down as the material is not recognised as any other than that for which the '*Aṣṭakapāla*' has been laid down. Exactly in the same manner, in the case in question, in taking up the *Somaplant*, one does not give up the *juice*, and hence there being no incompatibility between the two, inasmuch as the *Soma* mentioned in the sentence in question can very well be taken as the material for the sacrifices laid down by the other sentences, the sentence in question cannot be taken as laying down a distinct Action, merely on the ground of a difference in the materials mentioned. And further, the argument applies equally to the *Siddhānta* also ; because the *Siddhānta* also does not hold that the *unpounded soma plant* is to be offered at the sacrifice ; and hence just as for you the *plant* would only be the source of the *juice*, so also would it be for *Pārvapakṣin*. As a matter of fact, it is your own theory that would be the more incongruous of the two. For in your case, if the *Plant*, as mentioned in the ~~originative~~ Injunction, were to be the sole means of accomplishing the sacrifice, then it would never do to turn it into *juice*, in accordance with other sentences. In our case, inasmuch as the *juice* would not be possible without its origin (in the shape of the *Plant*), our sentence be always on the look-out for the mention of this source ; and hence even if such source happens to be mentioned by another sentence, there is nothing incongruous in our having recourse to it. In your case, on the other hand, inasmuch as the original *Plant* itself is quite capable of being offered bodily by itself, it does not stand in the need of any mention of its modifications ; and as such any connection of these would be wholly incompatible, consequently we could not accept any such connection as laid down by other sentences.

In view of these arguments, based as they are on the firm ground of such examples as the aforesaid injunction of *Vrihi*, etc., which completely shut out our mouth, it is best for us not to start the question of the Injunction of Materials, and to confine ourselves solely to the refutation of the view of the sentences in question being mere references to previously

mentioned sacrifices. In the case of the *Paśu*, however, as the animal as a whole is not capable of being bodily offered at a sacrifice, the above arguments of the opponent would not apply; and hence for this case alone the argument of the Injunction of different materials would be a good one for the *Siddhānta*. But in the case of '*Soma*' it becomes necessary for us to refute the opponent's arguments based upon the Injunction of the *Vṛihi*; and for this purpose we have the next *Sūtra*.

Or, we may take it thus—that having refuted the former *Siddhānta* arguments (by means of the arguments based upon the Injunction of *Vṛihi*) the true conclusion is arrived at by means of the arguments embodied in the following *Sūtra*.

Or, lastly, we can take the present *Sūtra* as embodying the *Pārvapakṣa* and the next *Sūtra*,—in which the '*cha*' may be taken in the sence of '*tu*' (which is a sign of the '*Siddhānta-Sūtra*') as putting forth the *Siddhānta*.

It may be asked how the present *Sūtra* can be taken as expressing the *Pārvapakṣa*. This we proceed to explain as follows:—

The question being,—do the sentences '*hridayasya*, etc.,' and '*Aindravāyavam*, etc.,' serve the purpose of laying down accessory details, like the *Dadhi*, etc., and the subsequent sentences (*Paśum* etc., and *Somena*, etc.) are the originative Injunctions of the sacrifices concerned?—or do the former sentences themselves serve as the Injunctions of Sacrifices? We have the following

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

The sentence '*Hridayasya*, etc.,' or '*Aindravāyavam*, etc.,' do not serve the purpose of laying down accessory details, like the sentences '*Dadhnā juhoti*' and the rest; in fact these themselves are original Injunctions. Why? *Because of the mention of materials, i.e.,* because of the mention of such materials as '*Hridaya*, etc.,' these sentences are the Injunctions of the *Paśu* and the *Soma*, as otherwise, through the *context* the connection of '*Hridaya*, etc.,' would become subsidiary to the sacrifice while as a matter of fact, it is not possible for this connection to serve as its accessory, because that would be contrary to the *Paśu* and the *Soma-plant* laid down in the original Injunctive sentences. Or in accordance with a previous law, the *Paśu* and the *Soma* having been obtained from other sentences, the mention of the connection of materials, in the present context, would in your theory be wholly useless. In my theory, on the other hand, the word *Soma* (in '*Somena yajeta*') is the name of the sacrifice, and the sentence '*Agniṣṭomīyam paśum*' serves the purpose of laying down the Deity '*Agni-Soma*'; and thus none of these two sentences making mention of

any material, the mention of materials in the other sentences is not at all superfluous. Consequently we conclude that the real Injunctions of the sacrifice are contained in the sentences '*Hridayasya*, etc.,' and '*Aindravāyavam* etc.,' (and the sentences '*Agniṣṭomīyam*, *paśum*, etc.,' and '*Somena yajeta*' are mere references to these sacrifices taken collectively,—the former serving the purpose of pointing out the Deity for the offerings of the pieces, and the latter supplying the name of the sacrifices taken collectively.)

The Vārtika takes the next Sūtra as embodying the Siddhānta of the Adhikarāṇa while the Bhāṣya takes it as meeting certain Pūvapakṣa arguments.

अचोदकाश्च संस्काराः ॥ १८ ॥

अचोदकाः Achodakāḥ, cannot be injunctive. च Cha, further. संस्काराः Saṃskārāḥ, laying down purificatory rites.

18. But as (laying down) purificatory rites they cannot be injunctive (of independent Actions).—18.

COMMENTARY.

The sentences in question cannot be taken as mere references to previous sacrifices, *because of these latter not being the sacrifices treated of by the context*,—an argument that has already been explained on a previous occasion in Sūtra II. ii. 10.

Question : "But how is it that these are not the sacrifices treated of by the context?"

Answer : Because the words '*avadyati*' and '*grihṇāti*' are not injunctive of sacrifices; as what they do is only to lay down certain purificatory or preparatory rites; because they are actually found to end with them: as when a sentence is actually found to have its sole ending in the pointing out of such rites, there is no ground for assuming a sacrifice to be indirectly indicated.

Thus, then, the actions (mentioned in the sentences '*Aindravāyavam*, etc.,') having the character of mere Preparatory Actions, they stand in need of the mention of a '*sacrifice*' somewhere else: and as such there would be nothing incongruous in the fact of such a sacrifice being laid down by another sentence (*Somena yajeta*), etc.

And our way of taking the sentences has the following advantage. (1) The singular number in '*Jyotiṣṭomena*' becomes capable of being taken directly (and not figuratively as necessitated by the *Pūrvapakṣa*, which makes it refer to many sacrifices), (2) we are saved the useless trouble

of accepting the word 'Soma' (in 'Somena yajeta') as a second name for the 'Jyotiṣṭoma,' (3) nor is it necessary for us to accept the apparently useless fact of the sentence in question being a reference to all the other sentences, as in the case of the Pūrvapakṣa in connection with 'Aghārāgnihoṭra.'

For these reasons we conclude that the sentences in question are injunctions of the *Animal* and the *Soma* sacrifices.

**तद्भेदात् कर्मणोऽभ्यासो द्रव्यपृथक्त्वादनर्थकं हि स्यात्
भेदो द्रव्यगुणीभावात् ॥ १६ ॥**

तद्भेदात् Tadbhedāt, because of difference. कर्मणः Karmṇaḥ, of the action. अभ्यासः Abhyāsaḥ, repetition. द्रव्यपृथक्त्वात् Dravyaprithaktvāt, as the substances are distinct. अनर्थकं Anarthakam, useless. हि Hi, because. स्यात् Syāt, it would be. भेदः Bhedaḥ, difference. द्रव्यगुणी भावात् Dravyagunībhāvāt, as it is subservient to the substance.

19. Because of difference, there is a repetition of the Action, as the substances are distinct, it would be useless (to mention another connection); hence there is a difference (in the *Grahana*); specially as it is subservient to the substance.—19.

COMMENTARY.

On account of the connection of the deity being different in each case,—there must be a repetition of the action of *grahana*; because on account of the distinctness of the substance that is to be prepared or purified by means of the *grahana* in connection with the said deities, if any other connection were mentioned, it would be wholly useless as it would not be performed; and hence, there is a difference of the *grahana*, because it is subservient to the substance to be purified (by that *grahana*).

The Vārtika has suggested another interpretation of the Sūtra also, it is as follows:—'tadbhedāt'—i.e., because of the diversity of the prepared 'Soma'—there is a repetition of the action of sacrifice; 'because of the separateness of the material accepted';—if all of them were not offered up, the whole 'would be useless'; and hence even though in the original Injunction, the sacrifice has been mentioned but once yet 'there is a diversity' of its performance, because of the fact of the originally enjoined 'substance being subservient to the various conditions mentioned in other sentences.

The substance, too, must be offered in the same way as it has been held in the various cups as, if the whole thing were to be mixed up again,

the previous holding into separate cups would become wholly useless ; and the deities, to whom the cupfuls have been previously dedicated, would not become connected with (possessed of) their specified shares ; nor is it possible for all the deities to be referred to at the time of the (single) offering, hence it is not possible for people, afraid of repetition, to mix up all the juice and make a single offering of it ; specially as even if this were done, it would lead to a confusion of the shares (previously specified). And when the shares have been once separately specified, it becomes necessary for the other party to clear up the said confusion, unless of course he has a scriptural text distinctly laying down such confusion. Thus then, it being necessary to make the offering as previously determined, it is only when all the deities (and the *grahanas* as taken collectively, that the following sentence—*daśaitānadhvaryuh prātaḥsavane grihṇāti, āśvino daśamo grihṇāti tam tritīyam juhōti* etc., etc., (laying down the definite order and the summing up of the various ‘*grahanas*’ becomes explicable.)

Thus then we conclude that the whole forms a single action (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

The use of the present *Adhikarāṇa* lies in the fact that, according to the *pūrvapakṣa*, among the sacrifices subsidiary to the same sacrifice (the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), we would have the performance of the details with regard to one cup, and that, too, only once ; whereas, according to the *Siddhānta*, the whole thing has to be done exactly as in the Primary Sacrifice (the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

संस्कारस्तु न भिद्येत, परार्थत्वात् द्रव्यस्य गुणभूतत्वात् ॥ २० ॥

संस्कारः Sanskārah, the purificatory action. तु Tu, however. न भिद्येत Na Bhidyeta, would not differ. परार्थत्वात् Parārthatvāt, on account of being for the sake of something else. द्रव्यस्य Daryasya, of the substance. गुणभूतत्वात् Guṇabhutatvāt, because it has a subordinate position.

20. The purificatory action would not differ because the substance being for the sake of something else has a subordinate position.—20.

COMMENTARY.

In the *Pūrvapakṣa* it has been argued that in the case of the tying of the animal there are a number of texts laying down the tethering post to be of *Khadira*, *Palāśa*, etc., and this tying being a purificatory act the various trees mentioned have been regarded as optional alternatives. In the same manner it has been urged in the case of the many deities mentioned also *Indra*, *Vāyu*, etc., these should be regarded as optional alternatives.

In answer to this argument the Sūtra points out that the analogy put forward does not hold good. In the case of the tethering post the several kinds of wood are laid down clearly for the purpose of accomplishing a purification. Hence there could be no necessity for the using of all the words, for which reason they are taken as optional alternatives. In the case of the deities on the other hand the passages under consideration do not mention them as accomplishing the sacrifice. Consequently not being subservient to anything they must be regarded as equally independent and hence every one of them has to be adopted.

It may be noted that this Sūtra has been omitted by Kumārila in his Vārtika.

Adhikaraṇa VII.—Actions differentiated by means of number.

SŪTRA II. ii. 21.

पृथक्त्वनिवेशात् संख्यया कर्मभेदः स्यात् ॥ २१ ॥

पृथक्त्वनिवेशात् Prithaktvanivesāt, because of its separateness. *संख्यया* Saṅkhyayā, by means of number. *कर्मभेदः* Karmabhedah, differentiation of actions. *स्यात्* Syāt, would be.

21. Because of the fact of its inhering in separateness, number would serve to differentiate the Actions.—21.

The treatment of the three exceptions to the law relating to the Reception of words has been finished, and we now proceed to show how Actions are differentiated (or distinguished) means by of number.

In this connection we should cite such sentences as 'tisra āhutir-yuhoti,' 'dvādaśa dvādaśāni juhoti' which are laid down as co-extensive with the actions enjoined by previous originaive injunctions, and which are accompanied by definite numbers.

And on this, we have the following :—

Pārvapakṣa (A).—Inasmuch as the word 'juhoti' is mentioned but once, the action laid down is one only ; and as for the Number (three, etc.) it could be made up by frequent repetition of the same Action.

Siddhanta (A).

To the above we make the following reply :—

Siddhanta (A).—In the case in question the number is mentioned in connection with the *Homa*, while it is being enjoined, and not after it has been enjoined as in the case of the sentence 'Ekadaśaprayajan,' and without an idea of 'separateness' the number does not attain its true character.

Nor can the number be said to be made up by a repetition of the same Action; because it is only when there is no other way of explaining the number that it is held to be made up by *Repetitions* as in the case of the *Prayajas*, the *Upasadas* and the like, which have had their own limits previously specified. In the case in question, however, inasmuch as no other number of the Action has been previously specified the number (*three*) must be taken as pointing out the separate character of the Actions themselves. And hence as the number is found to inhere in the Separateness of the actions themselves, we can not accept it as referring to the Separateness due to the mere repetition of the same action; as we shall show later on, under the Sūtra 'Agamādvā' *bhyāsasyāśentaticāt*—(X. V. 16).

The above is the presentation of the Adhikarāṇa according to Kumāṛila. He has taken for his basic text a passage in which the differentiating number refers to the action. The Bhāṣya, however, has taken for its basic text the sentence 'Saplādaṣa prayāpatyān paśūn ālabhet' while the numbers pertain not to the action but to the animals. The Vārtika points out that the Bhāṣya has chosen this text because it is more difficult to prove that the number pertaining to an accessory detail differentiates actions than to prove the same with regard to the number pertaining to the action itself.

Adhikarāṇa VIII.—The differentiations of Actions by names.

SŪTRA II. ii. 22.

संज्ञा चोत्पत्तिसंयोगात् ॥ २२ ॥

संज्ञा Sañjñā, name. च Cha, also. उत्पत्तिसंयोगात् Utpattisamyogāt, because of its occurring in the originative injunction.

22. Name also (serves to distinguish Actions) because of its occurring in the originative Injunctions.—22.

COMMENTARY.

The differentiation of Actions by means of Accessories and context, bristling with many discussions, is postponed for a future occasion; and we proceed to consider the case of name.

[In connection with the sentence 'Athaiṣā jyotiḥ atha viśvajyotiḥ, atha sarvajyotiḥ' there arises the following doubt—Do these names only serve to refer to the Jyotiṣṭoma for the purpose of laying down 'a thousand' as the sacrificial gifts in connection with it? Or do they lay down

other Actions at which that is the sacrificial gift? And on this we have the following]—

Pārvaapakṣa.—Inasmuch as the words ‘*atha*’ and ‘*eṣa*’ stand in need of something that has gone before, and as the rejection of the original subject and the taking up another is a faulty process,—it follows that the various names apply to the single sacrifice ‘*Jyotiṣṭoma*’ for which, as in the case of the ‘*Dakṣāyana*’ Sacrifice another detail (in the shape of the gift of a ‘thousand’) is laid down. And when we already have a sentence ‘*Jyotiṣṭomena Svargakāmo Yajeta*’ that lays down the connection between the material and the result, if we accept the words in question to be the names of the same Actions, we are saved the necessity of assuming—(1) another Action, (2) an *Apūrva* in keeping with that Action, and (3) wholly unheard-of methods for the accomplishment of that *Apūrva*, etc., etc., and there would be the further advantage that as the mention of the gift of ‘a thousand’ could be taken as laying down a method of procedure with regard to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we would not have to get aside this sacrifice (which forms the original subject of the context). If the sentences in question were to be Injunctions of other Actions, there would be no use for the word ‘*atha*’ which refers to something gone before; for one sacrifice does not stand in need of another; nor does any significance attach to any order of sequence among the sacrifices (that are independent of one another) as we shall show later on. And hence the word ‘*atha*’ cannot be taken as signifying this order of sequence. Nor does the Name express a *Bhāvanā* nor is the *Root-meaning* found to be mixed up with the Name, in the sentence in question, as is the case with the root ‘*yaji*’ (which is often mixed up with names of Sacrifices), and as such there could be no idea of difference among the *Root-meaning*. Nor again is the Name an *injunctive word*, whereby it could urge people to other (actions than the *Jyotiṣṭoma*); and so long as the human agent is not urged into activity, even if a difference could be *cognised*, we could attach no significance to it exactly as we do with regard to the singular number in ‘*graham*’ (in the sentence *graham sammârṣti*). The *injunctive word* (in the sentence *Etena Sahasradakṣiṇena yajeta*) that we have in connection with these sentences, is taken up by the mention of the accessory detail (in the shape of the sacrificial gift of ‘a thousand’); and as such it cannot pertain to the form of any Action. If the *Injunctive words* were not thus set aside then, too, the difference of the two *Sacrifices* would be based upon the repetition of the word *yajeta* and not upon the Names.

The mention of a Result also does not give rise to the idea of difference among Actions, in accordance with the *Sūtra* II.iii.26. Or,

it may be that inasmuch as the (gift of a thousand rests upon the previously mentioned *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the particular result mentioned in connection with this gift may be taken as following from the employment of this accessory gift in connection with the same '*Jotiṣṭoma*,' just as the employing of different accessories (at the same sacrifice) such as '*dadhi*' and '*milking vessel*' is laid down, with a view to particular results (in the shape of the obtaining of an organ of sense and Cattle, respectively). And thus, too, the Action referred to cannot be a new one.

In the case of the word '*Jyotiṣ*,' etc. there is a further peculiarity: they form part of the name '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' and as such they cannot fail to give an idea of the '*Jyotiṣṭoma*'. Specially as we find the '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' actually spoken of as '*Jyotiḥ*' in the sentence '*Vasante Vasante Jyotiṣi*,' etc.

For these reasons, we conclude that inasmuch as in the case in question, we find none of the abovementioned grounds of diversity, viz.—Difference of words, Repetition of the same word, Number, the mention of an Accessory incompatible with the original Action, and a Difference of context—the actions referred to cannot be any other than the original '*Jyotiṣṭoma*.'

Siddhānta.—To the above we make the following reply: when no word expressive of the Action has been used, the name that happens to be mentioned first cannot but give rise to the idea of something new. That is to say, in a case where the Action has been already laid down by means of a previously pronounced verb, before the name comes to be mentioned, the unity or diversity of the Actions concerned having, in that case, already been ascertained elsewhere by means of the verb, the subsequently appearing Name would not distinguish the Actions. In the case in question, however, we find that the name is mentioned in connection with an Action that has yet to be laid down (by the subsequent sentence '*Etena Sahasradakṣiṇena yajeta*') and such like the number, it must be expressive of *Separateness*. Because in all cases, it is most improper to use one word in more than one sense, or to express one thing by more than one word; and hence whenever we come across a new thing, we look for a new name; and *vice versa* whenever we find a new name we look for a new thing. When, however, we directly perceive both of these to be the same that has been known before, then this perception sets aside the weaker authority of the aforesaid character of the name. But so long as there is no such recognition of identity, there is nothing to set aside the idea of difference naturally afforded by the difference of names.

For instance, in the case in question, we find that entirely different from the previously mentioned *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is, later on, a new name

atha gauḥ’; and as this latter has apparently no connection with what has gone before, it cannot bring about any idea thereof; and hence it gives rise to the notion of something else coloured by itself (i.e., the name *gauḥ*.) And then we proceed to look out, in what follows as well as in what has gone before, for that thing of which this is the name, and we find that all the ‘*yajatis*’ that has gone before refer to, and have been absorbed by the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and as such cannot refer to anything else or have any other name; but as for the ‘*yajati*’ that comes afterwards (in the sentence ‘*Ētena sahasradakṣiṇena yajeta*’) though, on account of the mention of the Result, the Injunctive potency is taken up by the laying down of something else (i.e., the accessory gift of ‘a thousand’), and as such the Injunction itself does not serve to distinguish the Action,—yet, inasmuch as according to Sūtra II. i. 49, on account of the intervention of an unconnected word ‘*gauḥ*’ (between the passages dealing with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the sentence ‘*Ath uṣa Jyotiḥ*’ etc.) the word ‘*gauḥ*’ does not very well fit into what has gone before; and hence the idea of what has gone before not presenting itself at the time that the sentence ‘*Atha gauḥ*’ appears, the continuance of the previous context is broken off, and the mind naturally seeks for something else; and the subsequent ‘*yajeta*’ presenting itself to the expectant mind and being incapable of referring to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, which is already possessed by another name and turns itself to an object other than the taking up of that the continuation of which has been broken off. Consequently then, the subsequent ‘*yati*’ being separated from the previous context, by the giver of the name ‘*gauḥ*’ cannot go over to it, nor does the previous context go over to it; and hence *per force* it goes over to another object.

Thus, then, the word ‘*atha*’ not being able to be taken as signifying either reference to what has gone before, or immediate sequence it is taken as serving the purpose of introducing another Action. The word ‘*esa*’ also, being expressive of that which is perceptibly near it, is as applicable to what has gone before as to what appears subsequently, because both are equally perceptibly proximate to it, and hence the signification of this word does not affect the discussion. Thus, then we conclude that in consideration of the direct signification of the words ‘*Jyotiḥ* etc.,’ these names must be taken as differentiating the Actions referred to by them from what has been mentioned before.

*Adhikarāṇa IX.—Differentiations of actions
through their deities.*

SŪTRA II. ii. 23—24.

गुणश्चापूर्वसंयोगे वाक्ययोः समत्वात् ॥ २३ ॥

गुणश्च Guṇaścha, an accessory also. अपूर्वसंयोगे Apūrvasamyoge, when it is a new one. वाक्ययोः Vākya-yoh, of the sentences. समत्वात् Samatvât, because of equal independence.

23. An accessory also (serves to differentiate actions) when it is a new one, and incapable of being connected with the foregoing (action) because both the sentences are equally independent of each other.—23.

COMMENTARY.

Before dealing with the differentiating of Actions by context, we proceed to consider the Diversity and Unity of Actions based upon their Accessories.

In connection with the Châturmâsya sacrifice with reference to the *Vaiśradeva Parva*, we find the sentence 'Vaiśradevyâmikṣû,' which serves to lay down the sacrifice implied by the connection between the material and the Deity herein mentioned; and following on this we find the sentence 'Vâjibhiyo Vâjnam.' And on this point there arises the following doubt: Does the second sentence lay down an accessory material for the sacrifice laid down by the former sentence or does it serve to lay down a distinct sacrifice implied by the particular connection of the material and the Deity mentioned in itself?

Though there was a third alternative also possible, namely, that both the material and the Deity mentioned in the second sentence are laid down with reference to the previous sacrifice, yet this has not been put forth, because it has been shown in the *Adhikarāṇa* dealing with the Paurṇamâsî sacrifice, that it is not possible for many accessories to be laid down in connection with an Action that has been already enjoined by a previous sentence.

Thus, then, the question comes to be this: Is the material *Vâjina* connected, in the previously laid down sacrifice, with the Deity (*Vaiśradevas*) of that sacrifice, or is it connected with another Deity (*Vâjî*) another sacrifice and another Apūrva!

On this, we have the following:—

Pūrvapakṣa—The second sentence serves to lay down the material *Vâjina* with regard to the previous sacrifice.

Because of the word *Vaji* being taken as one who has *Vâja* or food and the food meant being the *Âmikṣâ* that has been laid down in the immediately preceding sentence (*Vaiṣvadevyâmikṣhâ*) it is the action too referred to in this second sentence being the same as that laid down in the former sentence, what this second sentence does is to lay down a new material, in the shape of the *Vâjina*.

That is to say, we do not know of any such deities as the *Vâjis* and no unknown meaning of the words can serve to complete the meaning of a sentence; but as a rule wherever the meaning of a word as a whole is unknown, what we do is to accept the meaning that is afforded by its constituent parts; and in the case in question we find that in the first sentence, the *Viṣvadevas* are represented as '*Vaji*' because of their having *Âmikṣâ* (which is a food, *Vâja*) and then these same Deities being understood, in the second sentence, to be connected with the material '*Vâjina*' they cannot be set aside from this connection (because there is no other known meaning of the word *Vâji* as a whole). These Deities (*Viṣvadevas*) are already impressed with the connection of the sacrifice previously implied by the first sentence; consequently, when with a view to establishing their relationship with the material *Vâjina*, we come to assume a 'sacrifice' we find that there is no reason why we should set aside the sacrifice that is pointed out by the word '*Vâji*' (which is synonymous with *Viṣvadevas*, and as such points to the sacrifice implied in the former sentence); and while we have that sacrifice, there arises no further inconsistency with regard to anything else; and hence we conclude that in the second sentence we have the same sacrifice, the same *Apûrva* and the same Deity as those in the previous sacrifice, and as such there is no reason for assuming any other sacrifice.

For these reasons we conclude that in view of the two sentences in question, the two materials, *Âmikṣâ* and *Vâjina* must be taken as pertaining to the same sacrifice, to be employed in it either as optional alternatives or both jointly and that the action mentioned in the second sentence is not different from that laid down in the first.

To the above, we make the following reply :---

Siddhânta.—Inasmuch as the sacrifice laid down by the first sentence has already a material mentioned for it, another material (mentioned in the second sentence) cannot possibly belong to it; and hence the mention of such a material, for the sake of establishing its relevancy, could not but indicate another Action.

The meaning of the *Sûtra* thus comes to be this: Inasmuch as the *Guṇa* (material) is new and incapable of being connected with the

previous Action it gives rise to the idea of a distinct Action ; specially as the two sentences are equal, i.e., independent of each other. That is to say, each of the two connections between Deity and material (that the two sentences speak of), not allowing the presence of the other, as incompatible with itself, lays down a distinct Action.

The passage in question comprises two distinct sentences 'Vaiśvadevyāmikṣā' and 'Vajibhyovājinam' and the case of the two sentences is not alike as in the sentence 'Vaiśvadevyāmikṣā' there are two relationships : (1) The Relationship of the material and the Deity, and (2) the Relationship of the qualifier and the qualified ; and of these the former is directly mentioned by the words, while the latter is indicated by syntactical connection.

For this reason, the qualification of the word 'āmikṣā' by the word 'Vaiśvadevi' is not through the meaning of these words; as it is in the case of the expression 'Nīlotpalām' what the fact is, is that the Nominal affix itself directly denotes the Āmikṣā together with the Deity Viśvedevāḥ and the particular material referred to (by the pronoun 'asyāḥ' in the expounding of the Nominal affix) is indicated by the proximity of the word 'Āmikṣā.' The case of the other sentence 'Vājivyo bajinam' is entirely different.

Because, *firstly*, in the sentence 'Vajibhyo Vajinam,' the material to be offered is not denoted either by the noun 'Vajin' or by the Dative affix (in the word 'Vajibhyaḥ') ; nor do any of these express the connection of that material with the Deity ; and hence we cannot cognise these by any other means save the syntactical connection (of the two words). That is to say, in the word 'Vajibhyaḥ' either the basic noun or the affix or both of them together express either the material in general or a particular material or connection of some material with the Deity, all that the word denotes is that "the object signified by the noun is the recipient ;" and certainly there is no idea of the relationship of the "material" included in the word ; and hence it has to be cognised by means of the syntactical connection based upon the proximity of the word 'Vajinam.'

And, *secondly*, in the case of the word 'Vaiśvadevi' we find that the signification of the Pronoun 'asyāḥ' is included in the Nominal affix, but in the case of the word 'Vajibhyaḥ' the Dative is not laid down in the sense of that of which the object signified by the basic noun is the receiver of the gift : That is to say, in the case of the former, we find that the Nominal Affix has been laid down by grammarians in the sense of 'that of which the object signified by the basic word is the Deity' ; while the Dative has not been laid down in the sense that 'that which is signified by the basic noun is the receiver of that (a certain gift)' ;

and as such in the case of a word with the Dative ending, there can be no indication of the meaning of the pronoun 'asyâh'; and as a matter of fact what such a word actually expresses is the mere character of the 'recipient' and hence, it is only on account of the inconsistency of the mention of a 'recipient' without the object to be received, that the word with the Dative can give rise to a desire on our part for some such thing; and certainly this does not make this thing to be directly expressed by that word, as, in that case, all that is signified by the sentence would become the denotation of that word. All that the said 'desire' raised by the Dative does it to bring about the requisite relationship when the other word is uttered; for if there were no such desire raised by the first word, even the second word could not bring about the said relationship.

Thus, then, though the Dative Affix directly denotes the deitic character (of *Vâjin*), yet its relationship with the material (*Vâjina*), is indicated by syntactical connection alone. Our connection is with regard to this relationship (of the material and the Deity) and there is no doubt that the relationship of the material *vajina* (with the Deity *Vajin*) (as indicated by syntactical connection) is very much weaker in authority than that of the *Āmīkṣa* with the *Viśvedevas* because this latter is mentioned directly by the Nominal Affix in the word '*Vaiśvadevi*.'

अगुणे तु कर्मशब्दे गुणस्तत्र प्रतीयेत ॥२४॥

अगुणे Agune, not being accompanied by the mention of any accessory. तु Tu, but. कर्मशब्दे Karmasabde, the word mentioning a previous action. गुणः Guṇaḥ, an accessory. तत्र Tatra, in that case. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta, should be recognised.

24. When however the word mentioning the previous action is not accompanied by the mention of any accessory, the accessory mentioned in another sentence should be taken as pertaining to that same action.—24.

COMMENTARY.

This "Sātra" mentions a counter-instance to the foregoing. The sense of it is that when a certain Action has not got any definite accessory laid down by its original injunction, if another sentence is found mentioning an Accessory, this latter sentence can be taken as laying down the Accessory for the same sacrifice that has been laid down by the previous sentence, and hence in such cases, the mention of the Accessory does not serve to distinguish the Action (from the previous one).

Adhikarāṇa X.

The Bhāṣya has also taken Sūtra 24 to represent an Adhikarāṇa by itself. In the case of the two sentences 'Agnihotrena juhōti' and 'Dadhñā juhōti' the question arising as to whether the two sentences refer to the same or to different actions. The conclusion is that the former sentence not laying down any material for the 'Homa' the latter sentence should be taken as laying down the material for that same 'Homa.'

It may be noted that there is no difference in the actual interpretation of the 'Sūtra.' In both cases the Sūtra deals with a counter-instance to what has gone before. The only difference is that by one interpretation the Sūtra is made a portion of Adhikarāṇa IX while by another it is made an independent Adhikarāṇa by itself.

Adhikarāṇa XI.—The mention of definite materials is with a view to distinct results.

SŪTRAS II. ii. 25, 26.

“फलश्रुतेस्तु कर्म स्यात् फलस्य कर्मयोगित्वात्” ॥ २५ ॥

फलश्रुतेः Phalaśrūteḥ, because of the mention of distinct result. तु Tu, really. कर्म Karma, a distinct action. स्यात् Syāt, should be. फलस्य Phalasya, of the action. कर्मयोगित्वात् Karmayogitvāt, being connected with a definite action.

25. Because of the mention of a distinct Result, there would be a distinct action (laid down by the sentence) specially as the Result is always connected with a definite Action.—25.

COMMENTARY.

In continuation of the sentence 'Agnihotram juhōti' we find the sentence 'Dadhñindriyakāmasya juhuyāt' and this gives rise to the following doubt: Does this second sentence lay down an Action different from that laid down by the former sentence? or does it only serve to mention a distinct result as following from the offering of a particular material at the same sacrifice?

Two conclusions have been previously arrived at: (1) If the original Injunction of the Action contain the mention of no accessory, the accessory mentioned in a subsequent passage pertains to the Action laid down by that Injunction, (2) If the original Injunction contain the mention of an accessory, there being no possibility of the connection of more than one enjoined accessory, the mention of another accessory pertains to another



Action. In the case in question, we find that the sentence laying down the original action—‘*Agnihotram juhōti*’—does not mention an accessory (*viz.*, the material ‘*Dadhi*’ and the Result ‘*Acquiring of sense, efficiency*’); and there arises a doubt as to the likelihood or otherwise of these latter appertaining to the former Action.

For the purpose of settling this doubt, we have got to settle at first the question as to whether the Result mentioned in the second sentence follows from the ‘*Homa*’ or from the particular material ‘*Dadhi*.’

There being every reason for a doubt in connection with the sentences in question, we proceed at first to deal with the following:—

Pūrvapakṣa.—Though in the case in question, the previous sentence ‘*Agnihotram juhōti*,’ mentioning the material, yet the sentence in question (‘*dadhnendriyakāmasya juhuyāt*’) lays down a distinct Action; because this latter contains, *i.e.*, distinctly mentions, a Result (‘*Sense-efficiency*’), and it is only from an Action that a result can follow.

The whole of the Bhāvarthādhikaraṇa (II. i. 14) serves as the present *Pūrvapakṣa*. Because the conclusion therein arrived at was that it is only Verbs and not Nouns or Adjectives (laying down the material or other accessory details), that are connected with the word speaking of the Result, and hence inasmuch as the Result is always connected with an Action, when there is a distinct Result mentioned, the sentence in question must be taken as laying down a distinct Action, and not as only pointing out another material (*dadhi*) for the previously mentioned Action (*Agnihotra*).

Because the material having been already mentioned once, the same cannot be enjoined over again; and if you hold the sentence to lay down a material that has not been already laid down, then the mention of the Result would be altogether superfluous (as no Result can ever follow from the material ‘*dadhi*’). That is to say, in a case where the word speaking of the Action does not speak of a material, we can take another sentence as laying down that material, only if either that material does not happen to have been laid down already by a previous sentence, or if the sentence in question is not found capable of asserting anything more than what has already been mentioned. In the case in question, however, we find none of these conditions present, as the material ‘*dadhi*’ has been previously laid down by another sentence ‘*dadhnā juhōti*,’ and the sentence in question mentions a Result (sense-efficiency) over and above what has been spoken of before. It is with a view to all this that the *Bhāṣya* has summed up the *Pūrvapakṣa* in the words: we find a distinct result mentioned in the sentence in question; and a (distinct) Result can, rightly speaking, follow from a (distinct) Action only.

अतुल्यत्वात् वाक्ययोर्गुणे तस्य प्रतीयेत ॥ २६ ॥

अतुल्यत्वात् Atulyatvāt, on account of not being exactly similar. तु Tu, but.
वाक्येः Vākyaḥ, of the two sentences. गुणे Guṇe, as laying down an accessory.
तस्य Tasya, for the action. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta, should be recognised.

26. The two sentences not being exactly similar, the second sentence should be taken as laying down an accessory for the previously mentioned Action.—26.

COMMENTARY.

The sentence in question is not similar to those with reference to which it has been concluded, under the Bhāvārthādhikarāṇa (II i. 1), that the Result follows from that which is expressed by the Root. Because so long as the potency of the Injunctive has not been removed from that which is expressed by the verbal root, whatever result is mentioned is taken as pertaining to that Root-meaning; when however, the potency of the Injunctive is transferred to the Accessory, if a Result happens to be mentioned, then inasmuch as this mention of the Result would be touched by the Injunction of the Accessory it is along with that necessary that the Result comes to be taken.

That is to say, the Injunctiveness in reality residing in the *Bhāvanā* is transferred to from one to the other factor, according as that factor comes to be recognised as helping that *Bhāvanā*. And at the time that the Injunctiveness, as transferred to the Root-meaning, gets at the *Bhāvanā* with a particular result,—it is the Root-meaning that is made the Instrument (of its accomplishment); and everything else becomes subservient to that Root-meaning. This (fact of Injunctiveness pertaining to the Root-meaning) is found to be the case, in connection with the sentence 'Agnihotram juhuyât svargakāmaḥ,' where the name (Agnihotra) is incapable of wresting, for itself, the operation of the Injunctive. On the other hand, in the case of the sentence in question ('*dadhnëndriyakāmasya juhuyat*'), the word '*dadhi*' has got none of the various characteristics of a Nāmadheya (Name of a sacrifice) (as detailed in the Fourth Pāda of the First *Adhyāya*) and hence it must be taken as something enjoined; and as such it wrests to itself the Injunctive operation that had been pointing to the Root-meaning. Thus then, the *Bhāvanā* in question, affected by its contact with the *Dadhi*, comes to stand in need of reference (to a previous Action) by means of the Root-meaning of the sentence; and consequently when we find a Result mentioned, we at once conclude this Result to be something to be brought about by the instrumentality of the *Dadhi*, and not by that of the *Homa* (expressed by the Root-meaning

of 'juhuyat'; specially because those that are not enjoined cannot be accepted to have the Character of the Instrument; and when we have accepted a certain other thing to be the object of the Injunction, we can never take the sentence as laying down that from which the Injunctive operation has been wrested, as we have already shown above (under Sūtra II. ii. 11) just as on account of the Injunctive operation being wrested by the *Dadhi* we deny the fact of the sentence enjoining the *Homa*, so in the same manner, on account of the presence of the word mentioning the Result, we cannot take the sentence as enjoining the *dadhi* with reference to the *Homa* (because of the chance of syntactical split, etc., etc.); hence what we hold is that the sentence enjoins the *Dadhi* with reference to the *Bhāvanā*, and as such, it must be admitted that the Result follows from the *Dadhi*, and the sentence does not lay down a distinct action.

Adhikaraṇa XII.—The Vāravantīya, etc., are distinct Actions.

SŪTRA II. ii. 27.

समेषु कर्मयुक्तं स्यात् ॥ २७ ॥

समेषु Sameṣu, the sentences being similar. कर्मयुक्तं Karmayuktam, related to the actions. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

27. When the sentences are similar (the Result) would be connected with distinct Action.—27.

COMMENTARY.

We now proceed to deal with an exception to the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

The subject of the *Adhikaraṇa* is thus shown: (1) we have the sentence 'trivṛḍagnīṣṭomaḥ, tasya vāyavyāsu ekaviṃśamagnīṣṭomasāma kṛtvā brahmararchasakāmo yajetā' and then in continuation of this Agniṣṭut sacrifice we have the sentence 'vāravantīyamagnīṣṭomasāma kṛtyam' which lays down an accessory in the shape of the *vāravantīyamagnīṣṭomasāma kṛtvā paśukāmo hyetenā yajetā*. [This difference between the bearing of the two sentences being that when the *Varvantīya* is sung to in connection with the *Vāyavya* verses then the result is in the shape of 'Brahmic glory' while when the same is sung in connection with the *Revati* verses, the Result is in the shape of 'Cattle'].

Here, too, we have as before, the following doubt:—Does this last sentence enjoin an independent action, distinct from that laid down in the previous sentence, as qualified by a distinct material (in the shape

of the *Varvantiya* in connection with the *Revatī verses*)? Or, does it only serve to lay down this distinct material only, with reference to the same Action, just as in the case of the sentence dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*?

And on this we have the following:—

Purvapakṣa.—In view of the reasons detailed, and the conclusion arrived at, in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, it must be admitted that the sentence in question serves only to lay down the *Result* as following from a particular accessory (in connection with the previously mentioned action). Because, as a matter of fact, we find that the Injunctive potency of the sentence is taken up by the connection between the *Revatī* and the *Vāravantiya*, and then we find a Result mentioned along with this Injunction; consequently we cannot take the sentence as laying down the *Sacrifice* (as that would entail a dual junctioning of the Injunction, thereby leading to syntactical split). And as for the connection between the *Revatī* and the *Vāravantiya*, this would be brought about, without a repetition of the Injunctive affix, by the word '*kṛtvā*' which is mentioned distinctly by itself (and as such this would not involve the said syntactical split).

To the above we make the following reply :

Siddhānta.—When there is an Accessory which accepts the previously mentioned Action as its substratum, then alone is it so that we do not perceive any difference between the Actions (mentioned in the two sentences), and the reason is that in such a case what the latter sentence does is only to refer to the previous Action for the sake of its connection with the new Accessory.

That is to say, we find the sentence in question '*etasyaiva revatīṣu*,' etc., containing the mention of 'sacrifice' directly by means of the root '*yaji*'; under the circumstances, if the exact sort of 'sacrifice' that is herein mentioned had been previously mentioned in another sentence, then alone could we conclude that the one mentioned in the sentence in question is not a distinct sacrifice. As for instance in the case of the sentence '*dadhnendriyakāmasaya, etc.*' we find that the sentence directly lays down only the relationship with the particular Result, and then the context helps to supply the other substrate of the relationship in the shape of *Homa*; and in this case we admit the mention of '*Homa*' in the sentence to be a mere reference to a previously mentioned '*Homa*' and another reason for this is that the *Dadhi* by itself also is capable of directly accomplishing the *Homa*. In the case in question, on the other hand, we find that the *Vāravantiya* qualified by the *Revatī verses* is not,

by itself, capable of directly accomplishing the sacrifice; because it is neither a Deity nor a material (which two alone are directly accomplishing the sacrifice); because the sacrifice requires for its accomplishment, no other helping factors, except those of the Deity, the material, and the performer; and hence it is never accomplished directly by means of a *Soma* (*Vâravantiya* and the like).

Thus then, though through the peculiar character of the context, the sacrifice (previously mentioned) is present in the mind, yet it does not become cognised as the substrate of the said *Soma*, because of its inherent incapability of having that character; and hence that 'sacrifice' cannot be accepted as *referred* to by the sentence in question (*Revatiṣu*, etc.), specially as we have no grounds for believing that the sacrifice herein mentioned is the same as the one previously mentioned. As for the *Hymning*, that forms a part of the previous 'sacrifice' and which being accomplished by means of the *Varvantiya Soma*, is capable of being taken as its substrate—it is not pointed out by the context; because the presence of *Hymning* in the previous 'sacrifice'; the '*Agniṣṭut*' is only based upon an indirect implication.

Adhikaraṇa XIII.—A single result following from two Actions.

SŪTRA II. ii. 28—29.

सौभरे पुरुषश्रुतेः निधनं कामसंयोगः ॥ २८ ॥

सौभरे Saubhare, in connection with the Subhara. पुरुषश्रुतेः Puruṣaśruteḥ, because of the mention of human effort. निधनं Nidhanam, with the Nidhana. कामसंयोगः Kāmasamyogaḥ, connection of a desirable result.

28. Because of the mention of human effort in connection with the Saubhara there must be a distinct desirable result connected with the Nidhana.—28.

COMMENTARY.

From among the Ukthya Hymns, the Saubhara is the *Brahmasāma* that has been laid down in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; in connection with this we have the sentences '*Yadi Rathantaram*,' etc., which serve to lay down certain motive causes; and then later on, we meet with the sentence.—(1) '*Yo Vṛiṣṭikāmo yo annādyakāmô yah svargakāmah sa saubharena stuvita*,' which mentions the three results in connection with the *Saubhara* which is a necessary accompaniment of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, in accordance with the rule that all such desirable results are

connected with the necessary accompaniment, because this is equally present in all cases; and it will be shown later on, under *Sātra* IV. iii. 5, that such an accompaniment can be only that which helps the sacrifice and fulfils a desirable end of the human agent; and under *Sātra* IV. iii. 26, that the several results mentioned follow from the said necessary accompaniment, alternatively. Then again, with reference to the aforesaid *Saubhara*, we have the following sentence (2) *Hiṣiti : vṛṣṭikāmāya nidhanam kuryāt urgityannādyakāmāya ān iti svargakāmasya* [*Nidhanam* is the concluding part of the *Sāma*.]

In connection with these two sets of texts, we proceed to consider the following question: Does the *Saubhara* (mentioned in the former sentence) bring about its result by itself, independently of the *Nidhanas*, *hiṣ* and the rest [mentioned in sentence (2)] which bring about separate results of their own (apart from that of the *Saubhara*), or these '*hiṣ*' etc., have been laid down as the various instruments which when employed in connection with the same aforesaid *Saubhara*, help it in bringing about the said results?

Though this question has nothing to do with the difference or non-difference of Actions, yet it has been introduced here as in a way connected with the subject. Or, it may be that, like the difference and non-difference of Actions, the difference and non-difference of the resultant *Apūrva* also forms the subject matter of the *Adhyāya*.

On the above question, we have the following :—

PŪRVAPAKṢA (A).

Pūrvapakṣa—If the results mentioned in the latter sentence were the same as those that followed from the *Saubhara* itself, then their repetition (in the latter sentence) would be wholly useless; because in that case, there would be nothing that would be laid down by the sentence in question; because the *hiṣ* and the rest are already known, from other Vedic texts, as the *Nidhanas* of the *Saubhara* (and the only other object spoken of in the sentence is the result, and this you take to be the same as that previously mentioned, and so the sentence would have nothing new to say.) Nor can it be urged that the sentence in question would serve the purpose of restricting the *Nidhanas* because these being directly laid down (in other Vedic texts) as the *Nidhanas* to be employed they cannot rightly be set aside on the strength of any such implied restrictions. As a matter of fact, in all cases, restriction as serving the sole purpose of setting aside something, is highly objectionable. But when all other objects are indirectly implied, then it is possible for the one that is directly laid down to set aside the rest. Because we find that they are all directly laid down by

the text that lays down the *Saubhara*; and under the circumstances it is scarcely right to take any one of them as setting aside the rest, on the mere ground of repetition actuated by an Injunction; specially when this latter admits of another explanation. In accordance with our theory, however, the use of 'his' and the rest having the capability of bringing about distinct results of their own, would be more desirable, for the agent, than those that have been mentioned as forming part of the *Saubhara* and thereby helping in the accomplishment of the sacrifice; and on ground of this greater desirability the former would very rightly set aside all the latter.

(2) The sentence in question would serve a useful purpose, only if it laid down the relationship (causal) between the Rain, etc., and the *his* etc., which is not laid down in any other sentence. And this would also save us from the anomaly of taking the word '*Vṛṣṭikāmah*' as a mere qualification of the *Saubhara* in a sentence which would be taken as serving to restrict the *Nidhanas*,—while it is quite capable of being taken directly by itself (as mentioning the result following from the *Nidhanas*).

(3) In the *Veda*, which consists of Injunctions, we always want a lot of desirable results, because that makes it easier for the Injunctions to urge the human agents to action.

For these reasons we conclude that the results following from the *Nidhanas* are distinct from those mentioned as following from the *Saubhara* itself.

सर्वस्य वोक्तकामत्वात् तस्मिन् कामः श्रुतिः स्यात् निधनार्था
पुनः श्रुतिः ॥ २६ ॥

सर्वस्य Sarvasya, of the whole. वा Vā, but. उक्तकामत्वात् Uktakāmatvāt, having their results already mentioned. तस्मिन् Tasmin, to that. कामः कामः श्रुतिः Kāmaḥśrutih, mention of the result. स्यात् Syāt, should refer. निधनार्था Nidhânârtâ, for the purpose of restricting the *Nidhana*. पुनः श्रुतिः Punaḥśrutih, repetition.

29. But because the results mentioned pertain to the whole *Saubhara* the result mentioned subsequently should also pertain to the same. The second mention is only for the purpose of restricting the *Nidhana*.—29.

COMMENTARY.

In answer to the aforesaid *Pārvaṇapākṣa* we have the following :—

Siddhānta (A.)—The *his* cannot be connected with the Result, because that would make the mention of the *Nidhana* wholly redundant; while if

the *Nidhana* be taken as connected with the *Saubhara*, the Result could be taken as qualifying the *Saubhara*.

That is to say, if we were to take the sentence as—‘one should bring about rain by means of the *hiṣ* and by that as a *nidhana* of the *Saubhara*,’—there would be a syntactical split; for if the *hiṣ* were not connected with the *Saubhara*, then the sentence would be wholly redundant. In accordance with our theory, there is nothing without some use; and out of the things spoken of in the sentence in a question, the *Saubhara*, as bringing about Rain, etc., mentioned in another sentence, has already been laid down elsewhere, as also the Results themselves, and hence all that the sentence has got to lay down is the relationship between the *hiṣ* etc., and the *Saubhara*; and as such there is no syntactical split.

Nor is the sentence altogether useless, as it serves the purpose of restricting the particular *nidhanas*. Even apart from any consideration of the one being more desirable, there is, in the case in question, a distinct setting aside of the one by the other, on the ground of one being more generic in its character than the other; as, for instance, the word ‘*Saubhara*’ applying to all parts of that *Soma*, it is only by indirect indication that all its *nidhanas* (*hiṣ* etc.) could be mentioned by the sentence speaking of the ‘*Saubhara*’; while the sentence in question mentions the particular *nīdhanas* directly; and as such this latter is more authoritative than the former (and as such this would very well restrict the use of the *nidhanas* implied in the former sentence). And just as that which is implied is set aside by that which is directly mentioned, so is also that which is indirectly indicated. Or, the sentence in question does not set aside anything of the *song* mentioned by the word ‘*Saubhara*’ because all that it does is to lay down certain letters ‘*triṣ*,’ for instance, and as such it would set aside certain other letters only (and not the *song* itself.) If the sentence had laid down the part of some other *song*, then the part of the ‘*Saubhara*’ would be set aside by that; as a matter of fact, however, the restriction of the *nidhana* only serves to preclude certain letters of the *śloka* (the *Sāma*). And as such there is no anomaly of the preclusion of that which has been directly laid down.

For these reasons, we conclude that the repetition of the Results in the sentence in question serves to restrict the *Nidhanas*.

Kumārila is not satisfied with the above presentation of the *Adhikarāṇa* and he makes the following observations:—

As for the form of the *doubt* itself, there can be no such doubt, because the construction of the sentence in question is wholly different from that on which the abovementioned doubt has been based, because (in the

sentence 'trīṣīti vṛṣṭikāmāya nidhanam', *trīṣ* cannot be taken along with the *nidhanam* because of the intervention between them, of the word *vṛṣṭikāmāya* as it would be very undesirable to take the sentence as *trīṣ* is the *nidhana*, etc. (This is the case of the above representative of the *Pārvapakṣa*).

So also in the case of the above representation of the *Siddhānta*, if the sentence be taken as laying down the '*trīṣ*' with reference to the *nidhana* as qualified '*desire for rain*,' then, inasmuch as it would contain a reference to a *qualified* object, there would be distinct syntactical split. If it be taken as laying down the *trīṣ* with reference to the *nidhanas* only (not qualified by "*desire for rain*"), then the mention of the Result would be wholly useless. Because the connection with all *nidhanas* has already been laid down by mere mention of the '*saubhara*' and hence no useful purpose would be served by the sentence laying down such a connection only. If again, the sentence be taken as—'*Vṛṣṭikāmāya yat saubharam tasya yannidhanam tatra hiṣ padamprayujīta*' (one should use the word *trīṣ* in the *nidhana* of that *Saubhara* which is sung for the sake of Rain)—then, inasmuch as this would involve various predictions, there would be a syntactical split. Though '*desire for rain*,' *Saubhara* and its *nidhanas* have all been mentioned before, yet inasmuch as there are many other *nidhanas* present in the *Saubhara* it is necessary to make an attempt to preclude these and thereby the sentence would come to serve more purposes than one; and that would entail a syntactical split.

Then again, the *Siddhānta* as represented above, has not quite effectually refuted the *Pārvapakṣa*; as the fact of the *trīṣ*, etc., being *nidhanas* is mentioned by Veda itself.

For the above reasons, we must explain the *Adhikaraṇa* as follows:—

The *trīṣ* being taken with the word *vṛṣṭikāmāya* there arises a doubt as to whether the sentence point to its connection with the result or with the means. That is to say, the sentence being taken as *trīṣīti vṛṣṭikāmāya* there arises a doubt as to whether the *trīṣ* is related directly to the Result, or to a particular *means* (in the shape of the *Saubhara*) as qualified by the Result?

In fact, it is this construction of the sentence that has been shown in the *Bhāṣya* by means of the sentences '*trīṣīti nidhanamiti etat phalambhavatīti*.' The sentence '*Vṛṣṭikāmāyeti Saubharaviśeṣaṇam* (*Bhāṣya*)—means that the *Saubhara* not being mentioned by name in the sentence in question, it is only by means of indirect indication that it could be qualified by the Result therein mentioned. The assertion '*Na trīṣā sambandhāt*—means that the *trīṣ* has no connection with the form of the result.

And then, inasmuch as the position of the *Pârvapakṣa* based upon the repetition of the Injunction would be established otherwise, through the force of the Collective Injunction relating to the sacrifice in question, we proceed to put forward the following position of the

Pârvapakṣa (B).—If every one of the *nidhanas* were restricted with reference to the *Saubhara* as engaged in fulfilling its own function,—then, inasmuch as the Injunction of the *trīṣ* and the rest would be established by the very fact of these being brought forward by the Collective Injunction of the sacrifice in question, there would be no use of another Injunction of them (in the sentence in question). No such Collective Injunction, however, is capable of expressing the independent relationship of the *hiṣ* with the particular Result; and as such, in giving expression of this relationship, the sentence would be serving a distinct useful purpose.

And further, the word '*Vṛīṣṭikāmāya*,' having directly mentioned the human agent concerned—it is only natural that when this agent comes to look for the means of accomplishing the Result, this want is supplied by the mention of *trīṣ*, etc. Otherwise (if the result belonged to the *Saubhara*, then) this *Saubhara* could be mentioned as the *means* sought after, only through indirect Injunction, based upon the fact of its occurring in the same context and being capable of bringing about the Result in question. And certainly there can be no ground for having recourse to such an indirect Indication (so long as the want is found to be supplied by means of Direct Assertion).

This representation of the *Pârvapakṣa* appeared to have been intended by the *Bhāṣya* as is shown by the sentence '*Tathāśrutilakṣaṇā viṣaye*, etc."

The *Siddhānta* in that case would be represented as follows :—

Siddhānta (B).—The previous sentence having spoken of a certain Result as following from the *Saubhara* as a whole, what the sentence in question does is to restrict the particular *nidhanas* of the *Saubhara* with reference to each one of the results mentioned (and thus the mention of the results in the previous latter sentence is a reference to the very same results mentioned in the sentence).

That is to say, inasmuch as the results mentioned in the sentence in question are distinctly recognised as being the same as those mentioned previously in connection with the *Saubhara* as a whole—we can never believe them to be distinct results (following from the particular *Nidhanas*).

To the question—"Why then should there be a repetition?"—the answer—'*Nidhanārtha punaśrutih*' (the repetition is for the purpose of

restricting the *Nidhanas*). This *Adhikaraṇa* embodies the exception to two of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇas*, viz., that the result follows from the Accessory (II. ii. 26), and that it follows from the Action and not from the Accessory (II. ii. 27). Because what is herein shown is that the sentence in question does not lay down the Result, but only indicates the 'His' etc., as part of the *Saubhara* leading to the aforesaid results.

The *syntactical split* that had been urged against us, would have been possible, if we admitted of a relationship of the *Nidhana* (with the *His*, etc.) or if we took the *Nidhana* as directly qualifying the *Saubhara*. As a matter of fact, however, we do none of these, as we hold the relationship to exist between the *His* and the word '*Vṛṣṭikāma*'; and the fact of the *Nidhana* being the qualification of *Saubhara*, we deduce from the context; and certainly the peculiarities deduced from the context do not cause a syntactical split. And hence the anomaly of syntactical split does not quite apply to us.

[SUPPLEMENTARY ADHIKARAṆA.]

There is yet another point to be considered in this connection : (1) Does the sentence in question serve to restrict the *His*, etc., with reference to the means of accomplishing Rain, etc., in the shape of the *Saubhara* in whatever rescension of the Veda the *Sāma* may be found to appear? Or is the *Saubhara* to be employed for one desiring rain, in that form in which it appears in that rescension wherein it is found with the *His* as its *Nidhana*? Similarly with the other two *Nidhanas*—*Ūrg* and *Ūn*.

And on this point we have the following :—

Pārvapakṣa.—As all the *Saubharas* appearing in the thousand rescensions of the *Sāmaveda* are recognised as optional alternatives, what the sentence in question does is merely to restrict the *His*, etc., with regard to the *desire for rain*, etc., (the *Saubhara* being of any Rescension of the *Sāmaveda*.)

To the above we make the following reply :—

Siddhānta.—As a general rule, the song to be employed for the sake of Rain etc., must be of that particular *Nidhana*.

Because in order that the form of the song may not be utterly destroyed, one song is never connected with the parts of another song; and hence what is recognised as the alternative to be employed is *the whole of the song* (together with its *Nidhana* and other parts); and as such all its restrictions should always follow the way in which it appears in the Veda.



The sentence in question is capable of yet another interpretation. The sentence lays down the mere relationship between the *Saubhara* and the *Hiṣ* both of which have been mentioned previously the construction of the sentence being 'Yat *vr̥ṣṭtikāmāya saubharam, yacca hiṣityevam nidhanam, tadekatra Sampādanīyam*.

Thus, then we conclude that the sentence serves to restrict the use of the whole *Saubhara Śāma* with reference to the various results.

SECOND ADHYĀYA.

THIRD PADA.

Adhikâraṇa I.—The Grahâgrata is subsidiary to the Jyotiṣṭoma.

SŪTRAS II. iii. 1—2.

गुणस्तु ऋतुसंयोगात् कर्मान्तरं प्रयोजयेत् संयोगस्याशेष-
भूतत्वात् ॥१॥

गुणः Guṇah, the accessory. तु Tu, really, ऋतुसंयोगात् Kratusamyogât, on account of connection with the sacrifice. कर्मान्तरं Karmântaram, a distinct action. प्रयोजयेत् Prayojayet, would bring about. संयोगस्य Samyogasya, of the connection. अशेषभूतत्वात् Aśeṣabhûtatvât, on account of being in its entirety. .

1. The Accessory, being in connection with the sacrifice, would bring about a distinct Action, because the connection is in its entirety.”—1.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, from among the various alternative Sâmas, the *Brahadrathântara* has been laid down as the means of accomplishing the particular hymn (Prothta); and then we find the sentence ‘*Yadi Rathantarâsâmâ somah syât aindravâyavâgrân grahân grihñiyât, yadi Brihatsâma śukrâgrân* (If the soma is connected with the *Rathantara sâma*, precedence should be given to the holding of the vessels dedicated to *Indra* and *Vāyu* etc., etc., etc.)

And in connection with these two sentences, there arises the following question with regard to the Action with its Accessory that is mentioned in the latter sentence : Is it an action distinct from the *Jyotiṣṭoma* or is it the same *Jyotiṣṭoma* mentioned over again, for the purpose of pointing out the reason for the precedence of the various vessels at the same sacrifice, as characterised by the *Rathantara Sâma* ?

For the sake of this question, we have got to consider the following question :—Is the *Rathantara* related to the sacrifice in its entirety (i.e., is the *Rathantara* the only *Soma* to be used at it) ? Or is it related by

mere existence (i.e., the *Rathantara* is one of the many used in the sacrifice.) ?

And this leads us to another question—Is the *Rathantara* accepted as qualified by the sacrifice or the sacrifice as qualified by the *Rathantara* ?

The conclusion that would suggest itself at the first sight, in connection with the above questions, would be as follows :—The action mentioned in the sentence in question is none other than the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself—(1) because the presence of the *Rathantara Sāma*, as also that of the *Brihat Sāmā*, is mentioned by another sentence ; (2) because the word ' *yadi* ' distinctly points to the conditional character, which depends upon the previous mention of that which is laid down as the condition ; (3) because the particular precedence of the vessel is included in the collective sentence laying down the whole procedure of the Action collectively ; (4) because the accessory mentioned more authoritatively elsewhere ; specially so, in accordance with the *Sātra* II. ii. 16.

In opposition to this position of the *Siddhānta*, we proceed to put forward the *Pūrvapakṣa* embodied in the *Sātra* :—

Pūrvapakṣa.—The Action mentioned in the sentence in question is a distinct Action because a compound is possible only, when the words compounded have a certain capability ; and this capability is held to exist in the qualifying *Sāma* ; and the qualification serves to differentiate the object qualified ; while in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we do not find the *Rathantara* differentiating the sacrifice (by precluding all other *Sāmas*).

It has been explained above under *Sātra* II. ii. 23, that it is only when the Accessory mentioned is wholly unconnected with the previously mentioned action, that it serves to differentiate the Action mentioned in the sentence from that mentioned before. In the case in question, however, we find that the existence of the object expressed by the *Bahuvrīhi* compound—' *Rathantara Sāma* '—is pointed out by the word ' *yadi* ' as the condition (for the precedence of the vessel) ; and the character of the condition is not found to belong to the existence of the mere *Rathantara* ; as that has only a subordinate position in the compound (being only a qualification of that which is expressed by the compound). Specially as in the sentence, we do not recognise the *Rathantara* to be qualified by the Sacrifice—we could not very well take the existence of the *Rathantara* as the condition. Nor is it possible for the *Sāma* (*Rathantara*) to be differentiated by the Sacrifice ; because that (*Sāma*) exists elsewhere also. It could have been so differentiated, if the *Rathantara* was the *Sāma* peculiar to the sacrifice in question alone ; but as a matter of fact, that is not so.

Therefore we must take the compound as expressing the fact of the *Rathantara* being the only *Sāma* connected with the particular sacrifice; and inasmuch as we do not find either the *Jyotiṣṭoma* or any other sacrifice, connected with that *Sāma* only, the presence of the mere *Rathantara* could not be the condition of any such sacrifice.

Thus, then, having to renounce all notion of *condition*, we find the word '*Rathantarāsāma*' to be inexplicable, and from this apparent inconsistency of the word, we come to take it as laying down an altogether distinct Action, at which the *Rathantara* would be the only *Sāma* employed. Specially as that distinct Action is quite capable of being performed. And the mere existence of the *Rathantara* cannot be a qualification, as it does not extend over the whole of the Sacrifice, and not being a qualification it cannot have the capability (of being compounded); and without the capabilities, there can be no compound; but as a matter of fact, we find the *Samāsa* actually present in the case in question; consequently the Action mentioned in the sentence is not recognised as being the same as the one mentioned before. For these reasons it is concluded that the sentence in question is the Injunction of a distinct Action.

एकस्य तु लिङ्गभेदात् प्रयोजनार्थमुच्येतैकत्वं गुणवाक्यत्वात् ॥२॥

एकस्य Ekasya, of the same Action. तु Tu, but. लिङ्गभेदात् Liṅgabhedaṭ, on account of diverse characteristics. प्रयोजनार्थं Prayojanārtham, for a certain purpose. उच्येत Uchyeta, could be mentioned. एकत्वं Ekatvam, being one only. गुणवाक्यत्वात् Guṇavākyatvāt, being a subsidiary sentence.

2. The same Action having diverse characteristics these could be mentioned for a certain purpose—the Action being one only, on account of the sentence (in question) being subsidiary (to the previous sentence).—2.

COMMENTARY.

On account of the reasons shown briefly at the opening of the present *Adhikaraṇa*, we conclude that the sentence in question merely lays down accessory details for the previously mentioned *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and does not put forward a distinct sacrifice. (1) Because it is the same sacrifice of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that is mentioned with its several characteristic *Sāmas*, with a view to serve the purpose of showing the cause or condition of the precedence to be accorded to one or the other of the vessels; and inasmuch as the sentence in question is subsidiary to the foregoing sentence, it cannot give rise to any notion of a distinct sacrifice; and hence the Sacrifice in question is believed to be one and one only. (2) Or,

because of the fact of the *Rathantara*, etc., being laid down in the sentence in question, it is concluded that it is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice that is laid down as having these *Sāmas* mentioned in the sentences that are subsidiary to the original Injunction of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and consequently, the Action mentioned in the sentence in question is none other than the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, which therefore is the only one sacrifice spoken of in the two sentences.

For these reasons we conclude that the sentences in question only serve the purpose of laying down certain conditions of *precedence* [and do not lay down distinct actions].

Adhikarāṇa II.—The Aveṣṭi is a distinct sacrifice.

SŪTRA II. iii. 3.

अवेष्टौ यज्ञसंयोगात् ऋतुप्रधानमुच्यते ॥३॥

अवेष्टौ Aveṣṭau, in the Aveṣṭi. यज्ञसंयोगात् Yajñasamyogāt, on account of connection with the sacrifice. ऋतुप्रधानं Kṛatupradhānam, pointing chiefly to a sacrifice. उच्यते Uchyate, must be accepted.

3. Because of the mention of the Aveṣṭi being connected with the mention of the sacrifice it must be accepted as pointing chiefly to a Sacrifice (and not to an Accessory).—3.

COMMENTARY.

In the same context with the sentence 'Rājâ rājasūyena svârâjyakâmo yajeta', we find the sentence—(i) *Āgneyoṣṭâkapâlo hiranyân dakṣiṇâ* and so forth, which serve to lay down, by mentioning the relationship of certain substances with particular deities, the sacrifice known as 'Aveṣṭi'; and then subsequently, we come across the following sentence: (u) 'Yadi Brâhmaṇo yajeta Bârhaspatyam madhye nidhâyâ hutimâhutim hutvâ hutvâ bhighârayet yadi Rājanya Aindram, yadi Vaiśyo Vaisvadevam.'

With regard to this last sentence, there arises a doubt, as before; and it is this: (a) Does it serve to lay down the inserting of the *Bârhaspatya*, etc., as due to (conditioned by) the connection of the *Aveṣṭi* as forming part of the *Râjasūya*, with the various castes, a connection that has already been laid down in the previous sentences? Or, does it lay down a distinct performance (of the *Aveṣṭi*), in connection with the *Brâhmaṇa* etc., not mentioned before?

This leads us to the further question: viz., (b).—Are all the three castes entitled to the performance of the *Râjasūya* or the Kṣatriya only.

[As if the latter, then the connection of the three castes with the *Avesti* of the *Râjasûya* cannot be said to have been previously mentioned.]

(c) And this last question would lead us to the consideration of the word '*Râja*,' which is the word that specifies the agent entitled to the performance of the *Râjasûya*; and in connection with the word '*Râja*,' we shall have to consider the question as to whether it signifies the *Kṣatriya* or one who performs the functions of a king?

And on this question we have the following :—

Pûrvapakṣa.—In view of the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, it must be admitted that the latter sentences only serve to lay down the conditions for the particular insertions.

And to the performance of *Râjasûya*, all the three castes are entitled, as shown by the word '*Râjâ*' which signifies 'one who performs the functions of a king.' Because all through the word, it is only one performing the kingly functions that is spoken of as '*Râjâ*.' And it is thus alone that the text in question can have an extended application.

That is to say, when it is possible for the word '*Râjâ*' to be taken both ways (i.e., as signifying the *Kṣatriya*, and as signifying one who performs the kingly functions), it is far more advisable to accept the signification of all the three castes; because this interpretation alone would be compatible with the mention (in the subsequent sentences) of the conditions ('*Yadi Brâhmaṇa, etc.*') and with the context, etc., and also because this interpretation would not curtail the scope of the declaration of all the three castes being entitled to the performance of the *Râjasûya*.

For these reasons it must be admitted that persons of all the three castes, performing the functions of a king are '*Râjâs*' and these functions are well known to consist in the protection of the people and the removal from among them, of all troublous factors.

To the above we make the following reply :—

Siddhânta.—The sentence in question serves to lay down the connection of the *Brâhmaṇa, etc.*, with the sacrifice; because such connection has not been mentioned before, the mere performing of kingly functions not sufficing to make one known as '*Râjâ*'.

That is to say, the word '*Râjâ*' denotes the *Kṣatriya* and cannot be taken in its literal sense. Because the literal meaning might consist, either in the performing of the kingly functions, or, according to the significations of the root '*Râj*' in *Brightness* or *Effulgence*, and both of these are impossible; because we find the word having a well known meaning apart from the literal; and even though this meaning may be known in one part of the country only, yet it will always set aside the

(1) In the three sentences—(a) *Vasante Brâhmano'gninâdadhîta*, (b) *Grîhṣṁ Râjanyah*, (c) *Śâradi Vaiśyâh*,—inasmuch as the laying mentioned in the first sentence would be wholly taken up by the accessories (*Brâhmaṇa* and *Vasanta*) mentioned in the same sentence; the accessories mentioned in the other two sentences would point to distinct actions of (Laying); and as such there would be *three* Layings of fire; (2) the presence of the *Âtmanepada* affix in *âdadhîta* would point to the necessity of the sacrificer himself laying his own fire;

3) the *Śādra* would become precluded (from sacrifices), as only the three layings of fire are laid down and without the laying of fire, no sacrifice would be performed. If, on the other hand, the sentences be taken, not as Injunctions of the laying, but as simply laying down conditions, then we would have the reverse of all these three advantages.

What is said in regard to the sentences in question would also apply to such other passages as *Vasante Brāhmaṇam upanayita, gr̥tsme Rājanyam, śāradi Vaiśyam* ; as the condition of these sentences is exactly like that of those dealt with in this *Adhikaraṇa*.

The *Adhikaraṇa* may be briefly summed up thus :—

Pūrvapakṣa.—The *Laying of Fire* having been implied by an injunction of a *sacrifice in general* (as *swargakāmo yayetā*) or laid down by a general Injunction (such as *ya evamvidvānaginādhatte*) its mention over again in the sentences in question must be taken as mentioning the various *śāstres* as conditions for the particular times of the Laying.

That is to say, in the first instance the first argument in our favour is that, inasmuch as the Injunction of such actions as the *Agnihotra* and the like would not be possible without the sacrificial fire made ready by the proper method of *laying* it, this laying of the fire must be taken as implied by those very Injunctions; and hence the mention, in the sentences in question, of the same *Laying* must be taken as serving the purpose of laying down the *Brāhmaṇa*, etc., by way of specifying certain conditions. If, however, it be argued, that on account of these injunctions having other direct objects of Injunctions they cannot rightly serve the purpose of indirectly implying any such action as the said *Laying*—then, in that case we would bring forward another independent Injunction of the laying itself, in the shape of the sentences '*Ya evamvidvām āgninādhatte, etc.*'; an Injunction which is wholly distinct from the previous Injunction, which has its Injunctive potency taken up by the laying down of the Accessory details. And thus then, the *Laying of Fire* having been already laid down in this Injunction, the sentences in question could not be taken as enjoining the same *Laying of Fire*.

The argument of the *Siddhānta* may be thus summed up :—

Siddhānta.—So long as we have a direct Injunction, we cannot very well admit of an implied or inferred one; and hence either the mention of the purpose to be served or that of the existing state of things, can never serve as Injunctions.

That is to say, the mere mention of the *purpose* to be served by the *Laying of Fire* (in the shape of the accomplishment of the sacrificial,

Ākavāṇīya fire for the Agnihotra &c.), cannot be taken as necessarily pointing to the injunction of the said *Laying* as the necessary fire could be obtained by merely begging it of another Agnihotra performer, specially as in the case of the injunction of the *Laying of fire* being implied by those of *Agnihotra*, etc., there is no *Ātmanepada* restricting the fire to that which is prepared by the Sacrificer himself. When, however, the necessary Injunction is found to be directly asserted (by a Vedic text), there is no Inconsistency which could lead us to assume an unheard of text (as containing the required Injunction) the only ground for assuming such text being some sort of an Apparent Inconsistency. Then, as for the mention of the existing state of things, in the sentence '*Ya evam vidvanāgninādhatte*,' etc.,—so long as we find a direct Injunction of the *Laying of fire* in the shape of the sentences in question '*Vasante Brāhmaṇo*' *gninādhatta*,' etc., etc., any mere description of the existing state of things can never acquire an Injunctive potency (to the same effect); specially as this latter has got to serve a distinct purpose of laying down all such details as the fetching of the water, etc., mentioned in the original direct Injunction.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the sentences in question serve to lay down the hitherto unmentioned *Laying of fire* as performed by the *Brāhmaṇa*, etc.

Adhikaraṇa IV.—*The Dākṣāyaṇa, etc., are Accessories.*

SŪTRAS II. III. 5 to 11.

अयनेषु चोदनान्तरं संज्ञोपबन्धात् ॥ ५ ॥

अयनेषु Ayaneṣu, in the sentences containing the word Ayana. चोदनान्तरं Chodanāntaram, distinct injunctions. संज्ञोपबन्धात् Sanjñopavandhāt, because of the particular names.

5. "The sentences containing the word Ayana must be taken as containing Injunctions of distinct actions:—(1) because of the particular names attached to them."—5.

COMMENTARY.

[In connection with *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* we find the sentence '*Dākṣāyaṇa-yajñena yajetā prajākāmaḥ. Sākamprasthāpyena yajetā pasukāmaḥ, saṅkramayāgena yajetā annādyāikāmaḥ.*' And in connection with this there arises a doubt as to whether these sentences simply lay down certain accessories for the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* as bring about certain definite results or they lay down distinct sacrifices independent of the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa*,

Pūrvapakṣa.—In connection with the sentence ‘*Dadhnedriyakāmasya juhuyāt*,’ it has been shown above (II. ii. 25, 26) that this sentence lays down a certain result following from a certain accessory of the same sacrifice. And this is quite proper; because in that case the *Dadhi* is not mentioned as co-extensive with the *Homa*, that would on account of this name, be taken as different from the previous *Homa*. In the case in question, on the other hand, we find that the name *Dakṣayana* is mentioned as co-extensive (identical) with the *sacrifice*, as has not been applied to the previous sacrifice (the *Darśa-Pūrnāmāsa*); consequently in this case, there can be nothing incongruous of the fact of the word ‘*Dakṣayana*’ pointing to distinct *sacrifice* qualified by that name. Nor is there any such substance as ‘*Dakṣayana*’ known to exist, as we do find those like the *Dadhi*. Consequently, on account of the reasons shown under II. i. 1, we conclude that inasmuch as the sentence lays down a sacrifice with reference to a definite result, that sacrifice is wholly distinct from the previous *Darśa-Pūrnāmāsa*.

“अगुणा च कर्मचोदनाम्” ॥ ६ ॥

अगुणा *Agunā*, not pertaining to the accessories. च *Cha*, also. कर्मचोदनाम् *Karmachodanām*, injunctions of actions.

6. “Because the Injunction of the Action does not pertain to the Accessory.”—6.

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the Injunctive potency of the sentence in question has not been removed away from the Action, so that it could go over to the Accessory.

“समाप्तं च फले वाक्यम्” ॥ ७ ॥

समाप्तं *Samāptam*, complete. च *Cha*, also. फले *Phale*, by the mention of the result. वाक्यम् *Vākyaṃ*, the sentence.

7. “Because the sentence is quite complete with the mention of the result.”—7.

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as the result can never form the object of Injunction, the sentence cannot be said to lay down the Result with reference to the sacrifices,—in the same way as the Corn is taken as laid down, in the sentence *Vrīhibhiryajêtā*; and as such the sentence must be taken as enjoining an Action (as no third object of Injunction is possible in the sentence), and (inasmuch as no Action that has already been enjoined once

could form the object of another Injunction) it must be admitted that the Action herein enjoined is distinct from all—*Darśa*, *Pârṇamāsa*, etc.,—that have been enjoined before.”

SIDDHĀNTA.

विकारो वा प्रकरणात् ॥ ८ ॥

विकारः Vikārah, modification. वा Vâ, really. प्रकरणात् Prakaraṇât, because of the context.

8. It is really a modification of the previous sacrifice.—8.

COMMENTARY.

Even though the sentence be the Injunction of Action, yet, that Action cannot be any other than the one laid down before,—for reasons shown under *Sâtra*, II. iii. 26, specially as the sentence is found to bring about an idea of the (causal) relationship between an Accessory (*Dâkṣa-yana*) and a Result (acquiring of children);—just as in the case of the sentence ‘*Dadhnendriyakâmasya*, etc.’ it must be admitted that the sacrifice referred to is the same that has been laid down before.

It has been argued that there is no Accessory known as ‘*Dâkṣa-yana*.’ But this is scarcely true; because the fact of there being such an accessory is pointed out by the context itself—just as are many other accessories, like the *Ukthya* and the rest; that is to say, we find in the context that after the sentence in question has laid down the *Dâkṣa-yana* as an Accessory; there is another sentence that points out the actual form of that Accessory.

And just as in the case of *Dadhi*, so here also, the *Dâkṣa-yana* is not found to be taken as co-extensive or identical with the *sacrifice*.

And further, even if the *Dâkṣa-yana*, etc., be taken as co-extensive with ‘*sacrifice*’ then too, on account of their proximity to the *Dadhi*, etc., these sacrifices would be recognised as mere modifications (of the *Darśa-Pârṇamāsa*). Consequently even in this case, what the sentence would do would be to lay down the Result following from a modification of the *Darśa-Pârṇamāsa* and not from any other sacrifice wholly distinct from it.

In this way, an utter disruption of the context would also be avoided. Though there will be a rupture of the context in connection with the *Dâkṣa-yana* to this extent, that which is mentioned as leading to a definite Result (e. g., the *Dâkṣa-yana*) cannot be taken as part of the procedure,—yet inasmuch as the *Darśa-Pârṇamāsa* would form the substrate of the *Dâkṣa-yana*, the mention of the *Darśa-Pârṇamāsa* could very well be connected with the subsequent sentences (under consideration) and thus help them (in their denotation).

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ ९ ॥

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च Liṅga darśanāt cha, also because we find indicative Vedic texts.

9. Also because we find Vedic texts indicative (of non-difference).—9.

COMMENTARY.

We have the sentence—‘*Triṃśatam varṣāṇi Darśa-pūrṇamāsābyām yajetā yadi Dākṣāyanayajī syāt atha api pañchadaśaiva varṣhāṇi yajeta atra hi eva sâ sampadyate ; dve hi paurṇamāsyām yajetā dve amavāsye ātra hi eva khalu sâ sampad bhavati*’ ‘one should perform the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* for thirty years; but if the sacrificer happens to be a performer of the *Dākṣāyana*, he could finish it in fifteen years as in this sacrifice two *Paurṇamāsīs* and two *Darśas* are performed; and hence the requisite number of these latter would be completed by the *Dākṣāyana* being performed for fifteen years only !

This completion of the ‘thirty years’ and the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* (by the performance of the *Dākṣāyana*) distinctly indicates the non-difference of the *Dākṣāyana* from the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa*. For the thirty years’ course of the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* could not be made up by the performance of an altogether different sacrifice (while the text distinctly lays down the fact of the thirty-year-course being made up by the fifteen-year-course of the *Dākṣāyana*). Nor could there be a gratuitous rejection of the thirty-year limit, whereby the fifteen-year course would be due to a different sacrifice (that is to say, the mere performance of an altogether different sacrifice could not justify a rejection of the original thirty-year limit). Nor can it be urged that the course of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa* is reduced to one of a *fifteen years*’ by reason of the performer being a performer of another sacrifice in the shape of the *Dākṣāyana*. Because if this latter were wholly distinct from the former, there would be no relationship between the two (whereby the performance of one could reduce the course of another). And also because in that case, there would be no justification for the explanatory sentence ‘*Dve hi paurṇamāsyām dve amavāsye*’ (which lays down the fact of two of each of these being performed in the *Dākṣāyana*, instead of one only, as in the case of the ordinary *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa*, as the reason for the thirty-year limit being reduced to one of fifteen only.)

गुणात्संज्ञोपबन्धः ॥ १० ॥

गुणात् Guṇāt, due to peculiarity. संज्ञोपबन्धः Saṃjñopabandhaḥ, the name.

10. The name (*Dākṣāyana*) is due to the peculiarity of the Accessory.— 10.

COMMENTARY.

(This Sūtra meets the *Pārvapakṣa* argument of Sūtra 6).

The Name serves the purpose of distinguishing an Action from others, only when it occurs in the originative Injunction of that Action. In the case in question, however, we find that the name '*Dākṣāyana*' is not connected with any originative Injunction ; specially as in this case we do not find the sentence introduced by any word expressing the beginning of a new action,—as we do in the sentence '*Atha esa jyotiḥ*' etc., And then, inasmuch as the name is quite capable of being explained as mentioning an Accessory of the previous Sacrifice, it cannot serve the purpose of distinguishing the Action. That the word '*Dākṣāyana*' denotes a mere repetition of the previous sacrifice of the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa* is shown by the sense afforded by the components of the word itself, as also by the above-quoted text (that there are two *Darśas* and two *Pāṇamāsas*, in the *Dākṣāyana*). Hence we conclude from the context that the Result mentioned in the sentence in question follows from the *Dākṣāyana* as based upon the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa*. The word '*Dakṣa*' means 'the Sacrificer' who is expert and very quick at the performance of the Sacrifice ('of thirty years, in only half the time'); the Priests appointed by such a sacrificer are '*dakṣa*' (appointed by the clever sacrificer) ; and the '*ayana*' (performance of these priests) is the '*Dākṣāyana*' (and thus we find that the constituent parts of the word also points to the same fact that is mentioned in the text quoted above).

The name '*Sākamprasthiya*' also means that the substance referred to by this word is offered (*prasthiyate*) along with (*sākam*) the smaller vessels, before the cutting up of the '*Sānmāyā*' cake ; and thus this name is also found to belong to a material only, in connection with the previous sacrifice ; and hence in this case also there is nothing to oppose the recognition, in the sentence in question, of the Action that has been mentioned before.

समाप्तिरविशिष्टा ॥ ११ ॥

समाप्तिः Samāptih, completion. अविशिष्टा Avisaṣṭā, nothing peculiar.

11. There is nothing peculiar in the completion (of the sentence with the mere mention of the result).—11.

COMMENTARY.

[This meets Sūtra 7.]

Though the sentence does not enjoin the Result in reference to the Action, yet, inasmuch as it does not speak of any connection between

the Action and the Result, the Action therein mentioned cannot be different from the previous sacrifice. Just as the fact of the Result following from the Action has been established under *Sūtra* II. i. 1, *et seq.*—so, exactly in the same manner, has it also been shown, under *Sūtra*, II. ii. 26, that there are certain sentences that serve the sole purpose of establishing the relationship between a Result and a certain Accessory of the previous sacrifice. And hence there being a doubt as to which of these two previous conclusions should be applied to the case in question, the presence of certain other words (such as those cited under *Sūtra* 9) distinctly points to the conclusion that in the present case, the Result is mentioned as following from the Accessory (of the previous sacrifice) and not from any distinct sacrifice.

Adhikaraṇa V.—Actions mentioned with specific substances and deities should be regarded as distinct.

SŪTRAS III. iii. 12 to 17.

“संस्कारश्चाप्रकरणेऽकर्मशब्दात्” ॥ १२ ॥

संस्कारश्च Saṁskāraḥ Cha, a mere preparatory rite. अप्रकरणे Aprakaraṇe, not occurring in any particular context. अकर्मशब्दात् Akarmaśabdāt, as there is no word mentioning an action.

12. “It is a mere preparatory rite as not occurring in the context (of any particular sacrifice); specially as there is no word denoting an Action.”—12.

COMMENTARY.

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we find the sentence ‘*Vāyavyam śveta mātabhelā bhūtikāmaḥ, Sauryam charum nirvapet brahmavarchasakāmaḥ.*’ And in connection with this there arise the following questions:—(i). Inasmuch as, as a general rule, all sentences not appearing in reference to any particular sacrifice, are taken as serving some purpose of the Action, mentioned in the context,—does the sentence simply lay down the accessories ‘*Śveta* and ‘*charu*’ respectively of the ‘Touching’ and ‘Preparing’ that form part of the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa* sacrifice, which is the action mentioned in the context? Or does it lay down two independent and distinct Actions? (ii). (If the Actions mentioned are distinct and independent), are these actions only those that are mentioned by the actual words of the sentence? Or is it these actions as accompanying the ‘sacrifice’ that are meant?

As for the word '*Vāyavyam*' (which might be urged as pointing to the fact of the 'white object' being *offered to the Deity Vāyu*, which offering would constitute a *sacrifice*), it could be explained away, as being a mere reference, on the ground that all substances are capable of being, in some way or other, related to certain deities (even without their being actually *offered* to them). Or, the sentence might be taken to mean that —'when one has set aside a certain object for the sake of *Vāyu*, if we happen to *touch* it, it would bring prosperity to us.' And as the sentence embodies a qualified Injunction, there would not be any very great trouble in taking the sentences thus. Or, the sentences might mean that the desirable results are obtained as soon as the white object is touched for the sake of *Vāyu*, or when the boiled rice is prepared for the sake of the Sun. And certainly it is not in a *sacrifice* alone that anything can be done for the sake of certain Deities. Because there is no incompatibility in something being done for the sake of a certain Deity, whenever that

happens to be enjoined for being done as such (even if it be not a sacrifice). Therefore all that the sentence in question means, in accordance with the expressed Injunction, is that 'something white should be touched for the sake of *Vāyu*.'

Thus there being no ground for connecting the sentences with any original primary Action mentioned before they must be taken as laying down a distinct touching and preparing.

यजतिस्तु द्रव्यफलभोक्तृसंयोगात् एतेषां कर्मसंबन्धात् ॥ १४ ॥

यजतिः Yajatiḥ, the action of sacrifice. तु Tu, but. द्रव्यफलभोक्तृसंयोगात् Dravyaphalabhoktrisaṃyogāt, because of the mention of the substance, the result, and the Deity. एतेषां Eteṣām, of these. कर्मसंबन्धात् Karmasamvandhāt, on account of being related to an action.

14. But the 'sacrifice' is laid down; because of the mention of the enjoyer of the substance and the Result, which are related to some sort of an Action.—14.

COMMENTARY.

Inasmuch as, as a matter of fact, the Injunction in question depends upon each of the words contained in the sentence, it must be taken in the case in question, as pertaining to the relationship of the substance, the Deity and the word '*Vāyavyam*' expressing the relationship. And as the relationship would not be possible without the action of *sacrifice*, it naturally implies such an Action, specially as no other action is capable of bringing about the relationship. For if we were to *touch* the substance, without offering to the Deity *Vāyu*, it would not be '*vāyavya*.' Nor can the sentence be taken to mean that we touch only that particular substance which is ordinarily known as *vāyavya* (dedicated to *Vāyu*); because such dedication to a Deity can be brought about only by *sacrifice*. Hence the sentence could not but be taken as meaning that 'the white substance should be offered to *Vāyu*'; and from this we conclude that the sentence is the Injunction of a 'sacrifice' (in the shape of offering). Specially as without the action of 'sacrifice' the result mentioned would not be attained. Because the 'Injunction of Sacrifice' will be defined later on as '*Yajatichodanā dravyadevatākriyam samuddāye kriyārthatvāt* (IV. ii. 27).

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ १५ ॥

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च Liṅgadarśanāc Cha, also because we find texts indicating the same conclusion.

15. Also because we find texts indicating the same conclusion.—15.

COMMENTARY.

We have the text '*Saumāraudrān charun nirvapēt...pariśrite yajetā*'; and in this as soon as the word '*Saumāraudrān*' (which speaks of the connection of the corn with the deities, *Soma* and *Rudra*) has been uttered, though there is no word expressing 'sacrifice'—yet inasmuch as the sentence '*Pariśrite yajetā*' which lays down the proper cooking of the rice, refers to a previous *Sacrifice* by the word '*yajetā*'—we always recognize the sentence as laying down a certain action connected with 'sacrifice.' In fact, in the case of the sentence '*Agniṣounyam paśumālabheta*' it is only by the above reason that the presence of 'sacrifice' is admitted.

In the previous *Adhikarāṇa* we considered the question as to whether the sentence is an Injunction or a mere reference to a previous Action; while what we have considered in the present *Adhikarāṇa* is the question as to,—the Injunctive character having been established,—what sort of an Action (either mere *Touching* or *Sacrifice*) is enjoined by it. And as such there is no mere useless repetition.

Adhikarāṇa VI.—Such actions as the Touching of the Calf and the like are purely purificatory.

SUTRA II. iii. 16—17.

विषये प्रायदर्शनात् ॥ १६ ॥

विषये Viṣaye, in a doubtful case. प्रायदर्शनात् Prāyadarśanāt, by a perception of similarity.

15. In a doubtful case, the correct conclusion is arrived at by a perception of similarity.— 16.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the present *Sūtra*, Upavarśa has cited the sentence *Votsamālabhetā* found in the *Agnihotra* section, in connection with the milking of the cow. And he has shown that, with regard to this sentence also, we have a threefold doubt : (1) Does the sentence lay down the calf with the reference to the Touching originally mentioned in the context ? (2) Or, does it lay down mere '*Touching*' ? (3) Or, does it lay down a '*Sacrifice*.'

As to the first alternative, it has been left out, because there being no specification in the sentence, there is nothing in it to point to '*Touching*' previously mentioned in the context ;—as shown in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*.

And inasmuch as the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa* points to the fact of the sentence under consideration here also being

the Injunction of a sacrifice, the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to explain the present *Adhikarāṇa* as an exception to the foregoing one.

Though, as a matter of fact, on account of the sentence dwelt with here being a counter-instance of the foregoing *Siddhānta* arguments based upon the connection of the *Enjoyer*, the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the present *Adhikarāṇa* has almost wholly been represented (in the shape of the *Siddhānta* of the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa*); yet the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to present it afresh, because of the peculiar character of the intellect of certain persons; as there are some people, so imbued with the idea of the Logician, that they think of interpreting Veda also by means of Inferences from similarity; and these persons would never grasp the fact of the *Pūrvapakṣa* having been refuted, unless it has been duly set forth previously.

Some people accept the word '*Ālabhetā*' as synonymous with '*Sacrifice*' on the strength of the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa* while others take it as merely implying the '*Sacrifice*'; and it is both these views that they bring forward in connection with the sentence in question also. And we have in connection with this a twofold—

Pūrvapakṣa.—Namely: "(1) The sentence in question lays down a distinct sacrifice, (2) it lays down the calf in connection with the sacrifice that has been laid down previously."

The *Siddhānta* view is that in the case of the sentence dwelt with in the foregoing *Adhikarāṇa* we accepted the injunction of the '*sacrifice*,' on the sole ground of relationship between the substance and the Deity therein mentioned by the word '*Vayāvyam*,'—and not, either on the strength of a newly discovered expressive potency of the word '*Ālabhetā*' or on that of fallacious Inference (of the implication of '*Sacrifice*,' by the word '*Ālabhetā*'). In the case in question, however, as we have no word expressive of the said relationship (of Deity and the substance), we must take the word '*Ālabhetā*' in its simple direct signification. Thus would the similarity of the present '*touching*' with the purificatory secondary Actions of *cow-milking* and the like to be explained; as the '*Touching*' also would be a mere secondary rite; and this '*touching of the calf*' at the particular time of milking the cow, would serve a visible purpose of making the cow yield more milk.

अर्थवादोपपत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

अर्थवाद Arthavāda उपपत्ते: Upapatte च Cha and.

17. Also because of the possibility of the connection with the particular Arthavāda.—17.

COMMENTARY.

Close upon the sentence in question we have the sentence *Vatsānikāntā hi pasavāḥ* ('Animals love their young ones dearly'); and this could be taken as an *Arthvāda* showing a reason for the previous Injunction, only when the preceding sentence '*Vatsamālabhetā*' is taken as enjoining the 'touching' by way of fondling it for the purpose of making the cow yield more milk [the two sentences together meaning that one should touch (fondle) the calf with a view to the yielding more milk *because animals love their young dearly*.]

If, on the other hand, the word, '*Ālabhetā*' meant touching for the purpose of killing' (by way of offering to a Deity) the mention of the fact of the young being dearly loved by animals would be wholly irrelevant; for in that case the purport of the two sentences would be this. Because the calf is loved by its mother, therefore it should be touched for being killed—certainly not a very relevant proposition? In the other case (*i.e.* when *Ālabhetā* means touching by way of fondling) it would be quite natural to expect that inasmuch as the cow is fond of the calf, if we fondle the calf or the calf fondles us, the cow would be moved to yield more milk, the flow of which would be accelerated by the sight of her calf being fondled.

Thus also, it must be admitted that the sentence in question lays down mere '*touching*' as a secondary action calculated to serve a useful purpose.

*Adhikaraṇa VII.—The Naivārcharu is
 for the purposes of Ādhāna.*

SŪTRA II. iii. 18.

संयुक्तस्त्वर्थशब्देन तदर्थः श्रुति संयोगात् ॥ १८ ॥

संयुक्तः Samyuktaḥ, connected. तु Tu, verily. अर्थशब्देन Arthasābdena, with the word mentioning an action. तदर्थः Tadarthaḥ, for the sake of that. श्रुतिसंयोगात् Śrutisamyogāt, because such is the direct signification of the words.

18. As connected with the word mentioning an Action, it must be taken as being for the sake of that Action; specially as such is the direct signification of the words of the text.—18.

COMMENTARY.

The *Adhikaraṇa* before last having dealt with the significations of the words '*Ālabhetā*' and '*Nirvāpet*' as contained in the sentences

'Śvetamâlabhetâ' and 'Sauryân carunnirvapet' the last *Adhikarâṇa* has dealt with the counter instance of the first part of that *Adhikarâṇa* and the present *Adhikarâṇa* proceeds to deal with the counter instance of the second portion dealing with the 'Preparing' in connection with the *boiled rice* nor is the case of this exactly similar to that dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikarâṇa* as in this we have a further ground of doubt, in the shape of the mention of a Deity (*Bṛihaspati*.)

[In connection with 'Āgni' we meet with the sentence '*Naivâraś-charubhavati*' and then '*Yadenam charumupadadhâti*' and here arises the question as to whether the *boiled rice* is laid down for the purpose of the sacrifice (the sense of the text being that having sacrificed out of the rice, the remnant is to be *kept aside*), or that it is laid down for the sole purpose of being *kept aside*]. And on this question we have the following:—

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

Pârvapakṣa.—"The character of a subsidiary to sacrifices is inherent in all such substances as *boiled rice* cake and the like ; and hence in all cases it is necessary to give up one's ownership of these substances (in favour of some one else). Consequently, what the word '*Upadadhâti*' in the sentence '*charum upadadhâti*' is that there is to be a '*Prapatti*' (keeping aside, throwing away) of the *corn* and as no such *pratipatti* of a thing would be possible until it had been already utilised, we are led to look out for that at which the *boiled rice* could have been utilised ; and the foremost of all, that which presents itself as being most capable of affording an occasion for the said utilisation of the *Rice*, is the *sacrifice* ; and hence we are led to accept the fact of the *corn* being of use at the *sacrifice*. Subsequently too, we meet with the sentence '*Bṛihaspatiretadannam yannivâra*,' etc., which distinctly mentions *Bṛihaspati* as the Deity of the *Rice* ; and under the circumstances, if the connection between the *Rice* and that Deity were not duly established by means of a sacrifice, the mention of the Deity would be absolutely meaningless. Therefore, we must take the sentences in question to mean that "after having performed the sacrifice of the *Bṛihaspatyacharu* which forms part of the *Āgneya* sacrifice, we should desist, for a time, from proceeding with other sacrifices connected with the '*Āgneya*' and *keep aside* the *Rice* (that has been offered to *Bṛihaspati*)."

Siddhânta.—To the above we make the following reply : There is nothing inherent in the *Rice* that would always make it employed at sacrifices ; in fact, the use to which such things are to be put is ascertained by means of the authoritative directions that may be found with regard to them. As soon as the appearance of the *Rice* has been mentioned, we

naturally seek for the use to which it could be put; and we are met by the sentence '*Yadenam charu upadadhāti*' which directly lays down the fact of the *Rice* helping towards the preparation of the altar for the reception of the fire to be used at the sacrifice. And the *Rice* thus having its use clearly defined, it could not have any connection with another Action, even if such an action were directly mentioned, and hence it is all the more impossible for it to having anything to do with an Action that is not even mentioned (but only indirectly implied). Nor can the *keeping* spoken of be said to have the character of the *Pratipatti*; because we do not know of any use to which it could be put prior to the *keeping*.

Adhikarāṇa VIII.—(The tvastrapatnîvatâ is subservient to the Paryagnikarāṇa).

SŪTRA II. iii. 19.

पालीवते तु पूर्वत्वादवच्छेदः ॥ १६ ॥

पालीवते *Pâtîvate*, in the *Patnîvatâ*. तु *Tu*, really. पूर्वत्वात् *Pûrvatwât*, because it is recognised as the previous one. अवच्छेदः *Avachchhedah*, preclusion.

19. Inasmuch as the *Patnîvatâ* is recognised as the previous one, the sentence in question must be taken as serving the purpose of precluding (the subsequent subsidiaries.)—19.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with what has gone before we proceed to consider whether the word '*Utsrjati*' signifies the sacrifice or not.

The sacrifice having been laid down in the sentence '*Tvastrâm pâtnîvatamalabhate*' we find another sentence '*Paryagnikritam pâtnîvatâmutsrījanti*.' And in connection with this latter sentence, there is a doubt as to whether it lays down an Accessory to the sacrifice (laid down in the former sentence), or a distinct Action, the doubt being due to the two-fold construction of which the sentence is capable. And on this we have the following :—

Pârvapakṣa.—"The sentence lays down a distinct Action; because the Injunctive potency of the sentence pertains, as in the case of the sentence '*Vâyavyam śvetamâlābhetâ*' to the relationship between the substance and the Deity.

And further inasmuch as the sentence in question does not contain any mention of *Tvaṣṭâ*, the action mentioned therein cannot

be recognised as the same as that mentioned in the previous sentence (in which the word *Tvāstrā* forms an important factor); and (if the action mentioned in the two sentences be taken as the same on the ground of both sentences laying down the '*Patnivatā*' then on account of the sentence in question containing the mention of '*Paryagnikarāṇa*' also, there would be a syntactical split (if it laid down the *Patnivatā* also)."

Siddhānta.—To the above we make the following reply : Inasmuch as the sacrifice mentioned in the sentence in question is actually recognised as the same as the one mentioned in the previous sentence, we cannot perceive any other sacrifice in it ; and what the sentence in question does is to lay down, with regard to the same sacrifice, all the subsidiary procedure ending with the '*Paryagnikarāṇa*.'

The word '*Patnivatā*' in the sentence in question can very well denote the previous sacrifice, even though it is accompanied by two qualifications, just like the word *agni* in connection with the *Manotā* sacrifice. And the words '*paryagnikṛtamutsṛjati*' also are cognised, on account of the context, as laying down an accessory for that same sacrifice.

Adhikarāṇa IX.—Adābhya, etc., are the names of the vessels.

SŪTRA II. iii. 20.

अद्रव्यत्वात् केवले कर्मशेषः स्यात् ॥ २० ॥

अद्रव्यत्वात् *Adravatyatvāt*, on account of there being no mention of the sacrificial material. केवले *Kevale*, there being the mention of mere holding. कर्मशेषः *Karmaśeṣaḥ*, subservient to the action. स्यात् *Syāt*, would be.

20. When the name appears by itself without any mention of the sacrificial material and there is merely the mention of 'holding' it would be subservient to the action.—20.

COMMENTARY.

[In no particular connection we find the sentences, *esha vai haviṣā haviryajetā yo dābhyam grihitvā somāya yajate* and *parā vā etesyānyuḥ prāṇa eti yonsum grihnāti*.]

And with regard to the holding of the *Adābhya* and the *Aṃsu* there is a threefold doubt, just as in the case of the *ālambha* (touching). And just as in that case, so here also, after having set aside the two other alternative theories, we have the following—

Purvapakṣa.—The sentence in question enjoins *two sacrifices*. The arguments in support of this view are as follows : It has been shown above

(under *Nāmadheya*) that the name of a sacrifice serves to distinguish it even from* that sacrifice which may have been originally mentioned in the context; and hence it will distinguish actions all the more easily from those that are not mentioned in the same context, with regard to which there can be no idea of identity.

In the case in question we find that the names '*Adābhya*' and '*Aṃśu*' are not known to belong to any sacrifice mentioned in the context; and hence the sentence cannot be taken as laying down a mere repetition of the same. Consequently we conclude that the sentence lays down the *Ekāha* sacrifice which forms part of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—this conclusion being pointed out by the similarity of the injunction of '*holding*.' Nor is the case in question similar to that of the '*touching of the calf*'; (1) because in the first of these two sentences in question, we find the direct mention of the '*sacrifice*' and in the second we have a specific name which serves to distinguish the Action so named from all other actions; and (2) because the presence of the injunction of holding in the sentences transfers, to the actions herein mentioned, all the details of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and as such these actions become fully equipped with all the necessary factors of the material and the Deity, etc., (which is not found in the case of the sentence '*vatsamālabheta*.'

And for these reasons, we conclude that the sentences lay down distinct sacrifices.

Siddhānta.—To the above we make the following reply :—

In the case of sentences where we have only the *name* and the *holding* mentioned (as in the case in question), the chances of the mention of a *sacrifice* are very much less than in the case of the sentence '*vatsamālabheta*,' because the former is devoid even of the mention of a material.

That is to say, we find that, in the sentences in question, the mention of the Deity is a long way off; and even the object that would form the objective of the mentioned '*holding*' is not mentioned. Because the substance cannot be pointed out except by a *class* or by a *property*. And so long as it has not been ascertained that the actions mentioned in the sentence are sacrifices, there can be no idea as to the sacrifices being similar to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and as such '*soma*' (the material offered at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) could not be recognised as the material to be *held*. And as for the verb '*grihṇāti*' also, there is no reason to believe that it is always concomitant with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; because all that it expresses is mere *holding* (and this action is present in all sacrifices).

Nor are the names in question '*Adābhya*' and '*Aṃśu*,' the names of any sacrifices, whereby they could serve to distinguish these sacrifices.

Because these words have been accepted as names, simply on the ground of their co-extensiveness with 'holding' and as for the difference of 'holding' from the previous sacrifices, we also admit it; but it does not follow from this that the sentence lays down a distinct *Sacrifice*.

As a matter of fact, we have proved under *Sūtra* II. ii. 18, that even when such sentences are accompanied by the mention of Deities and materials, they cannot be taken as laying down *Sacrifices* while in the case in question, we do not find even this 'mention of the Deity and the material). As for the *Sacrifice* that is mentioned by the word 'yajeta' in the sentence speaking of the *Adābhya*, it cannot in the present instance, be taken as enjoined by the Injunctive affix (in *yajeta*) which has its injunctive potency transferred elsewhere (to the Accessory) as shown under the *Purvapakṣa* of the *Sūtra* II. ii. 27. Therefore the sentence (speaking of *Adābhya*) must be taken as laying down the 'holding' with reference to a certain sacrifice (laid down before).

Adhikaraṇa X.—*The Agnichayana is a secondary preparatory rite.*

SŪTRA II. iii. 21—23.

“अग्निस्तु लिङ्गदर्शनात् क्रतुशब्दः प्रतीयते” ॥ २१ ॥

अग्निः Agniḥ, the word Agni. तु Tu, really. लिङ्गदर्शनात् Liṅgadarśanāt, because of the presence of indicative marks. क्रतुशब्दः Kratusabdah, denoting a sacrifice. प्रतीयते Pratiyāte, should be recognised.

21. “The word Agni should be recognised as denoting a sacrifice because of the presence of indicative marks.”—21.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the sentence 'Agnichinute' followed by the sentences—'athātognimagnīstomenānuyajati, tamukthyena tamatirātrena, tam ṣoḍaśina,' etc.—we have a threefold doubt: (1) Does it lay down a distinct *Sacrifice*, or (2) Does it lay down mere *chyana* 'collecting'? or (3) Does it lay down an accessory for all the Primary and Subsidiary sacrifices? And on this we have the following—

Purvapakṣa.—(1) As we do not find the sentence repeated again in the context, as we do in the case of the sentences dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, (2) as no useful purpose would be served by the mere purification of Agni, we conclude, from the very fact of the presence of the name, that the sentence lays down a distinct sacrifice; and thus alone could we justify the subsequent mention of the Result, in the sentence

'*Ridhnoti*,' etc. Nor can the result herein mentioned be said to follow from an Accessory ; because no substrate of any such Accessory is mentioned in the context.

And then we perceive that such distinctive marks as the *Upasad*, etc., which are the invariable accompaniments of the *Soma sacrifice*, are connected with the Action mentioned in the sentence in question.

So also in the sentences '*Athāto'gnimâgniṣṭomenânuyajati*,' etc., we find that '*Agni*' is the name of a sacrifice to be performed, because the sentence '*Agnim yajati*' is precisely similar to the sentence '*Samidhoyajati*' wherein it has been shown under Sutra I. iv. 4, that the word '*Samidhaḥ*' is the name of a sacrifice ; and hence we come to take the sentence in question as laying down a sacrifice qualified by the name '*Agni*.' And this *Agni*-sacrifice comes to be qualified by the *Sansthā's* of the *Agniṣṭoma*, which are found to be present in it. Then as for the words '*dvirâtra*,' etc., they could be taken as pointing out the alternatives of time.

SIDDHĀNTA.

द्रव्यं वा स्यात् चोदनायाः तदर्थत्वात् ॥ २२ ॥

द्रव्यं Dravyam, the material. वा Vâ, but. स्यात् Syât, should be. चोदनायाः Chodanâyâh, of the injunction. तदर्थत्वात् Tadarthatvât, on account of being for that purpose.

22. The material should be mentioned by the word because the Injunction is for that purpose.—22.

CÔMENTARY.

Inasmuch as the word '*Agni*' is one that has its signification universally known, unless this signification is found to give rise to certain anomalies, like syntactical split, etc., we cannot reject the sense of *Fire*, and take the word as the name of a sacrifice.

That is to say, the word '*Agni*' is not known to have any literal meaning, like the words '*Udbhid*' and the rest, nor is it accompanied by any of the three conditions of '*Nâmadheya*,' viz., '*Vâkyabheda*' '*Tadvayapadeśa*' '*Tatprakhya*' and (explained in *Adhikarāṇa* I, Pâda iv) ; and hence it could not be taken as the *Name* of a sacrifice.

It has been urged above that it fulfils the *Nâmadheya* condition laid down in Sutra I. iv. 4. But it would have been so if the *Agni* were actually enjoined in the sentence, as something to be purified by *chayana* (collection). And it has never been spoken of as to be so purified (in any other sentence save the one in question) ; and hence the condition laid down in Sutra, I. iv. 4, does not apply to the present case.

Therefore 'Agni,' spoken of in the sentence, is a substance (and not a sacrifice).

तत्संयोगात् क्रतुस्तदाख्यः स्यात् तेन धर्मविधानानि ॥ २३ ॥

तत्संयोगात् Tatsamyogāt, by connection with that. क्रतुः Kratuḥ, the sacrifice. तदाख्यः Tadākhyah, of that name. स्यात् Syāt, might be. तेन Tena, by that. धर्मविधानानि Dharmavidhānāni, laying down of details.

23. On account of the fact of the connection of Agni with all sacrifices a sacrifice might be named 'Agni,' but that name would only serve to lay down the details of the sacrifice.—23.

COMMENTARY.

In the case of such sentences as '*agneṣaṣtram*' (that have been cited by the *Pūrvapakṣa* as showing that 'Agni' is the name of a sacrifice), we have to take recourse to indirect indication, as there is no other way in which the sentence could be explained. In this sentence the word 'Agni' indicates *the place or altar connected with Fire*, and this place indicates *the sacrifice performed at that altar* (and thus it is by a very indirect process that the word 'Agni' can indicate the sacrifice). But the fact of such indirect indication being accepted in one place does not make it necessarily acceptable in all other cases. Hence in the case in question, where the indirect indication can be very well avoided it is only right that we should accept the word 'Agni' as signifying the substance (*Fire*).

In connection with the present *Adhikaraṇa*, the author of another *Bhāṣya* has also treated of the questions of Agni—(1) having a result or being fruitless, (2) being an independent action or subsidiary to another sacrifice, (3) being eternal or transient, (4) being a modification or not of *Uttaravedikā*. But all these questions have already been dealt with in other *Adhikaraṇas*, in connection with other similar sentences, and hence we have not taken them up for consideration here. And the Author referred to also has introduced them here by way of showing off the excellence of his memory.

Adhikaraṇa XI.—The Māsāgnihoṭra is a distinct sacrifice.

SŪTRA II. iii. 24.

प्रकरणान्तरे प्रयोजनान्यत्वम् ॥ २४ ॥

प्रकरणान्तरे Prakaraṇāntare, when there is a difference of context. प्रयोजनान्यत्वम् Prayojanānytvam, there is a difference in the Bhāvanā.



24. When there is a difference of context, there is difference in the Bhâvanâ.—24.

COMMENTARY.

We have finished the consideration of the question of the Differentiation of actions by means of Accessories, and we have also dealt with all side issues of such questions, as to what sort of Accessory is that mentioned in the subsequent sentence, which, not being applicable to the action mentioned in the previous sentence, makes that mentioned in the subsequent action different from it; and which sort is that which is applicable to the previous action, and as such does not make any difference in the Action. And the five means of differentiation having been dealt with, we now proceed to consider the differentiation of actions by context.

[In connection with the *Kuṇḍapâyināmayana*, we find the sentence 'Mâsamagnihotram juhōti, mâsam darśapârnāmâsâbhyām yajate,' and on this there arises a doubt as to whether these sentences lay down the month as the time for the previously mentioned Agnihotra and the Darśa-Pârnāmâsa or they lay down actions totally different from these].

And on this we have the following—

Pârvapakṣa.—Such words as 'Agnihotra' and the like, having already on one occasion denoted a certain action, the mere fact of the word occurring after a long interval does not make any difference in the Action itself. That is to say, just as where the word 'Agnihotra' is uttered in *Valabhi* or in *Pâtāliputra*, it does not signify two different things; so no matter whether the word occurs in one context or in another, its denotation cannot be different. For certainly the difference in the context does not bring about a fresh denotative potency in the word. And hence the verbs 'yajate,' 'juhōti,' etc., also as qualified by these words ('Agnihotra,' etc.) do not signify anything different; specially as the absence of another meaning does not make anything meaningless or irrelevant. For in the case in question, the mention of the 'month' is not incompatible with the ordinary 'Agnihotra'; because the monthly Agnihotra could very well be taken as an alternative to the Lifelong Daily Agnihotra. Or, it may be that the lifelong daily performance is laid for that Agnihotra which forms a necessary duty; while there are other occasional performances of the same Agnihotra with a view to the obtaining of certain desirable results; and it is for these that the sentence lays down the 'month' as the time. And it is only desirable that the syntax (of the sentence in question) should set aside that which is pointed out by the context.

Siddhānta.—To the above we make the following reply:—

In the sentence in question, we find that the *monthly Agnihotra* is laid down as to be performed *after the Upasads* whereas we do not find any such *Upasads* preceding the original *Agnihotra*; and as such the two *Agnihotras* must be different.

That is to say, if the sentence in question had simply laid down the *month*, then we could have thought that the time had been laid down with reference to the original *Agnihotra*. As a matter of fact, however, such is not the case; as the sentence distinctly mentions the action as to be performed *after the Upasads*; and as such the *sequence to the Upasads* must be taken as qualifying the time for the performance of this sacrifice. In connection with the original *Agnihotra*, however, we do not find any mention of these *upasads*, either as foreign to it, or as forming an integral part of it. If, again, the sentence were taken as laying down—(1) *Upasads* (2) the *sequence to the Upasads* and (3) the *month*,—then, there being various objects of Injunction, there would be a syntactical split.

This also meets all the other declarations of the *Pūrvapakṣa* that the sentence lays down the performability, in the midst of the *Sūtra*, of the otherwise prohibited *Agnihotra*, either as an independent sacrifice, or as a part of the *Sūtra* itself. Because in all these cases, the mention of the *sequence to the Upasads* and of *month* would be wholly meaningless.

When, however, the sentence is taken as laying down a distinct *Agnihotra*, there would be nothing incongruous in the laying down of many things. Hence the sentence must be taken as laying down a distinct *Agnihotra*.

Such is the *Siddhānta* as represented by the *Bhāṣya*. But there is something to be said against this representation of the *Siddhānta*. It is as follows:—

If the *Agnihotras* were taken as distinct, only because of the fact, there otherwise being a syntactical split,—then the present instance too becomes one of the Differentiation of Actions by means of syntactical split (already dealt with above), and not by that of *context* (what is really meant to be shown here) or, again the Actions would be different on account of the impossibility of the manifold accessories mentioned in the sentence in question belonging to the original *Agnihotra*; and thus the necessary differentiation being done by Accessories, there would be no room for the functioning of the difference of context (towards the differentiation). Because even if the sentence in question had occurred in the same context as that of the original *Agnihotra*, then too it could not but have been taken as mentioning a distinct Action, because of the

fact of the accessory details herein mentioned being inapplicable to the original *Agnihotra*.

And further, even though the reason shown in the *Bhāṣya* might, with difficulty, establish the difference between the two *Agnihotras*, yet it could do nothing with regard to the other sentence in question, wherein the monthly *Darśa Pāṇamāsa* is not mentioned as preceded by the *Upasads*. That is to say, the sentence '*Māsam darśapāṇamāśābhyām*' lays down only the connection of the sacrifice with the month; and as such there being no syntactical split, there would be nothing to show that the *Darśa Pāṇamāsa* herein mentioned is different from that mentioned before.

Thus then the explanation of the *Siddhānta* as given in the *Bhāṣya* being found to be untenable, the *Vārtika* explains it as follows:—

When the Accessory, though mentioned in a separate context, is laid down as a matter of independent Injunction, i.e., forms the predicate of the sentence, then it can be delegated to the previous action (and would not make any difference in it) when however the Accessory is mentioned only as an *Uddeśya* (not an object of Injunction, but an accomplished thing, forming the subject of the sentence), then the action with reference to which it appears must be taken as different from the previous action.

In the case in question, we perceive a difference between the two *Agnihotras*, not because of their being mentioned in separate contexts, but because of the fact of all connection with the previous context having been cut off. That is to say, when no idea of the original *Agnihotra* is present in the mind, at the time that the sentence in question is met with then the action mentioned in the latter cannot but be recognized as different from the previous *Agnihotra*. And as for the difference of contexts, even though it is present, it does not serve any useful purpose with regard to the differentiation; as we shall show under *Sūtra* II-iii-25.

Adhikarāṇa XII.—The Agneya, etc., are Kāmya Sacrifices.

फलं चाकर्मसन्निधौ ।

SUTRA II. iii 25.

फलं Phalam, the result. च Cha, also. अकर्मसन्निधौ Akarmasannidhau, mentioned apart from actions.

25. The Result mentioned apart from Actions (is a means of difference).—25.

COMMENTARY.

All the six causes of differentiation have been dealt with. We now proceed to show another way in which the difference of context operates towards differentiation. There are people who hold the differentiation (in the case cited in the last *Adhikaraṇa*) to be made by a difference of context only (according to the *Bhāṣya*), while others according to the *Vārtika* hold it to be made by the connection of a particular time; and they do not admit of any differentiation brought about merely by such agencies as non-proximity or the relationship of an *anupādeya* substance. It is with a view to explain the real state of things to these persons that the present *Sūtra* has been introduced. And what is dealt with in the present *Adhikaraṇa* is not a seventh cause of differentiation.

Then, the fact of *place* and *occasion* being *anupādeya* is too well-known, as has been shown in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*; and hence in the present *Adhikaraṇa* we do not cite any examples of these. And, in fact, the following two passages, too, dealing as they do with *place* and *occasion*—should have been dealt with in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, viz: (1) *satrâyāvagurya viśvajitâ yajeta Samyuthâne viśvajit*, etc., (these too speaking of *occasion*); and (2) *Dakṣiṇēna tīreṇa Sarasvatyâḥ âgneyenashtâkapâlēna śamyâ parâśāmiyât* (speaking of *Place*). Though, as in the case of the *Atirâtrâ*, etc., so in these also, we do not find any mention of the root 'yaji' yet inasmuch as, without the inference of the presence of the root 'yaji' the sentences containing the words with the nominal affix would remain incomplete (the *yaji* is inferred directly as the sentences have been pronounced), and hence the sentences do not stand in need of the 'yaji' occurring in any other sentence; and hence the actions mentioned in them must be taken as distinct from any others previously mentioned.

Then as for the other two *Anupādeyas* the *Result* and *Object to be purified* (or prepared)—we proceed to consider them now, amenable, as they are, to the same line of reasoning.

Of these two, the mention of the *Result* has been cited in the *Bhāṣya*: *Agneyamaṣṭâkapālannirvapet rukkâmaḥ*, '*Agniṣtomîyâmekâdaśa-kapālannirvapet brahmavarchasakâmaḥ Aindramekâdaśakapālannirvapet prajākâmaḥ*.' And as for the mention of the *Object to be purified*, we have the sentence '*Traidhâtavîyâ dīkṣanîya*, etc., which lays down a purificatory rite for the sacrificer.

The *Bhāṣya* speaks of the sentences as being found *without reference to any particular Action*; and this is done with a view to show that the case in question is not capable of being dealt with under *Difference of Context*.

[This question being as to whether the sentences in question only serve to lay down certain results with reference to the original *Āgneya*, etc., or they lay down distinct sacrifices], we have the following—

Pūrvapakṣa.—*Prâkṛiteṣu phalâvidhiriti*—That is to say, the sentence in question lays down the Result with reference to the sacrifice mentioned before,—first in the same manner as *Ahavanīya* and the rest are laid down ; because the Results herein laid down are capable of being desired, even by one who is engaged in the *Darśa Pârṇamāsa*.

Siddhānta.—The reply to this is this—the Result can never be enjoined. The sentence of this is that, on account of the reasons shown under *Sâtra*, VI.i.3. of the *Svâṅgakâmâdhikarâṇa*, the Result has always the character of the *Uddeśya* (that subject with regard to which something else is enjoined). Because if the Result were enjoined, it could be so only with regard to the Action ; and as such being a part of the Action itself, it would lose its character of Result to be brought about by that Action). And, on the other hand, if the action were not enjoined with reference to the Result then it would not have the character of the means to that Result ; and as such it would become fruitless. If again, both (Action and Result) were *Uddeśya* or both were *Vidheya* then they would have no connection with each other. And so the only alternative left to us is to admit that the sentence lays down an Action with regard to a particular Result. And then just as in the preceding case (of an Action being laid down with reference to a particular time, so in the present case also), the Action thus laid down in the sentence in question would be one that is wholly distinct from all previous actions.

The same line of reasoning would apply also to the case of the sentence that speaks of a purificatory rite for the sacrificer.

Nor is it possible for the transient Desire (for certain results) to be the means of accomplishing such eternal Actions as the *Āgnēya*, etc. (and this is what it would come to if the sentences were taken as laying down the Result with reference to sacrifices.)

For these reasons, we conclude that the sentences in question lay down Actions that are distinct from all previous Actions.

Adhikaraṇa XIII.—[*The Avesti leads to the acquisition of food.*]

SUTRA II. iii. 26.

सन्निधौ त्वविभागात् फलार्थेन पुनःश्रुतिः ॥ २६ ॥

सन्निधौ Sannidhau, when there is proximity. तु Tu, really. त्वविभागात् Avibhāgāt, there is no separation. फलार्थेन Phalārthena, for the purpose of pointing out result. पुनःश्रुतिः Punahśrutih, repetition.

26. When there is proximity, there is no separation ; and hence the second mention is for the purpose of pointing out another Result.—26.

COMMENTARY.

The present *Adhikaraṇa* is introduced by way of a counter instance to all the preceding *Adhikaraṇas* based upon *non-proximity*.

The mention of 'the Result' (in the *Sūtra*) indicates all other *Anupadeyas*. And hence the sentences forming the subject-matter of the present *Adhikaraṇa* are all the following:—(1) *Āgneyo'stakapālo bhavatietayā anaādyaśakāmam yājayet*, or *Darśapāṇnamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajeta śeṣāt sviśākṛitam yajet*, etc. (mentioning the Result); (2) *Sarve darśapāṇnamāsābhyām yajeta* (mentioning the Place); (3) *Pārṇamāśyām Paurṇomāśyā yajeta* (mentioning the Time); and (4) *Yāvajjīvam Durśa-paurṇamāsābhyām yajet* (mentioning the occasion).

[The question with regard to these being as to whether the actions mentioned are the same as those of the same name mentioned before, or they are distinct Actions altogether], we have the following—

Pārvapakṣa.—"Inasmuch as all these sentences lay down certain Actions, with reference to a particular Result, Place, etc., we conclude, in accordance with the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, that these Actions are other than those previously mentioned.

And in favour of this view, we have the following arguments: Inasmuch as there can be no Injunction of that which has already been enjoined we would have to take the names of Actions in the sentences in question as mere references to the original Actions (of those names)—if we do not take the Actions as distinct; and that which is *referred to* is that which is the *Uddeśya* (that with regard to which something else is laid down) but as a matter of fact, we do not find the Actions (mentioned in the sentences) to have the character of the *Uddeśya*.

Siddhānta.—To the above we make the following reply :

The potency of the Injunction varies according as it happens to be an *originative* or an *applicatory* one. And hence when it is practicable,

we take it as having the potency of only one; but when that is not found possible, we accept it as having both.

That is to say, in the case in question, we are forced to accept the same sentence to be an originative as well as an applicatory Injunction. It is only when the applicatory Injunction is such that there is no inconsistency in its pointing to the presence in itself of originative potencies, that we take it as having only the applicative potency, with regard to Actions whose idea is present in the mind as having been brought about by another originative Injunction. But the case of the sentence in question not being like this, we have to admit to have the double potency.)

The use of the present *Adhikaraṇa* has been expressed by the *Bhāṣya* as lying in the fact that, if the sentence in question refers to the original *Aveṣṭi*, then, the substance to be offered at the sacrifice performed for the acquiring of Food, would be the *Āgneya* cake; while if the Action were other than the *Aveṣṭi*, then we would have some other substance.

To this, however, some people make the following objection: "Even if the Action spoken of in the sentence '*Etayā annādyekāmam yājuyet*,' were other than the original *Aveṣṭi* then, too, inasmuch as the word '*etayā*' would point to the fact of this other Action being similar to the *Aveṣṭi*, the substance employed at it would be the same as that used in the *Aveṣṭi*, and no other substance would have to be used."

But this question is not quite pertinent. Because so long as it is possible for the word '*etayā*' to be taken, as in the case of the sentence '*eṣa jyotiḥ*,' etc., in its direct sense, as referring to the Action to be spoken of immediately after it,—it can be rightly taken as indirectly indicating similarity. Hence there is nothing incorrect in the assertion '*another substance will have to be used at the sacrifice*.'

We have found that the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* lay down six means for the differentiating of Actions:—

In another commentary (by *Bhavudāsa*, perhaps) only four such causes are mentioned, viz., (1) difference of words, (2) Difference of Names, (3) Difference of Accessory Details, and (4) Difference of Result. He has included Repetition and Number in Difference of words, and the 'Difference of context,' etc., in the 'Difference of Result,' because all that the context does is to help the Result.

But this appears to be highly objectionable. Because, in the first place (Repetition) cannot be included in 'Difference of Words'; as if the word '*yajate*' is repeated five times, or any number of times for the matter of that, it does not become a different word. And when the word *prajāpatyān* is used by way of *Ekaśeṣa* as pointing to seventeen *Prajāpatyas*,

we do not have so many different words, as the word is actually found to be one and the same only, in all cases. This is what has been explained under *Sūtra* I.i.15, and also in *Sūtra* I.i.20. And the singleness of such objects will be explained later on under *Sūtra* VI.iii.12. Consequently we conclude that in such cases, not being able to find other ground for differentiating the actions, the author of this commentary has gratuitously assumed the words to be different, even though, as a matter of fact, the word is one and the same. *Secondly*, this author of the commentary has failed to grasp the fact of the Result, etc., not being able to differentiate actions when the *Context* does not happen to be different—a fact that has been shown over and over again in the *Sūtra* just explained (II. iii. 26) and also in *Sūtra* II. ii. 16, *et seq.* And thus we find that though it is the *Difference of Context*, as helped by the mention of the *Result* that being the cause of non-recognition (of an Action as the other), is the real means of differentiating actions,—yet the said commentator has wholly neglected this fact (including the 'Difference of Context' in the 'Difference of Result'). *Thirdly*, he failed to perceive that it was the 'Difference of Result' that was included in the 'Difference of Context' and not *vice versa*.

It has been argued by the adherents of this commentator that the fact of only four opposites of ground of identity being mentioned in the *Sūtra* II. iv. 9, distinctly points to the fact of the ground of difference also being only four.

But we do not attach any such significance to the *Sūtra*, in the present connection; because in the *Adhikaraṇa* under consideration, we find no other means of Differentiation applicable save the *Difference of Context* (which therefore could not be denied as a means of Differentiation).

Hence we conclude that there are six means of Differentiation as explained above.

Adhikaraṇa XIV.—[The Repetition of the *Āgneya* serves the purpose of Glorification.]

SUTRAS II, iii, 27—29.

आग्नेयस्तूतहेतुत्वादभ्यासेन प्रतीयेत ॥ २७ ॥

आग्नेयः *Āgneyah*, the *Āgneya* sacrifice. तू Tu, really. उक्तहेतुत्वात् *Uktahetutvāt*, for reasons already explained. अभ्यासेन *Abhyāseṇa*, as repeated. प्रतीयेत *Pratiyeta*, would appear.

27. The *Āgneya* would appear as if it were to be repeated, because of reasons already explained—27.

COMMENTARY.

We find the sentence '*Āgneyoṣṭakapalo amāvāsyaśyām bhavati*, and then again '*Āgneyoṣṭakapalo amāvāsyaśyām purnamāśyaśchachyuto bhavati*' (this latter occurring in the text before the former.) And then arises the question as to whether the same *Āgneya* that is mentioned in the latter sentence is also mentioned over again in the former sentence, or the two *Āgneyas* are distinct actions.

This conclusion pointed out by the previous *Adhikarāṇa* would be that the two are the same, even though the action is laid down in reference to the particular time of the *Amāvasyā* which by itself, is *anupadeya*.

And against this conclusion we have the following—

Pūrvapakṣa.—It has been shown above that it is only when the Repetition is formed to serve no other purpose that it can be taken as serving the purpose of differentiating actions. And in this case in question, we actually find the repetition serving no other purpose hence we take it to mean that the *Āgneya* is to be performed twice over, that is to say, the two performances would constitute two distinct actions.

In contradiction to this we have another alternative theory, which we bring forward as—

Siddhānta (A.)

अविभागात् कर्मणो द्विरुक्तेर्न विधीयते ॥ २८ ॥

अविभागात् *Avibhāgāt*, on account of non-differentiation. तु *Tu*, really. कर्मणो *Karmaṇo*, of the action. द्विरुक्तेः *Dvirūkteh*, by reason of mere repetition. न विधीयते *Navidhiyate*, would not be enjoined.

28. The action not being found to be differentiated, the mere repetition of the same action would not make any difference in the action itself.—28.

COMMENTARY.

In the case of the sentences '*Sāmido yajati Bido yajati*,' etc., it is only right that we should take the repetition of '*yajati*' as serving the purpose of differentiating the actions; because in this case we find the distinct repetition of the 'Sacrifice' In this case in question, on the other hand, the sacrifice has got to be inferred from the relationship of the substance (cake) with the Deity Agni (expressed by the word '*Āgneya*'). And inasmuch as the Deity, as mentioned in the sentence, are found precisely



the same as those mentioned in the other, we are led, by the idea of those that we had obtained from the previous sentence to conclude that it is the same action that is mentioned in the latter sentence also.

It might be argued that "the Deity and the substance also are distinct in the two cases. But that is not possible ; because as a matter of fact, they are actually recognized as non-different. If the difference be based on the difference of the individuality of substance and the Deity, then such difference of individuality would be present also in the different performances of the same action.

Therefore we conclude that both sentences are optional Injunctions of the same *Āgneya* to be performed in the *Amāvasyā* day.

Or according to the law—*Yugapatpravṛtteryathā syāt sattvadarśanam* (i.e., two sentences operating simultaneously we must take them according as we find the object mentioned in them), it is the same action that is mentioned by both sentences. And it cannot be definitely ascertained which sentence really lays down the action and which is a mere repetition and such meaningless.

Siddhānta (B) :—

अन्यार्था वा पुनः श्रुतिः ॥ २६ ॥

अन्यार्था Anyârthâ, serving another purpose. वा Va, entirely. पुनःपुनः Punahsrutih, repetition.

29. The repetition serves quite another purpose.—29.

COMMENTARY.

When we proceed to look into the various purposes that are served by repetitions, we find that inasmuch as the sentence in question does not mention any qualifying accessory, and as *Preclusion of the Rest* is accompanied by a three-fold anomaly, we conclude that it serves the purpose of an *Arthavâda*. And as it is not quite clear in the sentence itself of what it is an *Arthavâda*, it must be taken as that of the *Âgneya* itself.

SECOND ADHYĀYA.

FOURTH PADA.

Adhikaraṇa I.—[Treating of the lifelong Agnihotra].

“यावज्जीविकोऽभ्यासः कर्मधर्मः प्रकरणात्” ॥ १ ॥

यावज्जीविकः Yāvajjivikah, lifelong. अभ्यासः Abhyāsaḥ, repetition. कर्मधर्मः Karma-dharmah, a property of the action. प्रकरणात् Prakaraṇāt, because of the context.

1. “The lifelong repetition is a property of the action because of the context.”—1.

COMMENTARY.

[We find the sentences ‘Yāvajjivamagnihotram juhoti,’ ‘Yāvajjivam Darśapūramāśābhyīm yajeta? And with regard to these sentences, there arises a question as to whether the mention of ‘lifelong’ qualifies the action, the sentence laying down the lifelong repetition of the action; or it serves to lay down a restriction for the performer of the action. That is to say, does the sentence lay down the *Repetition of the action* or only a *restriction for the agent* ?].

The relevancy of this *Adhikaraṇa* in the present context is thus explained by the *Vārtilka* :—

Just as the causes of difference operate towards the differentiation of the forms of action, so also do they operate towards that of their performances. Hence with regard to the Agnihotra, etc., qualified as they are by the mention of ‘lifelong’ there arises the question as to whether each of its (daily) performances is a distinct action by itself, or all the daily performances go to form a single action, meant to bring about a particular desirable end, and the time for whose performance is the whole of one’s life. If then, the time—whole of one’s life—were laid down as a property of the action, then the mere offering of the morning and evening libations in accordance with the injunctions “he should offer the morning libation with the *mantra* ‘Suryo joytiḥ, etc.,’ and he should offer the evening libation with the *mantra* ‘Agnirjoytiḥ, etc.,—would not be enough to complete the *Agnihotra*, till the specified time—‘life long’—expires; and hence a performance of the *Agnihotra* would come to be made of many daily repetitions; just as the performance of the

Jyotistoma is made up of the repetition of the same process with regard to each of the many *Grahas*. If, on the other hand, 'living' be taken as the occasion (or cause), with reference to which the sentence lays down the action,—then, inasmuch as the occasion would last till the Performer lasts, the action comes to be enjoined without any reference to any desirable result; and as such a neglect of the performance being sinful, it would be necessary for the man to perform it as long as he lives, either for the fulfilment of his own duty, or for the avoiding of the sin incurred by non-performance; and hence in this case the sentence would lay down a Restriction (or Duty) for the man. And in this case the occasion of the Agnihotra performance would be morning and evening together with the life of the agent; and hence as this occasion would present itself every day, the action would be complete every day also; and hence the complete performance of the *Agnihotra* would be repeated each day;—the performance of each day forming a distinct action by itself (independently of the other day's performance).

On the question, then we have the following—

Pārvapakṣa.—(1) All the daily repetitions of the Agnihotra form a single performance of it; (2) *lifelong* is a qualification of the action; and (3) the sentence serves to lay down the time.

Siddhānta.—

कर्तुर्वा श्रुतिसंयोगात् ॥ २ ॥

कर्तुः Kartuh, of the agent. वा Va, really. श्रुतिसंयोगात् Śrutisamyogāt, because of the direct signification of the words.

2. It must be taken as a property of the Agent, because of the direct signification of the words.—2.

COMMENTARY.

The word '*Dharmah*' is to be supplied from the preceding *Sūtra*; and hence the proposition laid down by the *Siddhānta* is that—'It is the property of the Agent that is enjoined. This property of the Agent too is binding, and does not depend upon his own sweet will.'

Because in our interpretation of the sentence, both the words—'*Yāvajjīvam*' and the verb '*juhoti*'—retain their direct signification; while in your interpretation, they will have to be taken in their indirect indicated meanings.

That is to say, in our theory, it is by direct signification that the word '*Yāvajjīvam*' denotes the *life-time* of the agent as the occasion (for the Action); and in the Verb '*juhoti*' and '*yajati*' also, it is only directly that

The time for the *Darśa Pārṇamāsa* of which the *Agnihotra* forms an integral factor, according to you, is the whole lifetime; and certainly no transgression of that time is possible. Because if the performance of a certain action is begun at the prescribed time, it is admitted that the time has not been transgressed. And certainly one who is a 'performer of the *Darśa Pārṇamāsa*' could never have allowed its prescribed time (his lifetime) to lapse without having begun its performance; because if he were to die without having begun it, he would not be a performer of the *Darśa Pārṇamāsa*. If by transgression were meant 'non-completion

during the prescribed time' then too, inasmuch as this 'non-completion' could be ascertained only after the death of the performer, the laying down of the Expiatory Rite (for such transgression) would be wholly superfluous.

In accordance with our theory, on the other hand, inasmuch as the beginning as well as the completion of the *Darśa Pārṇamāsa* is laid down for every month during the lifetime of the performer, it is possible that there may be transgression of that particular day of the month (omission of performance on that day; and hence too it would be quite possible for the transgressor to perform the expiatory rite after that date has elapsed.

व्यपवर्गश्च दर्शयति कालश्चेत्कर्मभेदः स्यात् ॥ ४ ॥

व्यपवर्गः Vyapavargam, completion. च Cha, also. दर्शयति Darśayati, speaks of कालः Kālah, time. चेत् Chet, if. कर्मभेदः Karmavedaḥ, difference of action. स्यात् Syât, should be

4. We have a text that speaks of the completion of the Action. If there is time, the performances of the Action should be distinct.—4.

We have the sentence '*Darśa Pārṇamāśābhyāmīṣṭvā somaṇa yujetā*. Now, if all the lifelong repetitions were to constitute a single performance of the *Darśa Pārṇamāsa*, then, for reason shown above, the *Soma* sacrifice would have to be performed only after all the repetitions had been finished; and (as these would be finished only after the death of the performer) the dead person could not perform the *Soma* Sacrifice. If, on the other hand, there is time for the performance of the *Soma* sacrifice (after the completion of the *Darśa Pārṇamāsa*.' This non-filling up of the whole lifetime is found to be possible, only if the 'lifetime' is taken as a property of the Performer; because in that case, each monthly performance of the *Darśa Pārṇamāsa* is a distinct action by itself. Thus then the latter part of the *Sūtra* means that if there is time left by the performance of *Darśa Pārṇamāsa* for the performance of the *Soma* sacrifice, then each performance of the *Darśa Pārṇamāsa* should be a distinct action, as held by us.

The latter part of the *Sūtra* is also capable of another interpretation. If the whole lifetime be laid down as the time for the performance of the *Darśa Pārṇamāsa*, then the *Soma* sacrifice as well as all other actions that may be laid down for the man, would be performed in the midst of the *Darśa Pārṇamāsa*; and in that case inasmuch as all these other

actions would break up the continuity of the lifelong extensive *Darśa—Pūrṇamāsa* the assertion '*Darśa—Pūrṇamāsa* *abhyāmiśtvā*' ('having performed the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa*') would be wholly incompatible and further, this interpretation of the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa* would constitute the improper procedure deprecated in such sentences as 'he falls off from heaven, who *perverts the sacrifice*' and the like.

For these reasons also we cannot take the sentence in question as laying down the *time*.

अनित्यत्वात् नैवं स्यात् ॥ ५ ॥

अनित्यत्वात् Anityatvāt, on account of non-binding character. तु Tu, really. न Na not. एवं Evam, so. स्यात् Syāt, could be.

5. Because of the non-binding character of the action (according to you) it could not be so.—5.

COMMENTARY.

We have already shown that in order to take the word '*Yāvajjivam*' as laying down *time*, it would be necessary to have recourse to indirect Indication. And now we proceed to show that even if we allow the indication, *the action not having a binding character, it could not be so*. That is to say, that alone can be spoken of as pointing to a definite point of time which is sure to appear, and always in connection with that point of time; As for instance, the *Amāvasyā* is pointed out as *the day in which the moon is not visible* but there is no such single thing that invariably marks the end of the life-time of all living beings; and hence this life-time is not capable of being definitely pointed out by means of anything, thus then the time (life-time) being wholly indefinite being ascertainable only if it actually happens, it must be taken as mentioned by way of an occasion for the performance of the *Agnihotra*, etc.

विरोधश्चापि पूर्ववत् ॥ ६ ॥

विरोधः Virodhaḥ, incongruity. चापि Chāpi, also. पूर्ववत् Pūrvavat, as before.

6. There is also incongruity as before.—6.

COMMENTARY.

If 'lifelong' is a restriction, qualifying the agent, it could not be applied to the subsidiary sacrifices, as it is only that, which pertains to the principal *sacrifice* that is implied in the subsidiary—as we shall show later on; and if the word were taken as laying down *the time for the sacrifice*, it would be relegated to the subsidiaries also (and then the

subsidiary sacrifices, the *Saurya*, etc., also would come to be performed throughout one's life, which is not desirable even for the *Pārva*pakṣi).

कर्तुस्तु धर्मनियमात् कालशास्त्रं निमित्तं स्यात् ॥ ७ ॥

कर्तुः Kartuh, to the agent. तु Tu, if. धर्मनियमात् Dharmaniyamât, restriction of character. कालशास्त्रं Kālaśāstram, time injunction. निमित्तं Nimittam, occasion. स्यात् Syât, would be.

7. If the restriction pertained to the performer the time injunction would be taken as mentioning the occasion.—7.

COMMENTARY.

What is said in this *Sūtra* being analogous to what has been said in *Sūtra* 4, the *Vārtika* has given three explanations:—

(1) This *Sūtra* being the last of the *Adhikaraṇa* rightly recapitulates what has been said before.

(2) It may be that though the author of the *Sūtra* has already said that the Restriction in question is a property of the Performer,—yet he has not yet shown what, in that case, would be done with the word '*Yāvajjīvam*,' and hence he now declares that the word can be taken as mentioning the occasion.

Or it may be that the *Sūtra* replies to the question—"In regard to the *Agnihotra* and the *Darsa Pāṇamāsa* inasmuch as we have the mention of the word '*Yāvajjīvam*' we could take lifelong as the occasion, but how can that be the occasion for the Animal sacrifice, the Soma sacrifice and the *Chaturmāsya* sacrifice?" The sense of the *Sūtra* thus is that even in the case of these latter, the prescription of time, mentioned repeatedly, would serve to point out the life-time as the occasion;—'the said prescription being in the form of the sentence '*Vasante vasante jyotiṣa*, etc.' This sentence does not lay down the time for the performance of any optional sacrifice because an optional sacrifice, depending for its performance upon one's whim, and as such being only subsidiary, it could not be spoken of as to be performed in *every spring*. Then as for the Necessary Binding Sacrifice, if that were to be performed but once, in any one Spring, the repetition of '*Vasante*' would be wholly useless. Nor is there any ground for limiting its performance to only a certain number of Springs, consequently we must conclude that the Injunction means that the sacrifice is to be performed in *every Spring that might occur during the lifetime of the Performer*. And as for the Locative in '*Vasante*' that too points to *Vasanta* being the occasion, just as it does in the case of the word '*bhinne*' in '*bhinne juhoti*.' It is for these reasons

that the Sūtra lays down that in all these cases, inasmuch as the mention of time lays down restriction for the performer, it must be taken as laying down the *Occasion*. Thus it is too that the necessary and binding character of the Animal sacrifice, the *Soma* sacrifice and the *Chaturmāsya* sacrifice becomes established.

Adhikarāṇa II.—[The action mentioned in different Rescension texts is the same].

SŪTRAS II. iv. 8-32.

“नामरूप धर्मविशेष-पुनरुक्ति-निन्दाऽशक्ति समाप्ति
वचन प्रायश्चित्तान्यार्थदर्शनात् शाखान्तरेषु कर्मभेदः स्यात् ”८॥

नाम Nāma, name. रूप Rūpa, form. धर्मविशेष Dharmaviśeṣa, particular details. पुनरुक्ति Punarūkti, repetition. निन्दा Nindā, deprecation. अशक्ति Aśakti, incapability. समाप्तिवचन Samāptivachanam, mention of completion. प्रायश्चित्त Prāyāchitta, expiatory rites. अन्यार्थ Anyārtha, distinct purposes. दृग्भात् Darśanāt, because we find. शाखान्तरेषु Śākhāntareṣu, when the texts belong to distinct rescensions. कर्मभेदः Karmabhedah, difference of action. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

8. “ When the texts belong to distinct Rescensions, the actions must be distinct ; because we find (differences in) (1) the name, (2) the form, (3) the particular details ;—and because of (4) Repetition, (5) Deprecation, (6) Incapability, (7) Mention of completion, (8) Expiatory Rites, and (9) Distinct purposes.”—8.

COMMENTARY.

[There are various Rescensions of the Veda ; and it is found that the same action is very often mentioned in all these texts ; then there arises the question as to whether all these actions are one and the same, or is every one of them distinct from the rest].

The present *Adhikarāṇa* is taken up with a view to show that there are no grounds for the Differentiation of Actions except those already dealt with. And hence we proceed to bring forward certain other grounds of difference, and then demolish them ; and then we shall show also, in course of the discussion, that every one of the grounds herein mentioned is included in one of those that have been already dealt with in the previous *Adhikarāṇas*.

On this question we have the following

Pūrvapakṣa.—The action mentioned in each Rescensional text is that it is distinct ; to say, the *Agnihotra* mentioned in the *Kāṭha* Rescension

is distinct from the *Agnihotra* mentioned in the *Taittirīya Rescension* ; for the following reasons :—

1. On account of the *Difference of Name* : for instance we find people declaring that such and such a thing is found mentioned in connection with the *Kāthaka Agnihotra* and that in connection with the *Taittirīya Agnihotra* (which showed that the two *Agnihotras* are distinct, one being called the *Kāthaka* and another the *Taittirīya*). [Here too the differentiating agency is that of *Name*, which is equivalent to '*Sabdāntara*' dealt with in *Sūtra II.ii.1.*].

2. On account of the *Difference of Form*, for instance, in one text the cake dedicated to *Agni Soma* is said to be '*ekādaśakapāla*' while in another it is said to be '*dwādaśakapāla*.' In this case also, inasmuch as the '*eleven*' and '*twelve*' are not capable of being exchanged, in the way that we find in the case of the numbers '*eight*' and '*twelve*' with regard to the *Vaiśvānara* or in that of the *Amikṣā* and the *Vājina*—the differentiating agency is that of the accessory (and this has been fully dealt with in *II.ii*).

3. On account of the difference of *sacrificial details*, for instance, the *Taittirīyas*, in connection with the *Kārīri* sacrifice, lay down eating on the ground, while those belonging to other *Rescensions* do not do so ; so also while in connection with *Agni sacrifice* some lay down the carrying of the water-pot of the tutor, while others do not ; and in connection with the *Āśvamedha*, some lay down that the sacrifices should present grass to the Horse, while others do not lay this down. And in all these cases, the differentiating agencies are those of the eating on the ground, carrying of the water-pot, and the presenting of the grass—all of which are mere sacrificial accessories, but taking the place of the *method* of the sacrifice, these have been mentioned apart from the former accessories, which are wholly outside the performance.

4. On account of *Repetition*, i.e., if the same action were mentioned in all the *Rescensional* texts, there would be many useless repetitions. In this case differentiating agency is that of '*Repetition*' (and has been dealt with under *Sūtra II.ii.2*).

5. On account of *Deprecation*, for instance : some people deprecate the offering of the morning libations before sunrise, while others deprecate the offerings of the same after sunrise. In this case also, the differentiating agency is that of the *time*, which is only an Accessory.

6. On account of *Incapability*. In this case also the differentiating agency is that of the Accessory, because all that is meant is that all the various details mentioned in connection with the action, in the several texts, could not possibly be performed at the single performance of the

action; and consequently, the action must be taken as distinct in each text.

7. On account of the difference in *Completion*: In that case also, that the differentiation is done by the Accessory; because what is meant by that the upholders of one text declare 'our Agni sacrifice is completed here, and not there, as in the Agni sacrifice of the other people' and this would not be possible if there were a single Agni sacrifice.

8. On account of the laying down of distinct Expiatory Rites: Though this is included in 'Deprecation' yet it is brought forward separately; because the mere deprecation of the time (before or after sunrise) might be explained as pointing to both times being optional alternatives for the same action; hence what is meant by the bringing forward of the mention of Expiatory Rites is that if the two times were mere optional alternatives, none of them would be faulty; as a matter of fact, inasmuch as expiatory rites are laid down in connection with both, both would be faulty, which could not be if the action were the same. Hence the action must be regarded as distinct.

9. On account of the perception of distinct purposes being served in the direction that if the sacrificer happens to be previously initiated, he should employ the *Atirâtra* of the *Brihatsâma*; because the *Rathantara Soma* will have been already employed at the previous initiation; while if he does not happen to have been previously initiated, he should employ the *Rathantara Soma*. In the *Tândaka*, however, we have it distinctly laid down that the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the very first of the sacrifices to be performed. And the uncertainty of precedence spoken of in the previous direction would be possible only if the *Jyotiṣṭoma* mentioned in the latter sentence were other than *Jyotiṣṭoma* occurring in the same text with the former sentence. For, if all the *Jyotiṣṭoma* were one and the same, then inasmuch as in accordance with the *Tândaka* direction in the case of all texts, it would always be the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that would be performed first, the sacrificer would always have been initiated for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the said mention of uncertainty—'if he be not initiated'—would be wholly incompatible; as no sacrificer would ever be found to be uninitiated.

Siddhânta.—

एकं वा संयोगरूपचोदनाख्याविशेषात् ॥ ६ ॥

एकं Ekam, one. वा Vâ, only. संयोगरूप चोदनाख्याविशेषात् Samyogarûp Chodanâkhyâviśeṣât, because of the non-difference of Connection, form, Injunction and Name.

9. The action is one only ; because of the non-difference of (1) Connection, (2) Form, (3) Injunction and (4) Name,—9.

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the identity of actions, recognized by means of their Names, Forms and Accessories, does not disappear even when they happen to be mentioned in various Rescensional texts.

The *Bhāṣya* says : The action spoken of in all texts, or in all *Brāhmaṇas*, is one and the same. The sense of the phrase in all *Brāhmaṇas* is that the same is the case even when the action appears in the various *Brāhmaṇas* of the same Veda. As for instance, when the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the *Dvādaśāha* sacrifices are mentioned in the *Pañchaviṃśa* and the *Sādvaiṃśa Brāhmaṇas* of the *Sāma-veda*.

(1) 'By 'Connection' is meant the connection of the Result, as that is the chief factor in the relationship, (2) By 'Forms' are meant the *Deity* and the (*material*), as being the most nearly related, (3) By 'Injunction' is meant that which partakes of the *Root-meaning* as well as the *Bhāvanā*, (4) And lastly, by *Name* are meant *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the like which are found to be exactly the same in all texts. Thus then, there being so many reasons for recognizing the action to be the same, we cannot but admit its identity in all texts specially as we do not find any reason for taking it as different.

न नाम्ना स्यादचोदनाविधानत्वात् ॥ १० ॥

न Na, not. नाम्ना Nāmnā, by name. स्यात् Syāt, would be. अचोदनाविधानत्वात् Achodanā-vidhānatvāt, because the names do not speak of actions.

10. Difference could not be established by the names in question because the names do not speak of actions.—10.

COMMENTARY.

Even if '*Kāthaka*' and '*Kalāpaka*' were the names of actions, then too, inasmuch as these do not occur in the originative Injunction of the actions, they could not serve to distinguish one action from another. As a matter of fact, however, they are not the names of actions at all ; because by the law that 'it is not right to accept a multiplicity of meanings,' the names belong to the books, and it is indirectly through these that they are applied to the actions (treated of in these books).

सर्वेषाञ्चैककर्म्यं स्यात् ॥ ११ ॥

सर्वेषां Sarveṣām, of all. च Cha, also. ऐककर्म्यं Ayekakarmyam, one action. स्यात् Syāt, would be.



11. (If the name belong to actions) all actions would become one.—11.

COMMENTARY.

The differentiation of the cause is generally found to bring about the differentiation of the effect. Hence inasmuch as the name 'Kāthāka' is one only, all actions—*Agnihotra* and the rest—mentioned in that text, would come to be taken as one (if the name belonged to the actions).

Though the reasoning herein advanced partakes of the nature of the Faulty Apparent Inconsistency (*vide Nyāya Sūtras*, V.i.21), because there is no actual invariable concomitance between the conclusion (oneness of actions) and the Reason (oneness of Name)—yet the *Siddhānti* has purposely brought forward a faulty argument, as a proper reply to the *Pitrvapakṣa*, which is based upon fallacious arguments through and through because a faulty rejoinder is always allowable against faulty arguments (*vide Nyāya Sūtras*, V.i.39, *et seq.*).

कृतकं चाभिधानम् ॥ १२ ॥

कृतकं *Kṛitakam*, coined. च *Cha* also. अभिधानम् *Avidhānam*, name.

12. The name is one that has been coined.—12.

COMMENTARY.

It has been shown under *Sūtra* I.i.30, that the names *Kathaka* and the like are coined ones; and certainly such recently-coined names could not very well differentiate the eternal actions.

That is to say, though on account of the eternality of the class *Kāthaka*, the word 'Kāthaka' is an eternal one,—yet it is a universally recognised fact that the word was applied as a *name* to the Vedic text, solely on account of the fact of that particular text having been taught, pre-eminently, by the teacher named 'Katha.' And there is no doubt that it is not the *action* that is taught but the *Verbal text*; and hence the name not applying to actions, it could not differentiate them.

एकत्वेऽपि परम् ॥ १३ ॥

एकत्वे *Ekatve*, even when it is one. अपि *Api*, also. परम् *Param*, diversity.

13. Even a single action has diverse forms.—13.

COMMENTARY.

Mere difference in such details as the number of *Kapālas*, cannot establish a difference between actions; because so long as there is absolutely no difference in the *Kapāla* itself, that in its number is an

insignificant detail. Hence we conclude that the two numbers—Eleven and Twelve—are optional alternative accessories with regard to the same action.

विद्यायां धर्मशास्त्रम् ॥ १४ ॥

विद्यायां Vidyāyām, pertaining to the science. धर्मशास्त्रम् Dharmasāstram, injunction of the detail.

COMMENTARY.

As for the difference in the sacrificial details, several of these are mentioned in the various texts, simply by way of showing all that has to be learnt about the sacrifices, and not as laying down something to be actually carried into practice at the performance.

आग्नेयवत्पुनर्वचनम् ॥ १५ ॥

आग्नेयवत् Āgneyavat, as in the case of Āgneya. पुनर्वचनम् Punarvachanam, there would be repetition.

15. "There will be a repetition as in the case of the Āgneya.—15."

COMMENTARY.

This *Sūtra* may be taken either as reiteration of the *Pārvapakṣa* argument—that many repetitions of the same action would be useless,—or as explaining the repetitions of the same action, as resembling that of the *Āgneya*; the sense of the latter explanation being that the Repetition serves the distinct purpose of glorifying the action (and as such there is incongruity in it) (*vide* *Sūtra* II.iii.29).

अद्युर्वचनं वा श्रुतिसंयोगाविशेषात् ॥ १६ ॥

अद्युर्वचनं Adyurvachanam, there is no repetition. वा Vā, however. श्रुतिसंयोगाविशेषात् Śrutisamyogāviśeṣāt, there being no difference in the method of declaration.

16. As a matter of fact, however, there is no repetition as there is no difference in the method of declaration.
—16.

COMMENTARY.

The word 'Vā' in the *Sūtra* serves to reject the explanation just given in the second interpretation of the foregoing *Sūtra*. And the reason for this rejection is that a *Repetition* is taken as serving other minor purposes, only under two conditions: *viz.*, (1) when the Repetition consists in another mention of the action only; and (2) when there are two objects of Injunction, in a single sentence. In the case in question, however, none of these two conditions are present; because

we find that the Repetition is one of the Primary Action itself together with all its details of procedure, etc. This is what the *Bhāṣya* understands by the word 'Śrutisaṃyogâviśeṣa, in the *Sūtra*.

But the *Sūtra* is capable of also another interpretation, as follows: As a matter of fact, there is no Repetition in the case in question; one sentence is known as a 'Repetition' of the other, only when both occur in the text of the same Rescension; while in the case in question, we find that the mention of the action is found in distinct texts of the *Kāthaka*, etc., and that too only once in each text.

In accordance with the law spoken of before that one man can read the text of only one Rescension, one who has read of the *Agnihotra* mentioned in the text of the *Kātha* Rescension, does not know of that which is mentioned in that of the *Taittirīya* Rescension; or even if he happens to know it, inasmuch as he has all necessary knowledge of the *Agnihotra* from the text of his own (*Kātha*) Rescension, he takes its mention in the other Rescension to be meant for those professing that Rescension; and hence he does not look upon it as a mere fruitless repetition. Similarly, does the professor of each particular Rescension treat of the text of other Rescensions. And every one of these professors equally recognizes the *Agnihotra* as mentioned in a single text (this is what is meant by the non-difference in the method of declaration). Nor is there any order of sequence among the various Rescensions; by which it could be ascertained that it is by the text of any one of them that the *Agnihotra* is originally spoken of and those found in the rest are mere repetitions. To this effect it has been declared elsewhere: 'Inasmuch as all Rescensions have a simultaneous existence, no one of them can be looked upon as a repetition of the other; specially as there is no order of sequence in which the various Rescensions are to be studied, as there is in the study of the various portions of a single Rescension.'

Consequently, even in the case of the mention of an action in a single text, if that very mention (of the same text) happens to be repeated at another time, for the sake of another person, such mention is not taken to be a mere useless repetition,—and the reason for this is that the persons addressed are different in the two cases; so would it also be in the case of the mention of the Action in various texts.

वाक्यासंवायात् ॥ १६ क ॥

वाक्यासंवायात् Vākyasamvāyāt.

16A. Because of the non-inherence of texts.—16A.

As a matter of fact the texts of two Rescensions can never be retained in the mind of the same person.

This Sūtra has dropped out of the *Bhāṣya*; but is explained in the *Vartikā*.

अर्थान्निधेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

अर्थ Artha, Purpose. अन्निधेश्च Asannidheścha, on account of non-proximity.

17. Also because of the non-proximity of the purpose.

—17.

COMMENTARY.

The various texts are known as the 'Branches' of the *Veda tree*, simply on account of their containing certain points of the same kind—in the shape of actions, just like the many branches of the same tree.

That is to say, if the action mentioned in the various Rescensional texts differed from one another, there inasmuch as the very roots (actions) would be distinct, on account of the facts of flowers and fruits—in the shape of the results of actions—being different from the very beginning, we would speak of the texts as '*distinct Vedas*' and not as '*distinct Rescensions*, (or branches). On the other hand, when the *roots* in the shape of actions and the *stems* in the shape of *Injunctions* are the same, the only difference would be in the details of procedure, etc., which would be difference in the number of fruits and flowers on the various branches of the tree; and as such from the similarity of the *tree* it is right that the different texts should be spoken of as so many different 'Branches' or (Rescensions.)

The Sūtra may also be taken as meeting the aforesaid objection with regard to Repetition. The sense would then be that, we take that to be a case of Repetition, where what has been spoken of once is approximate to the same man to whom it had been previously addressed. In the case in question, however, we find that, that which is mentioned in one text is not approximate to the person professing a different text.

न चैकं प्रति शिष्यते ॥ १८ ॥

न च Na Cha, nor. एकं Ekam, one. प्रति Prati, for. शिष्यते Śiṣyate, is enjoined.

18. Nor is the action in one text enjoined for one class of Brāhman only.—18.

COMMENTARY.

This Sūtra takes it for granted that the actions are different. The sense of the Sūtra is that even when the actions differ in their accessory details, those subsidiary accessories that are mentioned along with the

original Injunctive sentence, being laid down only as with reference to the *Agnihotra*, etc., come to be recognised as meant for all persons (professing all texts), and as such to be necessarily procured; and hence it follows that in matters of subsidiary accessories, we should not rest contented with our own particular text. Nor do we find a single author of the *Kalpasūtras* confining himself within his own particular Rescension; and for this reason also, we cannot ascertain all the details of any sacrifice from out of one particular text only.

This as regards subsidiaries; as regards the primaries also, inasmuch as the names of actions (*Kāthaka* and the like) are not capable of specifying the sacrifices as one professing any particular Rescension, the Injunctions of these primaries (in whatever text) must be taken as laying down these actions for all who may be desirous (of obtaining the result following from these actions); and hence the actions mentioned in all the texts appear before each one of the performers. Then inasmuch as all these (*Agnihotras*, for instance) lead to the same result, they could not all be performed conjointly and the result having been accomplished by means of anyone of these all the rest would become useless. If they be explained as serving the purpose of optional alternatives, then it would be far more reasonable to accept the texts themselves as optional alternatives.

समाप्तिवच्च संप्रेक्षा ॥ १६ ॥

समाप्तिवत् Samāptivat, accompanied by the mention of completion. च Cha, also. संप्रेक्षा Samprekṣa, assertion.

19. Also because there is the assertion speaking of “completion.”—19.

COMMENTARY.

If the sacrifices (*Agnihotra* for instance) mentioned in various texts, were distinct actions, then each of them would be completed, first it would happen to be mentioned in its own text, then we could not have such assertions as ‘Our *Agnihotra* sacrifices does not end here’ (this could be possible only when the speaker recognised the *Agnihotra* that is being performed to be the same as that mentioned in his own text). “The *Anvārohas* are the mantras in connection with the *Sihalarohana*, and it is with these that the sacrifice is finished by the professors of the *Maitrayāni* Rescension; but our sacrifice does not end there,”—such assertions of the learners of Veda distinctly show that even students, apart from the sacrificers, recognise the actions to be the same.

एकत्वेऽपि पराणि निन्दाशक्तिसमाप्तिवचनानि ॥ २० ॥

एकत्वे Ekatve, when the action is one. अपि Api, even. पराणि Parāṇi, others. निन्दाशक्तिसमाप्तिवचनानि Nindāśaktisamāptivachanāni, the mention of deprecation, incapability and completion.

20. Even when the action is one and the same, the mention of (1) Deprecation, (2) Incapability and (3) Completion is quite explicable.—20.

COMMENTARY.

(1) All that the mutual deprecation of the offering being made before and after sunrise would show would be that the two theories are optional alternatives. Even according to your theory, you admit the Result of such offerings to be alternatives.

(2) Similarly as for the Incapability or capability of persons, it varies with each individual ; and it is equally uncertain with regard to the details laid down in all texts, as well as with regard to those mentioned in one text only (i.e., there are men who are quite capable of duly carrying out all the minute details mentioned in all the various texts, while there are others that are not capable of performing even those mentioned in one text only), and after all there is not much difference between the details mentioned in the various texts.

(3) As for the declaration of completion, or otherwise that depends upon what the speaker may have learnt, and hence that does not establish a difference between actions.

प्रायश्चित्तं निमित्तेन ॥ २१ ॥

प्रायश्चित्तं Prāyaścittam, expiatory rite. निमित्तेन Nimittena, occasion.

21. Then as for the mention of the occasion for expiatory rites.—21.

COMMENTARY.

This *Sūtra* recalls for the purpose of refuting it what has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣi* under (8) of *Sūtra* 8, in connection with the laying down of distinct expiatory rites for the actions concerned. This *Pūrvapakṣa* argument is met in the next *sūtra*.

प्रक्रममाद् वा नियोगेन ॥ २२ ॥

प्रक्रममाद् Prakramât, in accordance with the method started with. वा Vā, really. नियोगेन Niyogena, would be controlled.

22. The application of the expiatory rites would be controlled in accordance with the method started with.—22.

COMMENTARY.

In all cases of alternative procedure, one can start with his performance distinctly in accordance with one method of procedure only; and hence, if subsequently he happens to leave off the details of that method, and takes up those of another, he commits a distinctly wrongful infringement; and thereby renders himself liable to expiatory rites; and thus the mere mention of expiatory rites does not necessarily show that any, or both, methods is objectionable or unacceptable by any performer.

समाप्तिः पूर्ववत्वात् यथाज्ञाते प्रतीयेत ॥ २३ ॥

समाप्तिः Samāptih, completion. पूर्ववत्वात् Pūrvavatvāt, because depending upon what has gone before. यथाज्ञाते Yathājñyāte, according to what we know. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta, should be accepted.

23. Inasmuch as the completion depends upon what has gone before, we accept it in accordance with our own knowledge.—23.

COMMENTARY.

We have shown under *sūtra* (19) that the mention of completion is compatible with both the unity and diversity of actions. But, inasmuch as the assertion of completion is always in accordance with what the speaker might know, it serves to establish the unity of action; and the reason for that assertion is that it is regulated by what has been done before in the beginning.

Or the *sūtra* might mean that, inasmuch as all verbal usage depends upon its previous acceptance by people, we could conclude that the 'completion' spoken of is what we actually find to be. And for this, we often find that even when the action has not been completed, as soon as the details mentioned in one text have all been performed, the professors of that text declare 'Our this sacrifice ends here'; and hence there is no incompatibility in this assertion (with our theory).

**लिङ्गमविशिष्टं सर्वशेषत्वान्नहि तत्र कर्मचोदना तस्मात्
द्वादशाहस्याहाराख्यपदेशस्यात् ॥ २४ ॥**

लिङ्ग Lingam, indicative word. अविशिष्टं Avisaṣṭam, equally applicable. सर्वशेषत्वान् Sarvaśeṣatvāt, because pertaining to all. नहि Nahi, nor. तत्र Tatra, in the text. कर्मचोदना Karmachodanā, injunction of another action. तस्मात् Tasmāt, therefore. द्वादशाहस्य Dvādaśāhasya, of the Dvādaśa sacrifice. आहाराख्यपदेशः Āhārākhyapadeśaḥ, incongruity in the performance. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

24. The indicative words are equally applicable to both views—because the mention (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* as the

very first to be performed) pertains to all (Rescensions) nor does the text enjoin another *Jyotiṣṭoma*; therefore there would (in both cases) be an incongruity in the performance of the *Dvādaśāha*.

COMMENTARY.

This meets an objection urged by the *Pārvaṇpakṣi* (Va. Text p. 198, line 26).

The presence of uninitiated sacrifices at the *Dvādaśāha* is equally incongruous, for both of us. Because what the *Tāṇḍaka* lays down is the fact of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* mentioned in all texts being always the first to be performed. Nor does the *Tāṇḍaka* enjoin a distinct *Jyotiṣṭoma* of its own with regard to which alone it would lay down that restriction. Thus then the restriction applying to the *Yajurvedis* also, and hence the said incongruity being found to be present in both theories, both of us should explain the clause in question as meaning that 'if the sacrificers happen to be initiated or not initiated for the *Dvādaśāha*.' And hence on this point there is no difference between our theories.

द्रव्ये चाचोदितत्वात् विधीनामव्यवस्था स्यात् निर्देशाख्य-
वतिष्ठेत तस्मात् नित्यानुवादः स्यात् ॥ २५ ॥

द्रव्ये Dravye, with regard to substance. च Cha, and. अचोदितत्वात् Achoditvāt, not being enjoined. विधीनां Vidhīnām, of injunctions. अव्यवस्था Avyavasthā, indefiniteness. स्यात् Syāt, would be. निर्देशात् Nirdeśāt, by being pointed out. व्यतिष्ठेत Vyavatiṣṭheta, would become well defined. तस्मात् Tasmāt, therefore. नित्यानुवादः Nityānurvādah, everlasting description, स्यात् Syāt, would be.

25. (The measuring of the *Vedī*) not being enjoined with regard to any substance, the injunctions would be indefinite; while when it is pointed out, they become defined, and hence it would be taken as an everlasting description.
—25.

COMMENTARY.

This meets an objection urged by the *Pārvaṇpakṣi* (Va. Text p. 199, line 8).

It has been argued above (*Sābara Bhāṣya*, p. 199, line 8, et seq.) that there could be no mention of the measuring of the *Pakṣa* and the *Vedī* (if the action were the same). And to this we make the following reply:—

That is to say, the sentence '*yat pakṣasammitam*,' etc., appears in the wake of the Injunction (there is but one post, and eleven animals),

and it means that as at the *Ekādāśini*, there would be a deal of trouble, if any of the two measures mentioned were accepted, it is far better to have only one post. And as for the measuring of the *pakṣa*, as it is one that has never been enjoined, it must be taken as always appearing as a mere description; and the Injunction of the measuring by the *Vedī* also only serves as a praise, showing the superior excellences of a single Sacrificial post. And as for the measuring by the 'eyes' of the chariot, it would be done at that sacrifice, in connection with which the *Ekādāśini* is laid down; and as such there would be no incompatibility. In the case in question, however, the measuring by the *Vedī* appears as the object of Injunction, by means of praise; and as such we cannot very well take it as eulogising anything else. Consequently it must be concluded that the 'measuring by the *pakṣa* which is not enjoined is a mere description for the sake of praising the 'measuring by the *Vedī*.' And as, in regard to the Agni sacrifice, this 'measuring by the *Vedī*, would be the most authoritative, on account of its being mentioned in the same context, —the Injunction of the 'measuring by the eyes of the chariot,' being thus freed from the primary Agni sacrifice, would betake itself to its subsidiaries.

The *sūtra* may be taken as follows: If the measuring with the *Vedī* were not laid down with regard to a substance, then there would be no restriction with regard to the measuring of the *Pakṣa*, etc., all of which would be (equally) implied and that would be set aside by the direct mention of the 'measuring by the eyes of the chariot.' In the case in question, however, it is not so; and hence there is no contradiction.

विहितप्रतिषेधात्पक्षेऽतिरेकः स्यात् ॥ २६ ॥

विहितप्रतिषेधात् Vihitpratiṣedhāt, on account of the prohibition of what is enjoined. पक्षे Pakṣe, optional. अतिरेकः Atirekaḥ, excess. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

26. On account of the injunction and prohibition of the same thing the excess would be optional.—26.

This *sūtra* meets one of the objections urged in the *Bhāṣya*, p. 19 line 17.

COMMENTARY.

One text lays down the holding of the *Ṣoḍaśī* at the *Atirātrā*; while another prohibits it; and hence its holding or not holding being both optional, when it is not held there would be an excess of two hymns only; when however it is held, the excess comes to be three, because in this latter case, there are two Rik verses added to the group of twenty-one, and in this way we do not find any contradiction between the texts concerned.

सारस्वते विप्रतिषेधात् यदेति स्यात् ॥ २७ ॥

सारस्वते Sârasvate, in the Sarasvata sacrifice. विप्रतिषेधात् Vipratishedhât, on account of prohibition. यदा इति Yadâiti, the conditional 'if'. स्यात् Syât, should be added.

27. In the Sârasvata sacrifice on account of the prohibition the sentence should be taken with a conditional 'if.'—27.

COMMENTARY.

This meets the objection urged by the *Pârvapakṣi* in the *Bhāṣya*, p. 199, line 22. As in regard to the *Sârasvatâ* sacrifice just as in the case of the *Dvâdâśîha* shown above, the previous performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* would be found necessary for both of us (disputants), both of us should explain the sentence concerned as follows :—

'If in the case of the performance falling in the bright fortnight of the month ending with *Paūrṇamâsî* the sacrificers happen to be *Purodâśins* then they should fast; whereas if in the case of the performance falling within the dark fortnight ending with *Amāvasyâ*, the sacrificers happen to be *Sânnâyyins*, they should remove the 'calves.' And in this way, we find that the mention of different sacrificers (*Purodâśins* and *Sânnâyyins*) indicates the different times of the performance, and as such there is no incompatibility.

उपहव्ये प्रतिप्रसवः ॥ २८ ॥

उपहव्ये Upahavye, in regard to the Upahavya. प्रतिप्रसवः Pratiprasavaḥ, incongruity.

28. "In regard to the Upahavya there would be certainly incongruity.—28.

COMMENTARY.

This Sûtra recalls an objection urged by the *Pârvapakṣi* *Bhāṣya* p. 200, line 1) the purport of which is as follows :—

In one Rescension we find the sentence '*upahavyo niruktaḥ, agniṣṭomo yajno rathântarasâma, aśvakhâyâvo dakṣinâ*'; while in another we find, '*upahavyaḥ aniruktaḥ, uktho yajno brihatsâmâ, acvâh eveto rukmalâlâto dakṣinâ*'; and in this case, in view of these two Injunctions the two Hymns could be taken as optional alternatives; yet, inasmuch as this alternative is already obtained from the Primary sacrifice, any mention of it would be absolutely useless, if the action (*upahavya*) were one only; while if the two *upahavyas* are distinct, the repetition (of what has been mentioned in connection with the Primary) would serve the

purposes of restrictions. Hence too the two actions must be taken as distinct.

गुणार्था वा पुनःश्रुतिः ॥ २६ ॥

गुणार्था Gunārthā, for the purpose of indicating an accessory. वा Vā, but.
पुनःश्रुतिः Punahśrutih, repetition.

29. The repetition referred to serves the purpose of indicating another accessory.—29.

COMMENTARY.

The answer to the above objection is that the repetition of the Brihata and the Rathantara could be explained as serving the purpose of restricting the number.

प्रत्ययश्चापि दर्शयति ॥ ३० ॥

प्रत्ययः Pratyayah, idea. चापि Chāpi, also. दर्शयति Darśayati, supports.

30. The Veda also lends support to the idea (that the action mentioned in the diverse texts is the same).—30.

COMMENTARY.

We find that the Veda, speaking of the *Homa* in reference to the *Prayaja* lays down the mantra '*Kṛiturasī*,' etc., which appears in entirely different rescensional texts, as to be employed in the *Aṣmāddāna*; and this distinctly shows that the action though spoken of in various texts is held to be one and the same.

“अपि वा क्रमसंयोगात् विधिपृथक्त्वमेकस्यां व्यवतिष्ठेत्” ॥ ३१ ॥

अपि वा Api vā, but. क्रमसंयोगात् Kramasamyogāt, on account of distinct orders of procedure. विधिपृथक्त्वम् Vidhiprithakatvam, difference in the injunctions. एकस्यां Ekasyām, in regard to what is laid down in one text. व्यवतिष्ठेत् Vyavatiṣṭheta, should be.

31. “As there are distinct orders of procedure the Injunction pertaining to what is laid down in one text must be regarded as distinct (from those pertaining to what is laid down in other texts).—31.

COMMENTARY.

The action mentioned in one text must be regarded as different from the same action spoken of in another text for the simple reason that the order of procedure is found to be entirely different in two cases.

विरोधिनात्वसंयोगदैककर्म्मं तत्संयोगात् विधीनां सर्वकर्म्म-
प्रत्ययः स्यात् ॥ ३२ ॥

विरोधिना Virodhinā, with the contradictory. तु Tu, but. असंयोगात् Asamyogāt, there being no connection. ऐककर्म्मं Aikakarme, the action being taken. तत्संयोगात् Tatsamyogāt, on account of connection with that action. विधीनां Vidhinām, of the injunctions. सर्वकर्म्मप्रत्ययः Sarvakarmapratyah, the common idea of all actions. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

32. There being no connection with contradictory processes the action is taken as one and the same, hence all Injunctions connected with that action must be taken as affording the idea of that same action.—32.

COMMENTARY.

That all actions are one is shown by *Syntactical Connection*; while the difference in the order of procedure would, at best, be pointed by the *order* in which they happen to be mentioned; and as a rule Syntactical Connection is always more authoritative than mere order. Because, as a matter of fact, we find that such details as are mentioned even in the *Smṛitis* are not rejected by any considerations of Order, time or Extent; and then, how could it be that that which is pointed by the Syntactical Connection of Vedic texts would be rejected by any such considerations?

Thus, then, we conclude that the action mentioned in each Re-scensional text being distinctly recognized as same, we cannot take each of these as a distinct action. And it has also been shown that there is no seventh means of differentiating actions, except those that have been explained above, which afford all the means for the necessary differentiation of actions.

End of Adhyāya II.

THIRD ADHYĀYA.

FIRST PADA.

Adhikaraṇa I.—Declaring the Subject-matter of the Adhyāya.

अथातः शेषलक्षणम् ॥ १ ॥

अथ Atha, now. अतः Atah, then. शेषलक्षणम् Śeṣalakṣaṇam, the Adhyāya dealing with Śeṣa.

1. Now then the Adhyāya dealing with the subject of Śeṣa.—1.

COMMENTARY.

The difference among actions having been established, the next question that arises is,—Is each and every action expressed by verbs occurring in the Vedic texts an independent act by itself, bringing into existence a distinct Apûrva? or, are some subordinate to, and subserve the various purposes of, some others?—and if the latter, what actions are subservient to what? Though this is what forms the main subject of Adhyāya (3), yet it will be shown here that it is not only *actions* that are subservient or subsidiary to *actions*, but that under the word ‘subsidiary’—‘śeṣa’, ‘aṅga’ āśrita—are also included substances and their properties. The consideration of this point is all the more important, as the subject-matter of all the rest of the *Sûtras* (Adhyāya 4 to 12) are directly or indirectly, based upon this relationship of the ‘principal’ and ‘subsidiary’ among actions as says Kumārila.

शेषस्यैवाधिकारोऽत्र युक्तो, नान्यस्य कस्यचित् ।

शेषधीसिद्धयपेक्षत्वात् अन्यलक्षणवाग्वियाम् ॥

Adhikaraṇa II.—The definition of Subsidiary.

शेषः परार्थत्वात् ॥ २ ॥

शेषः Śeṣah, subsidiary. परार्थत्वात् Pararthatvât, on account of being for the sake of another.

2. A thing is called subsidiary by reason of its being for the sake of another.—2.

COMMENTARY.

That is to say the 'subsidiary'—'*śeṣa*'—is defined as *that which is for the sake of another*; that is to say, that which is indicated by direct assertion etc. *as aiding some action towards the fulfilment of its Apūrva*; this latter qualification being necessary in order to preclude mere verbal relationship. This *being for the sake of another* does not necessarily *in itself* imply that the Subsidiary should in some way help the Principal, but such help is assumed on the strength of Presumption. For instance, in the case of the action of *sprinkling water* on the corn, the fact of its having been laid down in connection with a sacrifice leads to the presumption that it must accord some help to that sacrifice. Similary in the case of the *Prayâjas*, laid down in connection with the *Darṣapârnāmâsâ* sacrifice, we find that these latter stand in need of some help; and also that there are certain other actions laid down (in the shape of the *Prayâjas*), which stand in need of some other action to which they could accord help; and this mutual need leads us to the presumption that the *Prayâjas* subserve the *Darṣapârnāmâsâ*.

Adhikaraṇa III.—What can be Subsidiary ?

द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारेषु बादरिः ॥ ३ ॥

द्रव्यगुणसंस्कारेषु Dravyagunaśanskāreṣu, to substances, accessories and purifications बादरिः bādariḥ says Bādari.

3. The subsidiary character belongs to substances accessories and purifications only.—3.

COMMENTARY.

The question being whether only substances, accessories and purifications can be subsidiaries or actions and results also, we have the *Pûrvapakṣa* view as stated by *Bādari* that subsidiary character can belong to the first three only. That sacrifices and results cannot be subsidiaries is clear from the *Pûrvapakṣa sūtra* of the first *Adhikaraṇa* of the sixth *Adhyāya*.

In answer to this we have the *Siddhānta* in the next three *sūtras*.

कर्माण्यपि जैमिनिः फलार्थत्वात् ॥ ४ ॥

फलञ्च पुरुषार्थत्वात् ॥ ५ ॥

पुरुषश्च कर्मार्थत्वात् ॥ ६ ॥

कर्माणि Karmāṇi, actions, अपि 'Api, also. जैमिनिः Jaiminiḥ, says Jaimini. फलार्थत्वात् Phalārthatvât, on account of being for the sake of the result. 4. फलञ्च Phalañcha

the result also. पुरुषार्थत्वात् puruṣārthatvât, because it is for the sake of the agent
5. पुरुषश्च Puruṣaścha, the agent also. कर्मार्थत्वात् karmârthatvât on account of
being for the sake of action. 6.

4. Jaimini says that actions also are subsidiaries because they are for the sake of the result.

5. The result also can be subsidiary because it is for the sake of the agent.

6. And lastly the agent also is subsidiary because he is for the sake of the action.—4-6.

COMMENTARY.

(1). That *substances* are subservient to sacrifices follows from their very nature ; they exist, because they subserve some purpose.

(2). *Mantras* and *Deities* also are necessary appendages to the sacrifice.

(3). Such *purificatory* or *preparatory acts* as the threshing of the corn come to be regarded as 'subservient,' to sacrifices, in view of the fact that sacrifices need some substances out of which the cake and such other things could be made ; the cake, for instance, must be made of some corn ; but no entire corn can make it ; the grains have to be threshed and cleaned, so that it may be used for the making of the cake to be used at the sacrifice.

(4). *Actions* (sacrifices) also are 'subservient,' to their result ; as it is *for the sake of* the result that the action is performed.

(5). The '*result*' is 'subservient' because it is for the *sake of* the human agent that seeks it, and accomplishes it by means of the action.

(6). The *human agent* is 'subservient' to the actions—being the 'performer' who will accomplish the action, *for the sake of* which, therefore, he would exist. The 'subserviency' of the agent to the action is expressed by the word enjoining the act ; for instance, of the word '*yajeta*' the 'sacrifice' forms the principle factor in the denotation, and as no such action as the sacrifice would be possible without an *agent*, the agent also must be regarded as implied by the same word. Apart from this, there are cases where the human agent occupies the most subordinate position ; e.g., in the case where the man is required simply for the purpose of measuring the height of the sacrificial post.

The above is the view of Jaimini as interpreted by the Bhâṣya ; which quotes the interpretation of the author of the *Vṛitti* (Upavaṛṣa)—the sense of which may be thus stated:—It is only *Substances, Mantras and Deities and Purificatory acts* that can, by their very nature, be subservient

to sacrifices as held by *Bādari*; as it is only these that can *never* be 'principals'; and the reason for this view, says the *Bṛihatī* (pp. 66b), lies in the fact that the *Niyoga* or *Apūrva* is accomplished by the sacrifice, which in its turn, is accomplished by Substances, Mantras and Deities and purificatory Acts, which latter alone are forces contributing to the ultimate result.—To the other three things, mentioned by Jaimini, the *subserviency* can belong only relatively; for instance, the *sacrifice* (mentioned in sūtra 4) is principal in relation to the *substance*, but *subservient* in relation to the result; the *result* (mentioned in sūtra 5) is *principal* in relation to the *sacrifice*, but *subservient* in relation to the *agent*; the *human agent* (mentioned in sūtra 6) also is *principal* in relation to the result, but *subsidiary* to such acts as the measuring of the *sacrificial* post (*Śabara-Bhāṣya* page 211) :—

The meaning of this is that the first three, substance and the rest, are *always* 'subsidiary'; they are never 'principal', while the latter three—Result and the rest—are both 'principal' and 'subsidiary' in relation to one another.

Adhikaraṇa IV.—The details of threshing and the rest pertain only to particular things.

तेषामर्थेन सम्बन्धः ॥ ७ ॥

तेषां Teṣāṃ, of those details. अर्थेन arthēna, purpose, visible result. सम्बन्धः Sambandhaḥ, connection.

7. They are connected with a definite purpose.—7.

COMMENTARY,

In regard to the *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* we find the Injunction 'Darśa-pūrṇamāśābhyām svargakāmo yajeta;' and in connection with these two sacrifices, we have various texts laying down such details as the *nirvāpana* (pouring out), the *prokṣaṇa* (washing) *avahanana* (threshing), and so forth, as relating to vegetables, and *utpavana* (sprinkling), *vitapana* (boiling), *grahana* (holding), *asādana* (procuring), and the like, relating to the butter; and again *sākha-harana* (fetching of the twigs), *Gavāmprasthāpana* (fetching of the cows) *Gavāmprasnāvana* (making the cow yield milk), and so forth, relating to the *Sāmnāyā* (the mixture of Curd and Butter). And with regard to these details, there arises a question as to whether all these three classes of details are to be performed in connection with all three kinds of materials—Vegetables, Butter and Curd-Butter



And in support of this universal application, we have (in the *sūtra*. two reasons : (1) '*Samyogato*' '*viśeṣāt*' and (2) *Prākaraṇāviśeṣāt*. That is to say, the characteristic of bringing about the *Apūrva* that we find in one object (corn), as the ground of its connection with a particular detail (*Threshing*), is also found in the other object ; because as for the specific characteristic of the class 'corn' (which subsists in the corn only), this is of use only in the indication, and is of no use in restricting the application of the *Threshing*. Then, as for the *objective* character, of the corn as mentioned in the sentence *Vṛkṣinavahanti*), it is found in all the other objects also ; as all of them are *objects to be offered*. Therefore it must be admitted that, leaving aside all such objects as are not connected with the *Apūrva*, as are not objects to be offered, and as do not help in the bringing about

of the particular *Apārva* of the context,—with reference to all other objects, all the details should be performed.

अर्थलोपादकर्म स्यात् ॥ ९ ॥

अर्थलोपात् Arthalopât, on account of the absence of a useful purpose. अकार्म akarma, no action. स्यात् Syât, would be.

9. By being separated from a useful purpose it would no longer be an action.—9.

COMMENTARY.

The Siddhânta meets the Pŭrvapakṣa by the argument that if we dissociate the particular detail—of threshing, for instance,—there would be the danger of its ceasing to be an action; that is, ceasing to be performed at all.

फलन्तु सह चेष्टया शब्दार्थोऽभावाद्विप्रयोगे स्यात् ॥ १० ॥

फलं Phalam, the result. तु Tu, also. सहचेष्टया Saha cheṣṭayâ, along with the operation. शब्दार्थः Śabdârthaḥ as expressed by the words. अभावात् abhâvât, in its absence. विप्रयोगे viprayoge, on account of its absence. स्यात् Syât, would be.

10. Then again, the result is found to appear along with the operation. It is only when there is no visible result that its absence could justify the details being taken merely as expressed by the words—10.

COMMENTARY.

It has been urged that, “inasmuch as we shall assume certain imperceptible effects, there would not be an *absence of useful purposes*.” And to this the following reply is made.

As a matter of fact, we find that the *Threshing* brings about its perceptible result in the *Corn*, along with its performance; while in the others (the *Butter* etc.), we find the mere operation of *Threshing*, without any results; and so long as a useful operation is possible, no Vedic injunction can ever urge the agent to the performance of a useless operation; and in the absence of such urging by a Vedic injunction, there cannot be any ground for an assumption of imperceptible results. And thus there would be a mutual interdependence; the assumption of the injunction (of *Threshing* with regard to the *Butter*) being based upon the Results (imperceptible), and the assumption of the results being based upon the injunction. That is to say, in regard to the *Butter* etc. we do not find either the injunction or the result (of *Threshing*); while in regard to the *corn*, we find both independently of each other.

Adhikarāṇa V.—The Sphya and the other implements have their use restricted.

द्रव्यञ्चोत्पत्तिसंयोगात् तदर्थमेव चोद्येत ॥ ११ ॥

द्रव्यम् Dravyam, things. च Cha, also. उत्पत्तिसंयोगात् Utpattisamyogāt, on account of being connected with the originative injunction. तदर्थम् Tadartham, for the sake of that. एव Eva, only. चोद्येत Chodyeta, should be laid down.

11. The things being connected with the originative injunction should be taken as laid down for the sake of that.—11.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the *Darśa-Pūrnāmāsa*, we find the sentence 'Sphyascha kapālāni cha agnihotrahavani cha śāpancha, kṛṣṇājīnancha śamyā cha ulūkhalancha musalancha dṛshachhopata cha, etāni vai daśha yajñâyudhani. And there arises a doubt as to whether each of these implements is to be employed in whatever they may be found capable of doing, or only in that in connection with which they are mentioned.

On this point we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* :—

In as much as there is no connection with distinct *Apūrvas*, and as in all cases equally there are perceptible effects produced, we must employ the Implements in accordance with their capabilities. In this way, the sentence *sphyascha* etc. would become justified as constituting an injunction ; and as for the plural number in *etāni*, that could be explained as based upon the plurality of the objects (*sphya* etc). enjoined ; otherwise, as the whole forms a single sentence, there would be a single injunction. Consequently it must be admitted that the implements are to be employed according to their capabilities.

The *Siddhānta* view is that the implements in question are to be employed in connection with the actions along which they are mentioned in the injunctive sentences. All that the sentence enumerating the implement does is to give a collective description of the various implements and there is nothing to dissociate them from the actions along with which they have been originally laid down.

Adhikaraṇa VI.—The quality of 'redness' is restricted to the substance along with which it is mentioned.

अर्थैकत्वे द्रव्यगुणयोः ऐककर्मात् नियमः स्यात् ॥ १२ ॥

अर्थैकत्वे Arthaikatve, when it is possible for the two to be taken together. द्रव्यगुणयोः Dravyagunayoh, of the substance and the quality. ऐककर्मात् Aikakarmyât, they have the same function. नियमः Niyamaḥ, restriction. स्यात् Syât, should be.

12. Between the substance and the property, when it is possible for the two to be taken together they must serve the same function and as such their application should be restricted—12.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we find the sentence '*aruṇāyâ-pingâkṣyâ ekahânyanyâ somam kṛinâti*' and then the text goes on adding '*ajayâ kṛinâti, vâsâsâ kṛinâti, etc.*, where the word '*Aruṇa*' denotes the quality, while the words '*Pingâkṣî*' and '*Ekahâyanî*' denote the substance, because of their co-extensiveness (with the price to be said for the *Soma*). And with reference to the quality of 'Redness' (signified by *Aruṇa*), there arises a question, as to whether it qualifies the substance that is mentioned in the same sentence with itself, or it qualifies all the substances mentioned in the context.

The basis of the Pûrvapakṣa on this is borrowed from sūtra 8 above:—

That which is laid down would appertain to all, because there is no difference in their relationship, and because of the non-difference of the context. (Sūtra 8). That is to say, in as much as Direct Assertion and Syntactical connection are wholly indifferent on the question, we cannot but take our stand upon the indications of the context; so that in the present instance there is nothing to preclude the quality of redness from being taken with all the substances that are mentioned in the context.

The Siddhântin's answer to the above is as laid down in the sūtra. In the case in question the substance and the property are found to be such that neither the substance nor the property alone by itself can be employed. For instance, the redness can be of use only as qualifying the particular substance cow, and the cow also must be of some colour; and further the two words '*Aruṇāya*' and '*Ekahânyanyâ*' having the same instrumental ending, the two become related through syntactical connection to the action of purchase; hence the conclusion is that the property of redness must be taken as related to the particular object cow mentioned in the same sentence.

Adhikarāṇa VII.—The Grahaikatra Nyaya :—The non-significance of number.

एकत्वयुक्तमेकस्य श्रुतिसंयोगात् ॥ १३ ॥

एकत्वयुक्तं Ekatvayuktam, qualified by singularity. एकस्य ekasya, of the singularity. श्रुतिसंयोगात् Śrutisanyogāt, on account of being directly mentioned.

13. The thing must be qualified by singularity as singularity is directly mentioned.—13.

COMMENTARY.

The application of the various accessories has been duly explained : now we proceed to consider the details of the employment of these accessories.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we have the sentence 'Daśāpāitreṇa graham sammārṣti'; and there arises a question as to whether the *washing* is to be of only *one* vessel or of all the vessels mentioned in the context. Just as in the sentence we have a question as to the significance of the singular number, so also in others, we have it as to that of the Dual and the Plural; e.g., 'Yasya purodāśau Kṣāyataḥ' and 'Harīṅsi abhigḥārayati.' In all these cases, an action is enjoined with reference to a particular thing; and hence there naturally arises the question as to whether any significance is to be attached to the Number of the word signifying this thing or not.

On the above question we have the Pūrvapakṣa put forward in sūtra 13, the sense of which is that, as the text distinctly mentions the *washing* as to be done to *graham* in the singular, there can be no justification for disregarding the singular ending; and this leads to the general conclusion that in the case of all sentences due significance must be attached to the particular number used in connection with the predicate; exactly in the same manner as it is done in connection with that of the subject.

The Bhāṣya has included here the questions of significance being attached to the gender also; but the Vārtika says that the Bhāṣya has done this only by the way, as the question in connection with gender will be dealt with later on.

सर्वेषां वा लक्षणत्वात् अविशिष्टं हि लक्षणम् ॥ १४ ॥

सर्वेषां Sarveṣāṃ of all. वा vā, but. लक्षणत्वात् lakṣaṇatvāt, the indication pertaining to. अविशिष्टं aviśiṣṭam, equally. हि Hi, because. लक्षणम् Lakṣaṇam, the indication.

14. All individuals should be taken as indicated, for the simple reason that the generic indication is applicable to all.—14.

COMMENTARY.

It is a well-established fact that whenever anything is referred to by means of a generic name that name pertains to all the individuals included under that name. For instance, in the passage in question we find the word 'graham' used as a generic name for all vessels; and so long as there is nothing to indicate the contrary there can be no justification for restricting the action to a single *graha*. The conclusion therefore is that the *washing* laid down in the sentence in question should be done to all the vessels that are to be used at the sacrifice in connection with which the sentence occurs.

चोदिते तु परार्थत्वात् यथाश्रुति प्रतीयेत ॥ १५ ॥

चोदिते Chodite, in regard to which that is enjoined. तु Tu but. परार्थत्वात् Parārthatvāt, being subordinate to something else. यथाश्रुति Yathāśruti, exactly as mentioned. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta should be taken.

15. That which is enjoined should be taken exactly as it is mentioned because it is subordinate to something else.—15.

COMMENTARY.

The opponent has urged the case of the sentence '*paśumālabheta*' where due significance is attached to both number and gender of the word *paśum*. The answer to this is that the case of the sentence *graham sammārṣti* is not exactly analogous to that of *paśumālabheta*. In the latter the animal is distinctly laid down as subordinate to the sacrifice, and as there is nothing to indicate that the action of sacrifice has to be repeated with all its subordinates, there is naturally a desire on our part to find out the exact number of subordinates required to fulfil the action, and thus the singular number in *paśum* comes in useful as indicative of that number; and due significance must therefore be attached to it. In the case of the sentence '*graham sammārṣti*' on the other hand be the *washing* that is laid down, and not the vessel, is the subordinate factor; and there is no justification needed for the repetition of the subordinate washing with each and everyone of the vessels. In fact, the restriction of washing to anyone or two vessels would be highly objectionable in the absence of any distinct injunction to that effect.

Adihkarāṇa VIII.—The washing is not done to the chamasa etc.

संस्काराद्वा गुणानां अव्यवस्था स्यात् ॥ १६ ॥

संस्कारात् Saṃskārāt, because it is purificatory. वा Vā, really. गुणानां Guṇānām as to accessories. अव्यवस्था Avyavasthā, no restriction. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

16. As the washing is purely purificatory there should be no restriction as to its application to the several accessories.—16.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we meet with the sentence 'graham sammārṣtri' the question arises as to whether this washing applies to all sacrificial vessels chamasa and the rest or to only those particular vessels called 'grahas' which are besmeared with soma juice.

The Pūrvapakṣa embodied in the sūtra is that all the vessels should be washed as washing is purely purificatory and purification is equally necessary and applicable to all the vessels.

**व्यवस्था वा अर्थस्य श्रुतिसंयोगात् तस्य शब्दप्रमाण-
त्वात् ॥ १७ ॥**

व्यवस्था Vyavasthā, there should be restriction. वा vā, really. अर्थस्य Arthasya, of the object. श्रुतिसंयोगात् Śruti saṃyogāt, being directly mentioned. तस्य Tasya, such things. शब्दप्रमाणत्वात् Śabdapramāṇatwāt, based upon scriptures.

17. There should be a restriction as the one particular object is directly mentioned and specially as such matters are based entirely upon the scriptures.—17.

COMMENTARY.

The washing applies to the 'grahas' only as the text quoted distinctly mentions them by name and in the face of this direct declaration it would be very wrong to apply it to any other vessels.

Adhikarāṇa IX.—The measure of 17 cubits applies to the sacrificial post used at the Paśu sacrifice.

आनर्थक्यात् तदङ्गेषु ॥ १८ ॥

आनर्थक्यात् Anarthakyāt, on account of uselessness. तदङ्गेषु Tadaṅgeṣu, should apply to its subsidiaries.

18. Because it is of no use in the primary sacrifice itself, it must apply to the subsidiaries.—18.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the 'Vajpeya' sacrifice we have the text, '*saptadashâratnih vajpeyashyâyupah*' and in this connection the question arises as to whether the measure of 17 cubits applies to the vessels of the Vajpeya itself (there being no yupa in that sacrifice) or it pertains to the yupa used in connection with the 'paśuyāga' which is a subsidiary of the Vajpeya.

The Pūrvapakṣa is that the text distinctly mentions the measure in connection with the Vajpeya itself and there can be no justification for making it applicable to something else.

The Siddhānta as embodied in the sūtra is that as a matter of fact the name 'Vajpeya' belongs to a particular form of the soma sacrifice in which the sacrificial post has no place. Under the circumstances if the measure were made applicable to this sacrifice itself it will be absolutely meaningless, in order to avoid this the word 'Vajpeya' in the text may be taken as indirectly indicating the vessels used at the Vajpeya sacrifice. But this recourse to indirect indication cannot be justified so long as there is any possibility of avoiding it. As a matter of fact it is easily avoided by taking the word Vajpeya in its wider sense of the particular soma sacrifice called vajpeya along with all its subsidiaries among which latter is the Paśuyāga at which the post is used to which the measure of 17 cubits is fittingly applicable.

Adhikaraṇa X.—The action of 'Avikramana' is subsidiary to the 'Prayajas' only.

कर्तृगुणे तु कर्मसमवायात् (समवायित्वात्) वाक्यभेदः
स्यात् ॥ १६ ॥

कर्तृगुणे Kartriguṇe, in the case of performer's qualifications. तु Tu, and कर्मसमवायात् Karmāsamavāyāt, because it cannot co-inhere with the action. वाक्यभेदः (vākyabhedaḥ), syntactical split. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

19. As the qualification of the performer cannot inhere in an action the sentence should be broken up.—19.

COMMENTARY.

Purificatory Actions, Substances and Accessories have duly been discussed; and we now proceed to consider those cases in which an Action, being mentioned as related to another action, comes to be taken as a purificatory action.

For instance, in the case of the sentence 'abhihrāman juhoti' we find in the word 'abhihrāman' the repetitive affix 'namul'; and hence, there arising the question as to what is done by one 'walking round and round' we meet with another word 'juhoti' which points to the *Prayāja*, in whose context we find the sentence in question. And then there is a doubt as to whether the 'walking round' is connected with that *Prayāja* alone, or to every one of the *Homas* that are mentioned in connection with the *Darśa Pūrnāmāsa*.

In regard to the above question the Pūrvapakṣa view is that inasmuch as the *avikramāṇa* is an action meant to be a qualification for the performer it cannot be taken as having any connection with the particular 'homa' mentioned by the word 'juhoti' in the sentence, that is to say, the *avikramāṇa* or walking round cannot be connected with the *Prayajas*. It cannot, in fact, help in the accomplishment of the *Prayāja Homa*. And as such its mention cannot have any syntactical connection with the injunction of the *Prayajas*; so that in the sentence in question the participle *avikramāṇa* should be taken apart from the principal verb *juhoti* as pertaining to all actions mentioned in all other contexts.

साकाञ्चन्वेकवाक्यं स्यादसमाप्तं हि पूर्वेण ॥ २० ॥

साकाञ्चं Sākāṃkṣam, in need. तु Tu, but. एकवाक्यं Ekavākyam, syntactically connected. स्यात् Syāt, would be. असमाप्तं Asamāptam, incomplete. हि Hi, because. पूर्वेण Pūrveṇa, by the preceeding word alone.

20. But there is a deficiency in view of which the whole should be taken as one sentence specially the sense of the sentence is not completed by the first word.—20.

COMMENTARY.

The Siddhantin's answer to the above is that as a matter of fact the word (*avikramāṇa*) being a gerund cannot be taken as completing the sentence. It stands in need of another finite verb and as such a finite verb is available near at hand there can be no justification for dissociating it from that verb.

The *Tantravārtika* is struck by the palpably absurd Pūrvapakṣa as represented in the Bhāṣya and therefore offers a somewhat different explanation of the Adhikarāṇa. It puts forward the Pūrvapakṣa in the following form:—

Inasmuch as the 'walking round' is laid down with reference to all the *Homas* of the context, that are referred to by the word 'juhoti',—and as there is no intermediate context (that could take in the *Prayajas* only),

—the connection of the walking round cannot but be controlled by the single great context (which takes in all Homas); and in this case the sense of the preceding (*Pārvapakṣa*) *sūtra* would be thus: *In the property of the agent:—i.e., in 'walking round'—there being no inherence of the action of Prayâjya, which could be brought about only by an intermediate context, there would be a split of the sentence, only in so far as the 'walking round' would not be syntactically connected with that intermediate context.*

In that case, the present (*Siddhânta*) *sūtra* should be interpreted as follows: *Sākāṅkṣam* would refer to the intermediate context; and the sense of the *Siddhânta* would be that the 'walking round' is syntactically connected with the intermediate context, through its connection with the want of the procedure, which is aroused by the injunction of the *Prayajas* (i.e., the 'walking round' is to be taken as forming part of the procedure of the *Prayajas*). And in this case, the concluding clause *asamāptam hi purvena* would not mean the incompleteness of the sentence but that the intermediate context is not completed by what precedes—i.e., by the mere injunction of the form and the accessories of the *Prayajas*.

Adhikaraṇa XI.—The Upavīta is subsidiary to the entire Darśa Pūrnāmāsa and not to the Sāmādheni only.

संदिग्धेषु व्यवायात् वाक्यभेदः स्यात् ॥ २१ ॥

संदिग्धेषु *Samdigdheṣu*, in all doubtful cases. व्यवायात् *Vyavâyât*, on account of interruption. वाक्यभेदः *Vākyabhedah*, syntactical dissociation. स्यात् *Syât*, should be.

21. On account of the intervention of sentences of doubtful connection the sentences should be dissociated.
—21.

COMMENTARY.

This *Adhikaraṇa* is meant to settle the question as to whether the connection of actions is controlled by the intermediate or prime context.

In connection with the *Darśa Pūrnāmāsa* the *Sāmīdhanī Mantras* are laid down as the seventh and eighth *Anuvāhas*, the *Nivids* are laid down as the ninth; and the *Kāmyas*, identical with the *Sāmīdhanīs*, as the tenth; and then in the eleventh we have the mention of the *sacrificial thread* as to be worn on the left shoulder, passing under the right arm-pit.

And there arises the question as to whether the thread is to be so worn at the time that the person is reciting the *Sâmidhanîs* or during all the time that he is performing all that is laid down in the context.

The Pûrvapakṣa view is that in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Adhikarāṇa the mention of the *Upavîta* must be connected with what is nearest to it. That is to say with the mention of *Sâmidhanîs* only.

The Siddhânta embodied in the sûtra is that between the mention of two sets of *Sâmidhanîs* we have the mention of the *Nimids* and as such the connection of *Sâmidhanîs* being interrupted and the irresistible conclusion is that the *Upavîta* should be connected with the entire context of the Darśa Pûrnâmāsa and should be borne throughout its performance and not only during the recitation of the *Sâmidhanî*.

Adhikarāṇa XII.—The Varāṇa, the Vaikankatā and the other vessels belong to all sacrifices. The Mithosambandha Nyaya.

गुणानां च परार्थत्वात् असंबन्धः समत्वात् स्यात् ॥ २२ ॥

गुणानां Guṇānām, of the accessory details. च Cha, also. परार्थत्वात् Parârthâtât, on account of being subservient to the purpose of something else. असंबन्धः Asambandha, no relation. समत्वात् Samatwât, on account of being equal. स्यात् Syât, should be.

22. As the accessory details are all subservient to the purposes of something else, they are all of equal importance as such can have no relationship among themselves.—22.

COMMENTARY.

This Adhikarāṇa is an exception to Adhikarāṇa 9.

In connection with the *kindling of fire*, we find laid down certain vessels of the *Vârāṇa* and the *Vaikankatā* wood, as employed at the performance of the sacrifice, some of which are used at the *Homa*, while others are not used. And inasmuch as these *vessels* have nothing to do with the actual, *kindling of fire* they are, as a matter of course, taken apart from the context; and then there arises a question as to the particular sacrifice at the performance of which they should be used.

And on this question we have the following *Purvapakṣa*.

"In accordance with rule laid down in *Sûtra* III-1-18, we must conclude that the vessels in question are used for holding the *offering*

materials at the *Pavamāneṣṭi*, as this *Iṣṭi*, being laid down in connection with *kindling of fire*, is directly subsidiary to it and the vessels mentioned in the same context have to be connected with an offering and the nearest offering with which they can be connected is the *Pavāmāna* offering. For the simple reason that the vessels as well as the *Pavāmāna* offerings are mentioned in the context of the fire kindling. So that there being no use for the vessels at the kindling itself they must be connected with the nearest offering.

The *Siddhānta* embodied in the *sūtra* is as follows :—

That the said vessels belong to the fire kindling through the *Pavāmāna* sacrifice is shown only by the context, while that they belong to the fire and through that to all sacrifices is shown by the syntactical force of the sentence '*Yadāhavanēye Juhoti etc.* and the latter is certainly more authoritative than the former.

And further there is no close relationship between the *Pavāmāna* offerings and the *fire kindling* as the offerings are as much subsidiary to the fire as the kindling is and thus there being no relationship between the two the vessels found mentioned in the context of the kindling cannot reasonably be connected with the *Pavāmāna* offering.

The *Vārtika* is not satisfied with the way in which the *Bhāṣya* rests the *Siddhānta* upon an assumed sentence in the shape of *Yadāhavanēye juhoti*. In fact it discards the entire *Adhikaraṇa* and takes the present *sūtra* as a supplementary to the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*. That is to say in connection with the conclusion of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* there arising the argument that as the *Nibids* are subsidiary to the *Samdhenis* a mention of those cannot interrupt or disjoin the context,—the answer given by the *sūtra* the sense of which is that inasmuch as the *Nibids* also like the *Sāmidhenis* speak of the kindling of fire they are equally subservient to the purposes of fire and as such one cannot be taken as subsidiary to the other.

Adhikaraṇa XIII.—The *Vārtraghni* recitation etc. belong to the *Ajyavaga* offerings. *Vartraghni* (*Nyaya*.)

मिथश्चानर्थसम्बन्धात् ॥ २३ ॥

मिथः Mithah, of the pair. च Cha, also. अनर्थसम्बन्धात् Anartha-sambandhāt, the relations serve no useful purpose.

23. Any connection of the pair of Mantras with the primary sacrifice serving no useful purpose (they cannot be connected with the latter).—23.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the Darśa Pârnāmâsa we meet with the passage 'Vartraghni paurnamâsyâm vridhanvati amâvâsyâyam' and in regard to this there arises the doubt whether the two pairs of mantras *Vartraghni* and *Vridhanvati* belong to the primary sacrifice of the Darśa Pârnâmâsa itself or to the *Ajyavaga* offerings.

The Pûrvapakṣa view is that inasmuch as the Mantras are distinctly mentioned in the text along with the Darśa Pârnâmâsa itself there is no reason why they should not be taken as belonging to these.

The Siddhânta embodied in the sûtra is as follows:—

That any connection of the Mantras with the Darśa Pârnâmâsa would be useless, because the Pârnâmâsi sacrifice constitutes one action so also does the Darśa sacrifice and as such there could be no room for two Mantras in either of these and further because the deities mentioned in the mantras are not found connected with any of the two primary sacrifices, that is to say the *Vârttraghni* and the *Vridhanvati* each consists of two mantras, one mantra speaking of soma and another of Agni and as a matter of fact neither soma nor Agni by itself is the deity of the Darśa or of the Pârnâmâsa. The conclusion therefore is that the two pairs of Mantras should be connected with two *Ajyavaga* offerings. As there offerings are two in number the two mantras will fit in with these quite appropriately and the words *Paurnamâsyam* and *Amâvâsyayam* occurring in the sentence quoted should be taken only as pointing out the times for the offering.

Adhikarâṇa XIV.—The closing of the fist and such other details pertain to the whole context.

आनन्तर्यं अचोदना ॥ २४ ॥

आनन्तर्यं Ānantaryam, proximity. अचोदना Achodanâ, not injunctive.

24. Proximity is not injunctive (or connection).—24.

COMMENTARY.

We have just dealt with the employment of *mantras* in accordance with the order in which they are mentioned; and now we proceed to deal with the exceptions of that rule.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we find the sentence—'*Muṣṭim Karoti, Vachamyacchati dikṣitamavedayati*'; and then again '*hastan avanenikti ulaparajinstranati*'; and in connection with this, there arises a

doubt as to whether the ' *muṣṭikarna* ; (closing of the fist) and *vagyamah* (silence) simply serve the purpose of *āvedanā* (Addressing the initiated sacrificer) or they enter into the whole of the context? And similarly too, as to whether the *hastavāṇejana* (washing of the hand) is for the sole purpose of ' *uluparajistarana* ' (spreading of the bundle of grass) or it pertains to all the actions performed?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that owing to the close proximity of the sentences the closing of the fist and the silence should be taken as subsidiary to the addressing and the washing of the hand to the spreading of the grass.

The Siddhāntin answer to the above is that the force of the context, the actions in question, must refer to the whole set of actions mentioned in the context. This connection could be rejected only if there were more authoritative means indicative of their connection with the one particular action only. As a matter of fact, however, there is nothing to establish any sort of syntactical connection between the fist closing and the addressing. There is mere proximity of the two sentences and certainly the context is more authoritative than mere proximity.

वाक्यानाञ्च समाप्तत्वात् ॥ २५ ॥

वाक्यानां Vākyānām, the sentence. च Cha, also. समाप्तत्वात् Samāptatwāt, being completing themselves.

25. Also because every one of the sentences is complete in itself."—25.

COMMENTARY.

A further reason why there can be no syntactical connection between the two sets of sentences lies in the fact that every one of them is complete in itself and thus there is absent the principal condition necessary for syntactical connection as laid down in Sutra II i-46.

Adhikaraṇa XV.—The quartering pertains to the Agneya cake only.

शेषस्तु गुणसंयुक्तः साधारणः प्रतीयेत मिथस्तेषामसंबन्धात् । २६ ।
(तेषां संबन्धात्)

शेषः Śeṣah, the auxiliary. तु Tu, really. गुणसंयुक्तः Guṇasamyuktah, connected with the accessory detail. साधारणः Sādhāraṇah, common to all. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta, should be recognised. मिथः Mithah, mutually. तेषाम् Teṣām, of those, असंबन्धात् asambandhāt, absence of connection.

26. "The auxiliary connected with the accessory details should be taken as common to all specially as there is no special connection between the two."—26.

COMMENTARY.

We have spoken of the application of accessory details, in accordance with order in which they are mentioned ; and we now proceed to consider whether that application is possible to a part also, or only to the whole.

In connection with the *Darśa Pārnāmāsa*, we find the sentence,—*agneyam chaturdha karoti* ; and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the '*chaturdhakarana*' (quartering) is to be done to the *Agneya* cake only, or to the *Agnisomiya* and *Aindragna* cakes also.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* embodied in the *sūtra* is that the Quartering applies to all the three cakes as the *Aindragna* and the *Agnisomeya* cakes are also entitled to the name *Agneya* as the cake dedicated to *Indra* and *Agni* can certainly be spoken as dedicated to *Agni*. Nor is there any other text which makes the Quartering more nearly related to the *Agneya* cake than to the others.

In connection with this *sūtra* a curious fact reveals itself. From the closing lines of *Bhāṣya* on this *sūtra* it is clear that the *Bhāṣya* reads the *sūtra* as *teṣam sambandhat* as what it says is as follows :—(Page 241).

"If there were no relationship between the *Agnisomiya* and the *Agneya* cakes, then there would have been some justification for restricting the quartering to the *Agneya* cake only as it is, however, there is a relationship between the two so that there should be no such restriction." On the other hand we have the *Tantravartika* quoting the *Bhāṣya* as '*mithasliṣāmasambandhāt achodanā syat*' it is not easy to reconcile this quotation with the above declaration of the *Bhāṣya*.

व्यवस्था वा अर्थसंयोगात् लिङ्गस्यार्थेन संबन्धात् लक्षणार्था गुणश्रुतिः । २७ ।

Vyavasthā, restriction. वा *Vā*, but. अर्थसंयोगात् *Arthasamyogāt*, on account of connection with the direct meaning. लिङ्गस्य *Liṅgasya*, of the indicative power. अर्थेन *Arthena*, with such meaning. संबन्धात् *Sambandhāt*, connection. लक्षणार्था *Lakṣaṇārthā*, serving the purposes of indication. गुणश्रुतिः *Gūṇaśrutih*, subsidiary text.

27. "There should be restriction as there is an actual relationship with the direct meaning of the word specially as the indicative power is connected with such meaning as for

the subsequent mention of the Agneya it is for the purpose of indicating the talk of the Âgneya cake—27.

COMMENTARY.

The Siddhânta is that the Quartering should apply to the Âgneya cake only as the very signification of the word Âgneya makes it clear that it must be one that is dedicated to the single deity Agni ; whenever Agni is taken conjointly with any other deity the 'dhak' pratyaya becomes impossible so that the presence of the dhak pratyaya in the word Agneya makes it clear that the name can be applied only to that cake which is dedicated to Agni and Agni alone so that this restriction is indicated by that indicative power of the word 'Âgneya' which makes known the particular deity. In support of the Purvapakṣa they have cited the text 'Agnerasya mastakam bibhajya prasritayamabadhyati' where even though what is mentioned is the Âgneya only yet the avadâna is made out of all the cakes. The answer to this is that the meaning of this text is that when the several cakes are cut the cutting of the Âgneya should be done at its head so that it only serves the purpose of indicating a particular spot in the Âgneya cake for a special purpose and has just no bearing in the present question.

THIRD ADHYĀYA.

SECOND PADA.

Adhikaraṇa I.—Mantras are employed according to their primary meaning (Bahirnyāya).

**अर्थविधानसामर्थ्यात् (संयोगात्) मंत्रेषु शेषभावः
स्यात् तस्मादुत्पत्तिसंबन्धोऽर्थेन नित्यसंयोगात् । १**

अर्थविधानसामर्थ्यात् Arthāvidhānasāmarthyāt, because of the power of denoting things. मंत्रेषु Mantraṣu, among mantras. शेषभावः Śeṣabhāva, subsidiary character. स्यात् Syāt, should be. तस्मात् Tasmāt, there. उत्पत्तिसंबन्धः Utpatti sambandhaḥ, connection with the primary. अर्थेन Arthena, with meaning. नित्यसंयोगात् Nityasamyogāt, on account of eternal relation.

1. "In as much as subsidiary character of mantras depends upon their power of denoting things the particular mantra should be taken as related to its primary denotation as it is only with such denotation that they are eternally related."—1.

COMMENTARY.

We now proceed to deal with the application of *Mantras* in accordance with their own 'Linga'. By 'Linga' is meant the capability of the *Mantra* to signify something; and as a matter of fact, this capability is sometimes found to pertain to the direct primary, and sometimes to the indirect secondary meaning. And hence in the case of *Mantras* it is doubtful whether they are to be used in their primary sense or in the secondary one.

The discussion in the *Bhāṣya* is started with reference to a typical mantra 'barhirdevasadanam dāmi' the question is whether this mantra is to be used in the chopping of Kuśa grass only which is directly denoted by the word 'barhi' or in that of any grass, which could be only secondarily or indirectly indicated by the word.

The *Pûrvapakṣa* view is that the use of a mantra always depends upon the expressive power of its words and the word 'barhi' is as expressive of the Kuśa as of any other grass so that there is nothing to justify



the restriction of the mantra to the chopping of Kuśa alone. The advantage gained by this view is that, when we find, in the context of the *Darśa Pāṇamāsa* certain *Mantras* with the word 'Pāṣan', we do not find it necessary to remove these *Mantras* to another sacrifice, even though there is no such deity as Pāṣan in the *Darśa Pāṇamāsa*; because the word 'Pāṣan' indirectly indicates 'Agni', which is a deity at that sacrifice, while if any preference were to be shown to the direct denotation of the word 'Riṣan', then it would be necessary to remove the *Mantras* from the context in which they are actually mentioned in the Veda. In the same manner inasmuch as the word 'Agni' would indicate the *Sūrya*, the Injunction (that the ectype is to be performed in the same way as the archetype) would be duly followed, even without changing the words of the *Mantra* (i.e., the *Sauryacharn* is a modification or ectype of the *Āgneya Charn*, and the *Mantra* laid down for the latter being 'agnayetva', etc. when one comes to offer the *Saurya Charn*, he employs the same *Mantra*, but as the deity is not *Agni*, but *Surya*, in this case he changes 'Āgneyetva' into *suryāyatvās*, and this change would not be necessary according to the *Pūrvapakṣa* as the word *Agni* would be significant of *Surya* as of *Agni*).

In reply to the above Purvapakṣa we have the following Siddhanta embodied in the sūtra as follows :—

Mantras become auxiliaries to sacrifices, only on account of their capability of expressing certain meanings; and when they have this purpose served by their direct primary meanings, the acceptance of their secondary meaning would involve the necessity of assuming another text.

That is to say, in accordance with the law laid down under the *Sûtra* II-1-31, the Mantras even in their direct significations, lead to the assumption of texts, pertaining to their application. And hence if we were to accept them in their secondary signification, which totally abandons the primary, then in both cases it would be necessary to assume Vedic texts. And even while the *Mantra* indicates the secondary meaning if it denote beforehand its primary meaning also,—then inasmuch as there would be no reason for passing over this primary meaning, when the text pertaining to that meaning has been once assumed, all the requirements of the *Mantra*, of the sacrifice in question, as also of the Injunctions regarding the study of the Veda, will have been fulfilled by that text, and hence there would be no ground for assuming any other text; and the *Mantra* could not be applied in its secondary sense.

संस्कारकत्वादचोदिते न स्यात् । २ ।

संस्कारकत्वात् Saṃskāratwāt, on account of its sanctificatory character. अचोदिते Achodite, to that which is not enjoyed. न स्यात् Na syāt, cannot apply.

2. The Mantra being a sanctificatory factor cannot apply to that which is not enjoyed.—2.

COMMENTARY.

This sūtra meets what the Pūrvapakṣa has said with regard to the word 'Puṣan'. That the Mantras of the Darśa Pāṇamāsa do not apply to Puṣan etc, which are not enjoined as its deities, is only reasonable; because all Sanctifications appertain to that which has to be Sanctified; and hence the indicative power of the Mantra, which is more authoritative than the context, would make it applicable to Pūṣana etc, and not to the Deities of the Darśa Pāṇamāsa.

Adhikarāṇa II.—The 'Aindri' mantras apply to the gārhapatya. (gārhapatyanyaya)

वचनात्वयथार्थमैन्द्री स्यात् । ३ ।

वचनात् Vachanāt, because of the subsequent injunction. अथार्थं Ayathārtham, not in its direct sense. ऐन्द्री Aindri, the aindri mantra. स्यात् Syāt, should be taken.

3. "The Aindri mantra should not be employed in its direct literal sense because of the direct injunction."—3.

COMMENTARY.

We now proceed to deal with an exception to the general rule arrived at in the foregoing Adhikarāṇa.

The sentence cited in connection with this Adhikarāṇa is—'nivechanat sangamako vasūnāmīti aindryā gārhapatyamupatisthāt,' and though this Mantra is as applicable to the sacrificial fire (Gārhapata) as to Indra, yet, the special mention of 'aindrya' shows that it is to be taken in its direct sense applying to Indra. Some people, however, take the present Adhikarāṇa as based upon the sentence 'Kadachanastariraisi.....Indra etc.

In both these sentences, however, the question is the same, viz—Is the mantra to be taken in its direct literal meaning, and as such recited is descriptive of Indra or is it to be taken in its indirect meaning, and thereby applied to the sacrificial fire, on the strength of the subsequent direction?

On the above question we have the following Pūrvapakṣa :—

In accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Mantra* must be taken as applying to the *Description of Indra*. Then, as for the accusative ending in 'garhapatya' it could be taken as indicating other agencies, such as the vocative or the Ablative etc, just as in the case of the sentence '*Saktūn Juhoti*,' the accusative in *saktūn* is taken as indicating the Instrumental;—similarly in the case in question, inasmuch as the *objectivity* (expressed by the Accusative) is found to be incompatible, we cannot attach any direct significance to it, and must take as indicating mere agency in general. Consequently, in accordance with the sūtra VI-i-1, the sacrificial fire (Gārhapatya) becomes subsidiary to the *Description* (of Indra).

In answer to the above we have the following Siddhānta embodied in the sūtra :—

On account of the clear injunction *aindrya garhapatyaṃ praisthate* the mere indicative power of the mantra can have no force against it so that when we have to consider which of the two the *mantra* or the injunction has to relinquish its direct meaning we cannot but decide that it is the *mantra* that should do so. Thus the mantra in question has to be employed in connection with the 'gārhapatya.'

गुणाद्वाप्यभिधानं स्यात् संबन्धस्याशास्त्रहेतुत्वात् । ४ ।

गुणात् Guṇāt, due to certain circumstances and qualities. वा Vā, but. अपि Api, also. अभिधानं Abhidhānam, indication. स्यात् Syāt, should be. संबन्धस्य Sambandhasya, the relationship. अशास्त्रहेतुत्वात् Aśāstrahetuwat, not being dependent upon scriptural injunctions.

4. The required indication would be based upon certain common characteristics specially as the relationship of their words and their meanings is not determined by scriptural injunctions.—4.

COMMENTARY.

On behalf of the Pūrvapakṣa it may be urged that in the absence of any scriptural texts there can be no justification for making the word Indra of the mantra apply to fire. But the answer to this would be that as a matter of fact in the case of no word is its denotation determined by scriptural texts and as for the word Indra applying to fire this is quite possible because of the following characters which are common to both.

- (1) Both are connected with the sacrifice
- (2) The word Indra as derived from the root 'Indi' which signifies supreme lordship is as applicable to the fire as to the god Indra.

Adhikarāṇa III.—The Mantras speaking of calling are to be employed in calling.

तथाह्वानमपीतिचेत् । ५ ।

तथा Tathā, similarly. आह्वान 'Āhvānam, calling. अपि Api, also. चेत् Chet, if this be urged.

5. It may be said that the law of the preceding Adhikarāṇa applies to the case of the Mantras that mention calling.—5.

COMMENTARY.

We have dealt with the general rule that *mantras* are to be taken in their primary sense, and also with an exception to this rule. We now proceed to consider which cases are subject to the general rule and which to the exception.

There is a *mantra*—‘*Haviṣṭrtehi etc.*’ which speaks of the calling of the sacrificer’s who prepares the offering material, and with regard to this *mantra*, we have the following question: Is it to be applied to that *calling*, the mention of ‘threshing’ in the direction accompanying the *mantra* (*iti triravaghnanaheayati*) being explained as pointing out the time for the ‘calling’? Or, in the strength of the direction, the *mantra* is to be applied to the ‘threshing’ which is the first to be mentioned in the direction, and not to the calling to which it literally pertains?

The Pārvaṇakṣa view embodied in the sūtra is as follows:—

As the text directly mentions the ‘threshing’ and the word *haviṣṭr* in the *mantra* is capable of being taken as applying, even though indirectly to the threshing which also is something that helps in the making of the ‘havisa’,—the present case is exactly analogous to the one dealt with in the preceding Adhikarāṇa so that the *mantra* in question should be taken as applying to the threshing and not to the *calling*.

न कालविधिश्चोदितत्वात् । ६ ।

न Na, not so. कालविधिः Kalvidhiḥ, indication of time. चोदितत्वात् Choditatwāt, because it is already known.

6. “It cannot be so; the subsequent direction only points out the time which is already recognised by experience.—6.

COMMENTARY.

The subsequent direction on which the Pūrvaapakṣa lays great stress cannot be taken as laying down the use of the mantra at the 'threshing' as the actual threshing being already enjoined elsewhere all that the present direction does is to lay down the threefoldness of the repetition and it also serves the purpose of pointing out the time at which the mantra is to be recited, though this time does not stand in the need of being enjoined as it is well-known from ordinary experience that one who is to prepare the offering material is to be *called* at the time that the material is going to be prepared. It is in view of this fact that the Vārtika declares that by the word 'vidhi' in Kālvidhi means only pointing out and not injunction.

The Subodhini in construing the sūtra adds a second 'Na' and takes it to mean (1) "that the direction cannot be taken as enjoining the mantra in connection with the threshing; (2) that it cannot be taken as enjoining the time." But in the way that the Vārtika has taken the sūtra there appears to be no justification for interfering in the wording of the sūtra.

गुणभावात् । ७ ।

गुणभावात् Guṇābhāvāt, on account of the absence of the character.

COMMENTARY.

It has been urged by the Pūrvaapakṣa that the word 'haviṣkrita' can be applied to the threshing but this is not possible as the character of *making the offering material* and by its very nature it is incapable of being *called or addressed* which calling is directly mentioned in the mantra.

The Vārtika adds 'though you could in some way or other, assume the *threshing* to be the 'maker of the offering material' yet the subsequent word '*ahvayati*' (calls) would be absolutely meaningless, in regard to the inanimate *threshing*. And further we find the vocative case ending (in Haviṣkrit) and then an order or request (to come) contained in the word '*chi*', which is in the second person singular, all this would be absolutely meaningless if the *Mantra* were applied to the *Threshing*. On the other hand, when the *mantra* is applied to the *Sacrificer's wife*, who is an animate and intelligent being, all that has been indicated becomes applicable and useful; consequently the words of the *Mantra* cannot be accepted as applying it to the *Threshing*.

लिङ्गाच्च । ८ ।

लिङ्गाच्च Liṅgāchcha, also on account of other indications.

COMMENTARY.

Close upon the sentence under consideration, we find the sentence 'vāgrai havishṛt' where we find the 'maker of the offering material' eulogised distinctly as a feminine character; and this would be applicable only to the sacrificer's wife; as otherwise (if it were taken as applying to the *Threshing*), inasmuch as the action (of *Threshing*) has not its gender restricted to the feminine being, as a matter of fact, of an imperceptible gender, the eulogy in question could be applied to it, only indirectly, by applying the word 'kriyā' (which is in the feminine gender).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the *mantra* is subsidiary to the *calling*. The Subodhini reads the sūtra as *itaścha tathālingāt*.

विधिकोपश्चोपदेशे स्यात् । ९ ।

विधिकोपः Vidhikopah, incompatibility of direct injunction. च Cha, also. उपदेशे Upadeśe, if the direction in question be taken as enjoining the use of a *mantra*. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

9. "There would be an incompatibility of injunctions if the direction in question were taken as laying down the use of the *mantra* in connection with 'Threshing.'—9.

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact we find that an entirely different *mantra*—'avarakṣodibah' etc., is distinctly laid down as to be used in connection with the 'Threshing' so that if the direction in question be taken as laying down another *mantra* there would be a conflict of injunctions.

Adhikarāṇa IV.—The mantras speaking of walking round the fire are to be employed in connection with the same direction.

तथोत्थानविसर्जने । १० ।

तथा Tathā, similarly. उत्थानविसर्जने Utthāna visarjane, with rising and giving vent.

10. "Similarly with rising and giving vent."—10.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we find the sentences, *uttiṣṭan anvāha agnidagnin vihara*, and *vratam kṛnuta iti vācham visrjati*, and in

regard to these, there arises a question as to whether the two *mantras* *agnidagnin* etc., and '*vratan Krnuta*,' are enjoined as applying to the 'rising' and the 'giving vent to speech'; or these two latter are mentioned simply with the purpose of pointing out the time of the recitation of the two *mantras*.

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that the *mantras* to be employed in the act of 'rising' and in the act of 'giving vent to speech' respectively. But the Siddhānta as embodied in the sūtra is that the 'rising' and 'giving vent to speech' only indicate the time just as in the preceding Adhikaraṇa.

Adhikaraṇa V.—The Suktavali is employed in the offering of the grass bundle.

सूक्तवाके च कालविधिः परार्थत्वात् । ११ ।

सूक्तवाके Sūktavāke, in the Suktavak. च Cha, also. कालविधिः Kālavidhiḥ, injunction of time. परार्थत्वात् (Parārthatwāt) because it serves another purpose.

4. "The Sūktavāka must be taken as laying down the time as they serve different purposes—4.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the *Darśa-Pārnāmāsa* we find the sentence *suktāvakena prastaram prastarati*; and there arises the question as to whether this sentence lays down the *Sūktavāka* as subsidiary to the *Offering of the grass bundle*, or it only indicates the *Time*. And in this question we have the following.

PURVAPAKṢA.

The Sūktavāka (i.e., the *mantra* *Idam dyāvāprīthivi* etc.) serve the purpose of pointing out the Deity, and the *Prastara* (the Bundle of grass) serves as the place for the keeping of the *Sruḥ*, and hence both of these, having their purposes served independently of each other, do not stand in the need of being related to each other by the relationship of the Primary and the Subsidiary; and hence the sentence must be taken as pointing out the *Time*. The instrumental ending in '*sūktāvakena*' may be explained as indicating the qualification (Pāṇini II-iii-21).

उपदेशो वा याज्याशब्दो हि नाकस्मात् । १२ ।

उपदेशो Updeśaḥ, injunction. वा Vā, but. याज्याशब्दः Yājyā śabdah, the name 'yajya,' हि Hi, because. नाकस्मात् Nākasmāt, could not be meaningless.

12. "But the sentence must be taken as an injunction (of the *mantra* as applying to the offering of the grass

bundle), as the name 'yājya' (as applied to the Sūktāvāka) could not be meaningless.—12.

COMMENTARY

In the sentence '*Sūktāvākena prastaram prastarati*' we find that the *Sūktāvāka* is distinctly mentioned as connected with the action (of *Praharana*, offering); and the Instrumentality thus distinctly mentioned cannot be set aside: specially because of the great authority attaching to the signification of the case-ending (in *sūktāvakena*). Thus then the word '*sūktāvāka*' would in its direct meaning, be connected with the Action, otherwise what would be connected with the action would be the time indirectly indicated by the *Sūktāvāka*. And it is only the *Sūktāvāka* that is taken as Subsidiary to the Action; and being thereby similar in character to the other subsidiaries of sacrifices, it becomes capable of having the name '*yājya*' applied to it;—as is done in the declaration *sūktāvakenā yājyāśabdalḥ*'

सदेवतार्थः तत्संयोगात् । १३ ।

व Sa, the *Sūktāvāka*. देवतार्थः Devatārthaḥ, serving the purpose of indicating the Deity. तत्संयोगात् Tatsamyogāt, only on account of its connection with it.

13. "The *Sūktāvāka* serves the purpose of indicating the deity only on account of its connection (with the offering to the deities therein indicated)—13.

COMMENTARY.

It has been urged in the *Pūrvapakṣa* that as the *sūktāvāka* serves the purpose of indicating the deity it cannot be connected with the offering. But in answer to this it is pointed out as follows:—

Though it is quite true that the words of the *Sūktāvāka* itself point to the fact of its serving the purpose indicating the Deity, yet this indicative capability does not disappear from it, when it is employed in connection with the offering of the grass bundle, because in this latter it is not employed in any other way (then the one justified by the indication of the words). The fact is that the capability of the *Sūktāvāka* to indicate the deity stands in need of a reconciliation with the Direct Declaration '*sūktāvākena prastaram prastarati*.' and this latter Declaration also, finding the *sūktāvāka* itself making no mention of the said offering and finding itself incapable in the absence of such indicativeness (of the offering), of applying it to the said offering, and yet not taking upon itself the responsibility of creating a fresh indicative potency, keeps looking out

for some such way in which the *sūktāvāka* could be employed in the work mentioned by it, and yet not stepping beyond what is signified by the words of the *mantra* itself. Under the circumstance what can be more natural than that the *sūktāvāka* mantra should be connected with that same action of offering along with which it is mentioned and as the offering is to those same deities that are indicated in the *Sūktāvāka* the incongruity urged by the *Pūrvapakṣa* entirely ceases.

प्रतिपत्तिरिति चेत् स्विष्टकृदुभयसंस्कारः स्यात् । १४ ।

प्रतिपत्तिः Pratipattiḥ, a purificatory offering of disposal. इति चेत् Iticet, if it be urged, स्विष्टकृत् Svīṣṭakṛit, like the *svīṣṭakṛit* offering. उभयसंस्कारः Ubhavayasans kâraḥ two fold character.

14. "If it be urged that the throwing of the grass bundle into the fire is only an offering of disposal, our answer is that like the *svīṣṭakṛita* offering the action would have a two-fold character—14.

COMMENTARY.

An objection is raised. The bundle of grass is one on which the ladle has been kept during the sacrifice so that when it is laid down that it should be thrown into the fire it is only by way of disposing of the thing for which there is no further use. Thus being of the nature of disposal offering the action cannot stand in need of a *mantra*; hence the *Sūktāvāka* can have no connection with the action.

The answer to the above is that though it is true that the grass is thrown into the fire by way of *disposal*, yet it is also true that it can be also taken as an independent offering. Just as the *svīṣṭakṛit* offering is both an independent sacrifice and a disposal offering. Even if it were merely a disposal offering it could not necessarily follow that it cannot have a *mantra* subsidiary to it. Because such an offering is distinctly seen to serve a useful purpose; and for the sake of the bringing about of the transcendental result, proceeding from the Restriction laid down, it would certainly stand in need of certain Vedic accessories (in the shape of the *mantra* etc.)

And thus there can be nothing incongruous in applying the *Sūktāvāka* to the *Offering of the grass bundle*.

The *Vārtika* has broken up the *sūtra* into two *sūtras* one embodying the objection and the other the answer.

Adhikaraṇa VI.—The Sūktāvākas are to be employed in accordance with their meaning.

कृत्स्नोपदेशात् उभयत्र सर्ववचनम् । १५ ।

कृत्स्नोपदेशात् Kṛtsnopaśeśat, on account of being enjoined as a complete whole. उभयत्र ubhayatra, at both. सर्ववचनम् Sarvavachanam, the recitation of the whole.

15. "Because it is enjoined as one complete whole the whole of it should be recited on both occasions.—15.

COMMENTARY.

Reverting to the original subjects of the *Darśa Pūrnāmāsa*, we proceed to consider the question as to whether the whole of the *Sūktāvāka* is to be recited at the *Darśa* as well as the *Pūrnāmāsa* sacrifices, or portions of it are to be extracted in the case of each of these in consideration of the Deities (connected with the sacrifices and spoken of by the Mantras.)

And on this question we have the following :—

Pūrvapakṣa.—"The whole of it is to be recited at each of the two sacrifices. Because if the *Mantras*, as it appears in the text, that is called the *Sūktāvāka*; and if extracts were made from it, it would cease to be *Sūktāvāka*; and hence in this latter case, the offering of the grass-bundle would be made with a *mantra* that is not *Sūktāvāka* and that would be an infringement of the Injunction *Sūktāvakena Prastaram Prastarati*."

यथार्थं वा शेषभूतसंस्कारात् । १६ ।

यथार्थं Yathārtham, in accordance with the meaning. वा Vā but. शेषभूतसंस्कारात् Śeṣabhūtasamskārât, because purificatory of auxiliaries.

16. But the mantras are to be used in accordance with their meaning because they are meant to be purificatory of auxiliaries.—16.

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact the use of mantras depends upon what their words signify so that from among the *Sūktāvāka* Mantras those whose words are indicative of the deities of the *Darśa* sacrifice should be used at that sacrifice while those others should be used at the *Pūrnāmāsa* whose words, indicate the deities of that sacrifice and reason for this lies in the fact that the only useful purpose served by the Mantra consists in sanctifying certain sacrificial auxiliaries so that at any particular sacrifice only that much of the Mantra has to be used whose words have a sanctificatory bearing on the auxiliaries of that sacrifice (vide III-ii-2). The propriety of the use of only extracts from mantras is further explained under (II-i-13 to 29 and 12-3-29).

वचनादिति चेत् । १७ ।

17. *Objection* :—But on account of the direct injunction (the whole and not mere extracts should be used.—17.

COMMENTARY.

An objection is raised. The text distinctly says that the offering is to be made with the *Sūktāvāka* and as the name *Sūktāvāka* applies to the whole body of Mantras and not to mere extracts from them any use of such extracts would be contrary to the injunction.

प्रकरणाविभागात् उभेप्रतिकृत्स्नशब्दः । १८ ।

प्रकरणाविभागात् *Prakaraṇāvhibhāgāt*, as there would be not disjoining from the context. उभे *Uve*, both. प्रति *Prati*, to. कृत्स्नशब्दः *Kṛtsnashabdah*, the word 'whole.'

18. The word "whole" could apply to the two parts as both would appear in the same context.—18.

COMMENTARY.

One part of the *Sūktāvāka* is used at the *Darsā* Sacrifice and another part at the *Pūrnāmāsa* sacrifice and as the *Darsā* and *Pūrnāmāsa* together form one context we can certainly say that the whole of the *Sūktāvāka* has been used; even though the two parts of it have been used at two different times, yet it cannot be denied that the *whole* of it has been used at the single composite sacrifice named the *Darsā Pūrnāmāsa*.

The *Bhāṣya* has taken exception to the above exposition of the *Siddhānta*. Its objections are thus explained in the *Vārtika*. The Primary sacrifices are laid down with reference to a certain result, and not with reference to the *method*; consequently it is only with regard to the Result,—and not with regard to the *method*,—that they could be meant to be taken in combination (with one another). Because it is the *method* that is laid down with reference to the Primary sacrifices; as otherwise, if it were not so laid down, it could not perform an auxiliary to these sacrifices, and then if the *method* be taken as enjoined, then inasmuch as it would be wholly impossible for this *method* and the Primary Sacrifices to be enjoined with reference to each other,—as that would leave them wholly unconnected, the *method* could not but be taken as enjoined with reference to the Primary sacrifice. And inasmuch as these Primary Sacrifices or *Uddechyas*, i.e., those with reference to whom something is enjoined) no significance can be attached to their *combination*, which is denoted by the *Dvandva* compound (*Darsā-Pūrnāmāsābhyaṁ*). Consequently, the sentence laying down the *method* being

taken as complete with each one of those sacrifices, each of the Primary sacrifices must be accepted to be connected with the whole of the *method* and the performance also coming to be done accordingly, inasmuch as each of the six Primary Sacrifices constituting the *Darśa* and the *Pārnāmāsa*, performed at different points of time, would be complete in itself, the Recitation of the *Sūktāvaka* would be done but once, and would apply to all the rest. Thus, then, though the *Sūktāvaka* may not be repeated with each of the six Primary Sacrifices—the *Āgneya* and the rest like the *Prayaja*, yet the whole of it will have to be repeated once on the occasion of the *Darśa*, as well as once of that of the *Pārnāmāsa*. As otherwise, the *Prayaja* etc. also would have to be performed in parts; for which there would be no authority at all. Consequent, on account of the superior authority of direct Declaration (*Sūktāvakena*, etc.) We should set aside the Indications of the *Mantra* words; and take the *Sūktāvaka* (as applied to the *grass-bundle offering*) either in an indirect secondary sense, or as leading to certain imperceptible results, or as indicating, for the *offering*, other Deities (than those related to the *Darśa-Pārnāmāsa*.)

In view of the above considerations the Bâḥṣya puts forward the Siddhānta as follows:—

When extracts are made of the *Sūktāvaka* in accordance with the significations of its various parts, each of these extracts becomes a *Sūktāvaka* because there are many *Sūktāvakas*, specially as we find that the various mantras *Agniridam* etc., (constituting the *Sūktāvaka*, which are capable of indicating several Deities connected with different sacrifices, serving distinct purposes independently of one another, do not form a single sentence by being syntactically connected. Hence it must be admitted that there are many *Sūktāvakas* (contained in the *Sūktāvaka*) each of which is supplied with elliptical portions from that which precedes as also from that which follows it. For instance—(1) there is one *Sūktāvaka* beginning with the *mantra* *Idamdyâvâprthivi* etc., and ending with *agniridam* etc, (2) while there is another beginning with '*Idamdyâvâprthivi*, etc., and ending with *Somidam*, etc.

Thus then, we find that among these *Sūktāvakas*, which differ with each different deity, and which are amenable to the same procedure of recitation,—there are some that are recited as common to many. And hence whichever of these may be recited at the *offering of the grass-bundle*, the offering will have been done with the *Sūktāvaka* (as declared in the injunction, *Sūktāvakena Prastāram Prastarati*.)

The Vārtika however is not satisfied with this exposition of the Siddhānta. It says:—It must be admitted that though every one of the sentences is complete within itself, as regards its meaning,—yet, inasmuch as they are all enjoined with reference to the *Offering* (of the grass-bundle), all of them combined should be taken as forming a single sentence.

If each of them were a distinct sentence by itself then we would have the following anomalies: (1) each of them would have to be recited separately, because at the time of the performance the Deity is the principal factor; just as in the case of the *mantras* of the *Upasad*, *Dakṣiṇa* etc., and (2) inasmuch the singular number (in *Sāktāvākēna*) would be significant with reference to the *offering of the grass-bundle*, its requirements would be fulfilled by the recitation of any one of the sentences.

Thus, then, we conclude that in the *Darśa*, as well as in the *Pārnāmāsa*, sacrifices, the *sāktāvāka* to be recited is only that much which contains the words pointing out the Deities of each sacrifice,—such recitation being quite in keeping with law and reason.

Adhikaraṇa VII.—The “*Kamyayājyānuvākya* mantras belong to the *Kāmya* sacrifices only.”

लिङ्गक्रमसमाख्यानात् काम्ययुक्तं समाम्नानम् । १६ ।

लिङ्गक्रमसमाख्यानात् *Liṅgakramasamākhyānāt*, on account of the cumulative force of Indicative power, order of sequence and Name. काम्ययुक्तं *Kāmyayuktam*, in connection with the *Kāmya* sacrifices only. समाम्नानम् *Samamnānam*, the reciting.

19. “On account of the cumulative force of Indicative power, Order of sequence and Name, the reciting should be done in connection with the *Kāmya* sacrifices only.”—19.

COMMENTARY.

We find the *Kāmya* sacrifices (i.e., those performed with a view to certain desirable results)—*Aindrāgna* and the rest—laid down in a definite order of sequence; and we also find laid down, in the same order certain ‘*yajyāpuronuvākya*’ couplets, associated with the name ‘*Kāmya*’ and pertaining to the same deities (Indra, Agni etc.) as those of the *Kāmya* sacrifices.

And in regard to these there arises the question as to whether these couplets, from their indicative power, are to be employed, irrespective of

the order in which they are mentioned, in all the sacrifices that happen to be connected with those Deities, or they are to be employed only in the aforesaid *Kāmya* sacrifices, in the same order in which these latter are mentioned.

Pûrvapakṣa.—On the above question the *Pûrvapakṣa* is that—"The couplets, through their Indicative power, are to be employed in all the sacrifices that have those Deities."

The *Siddhānta* as embodied in the *sûtra* is that the use of the mantra is regulated not by its Indicative power alone but by Indicative power, Order of sequence and name and there is no doubt that on the strength of all these three the *mantras* in question are to be employed only in the *Kāmya* sacrifices and that too in the same order in which these latter are mentioned.

Adhikarāṇa VIII.—*The upasthana of the Agnîdhra priest should be done with those mantras that are found in the same context.*

अधिकारे च मन्त्रविधिः तदाक्षेषु शिष्टत्वात् । २० ।

अधिकारे *Adhikāre*, in connection with a certain sacrifice. च *Cha* also. चन्तविधिः *Mantravidhiḥ*, injunction of mantra to be employed. तदाक्षेषु *Tadākṣeṣu*, to those not appearing in the same context शिष्टत्वात् *Śiṣṭawât*, because both are enjoined.

20. "In regard to any sacrifice when a certain mantra is enjoined it applies also to the mantra appearing in the same context as this also is as much enjoined as the mantra appearing in the same context.—20.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭomâ* we find the direction that the *Agnîdhra* should be worshipped with the *Âgneya* mantra. The question arising as to whether it is the particular *Âgneya* mantra found in *Jyotiṣṭomâ* section that is to be used or that as well as any other *Âgneya* mantra,—the *Pûrvapakṣa* view is that the direction used the general term *Âgneya* and as every mantra is equally capable of being used at sacrifices the name should be taken as applying equally to all *Âgneya* mantras, irrespective of the context in which they may be found.

तदाख्यो वा प्रकरणोपपत्तिभ्याम् । २१ ।

तदाख्यो वा Tadākhyovā, those that are mentioned as belonging to the sacrifice named. प्रकरणोपपत्तिभ्यां Prakaraṇopapattibhyāṃ, on account of context and reasons.

21. "Only those mantras should be used that are spoken of as belonging to the sacrifice under treatment, on account of context and reasons."—21.

COMMENTARY.

The Siddhānta embodied in this sūtra is that only Āgneya mantras are to be used that are mentioned along with the Jyotiṣṭoma. Firstly, because on the ground of context the connection between the two is only natural; secondly, because there are other reasons also in support of this view. One of which is that when the upasthāna is mentioned in the section of Jyotiṣṭoma it is clearly meant that it helps in the Apūrva following from the Jyotiṣṭoma, which shows that the mantras chosen also should be those that are closely related to that same Jyotiṣṭoma.

Another reason put forward by the Bhāṣya is that the Pūrvapakṣa view involves a syntactical split. This is thus explained in the Vārtika:— In the sentence in question, the upasthāna is not laid down as due to the form of the Agnidhṛa himself; nor is it an independent action, leading to a certain desirable result, because no such result is mentioned in connection with it; hence it must be admitted that the upasthāna is performed with a view to help in the accomplishment of the Apūrva resulting from the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. And consequently the sentence in question comes to be taken as laying down a particular action in connection with the Jyotiṣṭoma. The injunction of this particular action could be possible only when there was a general action already enjoined; and then if the same sentence (āgnāyī etc.) were to lay down the connection of the Agneyi verses with the general as well as with the particular action, then there would be a syntactical split.

अनर्थश्चोपदेशः स्यात् असंबन्धात् फलवता नहि उपस्थानं
फलवत् । २२ ।

अनर्थकः Anarthak, useless. च Cha, also. उपदेशः Upadeśaḥ, injunction. स्यात् Syāt, would be. असंबन्धात् Asambandhāt, on account of non-connection. फलवता Phalavatā, with a fruitful action. न Na, not, हि Hi, because. उपस्थानं Upasthānaṃ, the action of upasthāna. फलवत् Phalavat, fruitful.

22. "The injunction would be wholly useless on account of non-connection with a fruitful action, specially as the upasthāna is not fruitful."—22.

COMMENTARY.

Another reason in support of the siddhānta is that the injunction of the Āgneya mantra as a means to the upasthāna would be wholly useless as it would have no connection with any desirable result, because as for the upasthāna itself it is not described as leading to any result and as for the result of the Jyotiṣṭoma there can be no connection with this as according to the Pūrvapakṣa view of the present case the employment of details is not to be governed by context.

सर्वेषाञ्चोपदिष्टत्वात् । २३ ।

सर्वेषां Sarveṣāṃ, of all. च Cha also. उपदिष्टत्वात् Upadiṣṭatwāt, enjoining.

20. "And also because all mantras are already enjoined.—20.

COMMENTARY.

It might be urged on behalf of the Pūrvapakṣa that if only the Āgneya mantra of the Jyotiṣṭoma context were to be used, then there would be no use for the other Āgneya mantras. But the answer to this is that the other Āgneya mantras are as a matter of fact already enjoined in relation to other fruitful actions.

Adhikaraṇa IX.—The Bhakṣānuvāk mantras are to be used in connection with the holding etc., in accordance with what is indicated by their words.

लिङ्गसमाख्यानाभ्यां भक्षार्थता अनुवाकस्य । २४ ।

लिङ्गसमाख्यानाभ्यां Liṅgasamākhyānābhyāṃ, on account of indication and name. भक्षार्थता Bhakṣārthatā, employed in the eating. अनुवाकस्य Anuvākasya, of the anuvāka.

24. On account of its indicative power and name the Anuvāka must be employed in the eating.—24.

COMMENTARY.

We find the Bhakṣa mantra laid down as follows: 'Bhakṣe hi mā viṣa.....; ēhi vaso purovaso..... bāhubhyāṃ saghyāsam, nrchaksantrā dēva.....avakhyēsam, hinva mē.....mā mē māvitrṣaḥ mandrābhībhuṭiḥ kētuḥ.....trpyatu.....gāyatrachehhandasaḥ Indrapītasya bhakṣhayāmi.' With regard to the whole of this Anuvāka there arises the question as to whether the whole of it used in connection with the eating or the several parts of it are to be used in connection with the subsidiary actions of holding,

seeing and proper digesting as may be found to be indicated by the words of the several sentences composing the Anuvāka.

On the above question we have the following Pūrvapakṣa embodied in sūtra 24 as follows:—

Inasmuch as it is the *Eating* alone that is enjoined,—as the word 'bhakṣayāmi' in the Anuvāka itself distinctly indicates that *Eating*,—as the whole of the Anuvāka, being held between the two words bhakṣê and 'bhakṣayāmi' cannot possibly pertain to anything else,—and, lastly, as, in accordance with the sūtra IX-i-37, the *Holding* etc., also being mere concomitants of the principal action of *Eating*, the whole Anuvāka is capable of being taken as a single sentence syntactically connected,—the Anuvāka must be taken as to be used, in its complete form, in connection with the *Eating* specially as the entire anuvāka is called the *Bhakṣanuvāka*.

तस्य रूपोपदेशान्यां अपकर्षार्थस्य चोदितत्वात् । २५ ।

तस्य Tasya, of it. रूपोपदेशान्यां Rūpopadeśābhyām, on account of the peculiar form and injunction. अपकर्षः Apakarṣa, disjunction. अर्थस्य Arthasya, of the actions. चोदितत्वात् choditātvāt, on account of being laid down.

25. "The mantra is to be dissociated (from the eating) because of the peculiar form of the mantras and also because of the direction, specially as the subsidiary actions (of holding etc.) is also enjoined."—25.

COMMENTARY.

The Siddhānta embodied in the sūtra is as follows:—

As a matter of fact it is found that certain words of the mantras are indicative of the subsidiary action of holding etc. Secondly, these subsidiary actions are also enjoined and as such stand in need of being connected with some mantra. From these two facts it is much more reasonable to associate the mantras with the actions indicated by their component words than to connect the whole with the single action of eating.

Adhikaraṇa X.—From the word 'mandra' up to
'bhakṣayāmi' it is one mantra.

गुणोविधानात् मन्द्रादिरेकमन्त्रः स्यात् तयोरेकार्थसंयोगात् । २६ ।

गुणोविधानात् Guṇavidhānāt, on account of mentioning a subsidiary detail. मन्द्रादिः Mandrādih, the sentence beginning with mandra. एकमन्त्रः Ekamantrah,

one mantra. स्वात् Syāt, should be. तयोः Tayoḥ, of the two. एकार्थसंयोगात् Ekārthasamyogāt, on account of expressing a single fact.

26. "The portion beginning with 'mandra' is to be taken as a single mantra, because it speaks of one subsidiary detail; specially as the two sentences therein contained jointly express a single fact—26.

COMMENTARY.

In the aforesaid '*Bhakṣaṇādvaka*' we find the sentence *mandrābhi-bhūtiḥ.....bhakṣayāmi* and in connection with this, there arise the question as to whether the sentence, from the beginning down to '*trpyatu*' forms one *mantra*, and that beginning with '*vasumat*' down to the end forms another, or the two together form a single *mantrā*.

On this we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*.

Inasmuch as, like *Holding* etc., in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, the single fact of *satisfaction* is denoted by the sentence ending with '*trpyatu*' this must be taken as a distinct *mantra*.

SIDDHANTA.

To this we make the following reply: That Action alone can form the object of *Indication by mantras*, which requires a distinct effort for its accomplishment,—and not these that merely follow on the wake of other actions. That is to say, in the case of the *Holding* etc. we find that unless one performs these other actions, he cannot accomplish the *Eating*; and hence it was only right for the performer, as well as for the scripture, to make a distinct effort (towards its performance and Indication respectively). In the case in question, however, we find that for the *satisfaction* (of Hunger) there is no other effort possible than what is involved in *Eating*; and as such no useful purpose could be served by its indication (by the mantra). Consequently, we can explain the Imperative (in *trpyatu*), either as denoting a *request*; or as having the force of the *Present*; and thereby the two sentences would be connected syntactically,—indicating 'jointly' the single act of *Eating as qualified by satisfaction*,—thus forming a single *mantra*.

Adhikaraṇa XI.—The mantras beginning with the word 'Indra pītasya are employed by modification to all Eating.

लिङ्गविशेषनिर्देशात् समानविधानेनैन्द्राणामर्मत्रत्वम् । २७ ।

लिङ्गविशेषनिर्देशात् Liṅgaviśeṣanirdeśāt, as the mantra distinctly indicates a particular thing. समानविधानेषु Samānavidhāneṣu, out of a number of those that

are enjoined by the same injunction. अनैन्द्रपां Anaindrāpām, those not dedicated to Indra. अमन्त्रत्वम् Amantra twam, without any mantra.

24. "Inasmuch as the mantra indicates the particular 'Eating' out of a number in those that are all enjoined by the same Injunction,—the 'Eating' of the soma other than that dedicated to Indra is to be done without any mantra"—24.

COMMENTARY.

[In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there are several cups of soma dedicated to a number of Deities, Indra and the rest. The remnants of these offerings are to be *eaten*, and the *mantra* laid down in connection with this eating is the *Bhakṣānuvāka* under consideration. And there now arises the question as to whether the *mantra* is to be repeated with the eating of every one of the remnants, or of that alone which has been dedicated to Indra, and those of others are to be done without any *mantras*.]

Inasmuch as the word *Indrapitasya* (in the *mantra*) is co-extensive with the *soma* (that is offered to Indra), as there are no words in the *mantra* indicative of those not dedicated to Indra, and lastly, as there can be no modifications in *mantras* connected with the Primary Actions, (and every one of the *eatings* is a distinct Primary by itself), it would appear that the *eating* of the *soma* dedicated to other Deities is to be done without *mantras*.

As against the above we have the following Pūrvapakṣe.

यथादेवतंवा तत्प्रकृतित्वं हि दर्शयति । २८ ।

यथादेवतंवा Yathādevatamvā, or in accordance with the deity. तत्प्रकृतित्वं Tat-prakṛititvam, having that for its archetype. हि Hi, because. दर्शयति Darśayati, is shown.

28. "The mantra will have to be applied in accordance with the Deity (to whom the offering has been made); because the offerings to the other Deity are shown to have their archetype in the offering made to Indra"—28.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the *eating* of the soma dedicated to other Deities than Indra, the *mantra* is to be repeated with the necessary modifications; because the offerings to the other Deities are mere ectypes of the offerings to Indra. Though all the offerings are similar actions,

yet inasmuch as they are distinct actions, some would be mere offshoots of the other. And here we find that the offering of the *Dhruvasoma* to Indra forms the archetype of the other offerings, as is clearly shown by the mantra for the holding of the soma.

It is interesting to note that the statement of Siddhânta of this Adhikarâṇa is postponed to the end of the Pada where sūtra 43 lays down the final Siddhânta derived from the discussions embodied in sutras 27 to 42.

Adhikarâṇa XII.—Indra also should be mentioned in connection with the *Punarvinîta soma*.

पुनरम्भिनीतेषु सर्वेषामुपलक्षणं द्विशेषत्वात् । २६ ।

पुनरम्भिनीतेषु *Punarambhiniṭeṣu*, in connection with *Punarambhiniṭa* offerings, सर्वेषां *Sarveṣāṃ*, of all. उपलक्षणं *Upalakṣaṇaṃ*, mention. द्विशेषत्वात् *Dviśeṣatwât*, because it contains the remnants of both.

29. "In connection with the *Punarabhynîta*, there should be a mention of all Deities, because it contains the remnants of both.—29.

COMMENTARY.

While the foregoing Adhikarâṇa still rests in the *Pârvapakṣa*, and the Siddhânta is not finally stated and established, till the end of the Pada, we take for granted, for the time being, the propriety of having modifications, and then proceed to consider under what circumstances the modifications, if allowable, would be possible.

When the *soma* contained in certain vessels has been offered and poured out, even while there may be some remnants left in them, more *soma* is poured into the same vessels (for other offerings); and the *soma* thus poured is called the *Punarabhyunnîta soma*. How this character belongs to that *soma* and how it forms the object of the discussions relating to *modifications*, is thus shown :—There are ten vessels; four of these belong to the *Brahmâ*, etc., who make the middle offerings and each of these four is used twice in the offerings of *Vaṣatkâra* and the *Amvaṣatkâra* of the Hotṛpriest; while the *Huntraka* vessels (that is the vessels belonging to the Hotṛ) are used only once in the offering of the *Vaṣatkâra*, in all these the Deity is Indra; and while these vessels still contain remnants of the previously offered *soma*, more *soma* is poured into them and offered to other Deities;—all this is shown by

the Directions, in connection with the offerings to many Deities that are made by the priests in connection with the *Second Homa*,—implied in the *Yâgyâ mantra* connected with those offerings;—such, for instance as *maitravaruno mitravarunau mitram vayam harmatī etc, etc*;—and when, after all these offerings have been made, the vessels are brought out for the purpose of the post-sacrificial *eating*, then they are found to contain two remnants,—the former, the remnants of the first offering to Indra, and the latter, that of the offering to *Mitravaruna*. And then, when the time comes for the mention of the Deities (in course of the *mantras* to be recited in connection with the *eating* of these remnants) there arises a doubt as to whether there should be a mention of *Indra*, whose connection with the vessel as its Deity has been passed over, as also of *Maitravaruna*, the *mantra* being read *Indra mitravaruna pitasya*, etc.,—or that the latter ones only are to be mentioned (the *mantra*, in this case, being read as '*Mitravaruna pitasya*, etc.).

This question turns upon another question, as to whether the advent of the other Deity wholly sets aside the connection with the previous Deity, or not. If it does set it aside, then *Maitravaruna*, etc; alone should be mentioned; while if it does not set it aside, then there should be a mention of *Indra* also.

On this question we begin with the statement of the *Siddhânta* (in the present *sūtra* 29), the sense of which is that all the Deities should be mentioned, because of the vessel containing the remnants of both (offering).

And on this *Siddhânta*, we have the following *Pûrvapakṣa*.

अपनयाद्वा पूर्वस्य अनुपलक्षणम् । ३० ।

अपनयाद्वा *Apnayâdvâ*, on account of being set aside. पूर्वस्य *Pûrvasya*, of the previous deity. अनुपलक्षणं *Anupalakṣaṇam*, non-mention.

30. "Inasmuch as it has been set aside, there should be no mention of the previous Deity."—30.

COMMENTARY.

"Inasmuch as there are various pourings and outpourings of the *soma*, at the time that the latter offerings are made, and there is an advent of another Deity, the previous Deity is set aside from the substance (*soma*); and inasmuch as there was, in the original offerings, no mention of the Deity removed from it, there should not be any mention of such removed Deity in the subsequent offerings."

To this pûrvapakṣa we make the following reply :

अग्रहणाद्वा अनपायः स्यात् । ३१ ।

अग्रहणाद्वा Agrahanâdvâ, on account of their being no actual taking up. अनपायः Anapâyah, there can be no setting aside. स्यात् Syât, would be.

31. "Inasmuch as there is no actual taking up (of the remnant of the former offering, by the latter Deity) there could not be a setting aside (of the previous Deity)."—31.

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, the connection of the Deity is established by means of scriptures alone and at the time that the substance is held in the hand for being offered, it begins to belong to the Deity, only in accordance with the scriptural Injunction; and that with which it begins is that with which it ends. In the case in question, we find that the directions with regard to the "*Punarabhyannita*" distinctly show that the substance to be offered to the other Deities is to be held in the vessels which contain some remnants of the *soma* previously offered to Indra; and the presence of this remnant is meant only as a characteristic of the vessels (in which the subsequent offering is to be held). Thus then, inasmuch as, at the time of the holding of the latter offering, the remnant of the previous offering is not recognised as belonging to the latter Deities,—at the time of the actual offering also the offering being only of that substance which has been held (or taken up) for offering, even though the Remnant of the previous offering lies in close proximity to that substance; yet, inasmuch as it is not included in the words conveying the offering, it does not belong to the latter Deity. Nor, at the time, are there any other words conveying the gift of that remnant (to that Deity), for the simple reason that there is no Injunction to that effect. Nor, too, is that remnant even distinctly touched by words conveying other gift to that Deity;—because the gifts are conveyed by means of particular words, at the time that the various offerings are quite separate from one another. And, as a matter of fact, no further words are used at the actual offering; for the simple reason that no such words are necessary in connection with the gift that has already been conveyed by means of words. And then again, a single substance cannot be offered more than once. Hence it is that there is no use of words conveying the gift, at the time that the actual offering is made.

And hence, at the time of the *Eating*, as there will be left in the vessel a portion of this remnant also, whose connection with the previous deity has not been set aside,—it would be absolutely necessary to make a mention of that previous duty (in the *Mantra* that is recited).

Adhikaraṇa XIII.—In the eating of the Pātñivata Indra and other Deities should not be mentioned.

पालिवते तु पूर्ववत् । ३२ ।

पालिवते Pātñivate, in the case of the Patñivata. तु Tu, really. पूर्ववत् Pūrvavat, as before.

32. “In the case of the Patñivata it should certainly be as in the preceding case.”—32.

COMMENTARY

We proceed to consider exceptions to the general rule arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

As a matter of fact, we find that the remnants of the offerings to the pair of Deities are thrown into the *Adityasthālī*, and from that they are again transferred to the *Āgrayanasthālī*, and subsequent to this, we have the declaration of the holding of the *Patñivata* in the sentence ‘Upāṅsa—*Patrena Pātñivatamāgrayāpt grhṇati*.

And when the *eating* of remnant of this *Patñivata* offering comes to be done, there arises the question as to whether the deities other than *Patñivata* should be mentioned in the *mantra* recited, or not. And on this we have the

PŪRVAPAKSA.

That they should be mentioned—the *mantra* being read as *Indra-vayupatñivatpitasya etc.*

ग्रहणाद्वा अपनीतं स्यात् । ३३ ।

ग्रहणात् Grahṇāt, on account of being taken up. वा Vā, but. अपनीतं Apanītam, removed. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

33. “Inasmuch as the remnants is taken up (by the subsequent deity) the connection of the previous deity should be set aside.”—33.

COMMENTARY.

The present case is by no means similar to that dealt with in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. Because at the time of the holding of the offering to *Patñivat*, the proximity of the other Deity is actually set aside; and the offering to *Patñivat* is laid down as to be conveyed together with the remnants of the previous offerings.



Adhikarāṇa XIV.—At the Eating of the remnant of the *Patnivat* offering there should be no mention of *Tvaṣṭri*.

त्वष्टारन्तु उपलक्षयेत् पानात् । ३४ ।

त्वष्टार' *Tvaṣṭāram*, the deity *tvaṣṭri*. तु *Tu*, really. उपलक्षयेत् *Upalaksayeta*, should mention. पानात् *Pânât*, on account of the drinking.

34. "Tvaṣṭri should be mentioned because of the drinking."—34.

COMMENTARY.

[In connection with the *Patnivat* offering, we have the *Mantra*, 'Āgnâi patnivan, Sajârdevena Tvaṣṭrâ Somam Piva, and with regard to this, there arises the question as to whether *Tvaṣṭi* should be mentioned at the eating or not.]

On this question we have the following *Pûrvapakṣa*.

Inasmuch as in connection with the *Patnivat* offering, *Tvaṣṭr* is spoken of as 'Drinking the Soma' in the company of *Patnivat*, he also must be regarded as the Deity of that offering, as indicated by the words of the *Mantra*.

अतुल्यत्वात् तु नैवं स्यात् । ३५ ।

अतुल्यत्वात् *Atulyatvât*, on account of inequality. तु *Tu*, really. नैवं *Naivam*, not so. स्यात् *Syât*, would be.

35. Such should not be the case because of inequality.—35.

COMMENTARY.

Tvaṣṭr should not be mentioned ; because between the *Mantra* and the *Direct Injunction*, there is a vast difference of authoritative strength (this is one 'inequality') ; and then again there is a difference in the characters of *Tvaṣṭri* and *Patnivat* as nominatives to the action of *Drinking* ; as what the *Mantra* denotes is the mere companionship (of *Tvaṣṭr*) (this is another 'inequality').

Thus it must be admitted that the *Mantra* does not indicate the fact of *Tvaṣṭri* being the Deity (of the *Patnivat* offering) ; and as such there should be no mention of him (at the eating of the remnant of that offering).

Adhikaraṇa XV.—At the eating of the remnant of the Patnivat offering there should be no mention of the Thirty and three deities.

त्रिंशच्च परार्थत्वात् । ३६ ।

त्रिंशत् Trimsat, the thirty. च Cha, also. परार्थत्वात् Parārthatwât, as it serves another purpose.

36. "So also the thirty (and three), as the Mantra serves another purpose."—36.

COMMENTARY.

This Adhikaraṇa simply deals with the applicability of the conclusion of the foregoing Adhikaraṇa to another case.

In connection with the same Patnivat, we find another Mantra "Aibhiḥ agne saratham yahyarvâk nânâdratham vâ vibhavo hyaśvâḥ pātñivatastrimhatastrimścha devânauṣvadhāmāvaha mādayasva; and therea rises the question as to whether at the eating of the Remnant of the Patnivata offering, there should be a mention of the 'Thirty and Three' Deities spoken of in this mantra or not.

And on this question we have the following Pūrvapakṣa.

"Inasmuch as there are several points in which the present case differs from that dealt with the foregoing Adhikaraṇa, the conclusion thereof is, for this reason, not applicable to the present case. These points of difference are the following :—

(1) The same mantra that indicates Agni to be the Deity, also indicates the fact of Agni being the Distributer of the Drink to the Thirty and Three Gods, who are spoken of as the partakers of that Drink; and hence the fact of these latter also being the principal Deities is shown by the mantra itself, which prevents Agni in quite a secondary position (of that of Distributer or Attendant at meals).

(2) In the case of the mantra treated of in the previous Adhikaraṇa, we found that it denoted mere companionship, and hence Śaṣṭr not being found to be mentioned on terms of equality, was rejected from the deific position. The case is reversed in the mantra now under consideration, as in this it is Agni that is spoken of as subordinate; and hence the former law cannot apply to the present case.

(3) All that the Injunction contained in the word with the nominal affix (Patnivan) denotes is that the deific character in connection with the

Action in question consists in the fact of a certain Deity being *Patnivan*, (having a wife); and this qualification is found to be as concomitant with *Agni* in the mantra *Agndi Patnivan* as with the thirty and three gods, who are also spoken of in the same *mantra* as having wives, in the sentence *Patnīvatastrīmśatastrīmścha devān*.

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta* embodied in the *sūtra*.

There should be no mention of Thirty and Three gods at the eating of the *Patnivat Remnant*. Because in all cases the functioning of the *mantra* is controlled by what is directly enjoined; consequently, as in the case of *Traṣṭr* so in the present case also, the mention of the Thirty and Three gods (in the *mantra*) must be taken as contributing to the praise of *Agni*. That is to say, inasmuch as the sole business of the *mantra* lies in recalling to mind what has been previously enjoined (in the Injunction (*patnivalam grhnati*), it could not, in any case, serve the purpose of indicating either the fact of *Agni* being the *Distributor*, or of the Thirty and Three gods being the partakers, of the Drink, both of these facts not having been previously enjoined.

Adhikarāṇa XVI.—At the 'eating' there should be no mention of the Anuvasatkār deity.

वषट्कारश्च कर्तृवत् । ३७ ।

वषट्कारश्च *Vaṣaṭkāraścha*, the *Vaṣatkāra* also. कर्तृवत् *Kartṛivat*, like the agent.

37. "The *Vaṣatkāra* also, like the Agent, (should not be mentioned)".—37.

COMMENTARY.

[There is an *Anuvasatkāra* mentioned in the sentence '*Somasyagre vihityanuvasatkaroṣi*,' and in connection with this there arises the question as to whether this *Anuvasatkāra* should be mentioned or not, at the time of the *Eating*.]

On this we have the following *Pūrvapukṣa*.

'Inasmuch as there is no doubt as to the deific character of the *Anuvasatkāra* being expressed by the said Injunction, as well as by the words of the *mantra*, there must be a mention of this.'

SIDDHĀNTA.

To the above we make the following reply: Just as the Drinker appearing subsequently could not make a mention of the previous

Drinker, who is not connected with the Primary sacrifice, so in the same manner, there could be no mention of the *Vasatkara* in question. Because this latter is not mentioned in the Primary sacrifice; and even when it does appear, it does not appear as doing anything for that sacrifice. Consequently there should be no mention of this.

Adhikaraṇa XVII.—The remnants of offerings other than the one to Indra should be eaten without mantras.

छन्दःप्रतिषेधस्तु सर्वगामित्वात् । ३८ ।

छन्दःप्रतिषेधः Chhandahpratiśedhaḥ, it is a mere preclusion of the metre. तु Tu, really. सर्वगामित्वात् Sarvagāmitvāt, on account of pertaining to all.

38. “As the soma belongs equally to all the Deities (there can be no relationship of the Archetype and Ectype among the various offering); (and as for the declaration of the change into the Anuṣṭup metre) is a mere preclusion of the use of the preceding metre.”—38.

COMMENTARY.

We now proceed to offer our reply to the opponent's arguments contained in *sūtra* (28).

There should not be any modifications in the *mantras*, in accordance with the Deity, the remnant of whose offering is to be eaten; the remnants of the offerings to other deities than Indra should be eaten without *mantras*. Because the whole action of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* forms a single context; and as such an action could not be its own *archetype* (*Prakṛti*) and *ectype* (*vikṛiti*).

That is to say, if each of the several repetitions of the same action of offering to the various Deities (which repetitions constitute the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice) were a distinct action by itself, then each would have been related as the *archetype* and *ectypes* of another. As a matter of fact, however, they are not so many distinct actions; for neither the *soma* nor any accessory details are laid down with reference to these individual offerings; as the way in which one of these takes up the *soma* etc. is exactly the same in which they are taken up by the rest.

Thus then, the *soma* is equally connected, by injunction, with all the Deities; and thus none of the offerings could be taken as a mere *ectype* of the other.

It has been argued above (under *sūtra* 28) that, inasmuch as we have an injunction as to changing the metre of the original into the *Anuṣṭup*, the offering in connection with which this change is laid down is an ectype of the former. But the injunction of the change could very well be applicable, even when the *Soma* is equally applicable to all Deities, as in that case it could be explained as a qualified injunction of a particular *Metre* in the place of the *Jagati* metre which would have been used, on account of the offering falling in the Third *Savana*. Or it may be that, inasmuch as the several *Samasthas* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* are mere ectypes, it is only natural that there should be modifications in connection with these ; but that does not serve the purpose of "showing" that the offerings to the other Deities are mere ectypes of the offerings to Indra (as held by *Sūtra* 28).

Adhikarāṇa XVIII.—The "Eating" of the remnant of the Indra-Agni offering is to be done without mantras.

ऐन्द्राग्ने तु लिङ्गभावात् स्यात् । ३९ ।

ऐन्द्राग्ने Aindrāgne, in the case of the offering to Indra-Agni. तु Tu, really. लिङ्गभावात् Liṅgabhāvāt, on account of the presence of indicative force. स्यात् Syāt, would be.

39. "In the case of the offering to Indra-Agni the mantras should be used as there is in the mantra a word with the necessary indicative force."—39.

COMMENTARY.

The question dealt with here is whether or not the mantra *Indrapitasya* etc., is to be used in the case of the remnant of offerings made to Indra in conjunction with some other Deity, Agni, for instance.

The *Pārvaṇapākṣa* embodied in *sūtra* 39 is as follows :—

In the case of the Indra-Agni offering, inasmuch as both Indra and Agni would drink the *soma* offered, we could very well assert that half of it had been drunk by Indra, and half by Agni. And as the character of 'being drunk by Indra' does not exactly exist in the Remnant that is before us (at the time of *Eating*), we must take the word '*Indrapitasya*' (in the *Mantrā*) as applying to it, through that portion of it which has been poured in libation, and there is no such limit to this as that is only when so much has been drunk of that it can be called by the name.

Thus then, inasmuch as the distinguishing property expressed in the word '*Indrapitasya*' found to exist in the *Indra-Agni* offering, the remnant of this latter also is to be eaten with the *mantra* (*Indrapitasya*, etc.)"

एकस्मिन् वा देवतान्तरात् विभागवत् । ४० ।

एकस्मिन् Ekasmin, to all. वा Vā, really. देवतान्तरात् Devatāntarāt, because of its being a distinct deity. विभागवत् Bibhāgavat, just as in the case of quartering.

40. "The Mantra should apply to that of which there is a single Deity (*Indra*); because (*Indra-Agni* is) a distinct Deity (from *Indra*); just as in the case of the quartering (of the cake.)—40.

The *Indra-Agni* offering would certainly have been included in the word '*Indrapita*,' if the distinguishing feature, expressed by the word, had consisted in the functioning of the Deities towards actual *drinking* of the *soma*. But as a matter of fact, our Deities do not drink; as all that they do, in the case of an offering being made to them, is that they serve as the Recipients of the conveyance of the gift. And at the time that the gift is conveyed to a joint Deity, there cannot be a mention of any *one* of them singly: as like the nominal affix (in *Agneyam*) the compound also (in *Indra-Agni*) would not be possible in case the factors compounded depended upon something else. Consequently, just as in the case of the quartering of the *Agneya* Cake the quartering does not pertain to the cake dedicated to *Indra-Agni* jointly, so in the case in question also, inasmuch as the word '*Indrapitasya*' denotes the fact of *Indra* alone being the Deity, it could not apply to the offering that is made to both (*Indra* and *Agni*) conjointly, and as such the *Mantra* in question cannot be applied to this latter offering.

Adhikaraṇa XIX.—The Mantras beginning with the word '*Gayatra-chandasah*' are to be used in connection with the offering in which several metres are used.

छन्दश्च देवतावत् । ४१ ।

41. "The Metre is like the Deity."—41.

COMMENTARY.

The present *Adhikaraṇa* deals with an exception to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.



सर्वेषां Sarveṣām, of all. वा Vâ, certainly. एकमन्त्राय Ekamantryam, connected with one mantra. ऐतिशायनस्य Aitiśāyanasya, according to Aitiśāyana. भक्तिपानत्वात् Bhaktipānatvât, on account of the contingency that drinking will have to be taken

in its secondary sense. सयनाधिकारो Savanādhikaro, pertaining to the Savana. हि Hi, because.

43. “ One and the same mantra belongs to (the eating of) all (the offering) as held by *Aitiśayana* ; because the word ‘ *Indrapita* ’ indicates the savana ; as otherwise, the drinking, (as pertaining to the Remnant) will have to be taken in its secondary figurative sense.”—43.

COMMENTARY.

The word ‘ *Indrapitāśya* ’ is to be taken, not as qualifying ‘ *samasya* ’ but as qualifying the *Prātaḥsavana* ’ (Morning libation), and as such applying to every one of the offerings connected with that savana. Nor is the word ‘ *Prātaḥsavana* ’ co-extensive with *Soma* ; as it is the name of a certain part of the sacrifice (*Jyotiṣṭoma*). If then the word meant the ‘ soma connected with the *Prātaḥsavana*, ’ then we should have had the word ‘ *Prātaḥsavaniyasya* ’ (and not *Pratahsavanasya*.) Thus then the word ‘ *Pratahsavanasya* ’ being taken as co-extensive with ‘ *Indrapitāśya*, ’ the genitive in these two words is due to their differentiation from all connection with *Soma* ; and that in ‘ *somasya* ’ being non-coextensive, is based upon the non-differentiation (from the *soma*).

Thus then, on account of the indication of another word (*savanasya*) and on account of the fact of all the offerings having the same connections and occurring in the same context, the *mantra* should be used in connection with everyone of them.

We conclude thus for the simple reason that, otherwise, the *soma-remnant* (if connected with *Indrapita*) would have to be taken in its secondary figurative meaning. That is to say, the whole quantity of *soma* conveyed, by means of words, as gift to Indra, would be the direct or principal and *Indrapita* ; and the portion of it left behind in the vessels after the offering has been actually poured into the fire, would be spoken of as *Indrapita* only figuratively. And certainly this would be highly objectionable.

Consequently, inasmuch as all the *soma offering* are connected with the *Indrapitasavana*, it is established that the eating of the remnant of every one of them should be done with the mantra ‘ *Indrapitāśya* etc.’

Thus ends the *second* Pada of Adhyaya III.

THIRD ADHYĀYA.

THIRD PADA.

Adhikarana I.—The loudness etc. pertain to the entire veda.

श्रुतेरजाताधिकारः स्यात् । १ ।

श्रुतेः Śruteḥ, on account of direct declaration. अजाताधिकारः Ajâtâdhikâraḥ, pertaining to the community. स्यात् Syât, should be.

1. "On account of the direct declaration the properties should pertain to the community."—1.

COMMENTARY.

Having dealt with the applicability of *mantras* based on their indicative power, we now proceed to take that based upon syntactical connection.

The sentences taken up for consideration are 'uchchairichḥ kriyate (the Rik is recited loudly) etc, and also Tadyadi ṛkta ulvanamkriyati Gârhapatyam paretya bhûti svâheti juhinyât (if we should make a mistake in the Rk. he should offer a libation into the gârhapatya fire with the mantra bhuh svâhâ) and so forth.

The question now is this : In the former sentence which lays down the qualifications of loudness etc. with reference to the Rk. etc. as also in the latter sentence which lays down the Homa into the three Fires with the three *vyâhrtis*,—should we, on the strength of the fact of its being directly mentioned as independent of anything else, take the word 'Rk.' in the sense of *verse* as explained in *Sâtra* II-I 35 ? Or should we take it as denoting the whole of the *Ṛgveda* consisting of the entire set of *mantras* and *Brahmanas* ?

On this question, then, we have the following *Pûrvapakṣa*.

In accordance with the arguments advanced under the *Pûrvapakṣa* of *Sâtra* I-iv-29 ; it must be admitted, on the strength of the direct Declaration of the object of Injunction, that the properties pertain to the communities of the Rk. etc. (i.e., to the verse etc. and not to the *Ṛgveda* etc.).

वेदो वा प्रायदर्शनात् । २ ।

वेदो वा Vedovâ, it should pertain to the Veda. प्रायदर्शनात् Prâyadarśanât, because of the fact of the words occurring in a context pervaded by the idea of the Veda.

2. "It should pertain to the whole Veda, because of the fact of the words occurring in a context pervaded by the idea of the Veda."—2.

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact we find the sentences under consideration in a context that begins with the speaking of the entire Veda so that there is no reason why the word should be taken in its restricted sense ; and it is only natural the words *Rk*. etc. should be taken as indicating the entire Veda.

लिङ्गाच्च । ३ ।

3. Because of indicative words.—3.

COMMENTARY.

There are many other texts also which show that the words '*Rk*' etc. stand for the entire Vedas. For instance, in the sentence '*Rgbhih prâtardivi deva iyate, yajurvedena tiṣṭhati madhye'lnah, sâmarêdenâstamayê mâtiriyate Vedairae'nyaistribhirêti Sâryah* ;—we find the three last feet, all speak of the Vedas, and hence we are led to take the word '*Rk*' (in *Rgbhih*) as indicating the *Rgvêda* ; specially as the last feet speaks of '*Vedam*' in the plural (which could not be if only two Vedas, the *Sâma* and the *Yajus*, were meant), which distinctly shows that the word '*Rk*' indicates the whole of the *Rgvêda-Mantras* as well as *Brâhmanas*.

धर्मोपदेशाच्च नहि द्रव्येण सम्बन्धः । ४ ।

धर्मोपदेशाच्च Dharmopadesâchcha, on account of injunction of qualification. नहि Nahi, not, द्रव्येण Dravyeṇa, with the substance. सम्बन्धः Sambandhah, connection.

4. "On of account injunction of qualification it could have no connection with the substance."—4.

COMMENTARY.

If the injunctions were taken as laying down the qualifications of the *Rk* verse, etc., then, inasmuch as the sentence '*Richyadhyâdham Sâma geyati*' points to the fact of the *Soma* never being separate from the *Rv*, the qualification of the former would be included in that of the latter ; and as such the further injunction '*Uchchahi Sâma* would be wholly redundant.

Because it is not possible for one to sing the *Sāma* based upon a *Rk* in any other way, while he is reciting the *Rk* itself *loudly*.

If, however, we take the qualifications as laid down for the *Vedas*, both injunctions become quite justified, inasmuch as what is enjoined by the *Sāmaveda* is wholly different from that which is enjoined by the *Rgvēda*.

For some reason, not given, the *Vārtika* puts this *Sūtra* at the end of the *Adhikarāṇa* after *Sūtra* 8.

त्रयीविद्याख्या च तद्विदि । ५ ।

तस्य विद्याख्या *Trayīvidyākhyât*, the title '*Tryi Vidyâ*.' च *Oba*, also. तद्विदि *Tadvidi*, to one who knows them.

5. "The title *Trayīvidyâ* is applied to one who knows the three *Vedas*."—5.

COMMENTARY

The *Rk*, *Sāma* and *Yajus* are known as '*Trayī*'; and the word '*Trayīvidyâ*' is capable of being explained only as '*Trayī Vidyâ asya*.' This word is found to be applied, in usage, to one who has read the three *Vedas*, and not to one who has only read the *Rk* *verse*, the *Sāma*-song and the *Yajus*; because the name is never applied to the '*Sāmavedis*', even though in knowing the *Sāma Veda* he knows the three—viz: *Rk* *verses*, *Sāmas*, as well as certain *Yajus*. Consequently it follows that in the word '*Trayīvidyâ*' the word '*trayī*' is used in the sense of the *Three Vedas*; and hence it must be admitted that the words '*Rk*' '*Sāma*,' and '*Yajus*' which are spoken of in lexicons as co-extensive with the word '*trayī*', denote the *Vedas* themselves, and thus too we find that the words '*Rk*' *etc.*, are applied to the *Vedas*.

व्यतिक्रमे यथाश्रुतीतिचेत् । ६ ।

व्यतिक्रमे *Vyatirkame*, in case of transference. यथाश्रुति *Yathāśruti*, in accordance with the direct signification. इति चेत् *Iti chet*, if this be urged.

6. "In a case where there is transference, the injunction will have to be taken in its direct signification."
—6.

COMMENTARY.

This is a reference to a previous objection (the sense whereof is this): In a case where a *Rk* *verse* will be found in the *Yajurveda*, it will have to be sung *slowly*, as occurring in the *Yajurveda*, according to the *Siddhānta*, this however is not the case; while according to us,

being a *Rk* verse, in whichsoever *Veda* it might appear it will have been quite reasonably sung loudly, in keeping with the direct signification of the Injunction.

न सर्वस्मिन्निवेशात् । ७ ।

न Na, not. सर्वस्मिन् Sarvasmin, to the whole. निवेशात् Niveśāt, on account of belonging.

7. "Reply : No ; because the qualification belongs to the whole."—7.

COMMENTARY.

The mere fact of being found in the text of a *Veda* does not make a sentence liable to be called by the name of that *Veda*. The fact is that, that which is enjoined by one *Veda*, is always done in accordance with that *Veda* ; consequently a *mantra* would be called by the name of that *Veda* in which it may be enjoined. If it should be found to have been enjoined in both *Vedas* (the *Yajus* and *Rk*), then inasmuch as the law laid down in *Sūtra* III-iii-10 would not apply to the case, we could not but take the two (qualifications of *loudness* and *slowness*) as optional alternatives for that *Mantra*.

वेदसंयोगान्न प्रकरणेन बाध्येत । ८ ।

वेदसंयोगात् Vedasanyogāt, on account of being connected with *Veda*. न Na, not. प्रकरणेन Prakaraṇena, by the context. बाध्येत Vādhyaeta, could be set aside.

8. "Because of being connected (syntactically) with '*veda*' the indication (by the words '*Rk*' etc., of the *Rigveda* etc.,) could not be set aside by the context."—8.

COMMENTARY.

That is to say, Syntactical connection being more authoritative than context, there would be nothing objectionable in the indications of the context being rejected in favour of Syntactical connection.

Some people read 'vādheta' instead of 'vādhyaeta.'

Adhikaraṇa II.—In the *Adhana* the singing is to be done gently.

गुणमुख्यव्यतिक्रमे तदर्थत्वात् मुख्येन वेदसंयोगः । ९ ।

गुणमुख्यव्यतिक्रमे Guṇamukhyavyatikrame, when there is conflict between the properties of the primary and its subsidiary. तदर्थत्वात् Tadarthatvāt, because it is for its purpose. मुख्येन Mukhyaena, by the primary. वेदसंयोगः Vedasanyogaḥ, the Vedic character.

9. "Whenever there is a conflict between the properties of the primary and its accessory, the Vedic characteristic of its accessory is to be determined by the primary because the accessory is always subservient to its primary."—9.

COMMENTARY.

We now proceed to consider a case where the primary laid down in one Veda (the *Ādhāna* in the *Yajurveda*) has an accessory laid down in another veda (*i. e.*—the singing of the *Samas*, *Vāravanṭīya*, *etc.*, laid down in the *Sāmaveda*.) In such cases the question arises as to whether the Accessory (singing) is to be done in a way in keeping with the Veda in which its primary happens to be laid down (*i. e.*, quietly on account of the *Ādhāna* being laid down in the *Yajurveda*), or it is to be done in a way in keeping with the Veda in which it is itself laid down (*i. e.*, loudly on account of *Sāma-singing* being laid down in the *Sāmaveda*.)

On this we have the following *Pārvapakṣa* "Inasmuch as the qualifications based upon names pertain to each unit, the way in which a certain thing is to be done is that in keeping with the character of the *veda* in which it happens to be mentioned.

The *Siddhānta* embodied in the *Sūtra* is as follows:—

The two qualifications being wholly incompatible with each other and hence it being necessary to set aside one of them, it is always that pertaining to the Accessory by itself that is to be set aside; as it is only thus that the primary would be performed as it should be, without its being deprived of its own accompaniments; and certainly the proper fulfilment of the Primary is a business of the Accessory also; as this latter also operates solely for the sake of the former. Consequently, if in consideration, of its own qualification, it were to deprive the Primary of its natural accompaniment, then there would be a disruption of that action (the Primary) for the sake of which it was meant to operate. Though in such a case the proper fulfilment of the Primary with all its accompaniments would mean the deprivation of the Accessory of its own natural accompaniment—yet, as the fact of the accessory being equipped with all its accompaniments is not so very necessary (as that of the Primary) there would be nothing incongruous in the said deprivation.

Consequently, inasmuch as *Ādhāna* belongs to the *Yajurveda*, the *Sāmas* that are accessory to it should be sung quietly.

The Vārtika is not satisfied with the above representation of the Adhikaraṇa. It offers three additional expositions as follows :—

Adhikaraṇa (B)

Questions to be dealt with:—In a case where a thing having its origin in one *Veda*, has its application or use laid down in another *Veda*, should that thing be equipped with the properties peculiar to the former veda, or with those of the latter ?

Pūrvapakṣa :—Inasmuch as the origination of a thing always precedes its application, the properties employed should be those of the veda in which it has its origin."

Siddhānta :—The properties should be those of that *Veda* which lays down its application—(1) because the origination of a thing is only for the sake of the uses to which it may be applied ; (2) because it is only when the thing in question—the *Sāma* singing is applied to use that it stands in need of some *tone* to be applied to it ; and hence the *tones* enjoined (in the Injunction '*uchchaihachâ* etc.') are those that are perceived at the time of usage, and not at the time of the origination ; as there is no injunction of its being brought into action at that time.

Adhikaraṇa (C)

Question :—In a case where the *origination* and the *Application* of a certain thing are non-concomitant, i.e., the *origination* is in one *Veda* and the *application* in another,—with the properties of which *Veda* should the *Sāma* be equipped.

Pūrvapakṣa :—It must be equipped with the properties of the *originative* *Veda* ; or with those of one or the other, optionally."

Siddhānta :—It should be equipped with those of the *Applicatory* *Veda* ; as *application* is the more important factor.

Adhikaraṇa (D)

Question :—In a case where the *Primary* is in one *Veda*, and the *Accessory* in another, after the name of which *Veda* should the *Accessory* be called ?

The *Siddhānta* conclusion would be that it should be called after the veda in which the *Primary* happens to be mentioned.

In this case (D) however it would be necessary to reject the conclusion arrived at in the *Sūtra* III-vii-51 and to accept the performer to be the same, in the original sacrifice, as in its modifications,—the one that is mentioned in connection with the *Primary*. If then, on the strength

of the Injunction, that Performer should be accepted who is mentioned in the same Veda with the Accessory—then the *tone* to be employed would also be the same that belongs to the *Accessory*; and it would not be proper to employ the tone of the *Primary*.

For this reason, it is best to take the *Adhikarana* as based upon the consideration of the comparative authoritativeness of the *originative* and the applicatory injunction. As it is only thus that the citing of the example of *Adhâna* appears justifiable. Specially as if the *Adhikarana* be explained as pertaining to the incompatibility of the Primary and the secondary, or to the contradiction between the Primary and the subsidiary—then, it would be necessary to explain how this would be a mere repetition of what is said under *Sâtra* XII-ii-25.

Adhikarana III.—The *Jyotiṣṭoma* belongs to the *Yajurveda*.

भूयस्त्वेन उभयश्रुति । १० ।

भूयस्त्वेन Bhuyastvena, in accordance with that in which most of its details are laid down. उभयश्रुति Ubhayaśruti, that which is spoken of in two Vedas.


10. “The Action mentioned in two Vedas is to be taken as belonging to that in which most of its constituent details are found.”—10.

COMMENTARY.

We now proceed to consider the question after which Veda a certain Primary Action is to be called, when it is found to be mentioned in more than one Veda. (As for instance, we find the *Jyotiṣṭoma* mentioned in the *Yajurveda*, as well as in the *Sāmaveda*, and the question is whether we should call it a ‘Yajurvedic’ or a ‘Sāmavedic’ sacrifice.)

The Pûrvapakṣa is put forth in the following manner ‘Just as in the various texts of the same *Veda*, so in different Vedas also, we have the action laid down *originatively*; and hence the matter of the property attesting to it would be a matter of mere option; or it may be that, inasmuch as both Vedas would be found to lay down the form as well as the accessories of the action, sometimes one and sometimes the other Veda might be taken as *originative* of it.

The *Siddhânta* conclusion is that it is to be called after that Veda in which we find it laid down *originatively*, and not as a mere subsidiary.



Consequently we must expound the *Siddhânta* as follows: In the case of the *Jyotistoma*, we find the form of the sacrifice consisting of the Substance, the Deity and the Action; and it is in the *Yajurveda* that all these three are laid down; while what the other Veda (the *Sāmaveda*) does is to merely mention the Action by name with a view to laying down certain Hymns, etc. in connection with it; and hence inasmuch this latter stands in need of the mention of the Substance and the Deity, it cannot be taken as independently by itself, laying down the Action in question. This we have explained under the *Śākhāntarādhikaraṇa*

(II—iv—8 et seq.) And even though the complete form of the Sacrifice is given in the *Yajurveda*, yet it is quite possible to establish the relationship of this sacrifice to the Hymns, etc. mentioned in the other Veda; as even though these latter serve only transcendental (imperceptible) ends, yet they are taken as connected with the sacrifice, on the strength of the directions laid down in connection with them.

Thus then, the meaning of the *sūtra* comes to be this: That action which is mentioned in two Vedas, should have its name ascertained by the mention of a larger number—i.e. the whole—of its constituent details, which may be capable of supplying all its requirements. The *sūtra* speaks of only “two Vedas,” because the *R̥k* and the *Sāma* Vedas have the same character of Loudness, and as there being no difference consequent upon this, a mention of these would be useless. (Hence all the difference that is possible is as between the *Yajurveda* and the *Sāmaveda*, and the *Yajurveda* and the *R̥gveda*).

Adhikarāṇa IV.—The context is a means of pointing out the use of mantras.

असंयुक्तं प्रकरणात् इति कर्तव्यतार्थित्वात् । ११ ।

असंयुक्तं Asamyuktam, that which is not co-related. प्रकरणात् Prakaraṇāt, by the context. इति कर्तव्यतार्थित्वात् Itikartavyatārthitvāt, because it stands in need of the details of procedure.

11. “(Mantra) that which is not already co-related becomes co-related by the context, because it stands in need of the details of procedure.”—11.

COMMENTARY.

Of the six means of ascertaining the relation of mantras the Bhāṣya has already cited instances of Direct declaration, indicative power and syntactical connection. It now proceeds to show how the use of a Mantra can be ascertained by means of context.

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that nothing can be ascertained by means of the context as to the use of Mantras.

The siddhānta embodied in the *sūtra* is as follows:—

To the above, we make the following reply: So long as the continuity of the details of procedure relating to the Primary Action has not been broken, whatever action, without any particular result, happens to be mentioned in the text, is taken to be an accessory of that Primary,—and this only by means of Context (*prakaraṇa*).

For instance, the Injunction '*Darśapāṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta*' having given the idea that 'one should obtain Heaven by means of the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa* sacrifices,' there arises a question as to 'how' this is to be done; and while this 'how' is being expounded in the Veda, we find mentioned certain Actions (the *Prayōjas*) apparently useless (having no use stated in the context), in such sentences as '*Samidho yajati*, '*Tanūnapātām yajati*,' etc., etc. Now then, we are led to believe that some help must arrive for the *Darśa* or *Pāṇamāsa*, (in the shape of certain details of its procedure), and also that these latter *Prayōjās* must have some end or purpose to serve. And then, we find that for the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa*, there is no aid,—mentioned either in the same word, in the same sentence, in the same context or in any other context,—which we could perceive by any of the five means of cognition (Sense-perception and the rest), or by any words cognizable by these means of cognition. Similarly too with the *Prayājas* (we do not perceive their end or purpose). And yet it is necessary that both of these must exist (as otherwise the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa* could not be performed, and the mention of the *Prayājas* in the Veda would be wholly useless). And we could conclude that these do not exist at all, only if we failed to obtain them by all the resources at our command. As a matter of fact, however, we have, at our command, a means, in the shape of Context, of obtaining an idea of those much-needed factors. Nor is extreme proximity the only ground of relationship between two things; and as a matter of fact, the Vedic potency continues to move on to the more remote factor, when it does not find a fit object among the more proximate ones. And in the case in question, it is this fact that will be the ground for admitting the mutual help (accorded between the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa* and the *Prayōjas*). The fact that, on not obtaining a fit object among those in close proximity, a remote one is admitted, is established by the mutual requirements (of the Primary Sacrifice and the *Prayājas*).—the infallible conclusion being that the aid that the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa* stand in need of is supplied by the *Prayōjas*, and, the use or purpose to be served, which the *Prayōjas* are in want of, lies in the help that they accord to the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa*. And as a matter of fact, neither of these has got anything more proximate to itself, supplying the said needs. Though we could assume this help to be accorded by some other Action,—yet, inasmuch as this other Action will have had its relationships all supplied through other Primary sacrifices, it would not stand in need of being connected with the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa*. For the same reason, the *Prayōjas* cannot be taken as leading to Heaven (the common result assumed in connection with the *Viśvajit*, etc.). Nor

again could they be taken as bringing about, independently by themselves, the Result that is declared as following from the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa*; because this one-sided supplying of requirement (by the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa* to the *Prayâjas*, could be admitted, only if there were no relationship between them based upon mutual requirement; and not while such a relationship is possible. Consequently, it must be admitted that these two supply each other's needs, just in the same way as the person whose cart-horse has died is helped by one whose cart has been burnt, and *vice versa*.

Adhikarāṇa V.—The use of mantras ascertained by the order of sequence.

क्रमश्च देशसामान्यात् । १२ ।

क्रमश्च Kramascha, order of sequence also. देशसामान्यात् Deśasāmānyāt, on the ground of the sameness of portion.

12. The order of sequence also (serves to point out the application of) on the ground of the sameness of position.—12.

The *Pūrvapakṣa*, with regard to this *sūtra* and the next—dealing with the agency of *Order of sequence* and *Name*—is much in the same strain as that with regard to that of *Context*, in the foregoing *sūtra*.

SIDDHĀNTA.

The Order of sequence, consisting of the commonality of position, is of two kinds, as based upon the text and upon actual performance; and it is a means of pointing out the application of Accessories.

Even when the two are not performed at the same place, if it be found that the *mantra* appears in the same place in the *mantra-section* of the Veda, as the Injunction of the primary sacrifice does in the *Brāhmaṇa-Section*,—then, when we proceed to seek for the relatives of both, the one brings the other to the mind, by reason of their sameness of position,—in accordance with the Law of Sequence. That is to say, when we proceed to look for the *mantra* to be employed in connection with the Primary, that is the first to be enjoined (in the *Brāhmaṇa-section*), we begin from the very beginning of the *mantra* section; and as soon as the first *mantra* comes to our mind, if we do not find any reasons for passing it over, we accept that as the *mantra* sought after. In the same manner, when we proceed to look for an Action, to which the *mantra* occurring in the

beginning of the *mantra*-section would be an auxiliary, we begin from the very first Action enjoined in the *Brāhmaṇa*-section ; and not finding any reasons for passing over that Action, we accept that as the one in connection with which the *mantra* should be employed. And in the same manner, the second would be connected with the second and so forth.

In the case of such *mantras* as the *Agneyanu mantra*, their application is found to be pointed out by the indications of such words as 'Āgnēya' and the like. Consequently, the *Bhāṣya* has cited, in the present connection, the *mantra* 'Dabdhirnāmāsīt etc.,' whose connection is not pointed out by the indicative power of its words and which is found mentioned in the same order of sequence as the *Upāmśuyāja*.

Adhikaraṇa VI.—The use of mantras pointed out by name.

आख्या चैवं तदर्थत्वात् । १३ ।

आख्याचैव 'Ākhyāchaivam, the name also. तदर्थत्वात् Tadarthatwāt because it is for that purpose.

13. The Name also does so : because it is for that purpose.—13.

The Name, that is applied to *Actions* in its literal sense, is a sure pointer of their relationship : and that relationship is shown to be one that the Auxiliary bears to be Primary.

As the names 'Ādhvaryava' and the like are used in the Veda alone, we do not show here the objections that were brought forward, on a previous occasion, in regard to the names occurring in ordinary parlance.

As a matter of fact we find that the *Adhvaryu* (Priest) stands in need of a function for himself—something to be done by him ; and if no particular function present itself, then he would take up anything. Similarly the action, called 'Ādhvaryava,' stands in need of an auxiliary in the shape of a Person that might perform it. And at the very outset, the idea afforded by the two words ('Ādhvaryava' and 'Ādhvaryu' is that the action that is done by the *Ādhvaryu* is called 'Ādhvaryava,' and that he who is the performer of the *Ādhvaryava* action is one who is called 'Adhvaryu' ; the signification of the basic noun 'Adhvaryu' (in the word 'Ādhvaryava') indicating that of the derivative (*Adhvaryava*), or vice versa. Though the derivative is a distinct word,—and hence the two words ('Ādhvaryu' and 'Ādhvaryava') are independent of each other, and have independent eternal relation with their respective significations,

—yet inasmuch as it is only the eternal functioning of a word that depends upon an eternal relationship, we have given the above explanation with regard to all such names as are applied to things in their literal sense; and we have already shown before (under the *Avēstyadhikarāṇa*) that the functioning of the word 'Rājya' has had no beginning in time. As for the causal relationship between the word and its meaning, there is nothing incongruous in it, even if they be eternal.

Adhikarāṇa VII.—Among direct declaration and the other means of ascertaining the use of mantras that which precedes is more authoritative than that which follows.

श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां समवाये पार-
दौर्बल्यम् अर्थविप्रकर्षात् । १४ ।

श्रुति.....स्थानं Śruti.....khyānām etc., of direct declaration etc.
समवाये Samavāye, on coalition. पारदौर्बल्यम् Pāradaurvalym, that which follows is weaker.
अर्थविप्रकर्षात् Arthaviprakarṣāt, because it is more remote from the purpose in view.

14. When there is a coalition of Direct Declaration, Indicative Power, Syntactical Connection, Context, Position, and Name that which follows is always weaker than the one preceding it; because it is more remote from the purpose in view.—14.

We now proceed to consider the comparative strength and weakness of the six agencies of Direct Assertion and the rest, in the matter of the employment of *mantrās*, etc. And as no comparison could be made when each of them treated of different subjects, we take them up as referring to one and the same subject; and that is why the *sūtra* speaks of their 'samavāya,' 'coalition,' by which is meant the fact of their bearing upon a single subject.

There are many cases in which one way of using the mantra is pointed out by direct declaration while an entirely different one is indicated by one or the other of the other fives. And the question arises as to how the mantra should be used under the circumstances. That is to say, which of the six should be regarded as more authoritative than the other.

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that all the six must be accepted as equally authoritative.

PŪVA-MĪMĀMSĀSŪTRAS. III ADHYĀYA.

The Siddhānta embodied in the sūtra is that among the six that which follows is weaker in its authority than that which precedes it and the reason for this lies in the principle that the ultimate authority in all matters relating to Dharma lies with the direct declarations of the Veda; and the other five derive their authority more or less directly from that direct declaration. For instance, indicative power cannot point out the use of a mantra until there is a prior assumption of a direct Vedic declaration authorising that use, so that there is a certain degree of remoteness from its purpose in the case of the indicative power which is not present in the case of direct assertion.

The following are a few examples of the conflict the fact of all the primary sacrifices of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* etc. belonging to the *Adhvaryu* alone; these sacrifices being *syntactically connected* with the 'Desire for Heaven,' they come to belong to all persons desiring any result.

Objection: "This that you have explained would be an instance of the superiority of Direct Assertion (and not of Syntactical Connection)."

Reply: The indication in question is not due to any particular word (of the *mantra*), as the Injunctive affix does not denote the agent: it is got at by means of a co-ordination based upon the indications due to the *proximity of two words* (which constitutes Syntactical Connection); and hence it is a case of the supersession of Name by Syntactical Connection.

As an instance of Conflict between Context and Name, we have the case of the *Prayōjas*, that are mentioned in the *Brāhmaṇa* named the '*Paurodāśika*,' which (though, by the name, belonging to the *Purodāśa* sacrifice) are applied to the *Sānnāyya Upâṃśu-sacrifice*, as shown by the Context.

We have explained the examples of conflict involved in the application of a single Accessory to several Primaries. And it now becomes necessary to explain the instances of those involved in the application of several Accessories to a single Primary.

(1) As an instance of conflict between Direct Assertion and Indicative Power, we have the case of the *Aindrī* Verse: the sentence '*aindryā gârhapatyamupatiṣṭhâte*' being found (by reason of the *Ātmanepada*-ending in '*Upatiṣṭhâte*') to be injunctive of a certain action the instrumentality whereof belongs to a *mantra* (Vide *Pāṇini Sūtra* I—iii—25),—and the Indicative Power (of the word '*gârhapatyam*') pointing to the applicability of any *mantra* pertaining to Agni, the

Direct Declaration (by the Instrumental in 'aindryā') lays down the application of the *Aindrī* Verse; and when the place has been once filled by that verse, there is no room for any other verse.

(2) As an instance of conflict between Direct Assertion and Syntactical Connection, we have the case of the *Yājñâyajñya Pragātha*, in which Syntactical Connection points to the use of the word 'girā,' while what is actually used is the word 'irā,' as shown by the Direct Assertion ('*airankṛtvā udgāyēt*'). In the same manner, for the *Viśve-Dēvas*, the substance mentioned by Direct Assertion is the *Āmiksā*, while Syntactical Connection shows it to be the *Vājina*; and this latter, being possessed of an authority inferior to that of Direct Assertion, being rejected, the *Vājina* is not admitted as a substance for the *Viśve dēvas*.

(3) As an example of conflict between Direct Assertion and Context, we have the case of the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa* performed with a desire to obtain fame,—in regard to which the Context pointing to the use of fifteen Sāmidhāni-recitations, the Direct Assertion (contained in the sentence '*Pratiṣṭhāḥkāmasyaikavimśatīranbāyāt*') shows the number of the recitations to be twenty-one; and hence there is a rejection of the number 'fifteen' which pertains to that performance of the *Darśa-Pāṇamāsa*, which is done without desire for any particular result.

(4) Of the contradiction of Direct Assertion and Order, we have the case of the sacrifice performed with the desire for cattle, for which, Order points to the *chamasa* as the Vessel (for the fetching of water); while Direct Assertion (in the sentence '*godohēna paśukāmasya*') declares that vessel to be the *milking vessel*; and here the indications of the former are set aside.

(5) Similarly as an example of the contradiction of Direct Assertion and Name, we have the case of the *Vājapēya*, which, from its Name appears as to be performed by the *Adhvaryu*, while the Direct Assertion ('*Vajapeyena svārājyākāmaḥ etc.*') points to it as to be performed by one who desires the 'Kingdom of Heaven'; and hence there is a rejection of the *Adhvaryu* as the performer of that sacrifice. Another example of the same we have in '*yajamānasya yājyā*.' In connection with the *Pitryōjas*, the name '*Hautra*' points to the fact of the *yājyā* belonging to the *Hotṛ* priest; while the fact of its being performed by the *Yajamāna* is shown by the Direct Declaration of the genitive (in '*yajamānasya*') which denotes the relationship of the agent.

As an example of conflict between Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection, we have the *mantra* '*Syonante etc.*,' wherein by Syntactical Connection the whole *mantra*—from the very beginning—is shown to

pertain to the action of *seating* or *depositing* (the *Purodāśa*); while Indicative Power points only to the part '*tasmin sīda*' as the *mantra* pertaining to that action. In the same manner, while Syntactical Connection connects the portion '*tasmin sīda*' with the action of *Abhīghāraṇa* (Pouring of *ghee* over the grass-bedding), while Indicative Power points to '*Syonante.....kalpayāmi*' only as belonging to that action; and the former is accordingly set aside.

As an instance of conflict between Indicative Power by (1) Context, (2) Order, and (3) Name, we have, (1) the case of the *Nirvāpa*, etc., for which the *mantra* '*Devāsyā tva*, etc.' is pointed out by Indicative Power, which sets aside the applicability of any other *mantra* indicated by the Context; (2) the *Aindrāgna* is performed with a view to a certain desirable result, wherein the couple of *Yājñānuvākyās* proceeding from the *Sāmidheni*, indicated by the Order, is set aside by Indicative Power; and (3) in the *Somāraudrīya*, wherein the application of the *Manu-Verses* pointed out by *Name* as the *Yājñānuvākyās* is set aside by those *Yājñānuvākyās* that contain words indicative of *Soma* and *Rudra*.

As an example of conflict between Syntactical Connection and Context, we have the sentence '*Pūrvedyuramārvāsyâyām vedīṅkaroti*.' The Context shows that we should have recourse to that process of making the *Vedī* (altar) which is laid down as following after the *adhivāsana* of the sacrificial material; while the Syntactical Connection with '*amārvāsyô*' shows that it should be done on the 'previous day.' This is not a case of Direct Assertion; as the Locative Ending (in '*amārvāsyâyām*') does not denote the relationship of the Primary and the Accessory; though it denotes *location*, yet the character of *location* could not possibly belong to the *action*; consequently the connection shown must be admitted to have been pointed out by the proximity of the words to one another (which constitutes Syntactical Connection), and which operates more quickly than the Context.

Of conflict between Syntactical Connection and Order we have an example in those *Pratipatkālpas* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that are performed with a view to certain results, or on account of a certain occasion having presented itself; we have the Direct Assertion specifying only one foot of each *Mantra*, as the one to be employed; and then the second and subsequent feet that are to be used are shown, by Order or Position, to be those of the verses appearing in the same order in connection with those *Kālpas* whose performance is absolutely binding; for instance, in connection with the Declaration '*Vrkaha, parasma dhārayeti rājanyāya pratipadan kuryāt*,' the second and third feet to be employed are shown,

by Order, to be '*pavamānāyendāve abhidevam iyakṣate*' but we have Syntactical Connection indicating,—*maruttvate chamatsarah viśvā dadhānā ojaś*'—as the feet to be added (and it is this latter that is accepted as the correct form).

Of conflict between Syntactical Connection and name we have the following example: In the chapter called '*Hautra*' we have a mention of the *addressing of the Directions*, in the sentence—*Tasmān 'maitra-varuṇaḥ preṣyati chānuchāha'*; and when we look out for the person who is to do this *Addressing*, the aforesaid Name points to the *Hotr* priest as the person; while the Syntactical Connection of the sentence quoted points to *Maitrāvaruṇa*. Then as a matter of fact when the required agent has been pointed out by some one means, there is no need of the mention of any other; consequently *Maitrāvaruṇa* having been pointed out by the more-quickly-operating Syntactical Connection, the indication of the Name is set aside, long before it has had time to reach the assumption of a corroborative Context.

As an example of conflict between Context and Order, we have the use of the word '*gīrā*' and '*irā*' in regard to the Hymn. In the *Agniṣṭoma Sāma*, the word to be used is indicated by Order to be '*gīra*'; while Context points it out to be '*irā*'; and certainly this latter is stronger in its authority. On the former occasion we had cited the case of the words with regard to the *Sāma* (while the present is with reference to the *Stotra*), consequently the two cannot be said to be mixed up.

As an example of conflict between Context and Name, we have the case of the sentence '*tasmān maitrāvaruṇaḥ preṣyati chānuchāheti*' as with reference to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. The addressing spoken of in this devolves upon the *Hotr* priest, as indicated by the Name ('*Hautra*,' of the section in which the sentence occurs); while the Context distinctly points to *Maitrāvaruṇa* as one who does it. This same example had been cited above; but that was with reference to the form of the *Addressing of the Directions* itself.

Lastly, as an example of conflict between Order and Name, we have the case of the couple of *Aindrāgna mantras* occurring in the chapter of *Kāmyayjyāis*; the Name of these *mantrās* points to the fact of their being used as alternatives in both the offerings (to Indra and Agni); while the stronger authority of Order indicates the use of the first couple with the first, and of the second with the second. As for the Indicative Power of the *Mantras* themselves, it lends its support to both alternatives; consequently, the case is one of conflict between Name and Order.

Adhikaraṇa VIII.—The twelve Upasads pertain to the Ahîna sacrifice.

अहीनो वा प्रकरणाद् गौणः । १५ ।

अहीनो Ahīnaḥ, the word Ahīnaḥ. वा Vā, really. प्रकरणाद् Prakaraṇāt, on account of the context. गौणः Gaūṇaḥ, indicative of the presence of a qualification.

15. On account of the context the word Ahîna should be taken as indicative of the presence of qualification.”—15.

COMMENTARY.

In the context of *Jyotiṣṭoma* we find the sentence—‘There are to be three *upasads* for the *Sâhna* and twelve for the *Ahîna*.’ And in this the words ‘*sâhna*,’ meaning ‘that which is finished in a day,’ refers to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, with regard to which we have the declaration—‘They finish it within a day’; consequently it follows that the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has three *upasads*. Then as regards the clause ‘twelve for the *Ahîna*,’ there arises the question as to whether ‘twelve *upasads*’ also belong to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, or only to the *Ahîna* sacrifices, the *Dvâdaśa* (Twelve-Day sacrifice) and the rest?

If the name ‘*Ahîna*’ could, in some way or other, be found to be applicable to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, then in view of the compatibility of the Context, the ‘twelve *upasads*’ would certainly be taken as finding a place in that sacrifice. If on the other hand, the name ‘*ahîna*’ belonged to those sacrifices that extend over a number of days, then, inasmuch as the ‘twelve *upasads*’ would be connected with the Direct Declaration (‘twelve *upasads* for the *Ahîna*’), they could not be taken up by the Context, which takes up only that which is not related to Direct Declaration (Vide *Sâtra* III—iii—11), [and consequently the ‘twelve *upasads*’ would belong to those sacrifices that last for many days, and not to the one-day *Jyotiṣṭoma*]; and thus the sentence in question presents a case of the conflict between Direct Declaration and Context.

And on the above question, we have the following :—

“For these reasons we conclude that the name ‘*Ahîna*’ signifies ‘that which does not abandon (*na jahâti*) any sacrifice, in supplying the details ‘of the performance’ and ‘that which is not abandoned (*na hiyate*) by any sacrifice (for all of which it serves as the original fountain-head’;—and inasmuch as it is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* alone that is possessed of these qualifications (and fulfils these conditions), and as the Context to belong to the *yotiṣṭoma*, it must be this to which the twelve *upasads* belong.

The word 'gaunah' in the *sūtra* must be taken as signifying 'that' pointed out by the qualification,' and not in the ordinary sense of the indirect, secondary signification."

असंयोगात् मुख्यस्य तस्मादपकृष्येत । १६ ।

असंयोगात् Asamyogāt, on account of being not connected. तु Tu, but. मुख्यस्य Mukhyasya, direct meaning. तस्मात् Tasmāt, from that. अपकृष्येत Apakṛiṣyeta, should be disjoined.

16. "On account of the absence of any connection of that which directly denoted (by the word *Ahina*) "the twelve upasads" should be disjoined from that (context of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*)."—16.

COMMENTARY.

The *Siddhānta* embodied in the *sūtra* is that as a matter of fact there is no connection between the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (which is finished in one day) and the *Ahina* which directly denoted a sacrifice extending over many days. So that the twelve upasads laid down for the *Ahina* can have no connection with the context of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.

Though the real sense remains the same the interpretation of the *sūtra* by the *Vārtika* is somewhat different from the above. It is as follows :—

By the word '*mukhya*' ('Principal') in the *sūtra* is meant the *Jyotiṣṭoma* because it is the first to be performed ; and as a matter of fact, this has no connection whatsoever, with the word '*Ahina*.' And inasmuch as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has no connection with this name, the number ('*Twelve*') that is found mentioned in connection with that name could not be taken as belonging to that sacrifice, merely because of the Context ; consequently it must be taken (and used) apart from that. Specially as we find that the number '*Twelve*' is connected with the *Ahina*, by means of the Direct Declaration of the genitive (in '*ahīnasya*'); and as for the word '*Ahina*' what it literally signified is a number of days, while the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is a distinct *Sāhna*—, being finished in a single day.

Nor can the word be rightly made literally applicable to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, by being explained as a negative compound. Because any such literal application is set aside by the meaning known to be conveyed by the word as a whole. Then again, as a matter of fact, we do not find the word bearing the marks of a negative compound ; because a negative compound having the accent of the indeclinable, it is the first word or the basic word that should have had the *udātta* (Acute) accent in its

beginning ; while, in reality, we find that it has the acute accent at the middle. For this reason it must be admitted that the word is made up of the word 'ahan' (=Day) with that affix 'kha.' In that case, in accordance with the *Vārtika*—*āyannādiṣu upadeśiradrachanam svarasiddhyartham*,—we have the insertion of the particle 'ina'; and thereby the letter 'i' forming the beginning of the affix, it is only right that the acute-accent should be on that letter.

For these reasons the word 'ahina' must be taken as the name of those sacrifices that extend over a number of days.

The *Vārtika* is not satisfied with the above exposition of the *Adhikaraṇa* on the following grounds:—

Firstly, because it is scarcely right for the details of one sacrifice (the *Ahina*) to be laid in the Context of another (the *Jyotiṣṭoma*); *secondly*, in case such details were laid down, the continuity of the Context would be broken by that interpolation of foreign matter; and then it would involve a deal of trouble to take up the chain of the Context over again; and *thirdly*, we find that the 'twelve *upasads*' for the *Twelve Day* sacrifice have already been enjoined in the Context of this latter sacrifice,—and as all the sacrifices extending over a number of days have their origin in this *Twelve-Day* sacrifice, the said injunction in the Context of this latter would be enough to connect the 'twelve *upasads*' with all such sacrifices. Consequently, the sentence in question must be taken wholly as containing the injunction of the 'three *upasads* alone; specially as there are no objections against this. Then, as for the connection of 'Twelve,' that has been enjoined already in another sentence; and hence its mention in the sentence in question must be taken as meant to be in praise of the propriety of the number of *upasads* at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—just as in the case of the *nivṛta* ('the sense of the sentence being that the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has only three *upasads*, and as for *twelve upasads* these belong to such petty sacrifices at the *Ahina* and the rest, and not to the excellent *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice.')

The *Vārtika* puts the *Adhikaraṇa* in the following form:—

If the character of 'Ahina' had belonged to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, then, the sentence in question would have been an Injunction; but inasmuch as that character belongs to the sacrifices extending over a number of days, for which, again, the 'twelve *upasads*' have been already laid down elsewhere,—the sentence in question cannot but be taken as meant to eulogise (the *Jyotiṣṭoma* as shown above).

Thus, then, the question of the *Adhikaraṇa* comes to be this: Is the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. the *Ahina*, for which the sentence, occurring in its

Context, lays down an accessory detail? Or the 'word *Ahîna*' applies to the sacrifices extending over a number of days,—and inasmuch as the 'twelve *upasads*' for it have been laid down elsewhere, their mention in the sentence in question is meant to serve some other purpose (that of eulogising f.i.)?

Objection :—"If such be the case, then the *Adhikarāṇa* would not be a discussion of the conflict and non-conflict of Context (with Direct Declaration); because it would come to this that, though connected with the *Ahîna* sacrifices the 'twelve *upasads*' would be mentioned with a view to eulogise the *Jyotiṣṭoma*."

Reply :—That does not quite affect the case. Because as a matter of fact, the *Pûrcapākṣa* (B) would favour the Context; inasmuch as the Context would take up the number 'twelve' as enjoined (in connection with the subject: of the Context, the *Jyotiṣṭoma*); while the *Siddhānta* (B) does not favour the Context; as in accordance with this view the 'twelve' belongs to the sacrifices extending over many days, which has nothing to do with the Context; which latter therefore, in this case, becomes contradicted. And that this is still of use, in another way in the Context has got nothing to do with the main point at issue.

If, however, in accordance with the law arrived at in the next *Adhikarāṇa*, we could admit of the *Removal* (or *taking apart*, of the 'twelve *upasads*'), and if while we had the Injunction in one Recensional text, we could justify, on the ground of its having no other use, the injunctive character of that contained in another Text—then, in that case, we could take the *Adhikarāṇa* as presented in the *Bhāṣya*.

In any case, it becomes fully established that the sentence '*dvādaśāhīnasya*' is to be taken apart from the Context, as it evidently pertains to those sacrifices that extend over many days.

Adhikarāṇa IX.—The Pratipats are to be taken apart from the context along with the Kulaya, etc.

द्वित्वबहुत्वयुक्तं वा चोदनात्तस्य । १७ ।

द्वित्वबहुत्वयुक्तं *Dwītvavahutvayuktam*, that which is associated with singleness and duality. वा *Vā*, really. चोदनात् *Chodanāt*, on account of being directly enjoined. तस्य *Tasya*, of that.

17. That which is associated with singleness and duality (should be taken apart from the context because it is directly enjoined (elsewhere).—17.

COMMENTARY.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we find the sentence ‘*yurām hi-sthah svakṣpati iti dvayoryajamānayoḥ pratipadam kuryāt, ete asṛgraminda-vaḥ iti bahubhyo yajamānebhyaḥ.*’ And in reference to this there arises a doubt as to whether the two *Pratipats* herein laid down find place in the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, or they are to be taken apart from it and used in connection respectively with the *Kulāya* performed by two *yajamānas*, and with the *Dvirātra* performed by more than two *yajamānas*?

The *sūtra* begins the discussion with the putting forward of the *Siddhānta*, in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

SIDDHĀNTA.

The passage in question does not lay down the *Duality* and *Plurality* of the *yajamāna*; because it is fully taken up with the enjoining of the *Pratipats*; and refers to the *Duality*, etc., only as conditions for the use of the one or the other *Pratipat*; specially as the *Injunction* of many things would involve a syntactical split. Then again, inasmuch as they are not enjoined, the *Duality* and *Plurality* of the *yajamāna* cannot pertain to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; while they are found to exist in the *Kulāya* and other sacrifices,—those extending over one as well as those extending over many days,—wherein they are distinctly enjoined by such sentences as—“*Rājā cha purohitaśchā yājayātām*,” “*etenaiva dvau yājayēt*,” “*etē-naiva trīṇ yājayet*,” “*ēko dvau bahavo vā hinairyajeran.*” For these reasons the *Pratipats* should be taken apart from the Context.

पक्षेणार्थकृतस्येतिचेत् । १८ ।

पक्षेण Pakṣeṇa, as alternatives. अर्थकृतस्य Arthakṛitasya, for special reasons. इतिचेत् Itichet, of this be urged.

18. They might find place in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* as an alternative for special reasons—if this be urged.—18.

COMMENTARY.

The context belongs to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and so long as we can in some way or the other connect the *Pratipat* mantras with that sacrifice, there can be no justification for the dissociating them from the context in which they are found. As for the mention of two *yajamānas* that may be taken as an alternative method. To meet those special cases in which the single *yajamāna* by himself may be incapable of finishing the sacrifice.

न प्रकृतेरेकसंयोगात् । १६ ।

न Na, not so. प्रकृतेः : Prakṛiteḥ, of the original sacrifice. एकसंयोगात् Ekasamyogat, being connected with one only.

19. Reply : Not so ; because the original (Sacrifice of the Context) is connected with one only.—19.

The word 'Prakṛti' here is meant to signify the Sacrifice that forms the subject of the Context ; and it might have been meant to indicate that, being the object of direct Injunction, the singleness of the *yajamāna* in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* cannot be superseded ; though that which is indirectly implied could be rejected, for special purposes. As a matter of fact, we know that the singleness of the *yajamāna* is directly enjoined specially as we find that whether the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is laid down as to be performed with a view to a certain desirable result, or as a necessary duty, the *yajamāna* is distinctly mention as *one* only, as is shown by the use of the word '*yajeta*.' Nor do we find any reason for not attaching a significance to the singular number of that verb ; in fact, we shall show later on, in Adhyāya VI, that due significance is really meant to be attached to it.

The leaving off of certain accessories of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, on account of the incapacity of the sacrificer to carry them all out entirely,—that has been brought forward by the *Pārvaṇakṣi*,—is also based upon the declaration 'the Sacrifice should be performed in such a way as *one* person may be able to perform it' ; and in other cases also we find the word 'one,' which shows that the leaving off allowable is meant to refer to other accessories (and not to the number of *yajamānas*) ; as for instance, leaving off the exact amount of the 'gift,' the sacrifice can be fully accomplished by one person. Then again, inasmuch the number 'one' is found both in the originative injunction (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), as well as in that of its actual performance, we cannot but attach due significance to that number. Thus then, we conclude that inasmuch as the original sacrifice of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has only one *yajamāna*, it does not fulfil the conditions of the use of the particular *Pratipats* in question ; and hence these latter must be taken apart from it.

Nor can the Duality of the *yajamāna* be taken as referring to the presence of the wife of the *yajamāna*,—then, as her presence with her husband is a necessary condition for all sacrifices, such Duality could not have been laid down as the condition for the use of a certain particular *Pratipat* only ; and further, in the case of the word '*bahubhyah*,' inasmuch as it is distinctly found to denote the plurality of *men*, by

making it include the sacrificer's wives, we would be assuming, without sufficient grounds, an *ekaśeṣa* compound made up of heterogenous elements (one male and two females).

In the case of the sentence '*kṣaume rasānau*, etc.' (met with in connection with the *Āgnyādhāna*) we have had to accept the wife as the second person as there was no other way of taking it; specially as the *Ādhāna* is nowhere laid down as to be performed by two men, in the way that we find the *Dvīyārjya* (*Kulāya*) laid down.

Then again inasmuch as the sacrifice would always be performed by the *yajamāna* accompanied by one or more wives, there would, according to you, always be 'two' or 'three' '*yajamānas*'; and thus all sacrifices fulfilling the conditions laid down for the use of the *Pratipats* in question these would come to be used on all occasions; and the *Pratipat* that is laid down as the unconditional invariable concomitant of the *Jyotiṣ-toma* would never be used, and would become wholly useless; or, at best, it would be taken as an optional alternative to those *Pratipats* that are laid down apart from the originative Injunction.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the *Pratipats* in question are to be taken apart from the Context.

Adhikaraṇa. X.—The Jāghni is not to be separated from its context.

जाघ्नीचैकदेशत्वात् । २० ।

जाघ्नी च *Jāghni cha*, *Jāghni* also, एकदेशत्वात् *Ekadeśatvāt*, because it is a part.

20. The *Jāghni* also (would be taken apart), "because it is a part."—20.

We now proceed to consider the exception to the principle of factors being taken apart from their context.

In connection with the *Darśa Pāṇamāsa*, we find the sentence '*Jāghanyā patnīḥ saṃyājayanti*'; and as this admits of two distinct constructions, bearing upon the comparative predominance and subservient character of the two factors (in the sentence),—there arises a doubt as to its actual meaning. That is to say, (1) if the sentence be taken as laying down the *Patnīṣamyājas* as purificatory rites for the purification of the *Jāghani* (the animal's tail), then, inasmuch as the object of purification would be the predominant factor, it could not be removed from its place; and consequently, the *Patnīṣamyājas* would be taken to where the Tail

might be, and not *vice versâ*. And inasmuch as the ordinary animal's Tail would be of no use in a sacrifice, it is not this that forms the object of purification (by means of the *Patñisamyâjas* ; consequently the Tail of the animal that has served its purpose in connection with the *Agnî-ṣomîya* would come to be taken as that to be purified (by the *Patñisamyâjas* [and thus, in this case, there would be a removal of the Tail from all connection with the *Darśa Pârnāmâsa*]. (2) If, on the other hand, the sentence be taken as laying down the Tail (with reference to the *Patñisamyâjas*, then, in that case, inasmuch as the idea of the sentence being a reference to the subject of the Context does not entirely disappear, the injunction of the Tail comes to belong to the *Darśa-Pârnāmâsa* [and thus there is, in this case, no removal of the Tail from the Context.]

On this question, then, we have the following :

PURVAPAKSA.

“(1) Because the Tail helps the *Darśa-Pârnāmâsa* indirectly ;—(2) because that which helps directly in the body of the sacrifice is the more important ;—(3) because the other (*i.e.* the *Patñisamyâja*) being enjoined by means of the verbal root (in ‘*samyâjayêt*’) is more approximate to the Injunction ;—(4) because, inasmuch as any single part of an animal (the Tail) could not justify the employment of the whole animal, it would be necessary to take it out of the animal that has been used elsewhere and hence in that case the *Samyâja* would come to have the character of a *Pratipatisamskâra* (the setting aside of that which has been used) ;—therefore the sentence in question must be taken as laying down the purification of the Tail of the animal used in connection with the *Agnîṣomîya* ; and hence it must be taken apart from the Context (of the *Darśa Pârnāmâsa*).”

चोदना वा अपूर्वत्वात् । २१ ।

चोदना Chodana vâ, it must be taken as the injunction. वा अपूर्वत्वात् Apûrvatvât, because it is something new.

21. It must be taken as the injunction (of the tail) because it is something not already enjoined elsewhere.—21.

COMMENTARY

The Siddhanta embodied in the sūtra, is as follows.

As a matter of fact, the Injunction in question is not taken apart from the Context ; because if the Tail were referred to as something to be purified (by means of the *Patñisamyâjas*), then that would have been

the cause of the Injunction being taken apart ; as a matter of fact, however, we find that the *Tail* is enjoined as an accessory of the Sacrifice, exactly like the other accessories, in the shape of Butter and the like ; so that there is no justification for its being separated from the context.

एकदेश इति चेत् । २२ ।

22. (Objection) “But the Tail is a part.”—22.

“It has been argued in the *Pūrvapakṣa* that, inasmuch as the *Tail* is a part of the animal,—and as the originaive injunction speaks of it as related to something already existing,—it could not be utilized, etc., etc.” And to this argument the *Sūtra* offers the following reply :—

न प्रकृतेरशास्त्रत्वात् । २३ ।

न Na, not so. प्रकृतेः Prakṛteḥ, of the original. अशास्त्रत्वात् Asāstratvāt, being obtained by non-scriptural means.

23. Not so ; because the original (*Darśa-Pūrnāmāsa Jāghanī*, Tail) is obtained by non-scriptural means.—23.

COMMENTARY.

Under the circumstances, that alone would have been useless which, without taking up the original, could not be recognised ; *e. g.* in the case of the sentence ‘*uttarārdhāt sviṣṭakṛte*’ ‘*vādyati*’ in this what is to be offered is not recognizable without a reference to the original (Cake). The word ‘*Jāghanī*’ however is, like the word ‘*Hṛdaya*’ and the like denotative of a certain limb of the animal ; and as such, it could be very easily obtained, without getting hold of the whole animal for the purpose, or even out of the animal that has been used for another purpose ; specially as in the *sūtra* ‘*Rūpam vā śeṣabhutvat*’ it is shown that an accessory could be used by whatever method it may be produced or obtained. Nor is it impossible for the ‘*Jāghanī*’ to be known apart from the rest of the body ; for we actually find meat-vendors selling the bodies of animals, limb by limb ; and certainly the ‘*Jāghanī*’ (Tail) could be obtained by purchase, from these vendors. Nor again is it necessary that it should be obtained from the goat ; as all that is laid down in the text is only the particular limb, ‘Tail’. In fact, in the *Agnishomīya* also, it is quite possible for the ‘Heart’ etc. to be obtained by purchase or other ordinary means ; though it is so, yet in the case of these, as we find their particular ‘class’ and method of obtaining distinctly specified as ‘by killing’ and all the rest,—we do not have recourse to purchase, or other ordinary means, for obtaining these. But in the case of the *Tail* we have no such means specified in the scriptures.



The word *Prakṛiti* is meant to give an idea of the *Darśa-Pūrnāmāsa*.

Thus then it becomes established that the *Jāghaṇī* (Tail) is an accessory in the 'Patnīsamayōjas' performed along with *Darśa-Pūrnāmāsa*; and as such is to be used as an optional alternative for *Butter*.

Adhikaraṇa XI.—The joining of the slabs should find a place among the sansthās.

सन्तर्दनं प्रकृतौ क्रयणवत् अनर्थलोपात्स्यात् । २४ ।

सन्तर्दनं Santardanam, the joining together. प्रकृतौ Prakritau, in the original sacrifice. क्रयणवत् Krayaṇavat, like the purchase. अनर्थलोपात् Anarthalopāt, on account of the non-disappearance of its usefulness. स्यात् Syāt, should find a place.

24. "The Joining Together should find a place in the original sacrifice, because, like Purchase, its usefulness does not disappear."—24.

We now proceed to consider the cases of conflict and non-conflict between Syntactical Connection and Context.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we find two slabs of stone laid down, to serve as the receptacle upon which the *Soma* should be pounded; and with reference to these stone-slabs, we have the declaration 'Dīrghasome-santrdyād-dhṛtyai,'—that is, 'having separated the two slabs one should join them together, for the obtaining of *Dhṛti*.' With reference to the word 'Dīrghasoma' in this sentence, there arises a doubt, as to (a) whether it applies to the original sacrifice (the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), as indicated by the Context, (b) or it applies to such sacrifices as extend over longer periods of time, and as such not being compatible with the Context, has to be taken apart. On the point in question we can have also the following alternative, (a) the word applies to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself. (b) or to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* as performed by a tall ('Dīrgha') *yajamāna*, (c) or to the *Uktha* and other *samasthās* or parts (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), (d) or to the *Satra* and *Ahīna* sacrifices (that extend over many days), (e) or to all sacrifices excepting the *Agniṣṭoma* (which is the first *samasthā* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

On this question we have the following:—

Preliminary Pūrvapakṣa.—“(1) Because the word 'Dīrghasoma' is applicable to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* as compared with such shorter sacrifices as the *Iṣṭi*, the *Paśu* sacrifice, the *Darvīhoma* and the like,—(2) because

the purpose served by the joining together,' the strength of the pounding slab is quite applicable to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, (3) because the Injunction of 'not-joining together,' could be taken as an optional alternative (to the 'joining together'), just like the alternative of *vrihi* and *yava*,—therefore, for the sake of the Context, the 'joining together' should not be taken apart from it.

The expression 'like Purchase' may be explained as an instance of the *non-disappearance of usefulness* brought forward without any reference to the Injunction of 'not-joining together.'

The objection being—'Inasmuch as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice takes very little time to finish, there would not be much use in the said *joining together* of the pounding slabs being done in connection with that sacrifice,'—we have the reply—that does not much affect the question, as the *joining together* will still have its use, 'like the Purchase.' That is to say, the actual price of the *Soma* not being very much, and its *purchase* having been accomplished by the payment of any *one* of the prescribed articles—cloth and the rest—in exchange, one still gives to the owner all these articles, in keeping with the scriptural text laying down all these articles as to be given in exchange for the *Soma*; and though the payment of these latter is not necessary, yet it is not altogether useless, serving the purpose of still further winning the good graces of the owner; because it is well-known that the scriptures declare the fact of prosperity resulting from the purchase of *Soma*, if effected to the entire satisfaction of its original owner. In the same manner, even though the *unjoined* slabs would be quite efficient for the pounding of the *Soma* for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, yet, inasmuch as we are cognizant of the fact that the pounding done on the strengthened *slabs* brings about prosperity, the 'joining together,' done in accordance with the sentence under consideration, would not be entirely useless (even in the *Jyotiṣṭoma*)."

"For these reasons, we conclude that the 'joining together' is not to be taken apart from the Context."

PRELIMINARY SIDDHĀNTA.

उत्कर्षो वा ग्रहणाद् विशेषस्य । २५ ।

उत्कर्षः Utkarṣaḥ, removal. वा Vā, certainly. ग्रहणाद् Grahanaḍ, on account of the mention. विशेषस्य Viśeṣasya of the speciality.

25. It should be taken apart; because of the mention of the speciality.—25.

COMMENTARY.

On account of the Syntactical Connection of the 'joining together' with the '*Dirghasoma*' the former must be taken apart from the Context.

Because, an object is known as 'long' (*Dirgha*) only when it is compared with another thing of the same kind which is *shorter* than itself. Consequently, one *Soma-sacrifice* could be known as 'Long,' only in comparison with another *Soma sacrifice*; and it could not be spoken of, in comparison with such sacrifices as the *Iṣṭi*, the *Paśu* the *Darvīhoma* and the like (which have no connection with *Soma*; because these latter do not belong to the same class (as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the other *Soma-sacrifices*), and because they are not spoken of in the Context; and it is only when the two relative members of the comparison are mentioned that they are differentiated into the 'Long' and the 'Short,'—and in the case in question we do not find the *Iṣṭi* etc., mentioned, in comparison with which the *Jyotiṣṭoma* could be spoken of as 'Long.'

कर्तृतो वा विशेषस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

कर्तृते Kartrito, pertaining to the performer. विशेषस्य Viśeṣasya, the speciality. तन्निमित्तत्वात् Tannimittatvāt, being based upon it.

26. "The speciality could be taken as pertaining to the performer as it is upon him that it is based."—26.

"So long as we could interpret the word '*Dirghasoma*' in keeping with the indications of the Context, it is not proper to entirely reject this Context. And as the matter of fact, we find that it can be taken as pertaining to the Performer. Nor would that make any difference in the accent, as regards the compound; because in any case we have the acute accent upon the last syllable; consequently we must expound the compound as the Genitive Tatpuruṣa '*Dirghasya' puruṣasya Somaḥ.*")

क्रतुतो वा अर्थवादानुपपत्तेः स्यात् ॥ २७ ॥

क्रतुतो Kratuto, pertaining to the sacrifice. अर्थवादानुपपत्तेः Arthavādānupapateḥ, on account of the inexplicability of the Arthavāda. स्यात् Syāt, should be.

27. It must pertain to the sacrifice; as, otherwise, the two words could not have their own significations [and the Arthavāda would not be explicable.]—27.

The epithet 'Long' must pertain to the *Sacrifice*; (and not to the *Sacrificer*; and the compound must be expounded as a *Karmadhārya Dirghaśchâsau somaḥ.*)

Answer:—The chief reason for this is that it is only when the compound is thus explained that we have the direct significations of the component words; otherwise (if the compound be taken as the *Genitive Tatpuruṣa*) one of the words qualifies something wholly different (namely the Sacrificer), and that would make the direct primary significations of the words incompatible.

Thus then, when we come to think of the extremely large quantities of *Soma* to be pounded, we come to desire much strength and durability in the pounding slab; and in that case the injunction contained in the sentence in question (as explained by us) would be found to serve a visible purpose (that of making the slab strong by 'joining together' the two slabs). Otherwise there would be no cause for desiring any extra durability in the slab, and consequently, the Injunction would not serve any useful purpose.

So also, the *Arthavāda* contained in the word '*Dhṛtyai*' points to the propriety of our interpretation of the compound.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the joining together should be taken apart from the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself.

संस्थाश्च कर्तृवत् धारणार्थाविशेषात् ॥ २८ ॥

संस्थाश्च Samsthāścha, in the case of the Samsthās. कर्तृवत् Kartrivat, like the performer. धारणार्थाविशेषात् Dhāraṇārthāviśeṣāt, the mention of Dhṛiti being equal.

28. "In the case of (the word '*Dirghasoma*' applying to) the Samsthās also, the mention of '*Dhṛtyai*' would be as inexplicable as in that of (the epithet '*Dirgha*' belonging to) the Performer."—28.

This *Sātra* must be taken as urged by the opponent in reply to the following argument of the *Siddhānta*: It is possible that the 'joining together' may not find a place in the first Samsthā—the *Agniṣṭoma*—of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; but it could pertain to the other samsthās—the *Ukthya* and the rest,—which are 'longer' than the *Agniṣṭoma*, and by connecting with which we keep our interpretation in keeping with the Context. Consequently, we must take the 'joining together' as finding a place in all the three samsthās; specially as the fact of the samsthās belonging to the same Context as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has yet to be refuted by the *Samsthādhikāraṇa* (III—vi—41 *et seq.*) Or, even if there be a distinct Context of the samsthās,—then too, it would be only in those accessory details that are of use in the *Agniṣṭoma*, wherein the 'joining together' could be precluded, on account of the contradiction involved in

the mixture of the necessary and the unnecessary qualifications. Consequently we must admit that the 'joining together' should have a place in the second and subsequent *Samsthās* (sections) of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.

As against these arguments we have the above *sātra*, which formulates the following.

FINAL PŪRVAPAKṢA.

"Inasmuch as the quantity of *soma* used in everyone of the *samsthās* is the same as in the *Agniṣṭoma* the work of the pounding too in everyone of these would be exactly similar and hence the eulogy '*dhr̥tyai*' (=for the sake of making it strong and durable) would be as useless in this interpretation, as in that in which the Performer (is held to be qualified by epithet '*Dirgha*').

That is to say, though the subsequent *samsthās* take a longer time in performance (than the first *samsthā*), yet in every one of these, the quantity of *soma* pounded is only 'ten-handfuls,' as per injunction *daśa muṣṭīrminīte*, which is applied, by implication, to every one of the *samsthās* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. Thus then the strength and durability required (in the pounding slab) being the same in all cases, the absence of perceptible use and *Arthavāda* (in '*dhr̥tyai*') remain as inexplicable as in the former case.

Thus then the inexplicability of "*Dhr̥tyai*" being common in the case of all *samsthās* the 'joining together' should be taken apart from the latter *samsthās* also (and hence from the whole Context of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

FINAL SIDDHANTA.

उक्थ्यादिषु वा अर्थस्य विद्यमानत्वात् ॥ २६ ॥

उक्थ्यादिषु Ukthyaâḍiṣu, to the Ukthya etc. वा Vā, really. अर्थस्य Arthasya, the meaning. विद्यमानत्वात् Vidyamānatvāt, being applicable.

29. It should belong to the Ukthya and the rest: because the significations of the words are quite applicable to them.—29.

For reasons shown above, the 'joining together' should find a place in the *samsthās* of the *Ukthya* and the rest. And as an increase in the number of offerings would mean a corresponding increase in the quantity of the substance to be offered, the *Arthavāda* (contained in the word '*dhr̥tyai*') would be quite explicable in this case. As for the assertion, that 'the quantity of *soma-juice* would be increased by the addition of water;'—it is not admissible; because inasmuch as the

sacrifice is laid down as to be performed with the *soma* no other substance could rightly be added to it, without the authority of a direct scriptural declaration to the effect. Consequently under such circumstances, it would be the quantity of the *soma* itself that should have to be increased. But then this increase cannot be either in the thickness of the bundles or in the number of joints (because of these two being restricted to 'ten-handfuls' and 'three joints' respectively); consequently, the only way in which the quantity of *soma juice* could be lawfully increased would be by getting hold of such pieces of the plant as have their joints at *longer* intervals than is ordinarily the case; and in this manner we would have increased the quantity, and yet kept within bounds of the restrictions as to the measure of *soma* and also preserved the compatibility of the Context and the word '*Dīrghasoma*' because the 'length' of the pieces of the creeper would justify us in calling the *soma* itself 'long.'

अविशेषात् स्तुतिर्व्यर्था इति चेत् ॥ ३० ॥

अविशेषात् *Aviśeṣāt*, equally. स्तुतिः *Stuṭih*, the eulogy. व्यर्था *Vyarthā*, meaningless. इति चेत् *Iticheṭ*, if thus be urged.

30. "The opponent urges that the eulogy would be equally useless in the case of the *Ukthya* also."—30.

COMMENTARY.

For the *Jyotiṣṭoma* ten-handfuls of the *soma*-sticks are laid down, and as the *Ukthya*, etc., are only parts of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* the quantity should be the same in these also. So that there is no sense in the praise of the slabs as being conducive to firmness.

स्यादनित्यत्वात् ॥ ३१ ॥

स्यात् *Syāt*, would be. अनित्यत्वात् *Anityatvāt*, not being universally applicable.

31. "There would be some sense in the praise, as the restriction is not universal."—31.

COMMENTARY.

The answer to the above objection is that the limit of ten handfuls is not meant to apply to all sacrifices so that in the case of any sacrifice if the number of offerings is a large one, the use of a larger quantity would be quite justified and it is with a view to such cases that we have the word *Dhṛitye*.

Ahikarṇa XII.—The prohibition of the Pravargya refers to the First Performance.

संख्यायुक्तं क्रतोः प्रकरणात् स्यात् ॥ ३२ ॥

संख्यायुक्तं Sankhyāyuktam, the sentence mentioning the number. क्रतोः kratoh, to the sacrifice. प्रकरणात् prakarṇāt, on account of the context. स्यात् syāt, should be.

32. "The sentence mentioning the number would apply to "the whole sacrifice; because of the Context."—32.

The *Pravargya* is mentioned without reference to any particular sacrifice, in the sentence 'yat pravargyam pravṛñjanti'; and it is only by the syntactical connection of such sentences as 'purastādūpasadām pravargyan-charanti' that it becomes connected with a sacrifice; and this *Pravargya* betakes itself to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, in accordance with the *Sātra* III--vi--2; specially as it is only in connection with this latter sacrifice that the *Upasads* are laid down; and by the time that these would go over to the *vikṛtis*, on the strength of Inference, the *Pravargya* would also go to them. It is for this reason that the *Bhāṣya* has said—*Jyotiṣṭome pravargyam prakṛtya śrūyate* (though in reality the *Pravargya* is not mentioned in the Context of *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

Or it may be that,—inasmuch as in the *Kauṣītaki-Brāhmaṇa*, it is in the *Jyotiṣṭoma-Context* that we find the *Pravargya* laid down, in a certain order of sequence,—the *Bhāṣya*-statement is based upon a reference to this fact.

In regard to this *Pravargya*, it is declared—'na prathame yajne pravṛñjyāt' ('one should not perform the *pravargya* in the first sacrifice').

And with reference to this last sentence there arises a doubt as to whether the expression 'First Sacrifice' refers to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* with all its *saṁsthās* and all its various developments, or to only the first performance of that sacrifice.

And on this, we have the following

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

"(1) Because the expression is co-extensive with 'sacrifice'; (2) because the word *prathama* ('first') is distinctly found to be synonymous with the '*Jyotiṣṭoma*', as found in the sentence '*esha vāra prathamōyajñānām yajjyotiṣṭomah*'; (3) because the sentence '*ya etena anīṣṭa*,' etc.' shows that the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the sacrifice to be performed before all other sacrifices, which shows that the word 'First' applies to

that sacrifice ; (4) and because of the indications by the Context (in which the sentence under consideration occurs),—[the expression ' First Sacrifice ' should be taken as referring to the whole of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*].

नैमित्तिकं वा कर्तृसंयोगात् लिङ्गस्य तन्निमित्तत्वात् ॥३३॥

नैमित्तिकं naimitthikam, relative. वा Vā, really. कर्तृसंयोगात् Kartrisanयोगात्, through the connection of the performer. लिङ्गस्य Lingasya, the indicative power. तन्निमित्तत्वात् Tannimittatvāt, being determined by that.

33. It (the ' First ') is conditionally relative, through the connection of the Performer ; because the Indicative Power (*of the word*) is actually determined by that.—33.

If the word '*Prathama*' (' First ') were a name of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself, then what has been said in the *Pārvapakṣa* would be quite admissible. As a matter of fact, however it is sound to be expressive of the *Performance*.

That is to say, what the word '*Prathama*' actually denotes is *that operation of the performer which precedes all his other operations*, and not any particular *Action* ; and it is only by its connection with the said operation that it comes to be applied to the *Action* also ; but this too would be possible when the *Action* would be undergoing such an operation as that pointed out. Specially as when one is found to be going on with the second and subsequent performances (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), he is not spoken of as '*performing the first*' ; nor is one, who is not actually *performing* a sacrifice, called '*the performer of the first sacrifice*.'

Thus then, the word '*First*' having been shown to be denotative of the *first operation*, if it be, applied by indirect indication, to that which has that (*firstness*) as its qualification (the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice f. i.) then that would involve a certain degree of remoteness (of the word) from its objective ; and this remoteness can be admissible only in such cases where no syntactical connection is found to be possible without it ;—*e. g.* in the sentence '*eṣa vāva prathamo yajñanām, &c.*' In the case in question, however, we do not find the character of '*First*' incapable of being taken as the ground of the Prohibition (of *Pravargya*) ; consequently, it would be only after having superseded this previous denotation of the word, that we could apply it to the *sacrifice* (*Jyotiṣṭoma*), even in course of its first performance ; and under the circumstances, the chances of its being applicable to the other performances (by the same sacrificer) would be very much remoter indeed !

Adhikarṇa XIII.—The grinding of Pūṣa's share is to be done at the Vikṛti sacrifices.

पौष्णं पेष्णं विकृतौ प्रतीयेत अचोदनात् प्रकृतौ ॥ ३४ ॥

पौष्णं Pausṇam, pertaining to Pūṣan. पेष्णं Peṣanam, grinding. विकृतौ Vikṛtau, in the ectype. प्रतीयेत Pratiyeta, should be understood. अचोदनात् Achodanât, on account of non-impression. प्रकृतौ Prakritau, in regard to the archetype.

34. The grinding of Pūṣa's share is recognised as pertaining to the ectypes : because it is not enjoined with regard to the archetypes.—34.

[In connection with the *Darṣa-Pārnāmāsa*, we find the sentence *Tasmât Pūṣâ prapīṣṭabhāgah, adatkohi sah* ('Thus then Pūṣan has his share ground, because he is without teeth'); and in regard to this there arises the question as to where this *grinding* is to be done in the *Vikṛti* sacrifice or in the *Prakṛti*.] And on this question we have a conflict between Syntactical Connection and Context; and hence, in accordance with the 'Law of the joining-together,' III—iii—24 *et seq.*, it is clear that the *Grinding* is to be done in the *Vikṛti*; and the subject is yet introduced again, simply with a view to serve as the introduction to the next *Adhikarṇa*.

Adhikarṇa XIV.—The Grinding of Puṣa's share applies only to the Rice.

PURVAPAKṢA.

तत्सर्वार्थमविशेषात् ॥ ३५ ॥

तत् Tât, that. सर्वार्थं Sarvârtham, must pertain to all. अविशेषात् Aviśeṣât on account a non-distinction.

35. "The grinding applies to all offering materials equally ; because of non-distinction."—35.

"Whatever may be the particular material to be offered to Pūṣan, be it Rice, or Cake, or the animal Body,—it is necessary to grind it ; as no distinction has been made in the sentence laying down the Grinding, as to the particular material to which it should apply."

SIDDHANTA.

चरौ वा अर्थोक्तं पुरोडाशे अर्थविप्रतिषेधात् पशौ न स्यात् ॥ ३६ ॥

चरी Charau, in regard to the grain. वा Vâ, really. अर्थोक्तं Arthoktam, it serves the useful purpose. पुरोडाशे Purodâše, in the cake. अर्थविप्रतिषेधात् Arth-vipratishedhât, incongruity to the use. पशौ Paśau in regard to the animal. न स्यात् Nasyât, could not apply.

36. But it should apply to the grain only ; because in the case of the Cake, it is necessarily implied by the useful purpose served by it ; and in the case of the animal body, it could not apply to it, because of incongruity.—36.

In the case of the animal body, there would be a deficiency in the character of the Primary offering. Because the Primary offering has been recognized as being in the shape of the Heart, etc. ; and this could be done only by cutting these limbs out of the body. But when the body would be ground down, the necessary shapes would be no longer there, and so the offerings could not be cut out off the masses of those shapes. Even though it might be possible to make those shapes out of the pounded mass of flesh, yet in this case the names 'Heart' and the rest would apply to these newly-shaped masses of flesh only secondarily,—just like the name 'gavaya' to the animal made of clay ; and that causes a deficiency in the offering. Then again, we have the declaration that 'the piece is to be cut out from that region in which it has been torn from the body'; and when the Heart, etc. have been ground down, it could not be known by which particular part it had been torn from the body of the animal.

Thus then we find that it is only in the case of the Grain (or Rice), that the grinding does not cause any deficiency in the offering material, and that it is not necessarily implied by the purposes served by it ; consequently we conclude that the grinding laid down should be taken as applying to the Grain.

चरावपीति चेत् ॥ ३७ ॥

37. (Objection).—"In the case of the Grain also."—37.

[In the case of the Grain also, we find that the word 'Charu' ('cooked grain') is applicable only when each grain is distinctly visible and cooked ; and if it were to be ground and then cooked, then we would have, not distinct grains, but a single mass of cooked flour, which would lead to as great an 'incongruity' as the grinding of the Animal Body.]

न पक्तिनामत्वात् ॥ ३८ ॥

38. (*Reply*).—Not so; because it is the name of a peculiarly-cooked preparation.—38.

There is no incongruity of purpose in the case of the *Grain*. Because the condition of all things is determined by ordinary experience; and it is a matter of ordinary experience that it is a certain cooked preparation that is called 'Charu' (cooked grain).

That is to say, though the word 'Charu' is used in the sense of the 'cooked rice' and 'Charu-bread,'—yet inasmuch as one and the same word could not rightly be accepted as having more than one signification, we take the word 'Charu' as signifying that element which is common to the 'cooked rice' and the 'bread'; and that element consists in the fact of the (1) water in which it has been cooked not being thrown away, (2) in that of its being hot inside, and (3) in that of its being thoroughly well cooked.

Adhikarāṇa XV.—The Grinding of Puṣa's Share finds place only in that Charu which is dedicated to Puṣan alone.

एकस्मिन्नेकसंयोगात् ॥ ३९ ॥

एकस्मिन् Ekasmin, pertaining to one deity. एकसंयोगात् Ekasanyogāt, on account of connection with one.

39. (There should be a grinding of the Charu) only when there is one (Deity); because (the mention of grinding is) connected with one (Deity) only.—39.

Now then, there arises the question as to whether the Grinding is to be done also when the offering of that Charu is meant for two Deities—Indra and Puṣan,—or only when it is meant for Puṣan alone. And as the question is subject to the principles arrived at under the 'Chaturdhā-karāṇa' and the 'Indrapīta' Adhikarāṇa (III—i—26 et. seq., and III—ii—27 et. seq.),—we (omit the Pūrvapakṣa and) start off with the—

SIDDHĀNTA.

Inasmuch as we find the sentence, under consideration, which lays down the grinding, speaking of Puṣan alone as having his 'share ground,' the Grinding would apply to that Charu alone which is dedicated to (and meant for) Puṣan only.

धर्मविप्रतिषेधात् ॥ ४० ॥

40. Also because of the incongruity involved in the particular action (when applied to any other *Charu*.)—40.

For the following reason also, the grinding should be done only to that *Charu* which is meant for Pûṣan alone :—In the case of the *Charu* meant for two deities (Pûṣan and Indra), would you grind the whole of it or only half? If the latter then the cooking of it would be deranged; and if the former, the two shares would get hopelessly mixed up.

That is to say, if only half of the *Charu* were ground and the other half left unground, the *ground* half would become cooked very much sooner than the other half; consequently, if the whole thing would be removed from the oven as soon as the ground half would be ready cooked, then the other half would remain uncooked; while if we were to wait for this latter to become ready cooked (before removing the vessel from the oven), then by that time the ground half would become melted off in a single mass (of flour.) A careful and neat method of cooking makes even a 'cooked rice' of the ground grain also; but this would be absolutely impossible in the way suggested (by the *Pûrvapakṣa*). It might be suggested that the portion consisting of whole Rice should be put upon the fire first, and when that should have become half-cooked, then the ground half would be put in (and then the two portions would be ready by the same time). But in that case the simultaneity of the cooking of the offering material (meant for the two deities conjointly) would disappear. Then, lastly, if for the sake of Pûṣan, Indra's share were also ground, then the two shares would get hopelessly mixed up; and if the portion of one Deity happened to be offered to another, that would mean a great anomaly in the sacrifice.

But upon the above we have the following arguments for the

PŪRVAPAKṢA.

अपि वा सद्वितीये स्यात् देवतानिमित्तत्वात् ॥ ४१ ॥

अपि वा *apivā*, but. सद्वितीये *Sadvitīye*, where there is a second also. स्यात् *Syāt*, should be. देवतानिमित्तत्वात् *Devatānimitatvât*, on account of being due to the character of the deity.

41. "Even in a case where Pûṣan is coupled with another Deity (we would have the Grinding); as the presence of that Deity (Pûṣan) is the only condition (laid down for it)."—41.

“We could have the *grinding* even in those cases where we had Pūṣan coupled with another Deity. Because if the *grinding* were laid down either for that offering which is meant for Pūṣan alone, or for that which forms part of the sacrifice to Pūṣan;—then, in that case, there could have been no *grinding* in regard to the *Charu* meant for two Deities, on account of its not being declared to be for that purpose. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the only condition laid down for the *Grinding* is the *presence of Pūṣan*, and not any substance qualified by that Deity. Then, inasmuch as the character of the Deity of a sacrifice is *pervasive* (that is, the Deific character pervades as one complete whole over both Deities in a Two-Deity sacrifice), though the sacrifice which has two Deities (Indra and Pūṣan) could not be spoken of as ‘one qualified by Pūṣan as its Deity,’ yet by this it is not meant that either Pūṣan, or his *Portion*, does not exist in connection with that sacrifice; as will be declared in connection with the *Manolā* (in *Adhyāya* X) that ‘though Agni is not its Deity, yet that does not mean that he does not inhere in it.’ Consequently, even if the deific character does not belong to Pūṣan (in the case of the Two-Deity sacrifices), as the only condition (for *grinding*) is the mere *presence of Pūṣan*, even when the *Charu* would be meant for two Deities (Indra and Pūṣan),—it is always cognized that half of it is the portion of Pūṣan alone, in accordance with the conclusion arrived at under *Sūtra* X—iii—53; and thus when we would come to do the *grinding* of this portion of the *Charu*, then in accordance with the ‘Law of *Kānsyabhojī* (which makes it incumbent upon the Teacher to eat out of the *Kānsya* vessel, for the sake of his Pupil who is under a penance which makes it necessary for him to eat out of such vessel, and for whom it is necessary to eat only of what has been left by his Teacher), as the condition of even that which may be the secondary factor might affect that of the other, the *Portion* of the other Deity also would come to be ground, for the sake of the grinding of Pūṣa’s portion); and there would be nothing objectionable in this. If, however, it be found undesirable to do something (the grinding of Indra’s portion) not directly laid down, and it be concluded to grind only the Half meant for Pūṣan,—even then, the proper cooking of both (the ground and the unground grain) could be done by some clever stroke of the culinary art. Or we could very legitimately do away with the necessity of the minor details of the fact of the cooking of both being simultaneous, or that of both being cooked in the same vessel; and thus we should do the *grinding* (of Pūṣa’s portion even in the case of the *Charu* being meant for both Indra and Pūṣan).

It has been argued above (under *Sūtra* 39) that 'the Laws of the *Chaturdhākarana* and that of *Indrapīta* would apply to the case in question (and the performance of the grinding would be limited by the words of the sentence laying it down).' And to this we make the following reply: As for the compound (in '*Indrapīta*') and the word formed by a nominal affix (i.e. '*Āgneya*'), these can never appear in connection with such words as are incapable of affording the sense required; consequently in the case of the use of such words, we do not admit the capability of the expressive of *one* Deity referring to that which belongs to *two* Deities. That is to say, in the case of the words '*Āgneya*' and '*Indrapīta*,' we find that they are fully capable of referring to Agni and Indra respectively, and as such cannot in any case refer to that which belongs to two Deities; but in the sentence under consideration we find that the word '*Puṣā*' does not occur in a compound, (and hence there is no exclusive capability belonging to it); hence even though the compound '*Prapīṣṭabhāgāḥ*' is dependent upon something else, yet a reference to the Charu meant for two Deities does not deprive the word '*Puṣā*' of any recognized capability; and hence there can be nothing objectionable in speaking of the offering meant for Indra and Pūṣan as 'one meant for Pūṣan.'

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च ॥ ४२ ॥

42. "Also because we perceive an Indicative Force."

—42.

"The reason (for grinding) that is given is— '*because Pūṣan is without teeth*'; and this clearly indicates that the *Grinding* depends upon, and is conditioned by, the Deity. And certainly Pūṣan does not become endowed with teeth, when joined by another Deity; hence the condition (for grinding) remaining intact in the latter case also, it is necessary to do the *Grinding*. Specially as it is thus alone that we could reconcile the following declarations: 'We should offer the Charu meant for Soma and Pūṣan, half of which has been ground';—'In the case of two-Deity offerings, half of the Charu should be ground and half unground.' And that this is the right course is also indicated by the fact of the presence of the Deity being laid down as the sole condition for having recourse to Grinding."

वचनात् सर्वपेषणं तंप्रति शास्त्रवत्वात् अर्थाभावात् हि
चरावपेषणं भवति ॥ ४३ ॥

वचनात् Vachanāt, through the direct injunction. सर्वपेषणं Sarvapeṣṇam, the



grinding of all. तम्प्रति Tamprati, with regard to that. शास्त्रवत् Shāstravattvāt, scripturally authorised. अर्थभावात् Arthābhāvāt, there being no use. हि Hi, because. चरौ Charau, in regard to the charu. अपेक्षं Apeṣaṇam, negation of grinding. भवति Bhavati, there is.

43. “If the sentence were an injunctive one, then we would have the Grinding of all (offering materials); and with reference to that (the unqualified Somâ-Pauṣṇa offering) the Grinding would be scripturally authorised; and it would be of the Charu that there would be no Grinding; as there would be no use for it.”—43.

“(In regard to the sentence ‘*somâpauṣṇaṁ charunnirvapet nemapiṣṭam*, etc.’) it might be argued that ‘inasmuch as it is an Injunctive sentence, the expression *nemapiṣṭam* could not have the desired indicative force; in fact it would point to the contrary view.’ And in view of this objection, we explain as follows: If this were an Injunctive sentence, then, inasmuch as it would not be right to have an injunction of many things by a single sentence, the ‘grinding of half’ would be the object enjoined; and then, this could be enjoined, with reference either to the ‘Charu,’ or to ‘*Somâpauṣṇa*’; and with reference to whichever of these two the injunction would be made, that could not be qualified by the other,—and hence the grinding would come to have an universal application; and as such all the offerings would have to be ground; and in that case one of the two words (‘Charu’ or ‘*Somâpauṣṇa*’) would become useless. That is to say, if we were to take the Injunction as ‘that which is the Charu should be half-ground,’ then the grinding coming to be recognised as applying to all Charus, the word *Somâpauṣṇa*, as referring to only one of the Charus, would become useless. If on the other hand, the Injunction be interpreted as that ‘that which is *Somâpauṣṇa* should be half-ground,’ then too, the Grinding would come to apply to all offering-materials; because all that the word ‘*Somâpauṣṇa*’ would indicate would be the character of being meant for the joint Deity *Somâ-Pāṣan*; and this would be equally applicable to the Cake and the Animal Body also (just as much as to the Charu); and thus the word ‘Charum’ would become absolutely useless.”

“Specially would such be the case, because with reference to that—i.e. with reference to the *Somâ-pauṣṇa* even when unqualified (by ‘Charu’)—the grinding would be scripturally authorised,—as no useful purpose would be served by the qualification.”

“In fact, in accordance with this view, there would be no *grinding* of the *Charu*.”

“Thus then, inasmuch as the *grinding* would apply to all materials, it could not be taken as applying exclusively to the *Charu*; and hence its mention (in the sentence ‘*somâpauṣaṇ charum, etc.*’) would be wholly useless. Consequently it must be admitted that this sentence enjoining the relationship of the *Charu* with the Deity (Soma-Pâṣan, the ‘half-grinding’ is merely spoken of by way of reference (and not as an object of Injunction). And thus this latter word, not forming part of an Injunction, comes to be taken as having the desired indicative force (assigned under *Sâtra* 42).”

SIDDHĀNTA.

एकस्मिन् वा अर्थधर्मत्वात् ऐन्द्राग्नवत् उभयोर्न स्यात्
अचोदितत्वात् ॥ ४४ ॥

एकस्मिन् Ekasmin, to one only. वा Vâ, really. अर्थधर्मत्वात् Arthadharmatvat, because it pertains to the resultant. ऐन्द्राग्नवत् Aindragnavat, as in the case of Indra. Agni. उभयोः Ubhayor to both. न स्यात् Nasyât, could not pertain. अचोदितत्वात् Achoditatwât, because it is not enjoined.

44. It pertains to one only; because it is meant to belong to the resultant (Apûrva); consequently, it could not belong to both, just as in the case of the Aindrâgna, because it is not so enjoined.—44.

We could have the *grinding* only when *Pâṣan* alone would be the Deity, and not when he would be joined by another Deity. Because the *grinding* does not belong either to the Deity, or to his portion; in fact it is laid down as a detail belonging to the sacrifice of which *Pâṣan* is the Deity.

That is to say, (before the offering has actually been made) there is no ‘Portion’ (*Bhâga*) of the Deity, to which the *Grinding* could belong. Specially as the material becomes the ‘portion’ of a Deity, not merely by being offered to him, but by being accepted by him. And further, the word ‘*Bhâga*’ (Portion) is made up of the root ‘*bhaḥ*’ with the affix ‘*ghan*,’ in the Accusative sense,—it being etymologically explained ‘*bhajyate*’ (= ‘*sevyate*’) *yaḥ saḥ* ‘*bhâgaḥ*’ (= *that which is accepted*); consequently that which is accepted by one is his ‘*Bhâga*’ (Portion). And as a matter of fact we do not find the Deity actually *accepting* the offering;

specially as the fact of the Deity actually *partaking of the offering* will be refuted later on, in *Adhāya IX*. In fact, even if the Deity were to accept it,—yet, it could not have the capability of introducing an accessory, as also will be shown in *Adhyāya IX* (under the *Sātra IX—i—4 et seq.*). Thus then, it being as impossible for the *Grinding* to be an accessory of the 'Portion' as that of the 'Deity,' it must be taken as an accessory belonging, through the sacrifice, to its resultant *Apūrva*;—as is shown by the first *Adhikarāṇa* of *Adhyāya IX*, as also by the '*Devatādhikarṇa* (Adh. IX).' The author of the *Bhāṣya* has also referred to the same fact of the *grinding* being an accessory of the sacrifice, by denying that of its belonging to the Deity.

हेतुमात्रमदनतत्त्वम् ॥ ४५ ॥

हेतुमात्रं Hetumātrām, mere supplementary reason. अदनतत्त्वम् Adantatvam, absence of teeth.

45. The absence of teeth is a mere supplementary reason.—45.

It has been argued by the opponent that "the mention of the reason 'because he is without teeth' shows that the grinding is an accessory of the Deity." And to this we offer the following reply :—The sentence 'because he is without teeth' is an *Arthavāda* having a form indicative of a supplementary or corroborative reason; and as such it is only meant to be an eulogy of the particular accessory in question (viz. *grinding*); and as there would be nothing objectionable in this, it could not show that the accessory belongs to the Deity."

वचनं परं ॥ ४६ ॥

46. The other is an injunctive sentence.—46.

Inasmuch as the '*half-grinding*' has never been found to have been enjoined elsewhere, the sentence ('*Somāpauṣṇam, etc.*') would be an Injunction (and not merely indicative of the fact of the *grinding* applying to the *Charu* meant for the two deities *Soma* and *Pāṣaṇ*). And as the object of the Injunction is a *qualified* one, there would be no syntactical split. And as in accordance with the law of the *Arunādhikarāṇa*, the factors spoken of in the sentence would restrict one another, the Injunction of the *grinding* could not pertain to *all* offering materials. As a matter of fact, it is only in comparison with an *unqualified Injunction* that the *qualified Injunction* could be said to be *less* authoritative; in the case in question however there is no *unqualified Injunction*; consequently



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the sentence in question cannot be taken as merely *indicative* (and not *injunctive*).

For these reasons the *Grinding* must be taken as pertaining to the Portion of a single Deity.

Thus ends the Third Pāda of Adhyāya III.

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